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It is a common assumption in much of the scholarship on Eastern Anatolia that 
groups in the region, both today and throughout the past, primarily defined and 
distinguished themselves in terms of their ethnicity and religious affiliations and that such 
distinctions were the primary causes of tension and conflict throughout history.  
However, an in-depth investigation of government documents, firsthand accounts, 
memoirs, interviews, court records, official and private investigations, and travelogues 
written in Ottoman Turkish, Armenian, Russian, French, German, and English reveals 
that tensions in Eastern Anatolia between 1800 and 1878 ran along a number of different 
lines besides religion and ethnicity and that groups did not appear to even imagine a 
conflict along such lines until the Great Powers became more involved in Ottoman 
politics.  This study traces the major tensions and conflicts in Eastern Anatolia between 
1800 and 1878 and seeks to understand what factors escalated and mitigated these.  It 
contributes the growing body of literature that shows how groups who experienced large-
scale violent ethnic and religious conflicts at different periods in history managed to 
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PRONUNCIATION GUIDE FOR TURKISH WORDS AND NAMES 
 
 
Ç, ç: Like the “ch” sound in “chart.” 
 
C, c: Like the “j” sound in “job.” 
 
Ğ, ğ: Silent letter.  Ağa is pronounced “ah-ah” and ağnam is pronounced “ah-nahm.” 
 
I, ı: Similar to the vowel sound of the last syllable in the word “open.” 
 
İ, i: Like the “ih” sound in “miss.” 
 
Ö, ö: Similar to the vowel sound in “heard” (upper-class Londoner pronunciation). 
 
Ş, ş: Like the “sh” sound in “ship.” 
 
Ü, ü: Similar to the French “u” sound in “une,” the German umlaut sound, and the vowel 










GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
 
Ağa: Honorific title given to village heads and tribal chiefs in Kurdish society.  Also 
spelled “agha” in citations from other texts. 
 
Ağnam: Annual tax on sheep and goats levied by Ottoman state. 
 
Akçe: Silver coin used as the primary monetary unit in the Ottoman Empire during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
 
Amira: Elite Armenian financier class living mostly in Western Anatolia and Thrace. 
 
Ashkharh: Armenian word for “world,” often used to refer to the larger Armenian 
community. 
 
Azg: Armenian word for “nation.” 
 
Bab-ı Ali: See Sublime Porte. 
 
Başıbozuk: Irregular infantrymen. 
 
Bedel-i Askeri: Military exemption tax levied on non-Muslims. 
 
Bey: Honorific title given to tribal chiefs. 
 
Beylik: Political domain governed by a bey. 
 
Catholicos: The ecclesiastical head of the Armenian Gregorian Church at Echmiadzin. 
 
Cizye: A per capita tax on non-Muslims stipulated by Islamic law.  Also spelled jizya. 
 
Derebey: Semiautonomous leader of dynasty. 
 
Devşirme: System of recruiting Christian boys, through both abduction and bilateral 
agreement with families, to serve in the military (practiced by the Ottoman Empire in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
 
Dönüm: Area of land approximately the size of an English acre (with variations in size). 
 
Emir: Commander of military force, often self-proclaimed descendant of Muhammad. 
ix 
 
Esnaf: Merchant guilds. 
 
Eyalet: The main administrative division in the Ottoman Empire.  Similar to a province 
or state.  Also spelled eyâlet. 
 
Ferik: Major general. 
 
Ferman: Decree issued by the sultan.  Also spelled firman. 
 
Gavur: Derogatory term for non-Muslims; heathen. 
 
Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif: The reform edict decreed by the sultan in 1839. 
 
Has: Government-owned land that produces over 100,000 akçes. 
 
Hatt-ı Hümayun: The Imperial Reform Edict decreed by the Ottoman sultan in 1856. 
 
Hoca: A teacher or moral guide; honorific title for the sultan’s adviser. 
 
Hükümet: Semiindependent governorship. 
 
İcra-yi Zemin: Rent tax. 
 
Imtiyaz: Formal term for a political privilege or set of privileges granted by the sultan to 
another inhabitant of the empire, often a local magnate. 
 
Ishkhan: Honorific title for Armenian royalty, prince. 
 
Istilam: Official inquiry into grievances made by certain inhabitants of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 






Kapıcıbaşı: Head gatekeeper of a major fortress or imperial palace. 
 
Kassam: Officer of law who assesses the value of land and determines shares of 
inheritance. 
 
Kaymakam: Lieutenant colonel; district chief. 
 
Kaza: Administrative subdivision of a sancak consisting of a large town or cluster of 
villages.  Under the jurisdiction of a kadı. 
x 
 
Kethüda: Chief of the gatekeepers at a major fortress. 
 
Khan: Honorific title given to powerful local magnates. 
 
Khutba: The sermon delivered every Friday by local religious leaders in Muslim 
mosques, at which allegiance is often pledged to a particular political or spiritual leader. 
 
Kışlak: Winter quarters. 
 
Kuruş: Silver coin used as main monetary unit in the Ottoman Empire between 1687 and 
1843. 
 
Levend: Daily-wage irregular soldier. 
 
Liva: Administrative subdivision of an eyalet. 
 
Meclis: Town council. 
 
Melik: Armenian power-holding magnate. 
 
Millet: Confessional community within the Ottoman Empire. 
 
Milletbaşı: Head of a millet. 
 




Miri: State-owned land. 
 
Mirliva: Major General. 
 
Muavvin: High-ranking assistant. 
 
Müdür: State-appointed governor of a nahiye. 
 
Mufti: Legal authority who interprets Islamic law. 
 
Muhafız: Guardian of a fortress. 
 
Muhafızlık: Political domain governed by a muhafız. 
 
Muhtar: Head of a village or group of villages, often informally elected by locals in the 
area of muhtar’s residence. 
 
Müşir: Field marshal. 
xi 
 
Mutasarrıf: Governor of a sancak appointed directly by the sultan. 
 
Mutasarrifiyya: Administrative category applied by the Ottoman administration to 
Lebanon 1861-1918 in recognition of its semiautonomy.   
 
Mutasarrıflık: Political domain governed by a mutasarrıf. 
 
Mütesellim: State-appointed governor of an individual town. 
 
Nahiye: Third-level administrative subdivision consisting of a village or a town with 
surrounding villages.  Usually a subdivision of a kaza or a sancak. 
 
Nişan: Decorative pin awarded by the sultan to individuals for loyalty to him. 
 
Nizam-i Cedid: The conscription-based military reforms introduced by Sultan Selim III in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
 
Oblast: Administrative division in Russian Empire, similar to a state or province. 
 
Öşür: Annual tax levied on between one-sixth and one-tenth of Ottoman inhabitants’ 
proceeds. 
 
Padişah: Superlative title for the sultan. 
 
Paşa: Honorific title given to state-appointed political and military elites of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 
Polozhenie: A set of regulations that the Russian government put in force in 1836 that 
continued to allow the autonomy of the Armenian church but significantly limited the 
political powers of the Armenian ecclesiastic body. 
 




Rüşdiye: The name for secondary schools set up during the tanzimat to educate 
adolescents. 
 
Sancak: Administrative subdivision of an eyalet and later vilayet. 
 
Serasker: The head commander of the Ottoman military. 
 
Sharia: Islamic law. 
 




Shaykh: Honorific title for tribal leader.  In Ottoman Kurdish society, a shaykh was seen 
as a Muslim spiritual authority. 
 
Sublime Porte: A term for the central government of the Ottoman Empire.  Also known 
as Bab-ı Ali. 
 
Takrir: A lengthy letter of petition or complaint, a list of grievances. 
 
Tanzimat: A series of modernizing reforms implemented by the Sublime Porte 1839-
1876. 
 
Tapu: A permanent land lease wherein the state grants the lessee a title deed certifying 
his rights. 
 
Timar: Government land grants given mostly to military officers, smaller than zeamet and 
has lands. 
 
Ulema: Sunni Muslim religious scholars. 
 
Vakıf: Religious endowment, usually consisting of land or a building, the usage of which 
is designated for charitable purposes. 
 
Vali: Provincial governor of an eyalet or vilayet. 
 
Valilik: Domain governed by a vali. 
 
Vartabed: Bishop in Armenian Gregorian church. 
 
Yaylak: Summer pasture. 
 
Yurtluk-ocaklık: Hereditary land. 
 
Zaptiye: Officer in the Ottoman gendarme. 
 















Scholarship on late Ottoman Eastern Anatolia has primarily focused on the period 
between 1878 and 1918.  Scholarship that has looked at Eastern Anatolia during earlier 
periods is often done out of the hope of bolstering particular positions on the causes of 
conflict during the Sultan Abdülhamid II and Young Turk periods.  Consequently, the 
1800-1878 period is viewed selectively and retrospectively in scholarship with little 
consideration about the broader social fabric of the region and the factors that explain 
overall social cohesion and corrosion.  Furthermore, studies have tended to look at factors 
that escalated tension and led to conflict, but have ignored factors that mitigated tensions 
in society and allowed for a relatively peaceful coexistence.  To this day, no 
comprehensive study of the region during this period has been conducted in the English 
language.1  It is the aim of this study to analyze the evolution of different relationships in 
Eastern Anatolia during the Sultan Mahmud II and Tanzimat periods.  In so doing, this 
study hopes to bring out the nuances and contours of the social fabric of the region and 
explain how and why tension in some areas resulted in prolonged conflict and violence 
while in others it did not.  The geographical context is the whole of Eastern Anatolia with 
                                                          
1 Haik Ghazarian, Arevmtahayeri Sotsyal Tntesakan yev Kaghakakan Katsutyune 1800-
1870 [The Socioeconomic and Political Situation of the Western Armenians 1800-1870] 
(Yerevan: Haykakan SSH Gitutʻyunneri Akademiayi Hratarakchutyun, 1967) is the only 
comprehensive work on the region that I could find.  Stephan Astourian, “Testing World-
system Theory, Cilicia (1830's-1890's): Armenian-Turkish Polarization and the Ideology 
of Modern Ottoman Historiography” (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 





special emphasis on the Armenian-, Assyrian-, and Kurdish-inhabited regions and towns 
surrounding Lake Van (including towns and regions such as Van, Muş, Bitlis, Beyazıt, 
Hakkari, Siirt, and others).  For comparative purposes, some attention has also been paid 
to other regions of Eastern Anatolia including Diyarbakır, Erzincan, Erzurum, Zeytun, 
and Dersim. 
Discourse on late Ottoman Eastern Anatolia since the mid-nineteenth century has 
been primarily concerned with questions of justice and culpability: the extent to which 
the Ottoman Empire justly treated its minority populations, and the extent to which it was 
responsible for encouraging or directing violence against them.  Two major competing 
frames of understanding, namely the modernist (which has tended to assert that Muslim 
society was incapable of adapting to modernity) and structuralist (which has tended to 
attribute increasing conflict and tension in Ottoman society to Great Power politics), 
emerged during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on this question.  As 
these narratives have evolved, scholars have assiduously engaged themselves in an 
intense and competitive process of document collection.  Volumes of documents have 
been collected and published primarily regarding the ‘Armenian question’ in the late 
Ottoman Empire.  While these documents have greatly elucidated the complex web of 
relationships throughout Eastern Anatolia, they cannot, as is often wrongly assumed, 
speak for themselves.  Moreover, many of the scholarly narratives that have been 
produced on the basis of these documents have often simply repeated arguments familiar 
from earlier first- and second-hand accounts. 
Absent in scholarly discourse has been any in-depth analysis of the larger social 





which side of the coin it is on, has started with assumptions about culpability and justice 
in order to explain conflict.  Yet this study asserts that it should be the other way around: 
that the questions of justice and culpability cannot be understood without first developing 
a framework for understanding the psychological, political, and socioeconomic forces 
that drove social interaction in Eastern Anatolia. 
There is another issue that this study seeks to address, which is that scholarship on 
conflict in Eastern Anatolia has tended to view its history against the backdrop of the 
relationships between distinct ethnic groups.  Armenian-Ottoman relations have tended to 
dominate the discourse, while a significantly smaller body of scholarship has addressed 
Assyrian-Ottoman, Kurdish-Ottoman, and Kurdish-Armenian relations.2  Focusing on the 
relationships between two different groups (Ottoman-Armenian, Armenian-Kurdish, etc.) 
can be problematic in that in so doing, it is difficult to avoid conveying the idea that 
groups actually emphasized lines of ethnic and religious distinction in their discourse and 
behavior and that conflict continually arose along these lines.  While not all studies that 
focus on relationships between two different ethnic and religious groups presume this, it 
is hard to avoid drawing out distinctions that the groups may not have found particularly 
                                                          
2 Notable and relatively recent examples include Hirmis Aboona, Assyrians, Kurds, and 
Ottomans: Intercommunal Relations on the Periphery of the Ottoman Empire (Amherst, 
NY: Cambria Press, 2008); Sébastian de Courtois and Vincent Aurora, The Forgotten 
Genocide: Eastern Christians, the Last Arameans (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004); 
Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Tribal Zone (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011); Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables in the Ottoman State 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004); Vahan A. Bayburdian, Hay 
Krdakan Haraberutyunnere Osmanyan Kaysrutyunum: XIX Darum yev XX Dari Skzpin 
[Kurdish Armenian Relations in the Ottoman Empire: In the Nineteenth Century and the 
Beginning of the Twentieth] (Yerevan: Hayastan, 1989); and Gerard Libaridian, 
“Ideology and History: Problems in the Study of Armeno-Kurdish Relations,” in Modern 






important themselves.  This study seeks to analyze various distinctions that existed in 
society and the various lines along which tensions and conflicts emerged.  It places 
primary emphasis on social and power structures and the relationships within those 
structures and gives a more secondary emphasis on ethnicity and religion.  Highlighting 
the relationships between two categorically distinct ethnic and religious groups naturally 
leads to assumptions of ethnic and religious homogeneity and overlooks the diverse 
elements within each ethnic and religious group.  Hence, scholarship on the ‘Armenian 
question’ has tended to overlook the competition and conflict within the Armenian millet 
during the nineteenth century.  Similarly, scholarship has often assumed greater cohesion 
and homogeneity among Muslim groups than actually existed.  Multiple social and power 
substructures existed within religious and ethnic groups, which need special recognition. 
 
Historiography: Modernist and Structuralist 
Frames of Understanding 
There are arguably many positions on the conflict in Eastern Anatolia, some more 
extreme and others more nuanced.  Nonetheless by reading and comparing the literature 
on the region in the nineteenth century, two loosely structured frames of understanding 
emerge with identifiable patterns of assumptions: the modernists and the structuralists. 
 The modernist frame of understading evolved from the impressions of Western 
missionaries and diplomats (primarily from the British Liberal Party), who visited or 
concerned themselves with the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century.  
Embedded in the modernist view is the notion that one of the prerequisites for modernity 
was justice, and justice meant fairness and equal rights.  The group of power-holding 





minority Christian populations, and could not possibly incorporate the modern 
foundations of justice into the system unless the political culture of the elites was 
abolished altogether and replaced with an entirely new, possibly Western- or British-
sponsored political system. 
The Ottoman millet system did not represent an attempt to integrate the 
Armenians into the state in a just and humane manner; in fact it functioned as a repressive 
institution designed to stem their power.  In 1918 Henry Morgenthau cynically believed 
that the millet system was a way for the Ottomans to “disqualify” the Armenians and 
Greeks “for membership in the Ottoman state,” since the Ottomans regarded them as 
“vermin.”3  More recently and somewhat less cynically, Libaridian maintained that the 
millet system “excluded the masses from any real participation in the Ottoman political 
life while sustaining the impression of the Armenian access to power.”  It privileged a 
select few Christians, while denying rights and privileges to the vast majority.4 
 Modernists view the period of tanzimat reforms not as an Ottoman-initiated 
attempt to provide Christians with equal rights, but as a Western-imposed political 
framework that the Ottomans could never implement fully because of the opposition of 
Muslim masses.  William Ewart Gladstone was skeptical that the tanzimat reforms 
provided any sort of relief at all for Christian populations.  He argued that the massacres 
of Assyrians in 1843, the massacres of Maronite Christians in Lebanon in 1860, and the 
                                                          
3 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (New York: Doubleday Page and 
Co., 1918), 280 cited in Vahakn Dadrian, “Factors of Anger and Aggression in 
Genocide,” Journal of Human Relations 19, no. 3, (1971): 399. 






massacres of Bulgarians in 1876 provided clear evidence to the contrary.5  Vahakn 
Dadrian echoes Gladstone’s cynicism towards the tanzimat dismissing the reforms as 
mere “contrivances” and “paper privileges.”  “The Ottoman regime…continued to 
alternate between its policies of oppression and repression,” in spite of its nominal 
acceptance of reforms.6 
Modernists tend to focus primarily upon violence and conflict initiated from the 
top downwards (sometimes referred to as state violence) and explain most collective 
political violence as a result of Ottoman policy.  The basic motivating factor of state-
sponsored violence was the political culture of the Ottoman Turkish elite, which had 
permeated policy for generations.  This culture was based on a fusion of the religious 
heritage of Islam and traditional Turkish military culture and it tolerated the existence of 
the Christians generally as tax- and tribute-paying peasants (rayah).  Elites of this hybrid 
Turkish military and Islamic culture also tolerated the Christians to hold a degree of 
power and wealth if they believed their subject Christians to be capable of leveraging 
strong outside military power against them.  However, they were predisposed to massacre 
minorities whom they deemed rebellious.  Both liberal proreform politicians and 
conservative Pan-Islamist politicians of the late Ottoman Empire were subsumed into the 
same political culture.  Thus the massacres of Armenians in the 1890s under the Pan-
Islamist Abdülhamid II and the massacres of 1915 under the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) (which was more prone to Pan-Turkism, liberalism, and secularism), 
                                                          
5 Ann Potinger Saab, Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria, and the Working Classes, 
1856-1878 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 72. 
6 Vahakn Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the 
Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004), 25, 





were both evidence of the same cultural motivations.  Earlier episodes of harsh treatment 
against the Christians were no different.7 
Since the modernist view assumed that violence and conflict was mainly initiated 
by the state, violence initiated from below was regarded as far less significant.  Many 
scholars of the modernist persuasion downplay the role of Armenian revolutionaries in 
the instigation and provocation of locals.  Whatever violence may have been committed 
by Christians against Muslims was not a “poisonous weed,” according to Christopher 
Walker, but a “natural organic outgrowth from the circumstances of the Ottoman 
Armenians.”8 
In order for the Armenians and other Christians to rid themselves of the burden of 
the Ottoman yoke, the transition to political modernity was necessary.  Yet since the 
militaristic political culture of the Ottoman Turks was incompatible with modern political 
and justice systems,9 it was believed that they would not willingly transition to modernity 
                                                          
7 This argument is made very clearly by early Dashnak revolutionary writer Mikayel 
Varandian, in Haykakan Sharzhman Nakhapatmutyune [The Background of the 
Armenian Movement] (Geneva: Hratarakutyun H.H.D., 1912), 74, 244, and is echoed by 
Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the Turko-Armenian Conflict (New 
Brunswick; London: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 5-13.  Neither of these authors 
frames this phenomenon using the term ‘political culture,’ but it is quite implicit in their 
arguments.  Taner Akçam does, however, appeal directly to political culture in Siyasi 
Kültürümüzde Zulüm ve İşkence [Oppression and Torture in Our Political Culture] 
(Istanbul: İletişim Publications, 1992). 
8 Christopher Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1980), 172.  An important feature of much of the English-language scholarship is that it 
tends to ignore or gloss over any violence undertaken by Armenian revolutionaries.  A 
significant portion of Armenian-language scholarship, however, is more celebratory of 
Armenian nationalism. 
9 Scholars of the modernist frame of understanding are divided over the question of 
whether or not this political culture permeated only elite political circles, or whether it 
extended deeply into lower ranking administrative circles.  A sizeable group of scholars 





on their own accord.  Hence, outside intervention was the only way in which modernity 
and justice could be imposed on the Turks.  Modernists regard the British policy of 
preserving the integrity of the Empire as nothing but a meager attempt to usher in actual 
justice.  They mostly blamed the British for intervening in the Ottoman Empire only 
when economically and geopolitically convenient (taking control of Cyprus in 1878 and 
Egypt in 1882) but not being overly concerned for the human rights of the Armenian and 
Assyrian populations.  After the spate of widespread violence in Eastern Anatolia in late 
1895, the Duke of Argyll strongly criticized Britain for not acting more vigorously in 
favor of the Armenians at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and encouraged Britain to 
finally “come to terms with Russia and Europe” to stem the “chronic and 
inherent…natural…cruelties” of the Ottomans.10  Richard Hovanissian makes a similar 
criticism of Britain: “the British,…by their insistence on the revision of the Treaty of San 
Stefano in 1878[,] were the most responsible for the absence of adequate guarantees for 
the protection of the Armenians.”11 
The failure of Britain and the West to take proper action to prevent what would 
become the almost inevitable mass deportation and slaughter of Armenians and Assyrians 
in 1915 has been a subject of great  lamentation in the modernist narrative, to such an 
extent that there is a tendency to view the history of Eastern Anatolia as the inexorable 
                                                          
culture of repression was restricted only to the Ottoman Turks.  See Garo Sasuni, Hagop 
Shahbazian, and Gerard Libaridian. 
10 George John Douglas Campbell, Duke of Argyll, Our Responsibilities for Turkey: 
Facts and Memories for Forty Years (London: John Murray, 1896), 41. 
11 Richard Hovannisian, “The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1914,” 
in The Armenian People From Ancient to Modern Times, Foreign Dominion to 
Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century, ed. Richard Hovannisian 





march of history towards 1915.  Dadrian refers to the 1894-1896 massacres as “a 
probative effort which…may be characterized as a rehearsal for the…1915-1918 
cataclysm.”12  Even some scholarship related to the Assyrians has adopted this 
retrospective framework.  Grabill argues that Western missionary penetration in 
southeastern Anatolia during the 1830s and 1840s encouraged the Christians to desire 
greater independence, and that this caused the Turks and Kurds in turn to resort to 
increasingly repressive measures against them.  The massacres of Assyrians in 1843, he 
argues, were “a microcosm of the later Armenian massacres.”13 
In the mid-twentieth century the structuralist frame of understanding collective 
political violence in Eastern Anatolia began to take shape.  Much like the modernist 
frame of understanding, it is preoccupied with questions of justice and culpability.  
However, it posits that the Ottoman Empire was generally benevolent toward its minority 
populations and that the very existence of the millet system is evidence of this.  When 
and if the Christian populations did suffer, particularly during the late Ottoman period, it 
was for two primary reasons: first “because their ecclesiastical leaders were given much 
autonomy in running the affairs of their own community, with hardly any interference 
from the state” and second because “expansionist and colonialist powers began to 
plot…[the] downfall [of the Ottoman Empire] with the connivance of some of its 
minorities.”14 
The current structuralist frame of understanding is rooted partly in the traditional 
                                                          
12 Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide, 85. 
13 Joseph Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on 
American Policy 1810-1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 137. 
14 Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Ottoman Armenians: Victims of Great Power Diplomacy 





Ottoman defense narrative, and partly in an appropriation by scholars of the Ottoman 
Empire of the world-systems theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein.15  The Ottoman 
defense narrative was propounded by Ottoman statesmen, who argued that ethnic 
nationalism, which was largely instigated by the Russians, drove otherwise peaceful local 
inhabitants to defend themselves.  While the Muslims were stronger militarily, they were 
guarding against becoming potential victims of radical nationalist separatist Christian 
groups who had successfully leveraged external forces against them in the past.  In an 
interview with Alexander Watkins Terrell, American minister plenipotentiary to the 
Ottoman Empire from 1893 to 1897, Sultan Abdülhamid II claimed that while Muslims 
in the past had been guilty of “excesses” against the Christians, they could and would not 
murder the Armenians on the basis of their religion alone.  “Christian Europe” 
overplayed the murder of Christians by the hands of Muslims but “had no sympathy to 
bestow upon” Christians murdering Muslims.  “[T]he butchery of twenty-seven thousand 
defenseless Turkish men, women, and children, who were massacred in one city after its 
surrender” during the Greek revolution of 1827 was evidence of this.16  Scholars of the 
structuralist persuasion continue to appeal to the notion that Western observers of the 
Ottoman Empire were biased in their reporting and glossed over and in particular 
completely ignored Christian atrocities against Muslims, particularly in the Caucasus 
during the 1860s and Bulgaria in the late 1870s and early 1880s.  Instances of ethnic 
cleansing of Muslims in other regions, particularly in the Balkans, were enough to justify 
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the anxiety of Muslims in Eastern Anatolia about the rise of militant Armenian 
revolutionary groups, even if the armed Armenians were small in number.17 
The focal point of the Ottoman defense narrative is the characterization of violent 
instigation from below by Christian rebel groups.18  The implicit claim of the Ottoman 
defense narrative is that were it not for the provocation of local Muslim groups by 
Christian rebels, the locals would not have reacted violently and the Ottoman state would 
not have needed to intervene and put down rebellion with punitive action.  Collective 
political violence is always regarded as the fault of the Christians who were the main 
perpetrators while the Muslims, despite killing a greater number of Christians, were the 
victims.  While modern sympathizers of the Ottoman defense narrative have not overtly 
proclaimed the Muslims as the explicit victims of Christian instigation, they have 
strongly upheld the notion that collective political violence was primarily the result of 
Christian provocation.19 
Stephan Astourian and Hilmar Kaiser have produced a well-evidenced argument 
                                                          
17 See for instance Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman 
Muslims 1821-1922 (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995).  Guenter Lewy makes a similar 
case in The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press, 2005), 20-29. 
18 This point is made clear in the 400-page report of Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, the Ottoman 
Chief of Investigation (Zaptiye Nazırı) from June 1894 to November 1896, in which the 
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(terrorism) and erbâb-ı fesad (terrorists).  Ermeni Olayları Tarihi [History of the 
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19 See Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern 
Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 200-205; Justin McCarthy and 
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that the structuralist narrative, with its provocation thesis, has implicitly invoked world-
system theory to explain violence initiated from above.20  World-system theory, first 
developed in the 1970s by Immanuel Wallerstein, holds that since the sixteenth century 
local economies throughout the world have gradually been incorporated into a single 
world economic system dominated by groups of elite capitalists.  All major 
socioeconomic transformations since then were best explained on the level of the world 
system and not individual regimes.  By the mid-nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire 
had lost most of its agency and functioned as an extension of Great Power politics.  The 
major economic and political decisions of the sultan and Sublime Porte were influenced, 
if not directly guided, by the economic and political interests of Russia, Britain, and other 
European states.21 
Structuralists assume that the Russo-Ottoman Wars during the nineteenth century 
decreased the Empire’s control over its own future and especially that of Eastern 
Anatolia.  Therefore, Ottoman policy toward that area is viewed more as a struggle to 
maintain what little control he could over the region rather than stubborn resistance to 
British demands for reform.22  The sultan had only the tenuous allegiance of the local 
elites and had to maintain a “delicate balance” between their competing interests.  
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the empire. 
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Immediate concessions to all British demands for reform could risk rupturing that balance 
and make things worse for the Christians than they already were.23  It was perfectly 
possible for the Ottomans to establish justice for Muslims through their own efforts, and 
the Great Powers did not facilitate this process but disrupted it. 
The modernist frame of understanding maintains a clear picture of perpetrator, the 
state and its feudal minions, and victim, the subalterns and religious and ethnic 
minorities.  In contrast, the structuralist frame of understanding is more vague in its 
identification of perpetrator and victim.  Instead it maintains a rather teleological 
assumption about Eastern Anatolian history, assuming that the more the Great Powers 
cast their hegemonic shadow over the Ottoman Empire, the more the forces of social 
entropy and the natural decay of society would take hold in the peripheral and territorially 
contested regions of the Ottoman Empire, especially Eastern Anatolia.  In order to stave 
off the advent of a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ in Eastern Anatolian society, the Ottoman 
Empire had to have its former power restored.  Thus, while modernists “tend to deny 
agency to non-state actors”24 and regard Ottoman state control as an oppressive force, 
structuralists deny agency to the Ottoman state, attributing the responsibility for the 
social burden of Eastern Anatolia to Western hegemony. 
The main strength of the modernist frame is that it recognizes the hegemony of 
Ottoman state over its minority populations.  Its main weakness is that it does not 
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recognize the limits of that hegemony or the state’s ability to impose it.  It assumes that 
the political culture of the elites drove the state to make violent decisions and that the 
state controlled both the coordination and salience of collective political violence.  There 
was no possibility of conflict resolution, and there could only be peace if and when the 
minority was fully subjugated.  Clearly culture can influence and has influenced violent 
outcomes. Dov Cohen finds that “there are cultures in which violence is not an entirely 
deviant response, and in such cultures, one might expect that the stronger and tighter the 
social organization, the more culturally appropriate violence there will be.”25  However, 
the vagueness and amorphousness of the boundaries of culture make it difficult to 
determine the degree to which culture by itself influenced the violent act.  Furthermore, 
the notion that different Ottoman state and local elites had identical, even similar, cultural 
attitudes toward ethnic minorities over time and space is hard to accept.  Lastly, the 
implicit retrospection of the modernist frame of history, projecting the 1915 massacres 
into the past, does a disservice to the actual evolution of socio-historical processes in 
Eastern Anatolia.  The history of society is best viewed in terms of diverse actors moving 
toward a future with various possible outcomes, not as steps leading up to a specific and 
preset critical juncture. 
The main strength of the structuralist thesis is that it considers the resource 
deficiencies of the state as the principal reason for its inability to control anarchy.  Its 
main weakness is that society devolves into disorder without strong state control.  It is 
quick to accept the somewhat disingenuous narrative emanating from traditional Ottoman 
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‘apologists’ to the effect that the Ottoman state was indeed interested in the well-being of 
its minority populations and that its strength was required to maintain just social order.  
Its inherent assumptions about violence as the natural product of social entropy are also 
reductionist, if not entirely incorrect.  No matter what political and economic 
circumstances the various actors were facing, collective political violence was always a 
conscious and to some extent rationale, or at least rationalized, choice. As is often 
asserted, Kurdish tribes did not harass and kill simply because they were ‘tribal’ and   
thus had a gut reaction to kill when provoked.  Kurdish elites in Eastern Anatolia had to 
weigh the costs and benefits of engaging in conflict against non-Muslims.  In order to 
transcend these narratives, this study seeks to shift the focus on actors’ roles within 
power structures and patterns of interaction over time in order to explain how and why 
actors saw it necessary to settle their conflicts, sometimes violently, sometimes 
nonviolently.  For it behooves us as social scientists to “shift to observation of 




To construct a picture of nineteenth-century Eastern Anatolia, this study consults 
telegraphs, letters, journals, travelogues, periodicals, newspapers, and interviews which 
contain the words of Ottoman state officials, including the sultan, grand vizier, 
government ministers, valis, kaymakams, mutasarrıfs, müşirs, kadıs, and others of lower 
rank; Russian and British ambassadors, consuls, and military officials; local Kurdish, 
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Armenian, and Assyrian elites; Armenian and Assyrian ecclesiastics; American and 
British missionaries in Eastern Anatolia; and Russian, American, British, Turkish, and 
Armenian travelers.  To obtain documents with these writings, this study consulted the 
Başbakanlık Ottoman State Archives (abbreviated BBA in the footnotes), located in 
Istanbul, Turkey, published document collections which contain prints of documents 
from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, the Foreign Office of the 
British Empire, and Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts (abbreviated as 
Matenadaran), located in Yerevan, Armenia.  The Başbakanlık Ottoman State Archives 
contain numerous document compilations, of which this study consulted thirty-one.  The 
compilations most used were those from 1) the Hatt-ı Hümayûn Tasnifi (the Imperial 
Palace Compilation, abbreviated HAT), which contains correspondence to and from the 
palace during the Selim III and Mahmud II periods; 2) the Mesâil-i Mühimme İrâdeleri 
(Decrees on Important Matters), which contains documents from the Imperial Palace and 
the Sublime Porte on urgent affairs; 3) the Hariciye Nezareti (the Foreign Ministry, 
abbreviated HR) which contains correspondence between the Sublime Porte and foreign 
officials; and 4) the Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi (The Registry of the Office of the Grand 
Vizier, abbreviated A.MKT) which contains correspondence to and from the Sublime 
Porte during the tanzimat period.  This study also consults a thirteen-volume published 
collection of Armenian documents entitled Divan Hayots Patmutyun (Register of 
Armenian History) which contains various pieces of correspondence written in the 
Armenian language to and from the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul.  Additionally, this 
study consults published document collections from the British Foreign Office and the 





hundred secondary sources written in French, Russian, Arabic, Turkish, Armenian, and 
German, many of which contain research that is based mostly on primary source material, 
and some of which include long appendices that give the primary documents in full.  
Most important is a number of Armenian language monographs, whose authors 
conducted in-depth research in the Matenadaran in Yerevan, which is difficult for 
scholars to access.  These secondary sources contain valuable information which, 
although referenced in much of the Armenian language scholarship available, is seldom 
referenced in scholarship in other languages.  This is one of the few studies on Eastern 
Anatolia during this period that consults documents written in Turkish, Armenian, and 
Russian and therefore manages to capture a wider range of views than other studies.  
Excluded from this study are the words of the hundreds of thousands of peasants, women, 
servants, slaves, and laborers most of whom were illiterate and had little means of 
communicating their experiences and observations beyond a small social radius.  The 
descriptions of their experiences by others help us capture a glimpse of what their 
interactions with each other, Ottoman state and foreign officials, different religious and 
ethnic groups, and local elites may have been like.  Constructing a picture of history is 
much like unearthing an old mosaic whose missing pieces deprive us of a full picture, but 
provide us enough for our imaginations to reasonably reconstruct what could have 
happened.  In order to see the full picture, we must engage in a repeated process of 
stepping in closely to analyze the fine detail and stepping out to view the layout from 
different angles.  It is hoped that the vast array of sources consulted can provide both 
detail and an overall picture of the different patterns of social interaction in nineteenth-





Methodology and Contributions 
 Eastern Anatolia during the 1800-1878 period has been studied in snippets, 
usually around particular issues, regions, and events.  Commonly covered topics are the 
Bedr Khan revolt of the 1840s and his massacre of select Assyrian Christian villages, 
Kurdish-Ottoman relations, and Armenian-Ottoman relations.  Less common topics for 
Eastern Anatolia during this period are Ottoman-Iranian relations, Ottoman 
administration of Eastern Anatolian eyalets/vilayets, Kurdish-Armenian relations, and 
Eastern Anatolia in international diplomacy.  The most in-depth scholarship has been 
written in either Turkish or Armenian.  Studies written in the Turkish language tend to be 
largely based on documents found in the Başbakanlık Ottoman archives, with some 
including documents from the British archives, and focus largely on Kurdish-Ottoman 
relations and the Ottoman administration of eyalets/vilayets.  The studies written in 
Turkish that look at Armenian-related issues tend to rely largely very little on sources 
written in the Armenian language.27  Studies written in the Armenian language tend to 
focus on Armenian-Ottoman relations and, to a lesser extent, Kurdish-Armenian 
relations.  Armenian-language scholarship is reliant largely on Armenian sources 
gathered by the Armenian Patriarch and Armenian National Assembly, as well as 
Armenian travelogues.  Many also reference documents from the British and Russian 
state archives.  However, few, if any, reference the Ottoman archives. 
 It is the hope of this study to serve as a case study of interethnic and interreligious 
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relations and their evolution across time and space.  The questions of how and why 
communities maintained ethnic and religious distinctions, why tensions arose and 
subsided, the lines along which tensions emerged, why conflict occurred in some regions 
but not others, and which factors escalated or mitigated conflict are as important during 
the nineteenth century as they are today.  The aim of this study is to look at different 
relationships and social cleavages with the hope of providing not only a broader and more 
nuanced view to Eastern Anatolia, but to the study of ethnic and religious conflict on the 
whole.  It is hoped that by shedding light on Eastern Anatolia during the period just 
before it was riven by a spate of violent ethnic and religious conflicts that it can serve as a 
model for how other scholars might attempt to analyze tensions in other multiethnic and 
multireligious societies, particularly the periods that preceded outbreaks of massive 
violence.  It should be noted that ethnic, cultural, and religious difference were not 
always the reasons behind social tension and conflict.  Instead, family feuds, state vs. 
local competition, international conflict, and interregional conflict and competition 
between elites, and even intraregional rivalries, often proved to be greater sources of 
tension in Eastern Anatolia than religion and ethnicity. 
 
Layout 
 Chapter 1 looks at how and why non-Muslim communities existed in Eastern 
Anatolia and to what extent they maintained a peaceful coexistence with Muslims, who in 
most cases were their overlords, during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries.  It traces the history of complex power relations between the Ottoman state and 
the Armenian community as well as those between Kurdish elites and Armenian groups.  





over a long period of time and explain where and why tensions rose between groups.  It 
shows how the Ottoman state balanced power with the Armenian clergy and governed the 
larger Ottoman Armenian community through them.  It identifies the areas in which 
Armenians maintained political and military power.  Political tensions between the 
Ottomans and Armenians escalated largely in zones of international conflict, but did not 
appear to flare to any noteworthy extent elsewhere.  Armenians in the western Ottoman 
Empire were reliant on the Ottoman state for much of their wealth and power over the 
Armenian community.  Armenians in independent enclaves were isolated and feared 
being overwhelmed and losing the power privileges that the state allowed them if they 
tried to spread revolt. 
 Chapter 2 analyzes the balance of power between the Ottoman state and Muslim 
groups between 1700 and 1829.  Its main point is that Russia’s penetration of the Black 
Sea region in the late 1700s and the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia prompted the 
Ottomans to reverse their traditional decentralized policy in relation to Eastern Anatolia 
and undertake a calculated centralization project, which focused on strengthening control 
over Erzurum and restoring central control to the key garrison towns of Diyarbakır and 
Van.  It explores the effects of the conflicts with Iran and Russia in the 1820s on the 
Ottomans’ policy in Eastern Anatolia and how these wars altered the zeitgeist of Kurdish 
groups in the region.  It argues that overall Ottoman-Kurdish relations deteriorated during 
this period because the Ottomans tried to play Kurdish elites against each other and 
because the Kurds often proved to be fickle allies during the conflicts with Iran and 
Russia.  The main factor that was causing political tensions appeared to be the question of 





Yet, there is no evidence that tension in Eastern Anatolian society before 1829 mounted 
along ethnic and religious lines, as was the case in Morea and the Aegean. 
 In Chapter 3 it is argued that Ibrahim Paşa’s incursion into Syria during the early 
1830s coupled with Kör Mehmet’s rebellion spurred the Ottomans to undertake a hasty 
and violent centralization campaign in Eastern Anatolia during the 1830s.  This was 
followed by a more careful and calculated campaign of centralization in the 1840s.  This 
chapter looks into the question of Kurdish consciousness and the tradition vs. modernism 
debates as drivers behind the Ottoman state’s conflict with largely Kurdish beys 
throughout Eastern Anatolia.  It attempts to explain why conflict emerged in the area to 
the south of Lake Van and why it did not spread in the Kurdish regions to the north.  
Lastly it looks at the reasons behind the massacres of Assyrian Christians by Bedr Khan. 
 Chapter 4 explores the different ways in which the Ottoman state managed 
different tensions in Eastern Anatolia between 1847 and 1868 in the midst of competing 
demands by Kurdish warlords, Armenian elites, and international actors.  It argues that 
the Ottomans made the situation worse for the Armenians by eliminating many leading 
figures in Kurdish society, who had historically proven crucial to managing local 
relations.  Centralization of state power in the region reduced opportunity spaces for 
locals and increased competition among them.  It also analyzes the power shift that 
occurred in Ottoman Armenian society and its overall impact on Armenians in Eastern 
Anatolia.  Pressures from Britain to reform the Armenian millet made it so the Ottoman 
state had less control over the Armenians, which they had traditionally maintained via the 
millet structure.  Consequently, this reduced the power of the Armenian patriarch and 





Kurdish-Armenian relations became more unpredictable during this period, with some 
groups joining forces against the state and others entering into direct conflict.  This 
chapter explains the paradox of how centralization and reform efforts engendered a quasi-
anarchy in Eastern Anatolia. 
 Chapter 5 attempts to explain why tension generally escalated throughout Eastern 
Anatolia on the eve of and during the Russo-Ottoman War 1877-1878.  It pinpoints the 
1870s as the period in which tensions along ethnic and religious lines became the most 
pronounced.  Its main idea is that conflict took the form of how high-ranking world 
administrators viewed the conflict.  Since the Ottomans had defined its predominant 
concern in Eastern Anatolia as largely a conflict with the Kurds, a Kurdish question 
began to take greater shape.  Since many British and Russian officials and Armenian 
activists viewed the liberation of Armenians from the oppression of Muslims, an 
Armenian question emerged.  This happened in spite of the fact that tensions still existed 











TOLERANCE, RESISTANCE, AND DISTRIBUTION OF  




 The Ottomans seized control over Eastern Anatolia in the sixteenth century 
through a combination of the persuasion and/or cooption of local elites and sheer military 
force.  The history of Ottoman control over the region is undoubtedly full of stories of 
violence, oppression, and brutality,1 but it is nonetheless significant that a certain level of 
ethnic and religious diversity managed to exist in the region and hold some shares of 
power for long periods between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.  What were 
reasons that the dominant Muslim groups tolerated non-Muslims, what were the limits of 
the tolerance of diversity, and to what degree did different religious groups have power 
either to persuade or coerce Muslims to accept their policies and actions?  This chapter 
attempts to unpack the nature of the coexistence that existed between groups in Eastern 
Anatolia, explain how actors shared and balanced power, and to identify the main factors 
that escalated and mitigated tensions. 
Scholarship on the question of Ottoman tolerance of minorities in Eastern 
Anatolia is fraught with generalizations and retrospective historical readings.  Ottoman 
                                                          






apologists and many structuralists have often tended to convey an (over)optimistic 
picture of the relations between different groups in Eastern Anatolia during the Ottoman 
period.  A commonly read argument is that ethnic and religious minorities, including the 
Armenians, “owed their very existence” to the Ottomans’ generally benevolent sense of 
order and justice, which afforded them the privileges of language, culture, and religious 
preservation that they would not have enjoyed under other rulers.2  Strong Ottoman state 
control, although occasionally brutal towards actors whom they deemed threats, 
prevented an anarchical and often violent Hobbesian state of nature from emerging 
between fissiparous factions in the region. 
Many modernist arguments are no less generalizing.  While most modernists 
generally attribute the Ottomans’ maintenance of peace in the region to continuous 
oppression, coercion, and threats of violence, they are divided over the question of 
whether or not the Kurds were generally more prone to oppressing non-Muslim minority 
groups or more prone to collaborating with them.  Some modernists assert that local 
Muslim groups were natural allies of the Turks by virtue of a shared traditional Islamic 
and military political culture.3  Hence, they participated with them in expanding their 
domain into the predominantly Armenian inhabited territories in northeastern Anatolia 
and in extracting extortionate taxes and rents from them.4  Other modernist narratives 
have stressed the distinction between tribal Kurds, who acted as collaborators with the 
                                                          
2 Mehmet Hocaoğlu, Arşiv Vesikalarıyla Tarihte Ermeni Mezâlimi ve Ermeniler 
[Armenians and Armenian Atrocities in History with Archival Documents] (Ankara: ER-
TU Press, 1976), 51. 
3 Mikayel Varandian, Haykakan Sharzhman Nakhapatmutyun [The Early History of the 
Armenian Movement] (Geneva: Hratarakrutyun HHD, 1912), 1: 70-87 





Ottoman Empire and as oppressive rent-seekers, and the Kurdish peasantry with whom 
the non-Muslim population often had better relations, in spite of periodic mutual 
tensions.5  This narrative has tended to stress instances of Kurdish-Armenian 
collaboration and peace and downplay instances of Kurdish-initiated violence. 
The rationale behind Ottoman policy toward Christians and Jews was based partly 
on a solid Islamic legal tradition upon which the Ottomans gradually elaborated, but 
mostly on realpolitik considerations.  The Ottomans clearly did have a philosophical 
basis upon which they based their treatment towards non-Muslims that set them apart 
from other empires.  However, consideration of the unique sets of political circumstances 
that the Ottomans created help to explain what was often inconsistent policy towards both 
its non-Muslim and Muslim subjects. 
 
The Theoretical Basis for the Ottomans’ Tolerance 
of Religious Diversity 
William Kymlicka makes a compelling case that the Ottomans’ policy towards 
their Christian and Jewish populations was based on the principle of tolerance but not on 
the “principle of freedom of conscience.”  The Ottomans did not protect the individual 
liberties of the Christians, but generally protected their group rights.6  The Ottomans were 
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not a model of justice in a Rawlsian sense of “justice as fair individual treatment,” but as 
Christopher Walker points out, they were “morally ahead of anything to come out of 
Europe at the time.”7  This view, of course, is debatable. 
When the Ottomans rose to power, they relied on Sunni religious scholars 
(ulema), mostly from the Hanafi madhhab, to provide the theoretical foundations upon 
which to shape its policy toward its non-Muslim subjects.  These ulema already provided 
a crucial link between the Ottoman military elites and different Muslim populations 
throughout Anatolia.  It is only logical that the Ottomans would use them to advise on 
legal and juridical matters.  According to the legal theory advanced by the ulema, laws 
relating to personal status were to be based upon religious affiliation.  Christians and 
Jews were to be afforded contracts of protection, known in Arabic legal terminology as 
dhimma, by the sultan.  These contracts entitled the dhimmis (the Arabic term for 
Christians and Jews) to the physical and legal protection of the sultan and/or caliph from 
internal and external forces and the freedom to practice their religions on the condition 
that they pay (jizya) tribute to the sultan and/or caliph and pledge political allegiance to 
him.  
The dhimmi system had great appeal to the Ottomans because of its financial 
advantages, but it also coincided well with the their policy of “offensive realpolitik,” 
which they engaged in from the early sixteenth century until the mid-seventeenth century.  
The objective of this policy was to strengthen and expand the military, defend against 
external threats by absorbing the minorities in a diffuse, albeit loose, manner, under the 
                                                          





imperial aegis, and “maximize power by acquiring territory, population, and wealth.”8  
The Ottomans relied upon the populations that they absorbed into their political system as 
source of wealth to finance their expensive military.  Hence, it was not in their best 
interest to do them harm, or even to subjugate them in ways that limited their 
productivity, unless they posed a significant physical and political threat.  Furthermore, 
since the Ottomans were expanding at a rapid pace, they had little time and few resources 
to try to forcibly assimilate populations to the Turkish language and culture and to the 
Islamic faith.  Therefore, they developed a political system that could accommodate 
ethnic and religious diversity. 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ottomans were only beginning 
to come to terms with the diversity that existed among their subjects.  As they expanded 
into regions with large Christian populations, they simply sought to forge relationships 
with whatever identifiable religious authorities there were among them in order to 
establish political order and extract regular revenue.  The reasons that the Ottomans came 
to place power mainly in the hands of the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Gregorian 
elites, and not Assyrians, Jacobites, and Catholics, is that they constituted the largest 
Christian groups and were located in strategic and contested areas of the Empire.  Yet it 
is unclear exactly when the Ottomans recognized them as distinct jurisdictional entities.  
Tradition holds that the Greeks were recognized as a separate confessional entity in 1454, 
the Armenians in 1461, and the Jews soon after.  However, Benjamin Braude suggests 
that these so-called jurisdictional creations were based upon foundational myths, and that 
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Ottoman policy towards different Christian groups was inconsistent and ad hoc 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and probably later as well. 9 
Latent legal distinctions did, however, appear early in the Ottoman Empire.  By 
the seventeenth century, the term taife (an Arabic term denoting sect or denomination) 
was widely circulated among Ottoman officials to refer to different religious groups: the 
Christian taife, Frankish taife, and Jewish taife.  Each taife was allowed to establish the 
parameters of exclusion and inclusion for their communities and devise their own sets of 
rules.  They enjoyed the freedom to establish their own courts, schools, hospitals, and 
prisons and to prosecute whomever among their respective communities they pleased, but 
they were not entirely autonomous.  The Muslim court reserved the right to ensure that 
the taifes were living up to their own sets of rules as well as the right to intervene in 
internal disputes within a single taife and disputes between taifes.10 
By the eighteenth century the Ottomans had begun to use the term millet (an 
Arabic term for a confessional group) to refer to the different religious communities.  
They had used the term before then, but only with reference to Muslims living inside the 
Empire and Christians living outside it.  It was arguably not until the early eighteenth 
century that the Ottomans used the term millet to refer to Christians and Jews living in the 
Empire, and it was only during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that the 
term was used to specify distinct Armenian and Greek jurisdictional entities.11  The idea 
                                                          
9 Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System,” in Christians and Jews in 
the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, ed. idem. and Bernard Lewis 
(New York; London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982), 1: 75-83. 
10 Masters, Christians and Jews, 62. 
11 Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922 (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge 





that the millets were traditional historical divisions dating back to the early Ottoman 
Empire is an anachronism that nineteenth-century Ottoman historians appeared to have 
imposed on the past.  This erroneous idea was perpetuated by earlier Western historians 
of the Ottoman Empire and continues to circulate in less well-informed modern 
scholarship.12 
By the early nineteenth century, the Ottomans had strengthened the jurisdictional 
authority of the Greek and Armenian milletbaşıs (heads of the millet) at Istanbul over 
Christians throughout the Empire.  The Greek milletbaşı had authority over all ethnic 
Greeks and Orthodox and Catholic groups in the Balkans and western Anatolia, but only 
until the 1860s and 1870s when the various Slavic Orthodox churches became 
autocephalous (that is, formally independent) from the Greek patriarchate of Istanbul.  
The Armenian milletbaşı had authority over all ethnic Armenians, Gregorian Orthodox 
Christians, Nestorians, Jacobites, and Armenian Catholics in the Empire.  The 
centralization of authority in the hands of these two Christian milletbaşıs at Istanbul 
became a point of contention among many European diplomats, Catholics, and non-
Armenian Christian groups who encouraged the Ottomans to create separate millets for 
them, as will be discussed in a later chapter.  
 
                                                          
12 Most notably H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen argue that the parameters of the millet 
system were set in place in the early Ottoman period.  See Hamilton Gibb and Harold 
Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on 
Muslim Culture in the Near East (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), 2: 
207-61.  For a more recent analysis, see Maurits van den Boogert, “Millets: Past and 
Present” in Religious Minorities in the Middle East: Domination, Self-Empowerment, 







Realpolitik and Ottoman Treatment of  
Non-Muslims 1500-1736 
The Ottomans rose to power at a time when the most significant threats it faced 
were from rival Muslim dynasties rather than from the Christian powers.  Thus when the 
Ottomans took Constantinople in the mid-fifteenth century, the Byzantines had been in 
decline for several decades.  Likewise, by the time the Ottomans first entered Eastern 
Anatolia under the commandership of Sultan Selim I in the early sixteenth century, the 
Armenian religious and political elites had already been weakened by internal divisions13 
and were the de facto subjects of other more militarily powerful Muslim groups, 
particularly the Kara Koyunlu and Ak Koyunlu dynasties.14  By the early sixteenth 
century the Ottomans had singled out the Safavid dynasty, who also possessed 
gunpowder, as their greatest external threat.15  They probably also feared internal rivalry 
                                                          
13 The Armenian church has technically always been governed by a single hierarchy 
headed by the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians, located at Sis in 
Cilicia from 1292 to 1441 and at Echmiadzin ever since.  However, beginning in the 
twelfth century, some Armenian groups began establishing separate hierarchical 
authorities, particularly at Aghtamar in Lake Van in 1113, functioned independently of 
the authority of the Supreme Catholicos, although recognizing his authority.  In addition 
between 1377 and 1432, the Armenian groups in Cilicia vied with one another, 
sometimes violently, for the office of Catholicos.  The Armenian clergy in Van and 
Syunik (in the southern Caucasus) also engaged in political and physical struggle with 
each other over the office of Catholicos in the early fifteenth century.  See Avedis K. 
Sanjian, Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965), 29-30, 226-227.  Some Armenian clergyman also claim that 
authority was not legitimately transferred to Echmiadzin in 1441, but was to remain at 
Sis, see Dickran Kouymjian, “Armenia from the Fall of the Cilician Kingdom (1375) to 
the Forced Emigration under Shah Abbas (1604)” in The Armenian People from Ancient 
to Modern Times, ed. Richard Hovannisian (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 2: 38. 
14 Kouymjian notes that many of the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia during the fifteenth 
century relied on the protection of the Ak Koyunlu and Kara Koyunlu dynasties.  
Kouymjian, “Armenia from the Fall,” 4-8. 
15 The use of gunpowder tended to strengthen the ability and resolve of the Ottoman, 
Safavid, and Mughal dynasties to centralize military and administrative control.  Of 





in the Ottoman ruling family and the military more than whatever military force the 
Christian groups throughout Eastern Anatolia, which were small, decentralized, and 
lacking in military organization and technology, could muster through their own efforts. 
Nonetheless, the Ottomans did attempt to take measures to prevent Armenian 
groups from forming power blocs centered around local potentates and clergymen and to 
prevent them from allying with the Persians.  Despite the fact that the Ottomans had the 
upper hand against the Persians in the sixteenth century, the borderlands long remained 
highly contested and changed hands several times.  During times of overall political 
instability, indiscriminate violence and robbery occurred both on the part of the Ottoman 
military, whose soldiers were incentivized to advance on promises of booty, and the local 
elites, who killed other villagers out of suspicion and robbed lands as a means of survival.  
Yerevan was frequently the center of violent conflict between the Ottomans and Persians, 
changing hands several times between 1514 and 1639.  A testimony of the 
destructiveness of the military campaigns of the rival powers is that none of the oldest 
churches and mosques there date to before the sixteenth century.16  Van and Tabriz also 
changed hands several times during the same period, experiencing like periods of 
violence and political chaos.17 
                                                          
gunpowder.  But the need for large financial resources to purchase materials for firearms, 
manufacture weaponry, and train soldiers stimulated governments to acquire land, 
wealth, and population quickly.  See Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Gunpowder Empires 
and Modern Times, vol. 3 of The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World 
Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
16 George Bournoutian and Robert Hewsen, “Erevan,” Encyclopedia Iranica, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/erevan-1, accessed October 18, 2013. 
17 The Ottomans briefly occupied Tabriz in 1514, 1534, and 1548, and held it from 1585 
to 1603.  The occupied it for brief periods of time in 1618 and 1635.  V. Minorsky and 
Sheila S. Blair, "Tabrīz." Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd Edition, 





The military was more prone to violent attacks on opponents if they resisted 
military advancements.  During the wars with the Persians suspicions were heightened on 
the part of the Ottoman military, especially in regions with strong Persian contingencies.  
Brutality was particularly acute in Yerevan and Nakhchevan between 1553 and 1555 
where the Ottoman military, according to Ottoman chronicler Ibrahim Peçevi, “despoiled 
prosperous [Armenian] villages seizing…possession…and slaves.”18  However, if it 
appeared that the local inhabitants were not politically resistant to military control and 
were willing to pay tribute and provide the military with resources, the Ottomans were 
content to leave them in peace.  This explains why the wealthy Armenian village of Julfa 
in southern Transcaucasia, the center of a large Armenian trading network, was spared 
during the latter half of the sixteenth century in spite of its exposed location between the 
Ottoman and Persian zones of control.  Aslanian notes that the town “not only survived 
throughout the sixteenth century but even managed to prosper [probably because of] 
sheer luck, important political patrons, perceived neutrality as an all-Christian town, and 
handsome bribes paid to keep invaders at bay.”19 
Many Armenians were victims of violence in Erzurum and some other parts of 
Eastern Anatolia in the mid-1620s when Sultan Murad IV and his forces sought to 
                                                          
28, 2013.  The Safavids occupied Van briefly in 1534, 1546-1548, and 1605. C.E. 
Bosworth, "Wān," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd Edition, 
http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_COM-1336, accessed October 
28, 2011. 
18 Ibrahim Peçevi, Tarih-i Peçevi [History of Peçevi], cited in Arshag Safrastian, ed., 
Turkagan Aghpyurnere Hayasdani: Hayeri yev Antrkovkasi Myus Zhoghovrtneri Masin 
[Turkish Sources on Armenia: Concerning Armenians and Other Peoples of 
Transcaucasia] (Yerevan: Gitutyunneri Akademiayi Hratarakchutyun, 1961), 1:33. 
19 Sebouh David Aslanian, From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global 
Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa (Berkeley: University of 





reclaim land that was lost to Shah Abbas I in the Caucasus and northern Iraq between 
1603 and 1618.  In 1627 Abaza Mehmet Paşa, who was appointed by the Ottomans to be 
beglerbeg20 of Erzurum, was ordered to support the Ottoman military in a campaign 
against the Persians in the Caucasus, but he rebelled.  Abaza Mehmet had rebelled against 
the Ottomans twice before: once in 1622, when he crushed the Ottoman Janissary corps 
stationed in Erzurum, whom he accused of exploiting the local Eastern Anatolian 
population and assassinating Sultan Osman II, and again in 1624.21  He derived his power 
partly from local peasants, including Armenians, among whom he was popular. An 
Armenian monk, Vartabed Krikor of Kemah (a village near Erzurum), described Abaza 
Mehmet in a funeral eulogy as “an individual who loved the Christians and especially the 
downtrodden Armenian nation…, and was indiscriminately compassionate to the poor of 
every nationality.”22  Because of the alliances between Armenian groups and Abaza 
Mehmet the Ottomans deemed many of them to be resisters and thereby justified their 
slaughter.23 
Perceived resistance during time of war was also the most significant explanatory 
                                                          
20 An administrative title for military governors of provinces.  The term literally means 
bey of beys.   
21 Abaza Mehmet Paşa managed to keep his post as beglerbeg until 1628 by virtue of the 
fact that the Ottomans relied on whatever tenuous support he could lend against the 
Persians, and by the fact that the Ottomans could not muster enough force to oust him.  
Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 222-225. 
22 Hrand D. Andreasyan, “Abaza Mehmet Paşa,” İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi 
Tarih Dergisi 17, no. 22 (March 1967): 131. 
23 Richard Davey, The Sultan and His Subjects (London: Chapman Hall, 1897), 144.  
Davey claims that seventy thousand Armenians perished in the Erzurum eyalet alone.  In 
addition Armenians perished in Bitlis, Van, and Aleppo, which were also under the 
control of military men loyal to Abaza Mehmet Paşa.  The statistic is unsubstantiated, but 
is nonetheless an indication that the Ottoman army took Armenian lives in Eastern 





factor of violence against Armenians in the fighting in the Caucasus during the Ottoman-
Persian war 1722-1727.  Many Armenian soldiers serving in the Persian military against 
the Ottomans were partly responsible for the slaying of “20,000 Turks…in the Battel [sic] 
of [Tabriz]” in 1725.24  In addition they were responsible for thousands more Ottoman 
casualties throughout Transcaucasia from 1723 to 1727.25  Also during this period some 
of the Armenian meliks in Karabakh and Kapan who managed to gain de facto military 
control from the declining Safavids waged war against the Ottomans whom they feared 
would take away their autonomy.  The Ottomans responded to Armenian resistance, 
brutally slaying “30,000 Armenians” in 1725 at Yerevan and thousands more in 
Karabakh and Kapan.  They also carried thousands more into captivity, 26 forcing many 
Armenian villages in the region to convert to Islam, burning their religious books and 
killing the priests.27 
Although there is no evidence that the Ottomans undertook widespread violence 
against Armenians in other parts of the Empire during the 1722-1727 war against Persia 
and the Transcaucasian Armenians, there is evidence of palpable fear among the Ottoman 
Armenians and Russian diplomats that the sultan was plotting violent reprisal against all 
                                                          
24 Judasz Tadeusz Krusinski, The History of the Late Revolutions of Persia, 2nd edition 
(London: 1740, Reprinted in 1973, New York: ARNO Press), 2: 141.  Krusinski’s 
statistics are likely high estimates and inaccurate given the roundness of the figures and 
the fact that he claims that equal numbers were taken into captivity.  Nonetheless they are 
telling of the massive bloodshed of the military engagements and the formidability of the 
Armenian military.  
25 Armen Aivazian, The Armenian Rebellion of the 1720s and the Threat of Genocidal 
Reprisal (Yerevan: Center for Policy Analysis, American University of Armenia, 1997), 
20. 
26 Krusinski, The History of the Late Revolutions of Persia, 178.  On the likely inflation 
of the statistics see ft. 21. 





Armenians in the Empire.  A Mekhitarist Armenian Friar wrote a note to the Armenian 
Abbott General in Venice claiming that Sultan Ahmet III ordered the annihilation 
(pnachinch) of the Armenian population on suspicion of their disloyalty.  The Ottoman 
Şeyh ül-İslam did not agree to it.  But it caused the Armenian patriarch enough anxiety to 
call off persecutions of Catholic Armenians lest he incur the suspicions of the sultan of an 
Armenian uprising occurring within the Ottoman Empire.28  
Beyond the context of interdynastic conflict there is little evidence that the 
Ottoman military perpetrated widespread violence against Christians in Eastern Anatolia.  
This is not to say that the Ottoman administration and local Muslim groups did not 
subject Armenians in some regions to oppression, particularly in the form of heavy tax-
collection.  The greatest instances of Ottoman brutality against the Armenians between 
the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries occurred almost exclusively in Transcaucasia, at 
various times between 1550 and 1600 and between 1722 and 1736, during times when 
the Armenians had the most military power.  Similar incidents may also have occurred in 
Erzurum and Van in the early sixteenth century at a time when the regions had become 
the center of conflict between the Ottomans and Safavids, and during the early 
seventeenth century when the Ottoman military sought to oust a renegade military 
commander with whom many Armenians had allied. 
The Ottomans did not generally seek to destroy the Christians of Eastern 
Anatolia, but to restructure their society so as to accommodate it within the Ottoman 
                                                          
28 Ibid., 28-29.  The evidence that Aivazian has that there were threats by the Ottomans of 
“genocidal reprisal” against the Armenians is weak.  Even if the sultan did desire to 
massacre Armenians in areas other than the Caucasus, his own ministers did not appear to 
be willing to carry his orders out.  It appears that references to killing Armenians in the 





political system.  Both Selim I (1512-1520) and Süleyman I (1520-1566) sought to 
dissolve Armenian power blocs in Eastern Anatolia, enticing and forcing Armenians in 
the east to migrate west in order to populate Istanbul and form a new base of Armenian 
social power.  The policy was successful, and by 1604 the Armenian population of 
Istanbul and its environs was approximately forty thousand.29 
However, once the Ottomans had managed to drive the Persians from the 
Erzurum and Van regions in the mid-sixteenth centuries and secure some degree of 
control over the regions, they allowed the Armenians to return to their lands and to 
rebuild their collapsed economies.  The most prominent example of this is the city of 
Erzurum that had been predominantly Armenian during the fifteenth century when it was 
under the control of the Ak Koyunlu dynasty.  Completely destroyed in 1523, with its 
population scattered by Kızılbaş and Georgian troops, the Ottomans managed to rebuild 
the city between 1541 and 1591, establishing it as one of their main military garrisons in 
the east, and modestly repopulate it.  An Ottoman defter records the population of the city 
in 1591 as about 600, sixty-six percent non-Muslim (probably mostly Armenians) and 
thirty-four percent Muslim.  Also, many of the mahalles (living quarters) in the city and 
its environs were mixed Muslim and Christian.30  Kouymjian describes the region around 
Lake Van as the “most thriving center of Armenian culture in the fifteenth century, and 
perhaps the sixteenth century too.”  The region of Muş was well protected by local 
Kurdish groups “who were praised at least by the local Armenians as being 
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In spite of the fighting between the Ottoman military and Abaza Mehmet Paşa in 
the 1620s that resulted in the death or removal of many locals, Sultan Murad IV sought to 
repatriate seven thousand Armenians from Istanbul to Eastern Anatolia during the 1630s 
in order to form a base of loyalists there and to replace the population.32  When Evliya 
Çelebi visited the city Erzurum in 1645, he described the city as a flourishing center of 
trade with the third busiest customs station in the Empire after Istanbul and Izmir.33  
The Ottomans do not seem to have regarded the Assyrian Christian groups in 
southeastern Anatolia as a major threat.  By the time the Ottomans arrived in the region 
the Assyrians were relatively few in number compared to Muslim Kurdish groups.  
Several accounts of American and British missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century 
report that many of the Assyrian groups were rent-seeking clans with military power, 
particularly in the Hakkari region, which suggests that the Ottomans allowed them, like 
many of the Kurdish groups inhabiting geographically rugged terrain in the Ottoman 
domains, to enjoy a semiautonomous existence on the condition that they did not ally 
with the Persians. 
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The Relationship Between the Ottomans and the  
Christian Clergy in the East 
When the Ottomans first took over Eastern Anatolia in the early sixteenth century, 
the religious hierarchies were well-established in Armenian and Assyrian societies.  
These hierarchies generally functioned as a source of social cohesion among different 
interest groups, although sometimes privileging one group over the other.  The 
hierarchies also often served in some cases as vehicles through which select individuals 
could gain access to social status, political and social power, and wealth.  They were self-
enforcing and took measures to ensure that their members remained loyal, ostracizing, at 
best, and sometimes physically harming, at worst, those who did not. 
By virtue of their laws requiring the non-Muslims to pay an additional tax, the 
Ottomans had little interest in converting these Christian groups en masse to Islam, 
although they did encourage conversion where they perceived them to be posing a threat.  
Similarly, in view of the social and economic privileges that attachment to the religious 
structure could provide and also out of fear of punishment from the religious hierarchy, 
the Christians had little incentive to convert to Islam, even though this would have been 
accepted by their Muslim overlords and may have allowed them access to a different set 
of social privileges.  Nonetheless in some instances Armenians and other eastern 
Christians did convert to Islam of their own will, often as a means of gaining legal 
protection from the Muslim courts against the persecution of high-ranking Christian elites 
or out of hopes of enhancing their social status in their immediate communities.  For 
instance John-Shushdak Vartabedian, a leader of the Armenian Paulician sect which was 
popular among Armenians around Muş and Erzurum but which was persecuted by the 





prosecution in the Armenian Gregorian courts.34  A great number of Armenians in the 
Trabzon and Erzurum regions, known as Hemshin, converted to Islam towards the end of 
the eighteenth century in order to alleviate themselves from burdensome taxation and 
persecution by local Muslim derebeys (the title assumed by local Muslim potentates who 
protected the land and collected taxes).  Some still practiced Christianity in secret, others 
assimilated completely, and some even rose to positions of local political power as 
derebeys.35 Hence the Ottomans did not try to dissolve the social power that the religious 
hierarchies derived from their communities.  Instead they attempted to harness it under 
their control for their own political purposes.  Also, since there were many other greater 
potential threats from both Europe and Persia, the Ottomans hoped to obtain legitimacy 
from these groups and prevent them from being a source of internal opposition. 
Particularly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottomans were 
either unaware of the theological divisions between the various Christian communities or 
simply did not consider them a threat.  In an agreement with Francis I in 1534, Sultan 
Süleyman I recognized capitulatory rights to foreign Catholics traveling and residing in 
the Ottoman Empire, including the rights to establish missions in the Empire, build 
schools, and convert other Christians to Catholicism.  They were also exempted from 
taxation and the stipulations of sharia law.36  The Ottomans always tolerated conversions 
of Armenian Gregorians and Assyrian Christians to Catholicism and even accepted as 
                                                          
34 Leon Arpee, The Armenian Awakening: A History of the Armenian Church 1820-1860 
(New York: The Armenian Missionary Association of America, 1946), 67. 
35 Hovann H. Simonian, “Hemshin from Islamicization to the End of the Nineteenth 
Century,” in Hemshin: History, Society, and Identity in the Highlands of Northeast 
Turkey, ed. idem. (London: Routledge, 2007), 57, 74-75, 82. 
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milletbaşıs clerics that were in favor of union with the Catholic church.  For instance a 
pro-Catholic cleric Tovma Beriatsi usurped the office of patriarch in 1658 by promising 
to pay ten times the regular tribute that previous Armenian clerics had paid to the 
sultan.37   
Armenian Catholics in the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries generally appeared to enjoy “relative freedom and stability in the practice of 
their religion.”38  Whatever violence the Ottomans perpetrated against Catholic 
Armenians, such as that which occurred against the Armenian Catholic community in 
Nakhchevan in the sixteenth century, was largely the result of military action against the 
Safavids rather than of any particular bias against Armenian Catholics.39  However, 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ottomans seem to have begun to 
perceive the Catholics as more of a potential threat.  Evidence of this lies in the fact that 
they were slow to intervene in order to prevent the Gregorian Armenian clerics from 
persecuting, arresting, and even killing Armenian Catholics.  Furthermore the Ottomans 
denied the Armenian Catholics’ repeated bids for separate jurisdictional authority 
throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for which they often had the 
backing of French diplomats, until 1831, two years after they suffered a crushing defeat 
at the hands of the Russians in the 1828-1829 war.40 
The Ottomans allowed the Nestorian and Jacobite Christians located mostly in 
Eastern Anatolia, Iraq, Cilicia, and Syria, to practice their religions freely.  As they did 
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not constitute a majority of the population over any vast territorial expanse and the fact 
that many of them dwelled in enclaves that were difficult to access, the Ottomans did not 
believe them capable of leveraging significant social power against them.  They appeared 
content to allow the Mar Shimun, the head of the Nestorian church, to administer the civil 
and religious affairs of the Nestorian meliks (local potentates) and rayahs (local 
peasantry) from his headquarters in Qodchanis (not far from the town of Hakkari) in the 
rugged mountains of southeastern Anatolia.  Additionally Nestorian groups in the 
Hakkari region41 and Jacobite groups42 in Tur Abidin (comprising Mardin and Midyat) 
appeared to be largely self-sustaining both politically and militarily, and were 
independent of foreign rule, an indication that the Ottomans were never greatly interested 
in attempting to dissolve their power further than it had already dissolved by the activities 
of local non-Ottoman Muslim groups in the region.  However, by the early nineteenth 
century these groups’ only political and legal recourse was through the Armenian millet 
until the Ottomans created a separate Catholic Assyrian (Chaldean) millet in 184443 and a 
                                                          
41 Numerous European travelers to the region in the 1830s and 1840s report that the 
Nestorians in several areas around Hakkari were armed and conducted raids on 
neighboring Muslim and Christian villages.  See Asahel Grant, The Nestorians, or, The 
Lost Tribes (New York; London: John Murray, 1841), 188; Justin Perkins, A Residence of 
Eight Years in Persia among the Nestorian Christians: With Notices of the 
Muhammedans (New York: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell, 1843), 501; Henry Ross, Letters 
from the East, ed. Janet Ross (London: J.M. Dent & Co., 1902), 61-62. 
42 Southgate reports that the Jacobites of Tur Abidin were able to fend off attacks by 
outsiders by “force of arms.”  Horatio Southgate, Narrative of a Tour through Armenia, 
Kurdistan, Persia, and Mesopotamia (London: Tilt and Bogue, 1840), 2:268.  Also see 
Michel Chevalier, Les Montagnards Chrétiens du Hakkâri et du Kurdistan Septentrional 
[The Mountain Christians of Hakkari and of Northern Kurdistan] (Paris: Université du 
Sorbonne, 1985), 207. 
43 John Joseph, The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters with Western 





Jacobite millet in 1882.44  They Ottomans also did not interfere with the spread of 
Catholicism in southeastern Anatolia starting in the sixteenth century.  If anything, 
Catholicism divided the Christians against each other, thus weakening their potential to 
mobilize opposition against the Ottomans.45 
 
Loyalty and Opposition to the Ottoman State 
and Iran Among the Armenian Clergy46 
 
The history of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire reveals instances of both 
loyalty and opposition on the part of the clergy to the Ottoman state, sometimes even on 
the part of the same individual at different times.  Two factors help explain these patterns 
of loyalty and opposition among the Christian clerics of the eastern churches. 
First, the Armenian Gregorian religious institution did not function as an 
institution that was independent of the interests of its different constituents.  Before the 
advent of the Ottomans, the Armenian church had long provided the structural foundation 
for social order among the Armenian people.  It followed the Armenians wherever they 
went and became an agent of linguistic, religious, and cultural preservation, instilling the 
Armenians with a loose “national character.”47  The church also played a role in binding 
Armenians together across broad geographical spaces and different social strata.  
However, the selection process for high clerical office in the church had long involved 
                                                          
44 Joseph, Muslim-Christian Relations and Inter-Christian Rivalries in the Middle East: 
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45 Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 55-58. 
46 This section will not cover the Assyrian clergymen due to the paucity of resources on 
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Armenian laymen,48 including both the wealthy Armenian business class and local 
Armenian potentates (who came to be known by a number of different titles including 
melik and ishkhan).49 
The interests of different business elites and potentates often clashed, sometimes 
even resulting in violence.  Moreover, the cleavages in Armenian society were not 
necessarily along a business elite/potentate dichotomy as the two classes were sometimes 
divided among themselves.  Generally speaking, Armenian power holders in Eastern 
Anatolia, Cilicia, and the Caucasus tended to favor Muslim rulers when they derived their 
power and wealth from the Muslims’ political strength.  Potentates who were weakened 
as a result of the political and military strength of the Ottomans or the Persians (such as 
the Armenians living under Persian rule in Transcaucasia) tended to be more prone to 
political opposition.  There was no one geographical location where Armenian potentate 
groups were consistently in favor of or against Ottoman and Persian rule.  However, the 
majority of Armenian political opposition movements between the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries formed in Transcaucasia, the reasons for which will be discussed 
later.  Likewise, business elites who derived wealth from a strong Ottoman or strong 
Persian economy tended to favor the state, while business elites who derived their wealth 
from outside sources—who usually lived abroad—tended to be more prone to political 
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opposition against the Ottomans and Persians. 
All the lay classes of Gregorian Armenians tended to revere the hierarchical 
structure of the Armenian Gregorian church and saw it as a source of ethno-religious 
legitimacy and order.  Yet they were frequently in conflict over the choice of which cleric 
was to hold positions of religious power, since the clergy tended to act in the interests of 
their patrons and constituents.  Hence their loyalties to the Ottoman state or lack thereof 
depended upon who their major Armenian backers were.  The sheer competition among 
Armenian interest groups over power within the hierarchical religious structure 
significantly blunted whatever force of political opposition they might be able to muster 
against the Ottoman state. 
The second factor that explains patterns of loyalty and opposition to the Ottoman 
state among Armenians was their proximity to the centers of Ottoman political power.  
Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and arguably even in the seventeenth 
century, the Ottomans sought to restructure the hierarchy of power in the Armenian 
Gregorian church so as to make it function in tandem with state interests.  They did this 
by gradually centering authority in the position of the Armenian patriarchate of Istanbul.  
In the Armenian ecclesiastical hierarchy the patriarch of Istanbul was “little more than a 
local bishop,” whose sociopolitical authority was purely the creation of the sultan,50 but 
by the mid-seventeenth century his civil and religious authority over the Armenian 
community in the Ottoman Empire had grown significantly.  He had power over the 
Catholicos of Sis in Cilicia and the Catholicos of Aghtamar in the Van region, despite 
                                                          





being below them in ecclesiastical rank.51  Even the supreme Catholicos of Echmiadzin, 
the highest ranking ecclesiastical authority in the Gregorian church, who resided there 
under the authority of the Persian Khanate of Yerevan 1639 to 1829 and under Russian 
authority from 1829 until WWI, came to need the Armenian Patriarch’s stamp of 
approval for ecclesiastical appointments within the Ottoman Empire.52  In general clerics 
who lived near the center of power tended to favor the state, whereas those who lived 
away from the center of power were more susceptible to pressure to involve themselves 
in waves of political opposition. 
The Ottomans did not have full control over who would be appointed to the 
patriarchate and allowed him to be appointed by election.  Yet by the mid-sixteenth 
century it was evident that the patriarchs of Istanbul and Jerusalem and the Catholicos of 
Sis and of Aghtamar could not be appointed without Ottoman confirmation.53  However, 
the Ottoman authorities, as well as the Armenian religious authorities, often proved to be 
venal, granting clerical confirmations and appointments to the highest bidder. It was 
sometimes through such channels that individuals who secretly opposed the Ottomans 
managed to obtain positions of clerical power in the Empire.  For instance Hovannes 
Tutunji of Van, a collaborator with the businessman Mahdesi Murat of Bitlis, an 
Armenian businessman and conspirator against the Ottoman Empire, who lived in 
France, was able to buy his way into the office of patriarch of Istanbul (1663-1664 and 
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1665-1667) and of Catholicos of Aghtamar (1670-1672).54  The Ottomans did sometimes 
forcibly remove people from the patriarchate of whom they did not, or ceased to, 
approve; thus in 1649, Sultan Murad IV removed Patriarch Asdvadzadur from the 
patriarchate, but reinstated him the following year.55  In general the patriarchs at Istanbul 
did not side overtly with Armenian opposition movements. 
Between the sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Armenian political 
opposition movements were strongest in Transcaucasia and to a lesser extent in Cilicia.  
Armenian political activists were long aware that they lacked the numbers and strength to 
raise a military force by themselves that could feasibly take on the Ottoman or Persian 
armies.  Therefore their political strategy continually involved seeking to garner support 
from external political forces in Europe and Russia to help liberate the Armenians from 
Muslim rule. 
During the sixteenth century the most notable opposition movements were headed 
by clerics in Echmiadzin and Sis.  In 1547 Stepanos Salmastetsi, Catholicos of 
Echmiadzin, traveled to Europe with an Armenian delegation to meet with Pope Julius 
III, Emperor Charles V, and King Sigismund II of Poland to ask for their help to liberate 
the Armenians.  He even made a pledge of union with the Catholic church, since the Pope 
made this a precondition for any sort of political alliance.56  His successor Mikael 
Sebastatsi met secretly with some Armenian clerics in his hometown of Sivas to organize 
a mission to Venice in 1562.  Catholicos Tadeos conducted a third mission to Europe in 
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1575.  The Catholicos of Sis, who was ecclesiastically subordinate to the Catholicos of 
Echmiadzin, also sought the intervention of the Pope in 1575.  While the Armenians had 
the sympathies of European kings and clergymen, these missions were to little avail.57  It 
is unclear how much the Ottomans knew of these missions, but many Armenians feared 
Ottoman knowledge of their activities.  For instance Mikael Sebastatsi’s emissary, Abgar 
of Tokat in central Anatolia, delayed his return from Venice to the Ottoman Empire for 
fear of capture by the Ottomans, but eventually returned in 1566.58 
The long political struggle between the Ottomans and insurgents in Eastern 
Anatolia and between Ottomans and Persians in the Caucasus between 1603 and 1639 led 
to the complete change of the social and political distribution of the Armenians in the 
region.  Shah Abbas’ deportation of some “one hundred thousand” people living in the 
Caucasus and parts of northeastern Anatolia, including Armenians, Jews, and Muslims, to 
other parts of Persia significantly altered socioeconomic and political life in the 
Transcaucasian Armenian community, incidentally preventing the Catholicos of 
Echmiadzin from collecting the finances needed to form delegations to Europe and the 
power to wield centripetal force to unite different Armenian interest groups in 
Transcaucasia, including merchants and meliks.59 
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After the Ottomans and Persians concluded the Treaty of Zohab in 1639, which 
effectively ended Ottoman-Safavid hostilities until 1722 and established a fixed border 
line with Echmiadzin and Yerevan under Persian control, the Armenian clerical 
establishment was able to regain some order and social strength, but it faced increasing 
difficulty in forming a united bloc of political opposition against the Ottomans.  Hakob 
Jughayetsi, Catholicos of Echmiadzin 1655-1680, spent much of his tenure trying to 
outbid his rival Eghiazer Aintaptsi, who was attempting to sever the patriarchates of 
Jerusalem and Istanbul from the jurisdictional authority of Echmiadzin, in securing 
recognition of supreme ecclesiastic authority from the Ottoman authorities, largely 
through bribes, gifts, and mediation from wealthy Armenian financiers.60  However, in 
1678 he collaborated secretly with local meliks in Transcaucasia to organize a delegation 
to Europe to petition the Pope to help the Armenians achieve independence from the 
Safavids and Ottomans.  His delegation spent a considerable time in Istanbul, on the way 
to Europe, trying to persuade Armenians there to support his cause, but to little avail.  His 
death in 1680 put an end to the movement.  After his election as Catholicos of 
Echmiadzin in 1681, Eghiazer Aintaptsi also attempted to persuade the Pope to intervene, 
but to no avail.61 
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Between 1691, the year of Aintaptsi’s death, and 1736, the year when the Persians 
under the leadership of Nader Shah of the Afsharid dynasty regained control over 
Transcaucasia, meliks were the main Armenians involved in political activism.  Israel 
Ori, the son of an Armenian melik from Zangezur in the southern Caucasus, single-
handedly promoted Hakob Jughayetsi’s campaign to shore up support from European 
religious and civic leaders in Venice, France, Prussia, Vienna, and Russia for an 
Armenian liberation movement in Transcaucasia and Eastern Anatolia between 1678 and 
1708.  Some European leaders, notably Peter the Great of Russia, expressed interest in 
helping him take control of Transcaucasia, but did not follow through because they were 
involved in other more pressing political matters at the time.  Nonetheless, Ori’s idea of 
rallying the political support of multiple foreign groups gained popularity among the 
meliks in Transcaucasia, helping bridge the political rifts between many of them.  
However, Nahabed I (1691-1705), the Catholicos at Echmiadzin did not support Ori’s 
plan.62 
The degree to which the Catholicos in Transcaucasia was in favor of either 
supporting or opposing the various Muslim governments seems to have depended largely 
on the extent to which he derived status and wealth from the policies of the Muslim 
governors. The Safavids had granted the Catholicos of Echmiadzin several privileges at 
various times, including the rights to collect taxes from Armenian subjects, to travel 
freely, and hold civil and legal authority over all Armenians throughout Safavid-held 
                                                          
62 George Bournoutian, “Eastern Armenia from the Seventeenth Century to the Russian 
Annexation,” in The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, ed. Richard 
Hovannisian (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 2: 86-87; Libaridian, “The Ideology 





domains, in order to win their loyalties.  The Ottomans also attempted to curry favor with 
the Catholicoses of Echmiadzin, offering them “gifts and certificates of investiture.”63  
However, after the fall of the Safavids in 1722, and conflict arose in Transcaucasia, the 
economic and political future of the office of Catholicos became more uncertain.  Local 
Muslim and non-Muslim groups, including Lezgis, Kurds, and Persians, sought to usurp 
church lands that had formerly been protected by the Safavids.  When Peter the Great 
launched a military campaign against a weak and declining Safavid Persia in 1722, he 
was warmly welcomed by many Armenian meliks, some of whom had long sought his 
intervention.  However, whatever hopes of political liberation some of them may have 
had were dashed when he ceded Transcaucasia to the Ottomans in 1723.  This caused 
some leading Armenian military elites, most notably David Beg and Esayi Hasan-
Jalalian, to seek a measure of unity among the Armenian meliks in Kapan and Karabakh, 
to ally with the Persians, and wage war against the invading Ottomans.  The Armenian 
clergy were at this point divided over whether to play an activist or quietist role.  Some 
such as Hasan-Jalalian who was Catholicos of the episcopal see of Gandzasar (located in 
Karabakh) and from one of the most powerful melik families in Karabakh, was 
committed to political activism.  In addition, Asdvadzadur I (1715-1725), the Catholicos 
of Echmiadzin, corresponded secretly with Armenian rebel troops and led one of their 
platoons.64  However, as other interest groups bet on Ottoman victory, especially the 
many Armenian businessmen who had made secret deals with the Ottomans during the 
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conflict between 1722 and1727, some clerics chose to follow suit and remain aloof and 
apolitical.65 
After Nader Shah restored Transcaucasia to Persian control by 1736, new 
contracts were gradually formed between the Armenian church and the Persian 
government.  Karim Khan of the Zand dynasty (1750-1779), one of Nader Shah’s 
generals, sought to prevent rival dynasties in Iran from rising to power by dissolving the 
land holdings of locals and redistributing it among local loyalists.  He granted the petition 
of Simeon Yerevantsi (Simeon I), Catholicos of Echmiadzin from 1763 to 1780, through 
imperial decree (ferman) to purchase back the lands that had been seized by khans during 
the political turmoil of earlier decades.66  This enabled Simeon I to amass wealth at 
Echmiadzin and invest in a number of economic and social projects, including the 
establishment of a printing press and a paper mill.  He commended the Persians for 
minimizing the opposition against him, which included banning Catholic missionaries, to 
whose influence he was vehemently opposed, from establishing schools and preaching in 
the region.67 
Because of his good relations with the Persian monarchy, Simeon I was less prone 
to support Joseph Emin’s political activities against the Persians and Ottomans.  An 
Armenian political activist from a family of traders in Calcutta, Joseph Emin traveled 
throughout Russia, Transcaucasia, and Eastern Anatolia between 1761 and 1769 to try to 
gather support for the liberation of Armenians from Muslim rule.  He openly criticized 
Armenian clerics in the Ottoman and Persian political domains as “wolves who pretend 
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outwardly to be disciples of our Saviour, but…have always been instrumental in the 
downfal [sic] of our harmless nation, and who are no better than tools in the hands of 
infidels.”68  Although Simeon I may have initially supported Emin, at least according to 
Emin’s own account,69 he later came out strongly against him and was the target of the 
criticism of Emin and others.  In his autobiography Emin cites the Assyrian cleric 
Johannes vartabed who accused Simeon Yerevantsi of “fastening more strongly the 
chains of slavery on the Armenians and Assyrians when prince Emin was…[trying] to set 
those two miserable nations free.”70  Notwithstanding Simeon I’s opposition to his 
activities, Emin managed to draw the support of a number of lower ranking, yet still 
influential, Armenian clergy in Karabakh, Catholicos Johannes of Gandzasar, and Muş, 
Archbishop Jonah (Hovnan) of Surp Garabet Monastery (St. John the Baptist 
Monastery).71 
Simeon I’s successor Ghugas of Erzurum (Garin) (1780-1799) attempted to 
distribute power more evenly among Armenian clerics in the region.  By the time of his 
death in 1799 a number of clerics with different political interests had managed to gain 
power.  Between 1799 and 1828, when the Qajars formally ceded Yerevan to Russia, 
three main tendencies among clerics could be identified: advocacy of political neutrality 
and quietism, advocacy for Russian intervention to create a self-governing political 
territory for the Armenians in Transcaucasia, and advocacy of continued relations with 
Persia to maintain the status quo.  Russia and Iran each backed different candidates for 
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the office of Catholicos of Echmiadzin.  In 1799 the Russian-backed Hovsep Arghutiun 
was elected Catholicos; he had long promoted Russian intervention to decrease the power 
of rival meliks in Karabakh, Kapan, and Zangezur, and to alleviate the Armenians from 
the “cruel and unjust treatment” at the hand of the Persians,72 but he died in 1801 and was 
never formally confirmed as Catholicos.  His successor was the Persian-backed David 
Gurghanian, whom the pro-Russian Lazarian family ousted in 1807.  By then the church 
was in severe financial straits due in large part to the factionalism among clerics. 
With the election of the politically neutral Efrem of Tsoragegh as Catholicos in 
1809 (who would remain in the position until 1830) some order was restored in the 
church and the religious establishment at Echmiadzin remained politically neutral during 
the political turmoil between Iran and Russia between 1809 and 1828.73  Nonetheless 
some lower ranking clerics continued to drum up support among Armenians for Russian 
intervention.  Nerses Ashtaraketsi, a mere bishop in the Gregorian church at the time, 
started rallying up Armenian sympathies for a self-governing Armenian territory in 1813.  
His activism was most pronounced during the 1826-1828 Russo-Persian war when he 
called upon Armenians to fight “in the service of the holy Russian Emperor” and “shed 
[their] blood to its last drop.”74  After Russia took Transcaucasia, however, Czar Nicholas 
assumed the title of ‘King of Armenia’ and brought the Armenian-inhabited territories 
into the Russian Empire.75  Prince Paskevich accused Ashtaraketsi of attempting sedition 
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in 1828 and had him exiled to Bessarabia.  However, by 1836 the Russians had 
implemented the policy of Polozheniya, granting the Armenian Gregorian church 
sovereignty over its confessional community in religious and civic affairs.76 
Instances of Armenian clerical political activism in Transcaucasia between the 
sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries exhibit two main themes. The first was the idea 
of an autonomous self-governing Armenian territory, to be created with the help of 
outside military power, a notion which had been in existence since the mid-sixteenth 
century and was promoted by clerics.  Although the idea was at first centered around the 
principle that the Armenian clergy would govern the affairs of this autonomous territory, 
influential lay activists such as Israel Ori and Joseph Emin, and perhaps also the 
Catholicos Hovsep Arghutiun,77 promoted the idea that the rights to governorship and 
enfranchisement should be based more on ethnicity than religion alone, an idea which 
many clerics found unappealing.  Second, it shows that the Gregorian Armenian church 
could be manipulated as a vehicle of political activism.  However, the phenomenon of 
Armenian political activism was largely unsuccessful, since the Armenians were divided 
into several different interest groups who often clashed, while individual clergy were 
beholden to different groups. Of course, the eventual seizure of Transcaucasia by the 
Russians was attributable less to Armenian political activism than to Russia’s own 
geopolitical ambitions.  
Armenian clerical activism was most pronounced in Transcaucasia for three 
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reasons.  First political and military power was more concentrated in Armenian hands 
there, particularly in the melikdoms of Kapan, Karabakh, and Zangezur, than in any other 
Armenian-inhabited regions.  Since the melik families in those regions had great 
influence over the appointments of individuals to high-ranking offices in the Armenian 
church, many clerics tended to be more prone to political activism and opposition.  
Second, Transcaucasia experienced more political instability than other regions.  The 
region went backwards and forwards several times between the Persians and the 
Ottomans between 1501 and 1736, and political power in Iran changed hands several 
times between dynasties between 1736 and 1828.  Consequently the inhabitants of 
Transcaucasia, including the clergy, had a heightened political consciousness.  Even the 
quietism of the clerics can be interpreted as more of a conscious political choice rather 
than an inert aloofness from politics.  Third, Vagharshapat monastery at Echmiadzin, 
which housed the supreme Catholicos, was much more independent of state control than 
the Armenian patriarchate of Istanbul.  The relationship between the Catholicos of 
Echmiadzin and the Shah of Iran was always much looser and more tenuous than that 
between the sultan/Sublime Porte and the Armenian patriarchs of Istanbul.  Embedded 
within the Ottoman millet system was a much stronger state-subordinated hierarchy of 
power than the less consistent/more erratic policies of the various Persian dynasties 
toward non-Muslims.  This was also the case in relation to Muslim clerics.  The ulema 
(Muslim religious scholars) of the Ottoman Empire were much more incorporated into 





eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.78 
Armenian political activism in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries was far less pronounced than in Transcaucasia.  The most 
politically active Armenian groups in the Ottoman Empire were located in Cilicia and 
Eastern Anatolia, although these groups tended not to involve the clergy, with the 
exception of Archbishop Jonah of the St. Garabet Monastery at Muş in the mid-
eighteenth century.  The main reason for the lack of clerical involvement was that the 
Armenian patriarch of Istanbul had a strong grip on the Armenian Gregorian religious 
establishment and strongly discouraged any clerical engagement in political activity that 
was not directly relevant to the affairs of the Armenian millet.  Even Cilicia, where the 
Armenian clerics had been most politically active during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, had become politically quiet by the eighteenth century, largely because the 
Ajapahian family paid the sultan to recognize their hereditary position as Catholicos of 
Sis by imperial decree between 1731 and 1865.  In addition the local Muslim derebeys 
kept their political activities in check and were known to assault or kill leaders whom 
they suspected of disloyalty.79 
Yet why were the patriarchs of Istanbul generally loyal to the Ottoman sultan, 
when the Catholicos of Echmiadzin was not always loyal to the Persians?  The answer 
lies partly in the fact that the patriarchate was located in Istanbul, in close proximity to 
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the center of Ottoman state power and at the same time very far away from any centers of 
Armenian physical power, such as the semimilitant Armenian groups in Transcaucasia 
and parts of Eastern Anatolia.  But it also lies in the fact that the base of constituents 
involved in the selection of candidates for the patriarchal election became increasingly 
limited to a select group of Armenian business elites who came to known by the title of 
amira by the mid-eighteenth century.  
Groups of Armenians had long been involved in lucrative trading networks.  They 
had also long pooled money that was loaned out to debtors.  Merchants and financiers, 
known by the titles of çelebis, hocas, and mahdesi, during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries were sometimes involved in political activities against the Ottomans, especially 
those living outside the Empire.  However, by the mid-eighteenth century a group of 
Armenian elites living in western Anatolia and Istanbul (who came to be known as the 
amira class) had become increasingly reliant on the Ottoman state system for their wealth 
and status.  This group of Armenian elites played a very prominent role in the Ottoman 
economy: many of them owned and managed shipyards, weapons production facilities, 
trade routes, the imperial mint, architectural firms, and other industries that fueled the 
Ottoman economic and administrative apparatus.  A number of them had managed to 
amass large amounts of capital by acting as bankers (sarraf), providing capital for and 
collecting interest on the Ottoman taxation system (iltizam), and as merchants selling 
commodities for cash.80   Between the mid-eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth 
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century they managed to outbid most non-Armenian competition and phase out external 
influence in the politics of the Armenian millet.  Between 1810 and 1845 they had a near 
monopoly of power over affairs in the Armenian millet and largely controlled the 
succession to the patriarchate of Istanbul. 
By the early nineteenth century some amiras had gained considerable influence 
over political decision-making in the Ottoman Empire.  For instance Harutyun Amira 
Bezjian, who oversaw the mint in the 1820s, convinced Sultan Mahmud II, with whom he 
had a close personal relationship,81 to reverse an imperial edict (ferman) requiring 
Armenians to register their properties with the Ottoman ministry of evkaf (religious 
endowments).82  In addition the sultan took advice on monetary policy from Bezjian, who 
proposed devaluing the currency by mixing silver with copper to help cover the costs of 
the Ottoman-Russian war 1828-1829, over his other Muslim adviser Reshid Mehmet 
Paşa.  The sultan also provided him protection from enemies who threatened to kill him 
and awarded him a medal of honor.83  The political power that the amiras had in the 
Ottoman state, however, was limited.  Both sultans Selim III and Mahmud II had amiras, 
whom they suspected of disloyalty, killed.  The most famous case occurred in 1819 when 
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Halet Efendi accused the Duzian brothers, Catholic Armenians who had control over the 
mint and to whom the former was deeply indebted, of embezzlement of funds, eventually 
leading Sultan Mahmud II to decide to confiscate their wealth and hang them.84 
 
Power-Sharing Between Local  
Muslims and non-Muslims 
 
Armenians living Zeytun, Müküs, Çatak, Van, Hınıs, Sasun, and Çapakçur 
(Bingöl); Assyrian Jacobites living in Tur Abidin (south of Mardin); and Assyrian 
Nestorians living Tkhouma and Tiyari (in the Hakkari regions) had since the advent of 
the Ottomans been more or less self-governing.  These groups were remnants of 
collapsed Christian dynasties that had existed before the Muslim conquest of Anatolia.  
Their relative independence can be attributed to three major factors.  First, they were 
socially organized and their elites had extensive networks, often through the media of 
religion and trade.  Second, they possessed remarkable survival and military skills and 
were able to fend off Kurdish groups from completely dominating them.  The third and 
perhaps most important reason for their existence as semiautonomous political entities is 
that the Ottomans granted them semiautonomy as an incentive to remain loyal and not 
join local domestic or foreign opposition groups.  There is no record that the Ottomans 
officially granted non-Muslims hükümets and yurtluk-ocaklık lands, but they enjoyed 
relatively long periods of de facto semiautonomy from the state. 
In some cases the Ottomans devolved power into the hands of Christian military 
elites in order to entice them to not join in the widespread Celali rebellions against the 
Ottoman state in the early seventeenth century.  In 1626 Sultan Murad IV decreed that the 
                                                          





Armenians in Zeytun were “to be exempted from the haraç tax, since they are difficult to 
access being located in a rugged and mountainous area, and to pay the Ayasofya treasury 
a yearly tax of fifteen thousand kuruş and their church a yearly tax of fifteen thousand 
kuruş….  No Ottoman officer is to be found in the region and no one passing by the 
region is to stay the night.  Their freedom and beliefs are to be inviolate and they are 
allowed by law to govern themselves.”85 
The Armenians in the Cilician enclave of Zeytun (near modern-day Saimbeyli) 
were arguably the largest and strongest Armenian semiautonomous group in Ottoman 
Empire.  During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they were militarily strong 
enough to hold out against the local Kurdish and Turcoman groups and may have 
expanded their control to some lower lying areas; however, not much beyond Zeytun.  By 
1740 the Armenian inhabitants of Zeytun were mining the mountains for metal to be able 
to manufacture their own guns.86  Their military organization was strong enough to 
maintain their independence well into the nineteenth century.  Such was their strength 
and organization that the Ottoman government even enlisted their help against a Kurdish 
revolt in Akçadağ, north of Zeytun, in 1849.  The Zeytuntsi Armenians agreed to send a 
reinforcement of four hundred militants on the condition that they “not be mixed in with 
the Ottoman troops and that they fight independently under the command of their 
princes.”87 
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86 Aghassi, Zeîtoun Depuis les Origines Jusqu'à l’Insurrection de 1895 [Zeitoun from its 
Beginnings until the Uprising of 1895], trans. Archag Tchobanian (Paris: Mercure de 
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Many Armenians in the Van and Muş regions managed to hold power alongside 
Kurdish groups throughout the eighteenth century and up until the tanzimat period.  In 
the Van region, including the towns of Van and Erciş, many Armenian elites held what 
appear to be de facto hereditary rights to private property (mülk).88  Armenian elites 
around Erciş were recognized by local groups as Tarkhans, a title signifying their 
independence and exemption from taxes.89  In Van the group appointed by the Ottoman 
Empire to guard the Van fortress (located on the shore of Lake Van), known as the 
Vangüli group,90 was composed of both Kurds and Armenians.  There are a number of 
likely reasons that the Ottomans and local Muslim Kurdish groups exceptionally tolerated 
the participation of Armenians in joint military defense.  First the Armenian Tangovian 
family had historically held the fortress.91  Second, the Armenians had for most of the 
Ottoman period constituted a sizeable number in the region; a near majority in the town 
of Van itself as well as other nearby villages.92  Third, the military might of the 
Armenians at Van was probably lesser than that of the Ottomans and local Muslim 
groups but formidable enough to wear thin assailant groups making them more 
vulnerable to their local rivals.  For the Ottomans, the nearby Persian threat was greater 
than that of the Armenians at Van, and for local Kurdish groups, the threat of other rival 
Kurdish groups was more pressing than weakening local Armenian military strength.  
Kurdish groups used the Armenians to their military advantage against other rival 
                                                          
88 Ghazarian, Arevmtahayeri, 85. 
89 Hagop Shahbazian, Kyurto-Hay Badmutyun [Kurdish-Armenian History] (Istanbul: 
Dbaran Araks, 1911), 71. 
90 Ibid., 72-74.  Vangüli literally means of Lake Van. 
91 Ibid., 71. 
92 Khachatur Badalyan, “Vani Nahange 1840-akan 1914 tt.” [The Province of Van from 






The paucity of sources makes it difficult to determine the origins of the Vangüli 
defense organization and its origins.  According to Hampartsum Yeremian, an Armenian 
resident of Van in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Vangülis were 
gradually subsumed into the Ottoman administrative apparatus as they infiltrated Eastern 
Anatolia, but were allowed semiautonomous control over the fortress.  Armenians held 
positions of military power among the Vangülis up until the tanzimat period.  The 
Vangülis were often a thorn in the side of the Ottoman-appointed governor of Van, often 
disregarding his commands.   
Yeremian writes that a select group of local Christian elites held significant power 
over the political and even religious affairs of the city: 
Before the Tanzimat, notables of the city [of Van] were called hojas or şorbans 
[sic]93 and would manage the affairs of the people of the town.  Twelve elected 
officials…also called the onikler [sic]…,94 held the title of hocabaşı….  They 
were the amiras of the region…who would sometimes even extend their authority 
over a number of regional Kurds.  Each prior of the monastery, and even the 
Catholicos of Aghtamar, was chosen by the vote of a society of village meliks.  
They would also administer the episcopate’s affairs under the responsibility of the 
assembly.  The Patriarchate of Istanbul is not able to directly oversee the affairs of 
the region.95 
 
The Armenians in the Sasun region, a group of villages located in a mountainous 
area 50km south of Muş and 80km west of Bitlis, were nearly as strong and independent 
as those in Zeytun.  However, unlike the Zeytuntsis, they shared power with local Kurds.  
                                                          
93 In the Armenian original it is spelled շորպան (transliterated as şorban); however 
Yeremian likely means çoban, an honorary title given to pastoral chiefs. 
94 Here Yeremian writes օնիքլեր (transliterated as onikler) but really means onikiler 
which in Turkish translates as ‘the twelve.’ 
95 Hampartsum Yeramian, Hushartsan Van-Vasburagani [Memoirs of Van-Vaspurakan] 





According to Injijian, a Mekhitarist Armenian geographer from Venice who visited 
Eastern Anatolia between 1800 and 1804, wrote in 1806:  
The residents of [of Sasun] are both Kurds and Armenians and have a freedom 
one in the same.  They are brave and strapping, and appear to have a body of 
stamina, being warrior-like and ferocious….  They are numerous, have always 
been self-governing, and serve no one.  None of the paşas or beys are able to 
conquer them.  They are strong against [outside] force and dwell in fortified 






  Non-Muslim groups in Eastern Anatolia were able to maintain their ethnic and 
religious distinction for a number of reasons: 1) Islamic doctrine bestowed a protected 
status upon Christians and Jews, which became the basis for Ottoman administration, 2) 
the Ottomans either long envisioned a multiethnic and multireligious state or simply 
accepted that tolerance of religious diversity was the only way to feasibly control a large 
expanse of territory, 3) the Ottomans did not perceive Christianity in and of itself to be a 
significant threat, and 4) the Armenian and Assyrian Christians had deep ethnic and 
religious traditions that gave them a strong sense of identity along Armenian and 
Assyrian lines. 
 In spite of the number of Armenians who envisioned and sought liberation for the 
Armenians in Eastern Anatolia from the Ottoman government, this never came to fruition 
because of power struggles within the Armenian community, the dominance of the 
sultan-enabled Western Ottoman Armenians over the affairs of the entire Ottoman 
Armenian community, and the increasing dominance of Muslim Kurdish groups 
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throughout Eastern Anatolia.  Armenians coexisted with the Ottoman state and different 
Muslim groups with a lingering tension.  The collective memory of earlier periods of 
greatness gave many a deep sense of loss; however, Muslim groups had simply grown 
too powerful in most regions for the Armenians to do much about it.  The politically 
conscious elite Armenians had come to accept their roles as financiers, jewelers, 
ecclesiastics, merchants, physicians, and a host of other nonpolitical, nonmilitary paths in 
the Ottoman state, and many took great pleasure in these roles.  It is reasonable to believe 
that the Armenian peasantry, however, lived lives as second-class inhabitants of the 
Empire who were at the mercy of not only Muslim overlords, but also other Armenian 











EASTERN ANATOLIA 1800-1829: INTERNATIONAL 
  
WARFARE, CENTRALIZATION, AND  
 
THE POLITICS OF STABILITY 
 
Before the late eighteenth century, the Ottomans had treated Eastern Anatolia 
largely as a buffer zone between its more economically vital regions—the Mediterranean 
and Black Seas and the steppes of Central Anatolia—and the Iranians, with whom they 
had engaged in ten wars years since 1514 with little to no long lasting territorial 
acquisitions.  One can only speculate what may have happened had the Ottomans 
managed to penetrate, conquer, and hold the Zagros Mountains, the Caucasus, and 
beyond.  The question of whether or not the sultan would have sought and managed to 
integrate Eastern Anatolia more fully into the Ottoman administrative apparatus or not 
remains a mystery.  Nonetheless, it was arguably the stalemate and political tension that 
persisted between Iran and the Ottomans throughout the 1700s (particularly after the rise 
of Nader Shah in 1730) that led the Ottomans to pursue a continued policy of 
decentralization in Eastern Anatolia.  Yet, the rising threat of Russia on its eastern flank, 
continued border disputes with Iran, and power disputes with increasingly powerful local 
elites (whose activities were disrupting the delicate balance of international power 
between the Ottoman Empire and its eastern neighbors) made decentralization an 





and ineffectively undertook measures to dissolve power among the local elites and 
implement a more central order in the region.  The Ottoman struggle to centralize control 
over Eastern Anatolia between 1800 and 1829 was one that resulted in modest success 
but that came with a number of unexpected costs.  The Ottoman administrators’ clumsy 
and rash attempts to impose central order had the inverse effect of making them appear 
unpredictable, unreliable, and untrustworthy.  As a result increasing numbers of Eastern 
Anatolian actors turned to local magnates and to a lesser extent foreign powers as a 
means of developing a lasting stability.  Conflict in Eastern Anatolia during this period 
was centered largely around the questions of who was most capable of providing stability 
and the effectiveness of strong central controls more than the questions of class and 
ethnic and religious affiliations. 
 
The Politics of Decentralization in Eastern Anatolia 
Three main factors explain the continued evolution of the Ottoman Empire as a 
decentralized state throughout the 1700s.  First, the Janissary military corps had become 
corrupt, dysfunctional, expensive, unruly, and ineffective in combat against Russia, 
Austria, and Iran.  On the Empire’s eastern and western flanks, the Janissaries began 
relying increasingly on levends, who were generally daily-wage irregular recruits from 
the periphery who were often untrained and undisciplined, to fight their battles.1  
                                                          
1 Levends were frequently blamed for losses in battles.  After losing a key battle in the 
Caucasus at Baghavard (just north of Yerevan) in 1744 to Nader Shah, Sultan Mahmud I 
ordered officials to completely disband the levends and kill all those who rebelled.  See 
Stanford Shaw, “Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries,” The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic 






However, in spite of sultans’ efforts to dissolve the traditional military corps, Janissary 
leaders refused to accept military reform.  It was not until Sultan Mahmud II launched a 
violent attack against the Janissaries in 1826 that they were fully dissolved and replaced.   
Second, the increasing Ottoman military weakness against the increasing military 
strength of foreign foes kept the sultan from expanding his territory and thus being able 
to finance a strong central administrative and military presence in peripheral regions.  
Austria’s successful resistance against Ottoman expansion in the late seventeenth 
century, which culminated in Austria and other members of the Holy League forcing the 
Ottomans to accept the terms of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, completely halted 
Ottoman expansion on its western front.  Consequently, the Ottomans were forced to seek 
expansion eastward in order to increase revenue, manpower, and access to natural 
resources. 
The invasion of Iran by the ethnically Pushtun Mir Weis Hotak and his Ghalzai 
tribal forces in 1707, which culminated with their capture of the Safavid capital Isfahan 
in 1722,2 and Peter the Great’s military campaign southward in 1722 and 1723—which 
resulted in the military capture of Derbent and Baku and political acquisition of 
Astarabad, Mazandaran, and Gilan—provided both a window of opportunity and an 
incentive for the Ottomans to advance their forces eastward.  The Ottomans experienced 
initial success between 1722 and 1730, managing to take control of much of the 
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Caucasus, parts of Dagestan, and Hamedan and Kermanshah.3  However, between 1730 
and his death in 1747, Nader Shah managed to reverse all of the Ottomans’ successes by 
driving them from Iran and invading their territory on two separate occasions (although 
he did not make any permanent gains).  By 1746, the Ottomans and Nader Shah agreed to 
restore the border much as it was established under the Treaty of Zohab 1639.  Between 
1747 and 1800, Iran experienced numerous episodes of political instability.  However, 
due to conflicts with Russia and Austria and the Ottomans’ continued reliance on a 
decaying Janissary corps, the Ottomans were not able to exploit Iran’s periodic weakness 
as an opportunity for military expansion. 
The third main reason that the Ottoman Empire emerged an as decentralized state 
was that demands for power in the periphery were numerous enough and strong enough 
to outweigh the sultan’s capability to maintain central control.  As demands for autonomy 
from peripheral elites grew throughout the 1700s, the sultan’s ability to resist those 
demands decreased.  By the late 1700s, the sultan both tacitly and formally recognized 
varying degrees of autonomy for urban elites in Syria and Iraq, rival Mamluk dynasties in 
Egypt, the Georgian Mamluk dynasty over Basra and Baghdad, Janissary elites in Tunisia 
and Algeria, the Qaramanli governors in Libya, the Sharifian rulers in the Hijaz, as well 
as powerful families and individuals in Romania and Western and Eastern Anatolia.4  
While the Ottomans maintained their traditional eyalet administration in the provinces of 
Van, Diyarbakır, and Erzurum, the Ottomans relied extensively on either local elites, or 
                                                          
3 Gábor Ágoston, “Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran, Persia),” Encyclopedia of the Ottoman 
Empire, ed. Gábor Ágoston, Bruce Alan Masters (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 278-
282. 
4 See Malcom E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923 (London and 





an appointed elite from outside the city who had amassed power among local elites, from 
each of these cities to govern over provincial affairs.  The sultan’s allowance for different 
groups to hold power was not necessarily a surrender to their demand, but can be best 
interpreted as a stopgap measure for the purpose of maintaining order.  The central 
administration feared that hasty and rash action to remove a semiautonomous elite from 
power could result in a much larger destabilization that could have the dire consequence 
of rupturing the Ottoman Empire altogether and making their political situation akin to 
that of neighboring Iran throughout much of the late 1700s.  Furthermore, the Ottomans 
tended to reserve what political and military capabilities they did have towards quelling 
political movements aimed at separation from the Ottoman Empire with the aid of a 
foreign government or movements that threatened to destabilize the balance of power in a 
peripheral region to the extent of leaving it vulnerable to foreign intrigues. 
It is within this context of weakening Ottoman military and bureaucratic 
apparatuses that the rise of powerful elites in Kurdish and Armenian-inhabited areas can 
be best understood.  While the Ottomans had long allowed Kurds in peripheral and 
rugged regions differing packages of privileges of semiautonomy, they attempted to limit 
the extent to which Kurdish elites could acquire land and followers.  They strategically 
allotted power-holding privileges of different degrees to numerous select elites with the 
hope of giving them the sense, if not the illusion, of autonomy, but limiting their potential 
to acquire power.  The Ottomans continually made a concerted effort to keep 
semiautonomous elites small and reliant on the state for security against family feuds, 
skirmishes with neighboring tribal confederations, and the intrigues of foreign 





in Eastern Anatolia between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries makes it difficult to 
ascertain to what extent the groups were able to assert dominance over a given region.5 
Privileges of semiautonomy were extended to select Armenian and Assyrian 
groups, such as the Armenians in Zeytun, Hınıs, Sasun, Çatak (Shadakh), the Jacobite 
Assyrians of Jebel Tur, and the Nestorian Assyrians of Julamerk (Hakkari).  However, 
since these independent Christian enclaves were small and not adjacent to each other or a 
foreign Christian government, the Ottomans did not deem these enclaves to constitute 
any significant political threat.6 
 
Zones of Administrative Control over Muslim Lands 
Throughout most of the Ottoman period, three relatively distinct administrative 
zones can be identified in Eastern Anatolia: zones of central state control, zones of shared 
control between Ottomans and locals (or semicentral state control), and zones of local 
semiautonomy with weak state control.  Throughout the Ottoman period the level of 
actual power and control that the state had over a specific region varied over time.  The 
Ottomans arguably never had central control over the entire region at any given time.  
Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ottomans apportioned lands in 
Eastern Anatolia as yurtluk, ocaklık, hükümet, and salyaneli.  In lands designated as 
salyaneli the Ottomans appointed regularly rotated outsiders to the leading position and 
                                                          
5 Evliya Çelebi’s accounts of his travels in Eastern Anatolia during the mid-1600s 
provide some insight into the power sharing between the state and the periphery.  For 
instance he makes it clear that the beys of Bitlis managed to maintain a significant degree 
of independence from Istanbul.  However, the lack of reliable statistics and court records 
makes it nearly impossible to determine the extent of autonomy.  See Robert Dankoff, 
ed., Evliya Çelebi in Bitlis (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 12-18. 






regularly collected taxes and recruited soldiers.  In land designated as ocaklık, the 
prominent local elite of the region, or bey, was appointed as sancakbeği, the head 
position of the Ottoman administrative division sancak.  On condition of his loyalty, he 
was privileged to pass his political office to one of his sons.  At the same time the head of 
the ocaklık was to allow outsiders to hold timar, zeamet, and has7 lands, allow the 
Ottoman government to establish tahrirs (tax registries), and provide the sultan with 
soldiers at his behest.  Yurtluk lands were practically the same as ocaklık lands except that 
the position of sancakbeği was not to be inherited by the bey’s sons.8  In both yurtluk and 
ocaklık lands, holders were not allowed to sell or donate the land, nor turn it into a 
religious endowment (vakıf).9 
Lands designated as hükümets were essentially large land holdings (has) whose 
holders were granted general exemptions from taxation and military service, although 
occasionally Ottoman officials would request from inhabitants a payment of tribute or 
service as irregulars in the military.  The hükümets were de facto private property.  The 
Ottoman state did not generally intervene in the internal political affairs of the hükümets 
and recognized whatever group assumed power as the legitimate power-holder, on the 
                                                          
7 Lands known as timar, zeamet, and has were lands given by the state to high-ranking 
military officials in compensation for their military service.  Those entitled to these lands 
were responsible for upkeep on the land and collecting taxes from it.  Lands known as 
timars produced less than 20,000 akçes in annual taxes, lands that produced between 
20,000 and 100,000 akçes were known as zeamets, and lands that produced more than 
100,000 akçes were called has.  Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, 
52. 
8 Géza Dávid, “Administration, Central,” Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, ed. 
Gábor Ágoston, Bruce Alan Masters (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 14; Also see 
Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaykh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of 
Kurdistan (London; New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992), 158-160. 
9 Yılmaz Kurt, “XVI. Yüzyılda Adana Tarihi” [The History of Adana in the Sixteenth 





condition that they not create or aid political opposition.10 
According to Ottoman registrars between 1631 and 1740 a large number of 
sancaks in the eyalets (provinces) of Şehrizor, Kars, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, and Van away 
from the provincial capitals were held as yurtluk or ocaklık lands.  Hükümets were to be 
found in the Diyarbakır and Van provinces only, specifically in the sancaks of Hazzo, 
Cizre, Palu, Genç, and Eğil in the Diyarbakır eyalet and the sancaks of Bitlis, Hakkari, 
Hizan, and Mahmudi.  Yurtluk and ocaklık lands were often offered as incentives for 
loyalty to generally Kurdish Muslim leaders along the border regions.  Hükümet lands 
were given to leaders particularly in mountainous rugged regions that were difficult to 
access.  None of these were located near border of Iran, with the exception of Hakkari 
and Mahmudi (modern-day Güzelsu), the terrains of which are particularly difficult for 
armies to traverse.11  By the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, yurtluk and ocaklık 
lands were merged as a single land assignment called yurtluk-ocaklık.  Between 1750 and 
1840 Beyazıt and Muş grew to be among the largest yurtluk-ocaklık holdings in Eastern 
Anatolia whose proprietorship was passed down hereditarily, as will be shown later.  
                                                          
10 Evliya Çelebi notes on his visit to the Diyarbakır region in the mid-seventeenth century 
that the hükümets of Palu, Genç, Cizre, Hazo, and Eğil were essentially has lands that 
were still subject to tax collection and military obligations, but fewer of them.  Evliya 
Çelebi, Martin van Bruinessen, Iendrik Boeschoten, Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir: The 
Relevant Section of the Seyahatname (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1988), 23-27, 123-
127.  Also see Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State, 158; Mehmet Ali Ünal, “XVI. 
Yüzyılda Palu Hükümeti” [The Palu Hükümet During the Sixteenth Century], 
Ondukuzmayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi 7 (December 1992): 241-265; 
Mehmet Ali Ünal, “XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Diyarbekir Eyaletine Tabi Sancakların 
İdari Statüleri” [The Administrative Statuses of the Sancaks in the Diyarbakır Eyalet 
During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries], Ziya Gökalp Dergisi 44 (December 
1986): 31-40; and Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, 56-57. 
11 Orhan Kılıç, “Ocaklık Sancakların Osmanlı Hukukunda ve İdari Tatbikattaki Yeri” 
[The Place of Ocaklık Sancaks in Ottoman Law and Administration], Fırat Üniversitesi 





Also, between the same periods, the Ottomans seemed to make a concerted effort to 
reduce the number of hükümet lands and either merge them with larger yurtluk-ocaklık 
lands or recognize them as their own yurtluk-ocaklık.  This was especially the case after 
the Ottoman-Persian war 1821-1823 and the Russo-Ottoman war 1828-1829.  For 
instance, Ottoman documents record Hakkari as “hükümet-i Hakkari” (the hükümet of 
Hakkari) in 1821,12 but referred to it as yurtluk-ocaklık land by 1827.  Palu, which had 
been recognized as the “Palu hükümeti” (the hükümet of Palu) in documents in 180113 
was recognized as yurtluk-ocaklık in 1841.14 
The Ottomans’ decision to keep their political control over Eastern Anatolia 
somewhat loose and decentralized was partly the result of deliberated strategy and partly 
of insufficient resources.15  By the mid-seventeenth century, the Ottomans had acquired 
vast territories to defend, but they were unable to keep up military expansion at a pace 
that was sufficiently rapid and cost-effective to be able to fund the territorial integration 
of peripheral regions into its administrative center.  This was due to a number of factors 
including internal struggle within its military, its political stalemate with Persia, its 
difficulty of defending against opposition movements (often foreign-backed) in eastern 
Europe and the region north of the Black Sea (during the eighteenth century), and its 
inability to expand into Austria and beyond.  Consequently, the Ottomans pursued a 
                                                          
12 BBA, HAT 820/37372, 25 Rebiyülahır 1236/30 January 1821. 
13 BBA, C.DRB 47/2312, 16 Şaban 1216/22 December 1801. 
14 Fatih Gencer, “Merkezîleşme Politikaları Sürecinde Yurtluk-Ocaklık Sisteminin 
Değişimi” [The Alteration of the Yurtluk-Ocaklık System in the Process of Centralization 
Policies], Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih 
Araştırmaları Dergisi 30, no. 49, (2011): 78. 
15 See Yaşar Yücel, “Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda Desantralizasyona (Adem-i Merkeziyet) 
Dair Gözlemler” [Observations on Decentralization in the Ottoman Empire], Belleten 28, 





policy of defensive realpolitik16 in relation to peripheral regions, particularly near its 
borders with Persia.17  According to this policy, the Ottomans sought to avoid spreading 
their resources too thin by diverting them away from the periphery and towards both the 
center and select peripheral regions under the greatest political threat.  It should be noted 
that this trend was the opposite of its earlier policy of offensive realpolitik, according to 
which it concentrated its resources in its periphery with hope of enabling rapid 
acquisition of population and land. 
Since early conquest, the Ottomans had invested in maintaining relatively tight 
control over the administrative affairs of particularly Trabzon, Erzurum, and Diyarbakır, 
as well as Van and Kars to a lesser extent.  They oversaw appointments to political 
positions and internal politics in these cities much more closely than in other areas of 
eastern and southeastern Anatolia.  The Ottomans chose to concentrate their resources in 
these specific cities because their geographical locations made them the easiest passage 
into Central Anatolia from the Caucasus, Iran, and Iraq, and failure to fortify them 
increased the vulnerability of the Ottoman heartland.  By contrast, Anatolia was more 
difficult to penetrate via the Cizre, Bitlis, and Muş regions.  Hence the Ottomans chose 
not reinforce those regions as much. 
                                                          
16 The notion that the Ottoman Empire progressively degenerated from a highly 
centralized political entity in the sixteenth century to a semifeudal entity in subsequent 
centuries is incorrect.  Heper rises to this point in Metin Heper, “Center and Periphery in 
the Ottoman Empire, With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century,” International 
Political Science Review 1, no. 1 (January 1980): 81-104.  However, there was an 
ostensible change in policy in relation to Eastern Anatolia between 1639 and 1736.  This 
is evidenced by the fact that semiautonomous Kurdish beyliks appeared to expand their 
domains of influence during this period, a sign that both the Ottoman and Persian 
governments had focused their attentions away from the region. 





The growth and strength of semiautonomous Kurdish political groups appeared to 
loosely correspond with the state of relations between the Ottoman Empire and Iran.  
Between the mid-1600s to the mid-1700s, a period of relative stability and peace, albeit a 
cold peace, prevailed between the rival states.  They agreed to seek one another’s 
approval for appointments for governors of border provinces.18  Many of the prominent 
Kurdish families located in semiautonomous territories grew in power and influence.  
Kurdish families in Bitlis, Mahmudi (Güzelsu), Amadiya, Şehrizur (Rawanduz), Bohtan 
(Cizre), Süleymaniye, and Hakkari, were among the most powerful.19  The expansion of 
their political domains was largely a product of this period of Ottoman-Persian peace.  
Since neither state was making any serious attempts to play dynastic rival against each 
other, local opposition from among family and competing tribes had little foreign basis 
with which to gain force for an opposition movement.  Consequently local Kurdish elites 
were able to centralize control in semiautonomous regions. 
Decentralization opened opportunity spaces for Kurdish elites to increase their 
power.  Between 1750 and 1800, the house of Baban in Şehrizor, the house of Alaeddin 
in Muş, and the house of İshak in Beyazıt grew increasingly powerful, much to the 
chagrin of the central administration.  The Babans managed to maintain their autonomy 
from the Ottomans between 1750 and the 1820s by manipulating the delicate balance of 
                                                          
18 Graham Williamson, “The Turko-Persian War 1821-1823: Winning the War but 
Losing the Peace,” in War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present, ed. 
Roxane Farmanfarmaian (London; New York: Routledge, 2008): 88-89. 
19 Sevgen refers to these principalities as “beyliks” although they exhibited all the key 
characteristics of hükümets.  See Nazmi Sevgen, Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu’da Türk 
Beylikleri: Osmanlı Belgeleri ile Kürt Türkleri Tarihi [Turkish Beyliks in Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolia: Kurdish and Turkish History with Ottoman Documents] (Ankara: 





power in the region among the Ottomans, Persians, and Mamluks.  Their power over 
southern Şehrizor was considerably reduced in 1831 when Sultan Mahmud II restored his 
authority over Baghdad.  Kör Mehmet Bey of Soran further eroded the Babans’ control 
over northern Şehrizor during his military campaigns between 1831 and 1834.20  Still, it 
was not until 1851 that the Ottomans managed to remove the last Baban emir from 
power.21  Although it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the Babans in any 
detail, they were the first Kurdish family to launch a resistance through large-scale 
political coordination with neighboring Kurdish groups.  Kör Mehmet Bey of Soran and 
Bedr Khan Bey of Cizre applied a similar method of resistance to the Ottoman state. 
The Ottomans appointed Alaeddin Bey, a local magnate from the Muş region, to 
be the mütesellim22 of the Muş sancak (which was under the jurisdiction of the Erzurum 
eyalet) during the 1740s.  In 1747, territorial disputes arose between Alaeddin Bey and 
the khan of Bitlis, in which the former proved to have the upper hand.23  Since the vali of 
Erzurum feared that Alaeddin would amass power in the region, he urged the sultan to 
                                                          
20 Discussed in Chapter 3. 
21 For a summary of the struggles of the Babans against the Ottomans, Persians, and 
Mamluks, see Michael Eppel, “The Demise of the Kurdish Emirates: The Impact of 
Ottoman Reforms and International Relations on Kurdistan during the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century,” Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 2 (2008): 240-243. 
22 The title for the local notable who was appointed by the Ottoman government to 
oversee political affairs of the town and collected taxes.  See Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish 
Notables and the Ottoman State, 63, 72. 
23 The beys or khans of Bitlis were powerful and semiindependent during the 1600s.  
However, they were gradually overshadowed by the elites at Muş.  According to James 
Brant, “[t]he Begs of Bitlis were always powerful enough to preserve their independence 
until they were subdued by the father of Emin Pasha, since which time, the Beglik has 
been attached to the Pashalik of Mush.  Eighty villages were said to be under the 
command of Sherif Beg, and his territory forms therefore about one-third of the whole 
Pashalik.  During their independence the Begs struck a small copper coin which is still 
current at Bitlis.”  James Brant, “Notes of Journey Through a Part of Kurdistan, in the 





back the khan of Bitlis in order to preserve the balance of power in the Ottomans’ favor.  
However, the Ottomans’ war with Nader Shah between 1743 and 1746, in which they had 
sustained great losses and made no territorial gains, left them in a weak and vulnerable 
position.  Consequently, they were unable to keep Alaeddin from taking control of Bitlis 
in the same year.24  Yet between 1751 and 1754, the vali of Erzurum managed to enlist 
the support of in Mahmud Bey of Beyazıt25 and Çeteci Abdullah Paşa,26 who feared that 
the rebel mütesellim of Muş would encroach on their territory, against Alaeddin, 
eventually forcing him and his coterie to retreat to the mountains.27  Although the state-
led joint force was unable to dislodge Alaeddin, the Ottomans agreed to concede to him 
the privilege of holding the sancak of Muş as a yurtluk-ocaklık, which entitled his family 
to hereditary control.  To keep his power in check, the Ottomans conceded the sancaks of 
Hınıs and Tekman to Mahmud Bey of Beyazıt, thus expanding his landholdings.28  They 
                                                          
24 Note from the vali of Erzurum, BBA, C.DH. 270/13478, 13 Cemaziyülahır 1160/22 
June 1747; Mehmet İnbaşı, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Bitlis Sancağı ve İdarecileri” [Bitlis 
Province and its Governors During the Eighteenth Century], A.U. Türkiyat Araştırmaları 
Enstitüsü Dergisi 33 (2007): 250-251. 
25 The local Kurdish mutasarrıf of Beyazıt, who commanded the allegiance of several 
Kurdish tribal groups along the Ottoman-Iranian border, helped keep Alaeddin from 
expanding his control over the strategic enclaves of Hınıs and Tekman located north of 
Muş, see BBA, C.DH, 194/9667, 29 Cemaziyülevvel 1167/23 April 1754. 
26 Çeteci Abdullah Paşa was a Kurd from the Diyarbakır province, who had served as its 
vali several times.  The Ottomans appointed him to the position of vali of Van to help 
with the effort against Alaeddin Bey.  Abdullah Paşa had proven an effective military and 
political strategist against Nader Shah during the 1743-1746 war.  He was also effective 
at settling tribes to the south of Diyarbakır.  See Abdurrahman Ateş, “Avşarlı Nadir Şah 
ve Döneminde Osmanlı-İran Mücadeleleri” [Nader Shah Afshari and the Ottoman-
Iranian Conflicts during his Period] (PhD diss., Süleyman Demirel University, Isparta, 
2001), 106-107; BBA, AE.SMHD.I, 78/5200, 27 Safer 1164/15 January 1751. 
27 BBA, C.DH, 238/11866, 29 Recep 1167/22 May 1754. 





also attempted to restore the beys of Bitlis to power, although with only modest success.29 
As mütesellim of Muş, Alaeddin Bey is reputed to have patronized the Armenians 
of the region subject to him.  He encouraged Armenian settlement in Muş and protected 
them against the forays of other Kurds.30  His sons carried on relatively good relations 
with local Armenians.  One of the most prominent allies of family of Alaeddin was 
Bishop Jonah (Hovnan) of the Surp Garabet monastery, 31 who had great local repute 
among Armenians, both lay and clergy, throughout Eastern Anatolia.  In 1763, he sought 
to join forces with Armenian political activist Joseph Emin, who was at that time in the 
Caucasus.  He sent a letter to Emin via “Curd [sic] Armenians”32 informing him that he 
was capable of assembling a force of some “40,000 fighting men.”  In addition, he 
announced that when Emin arrived at Muş that the “Assyrians and Yezdy Curds [sic]” 
would be ready to “join” them.33  Emin also informed Prince Heraclius of Georgia, who 
                                                          
29 It should be noted that the Ottomans rotated the local elites in Bitlis in and out of 
power about every one to three years between 1756 and 1797.  This is a sign that the 
Ottomans, due in large part to threat of Alaeddin bey, had managed to regain some 
control over Bitlis.  See Mehmet İnbaşı, “Van Valileri (1755-1835)” [The Valis of Van 
(1755-1835)], A.Ü. Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi 29 (2006): 205-207. 
30 Simeon, Catholicos of Armenia; Ghukas, Karnetsʻi Catholicos; Daniel, Surmaretsi 
Catholicos of Armenia; Dawit, Enegettsi Catholicos of Armenia; Hovsep Arghuteants, 
Catholicos of Armenia; Manuel, Kiwmiwshkhanetsi; Giut Aghaneants, eds., Divan 
Hayots Patmutyan [Register of Armenian History] (Tiflis: Tparan M. Sharadze, 1912), 
13: 285-291. 
31 Muş was undoubtedly an important place of Armenian culture and civilization.  In 
1859, the Russian Consul at Trabzon wrote that “Mush, after Etchmiadzin, is the most 
holy place for the Armenian-Gregorians.”  George A. Bournoutian, ed., Russia and the 
Armenians of Transcaucasia, 1797-1889: A Documentary Record (Costa Mesa, CA: 
Mazda Publishers, 1980), 422. 
32 In his autobiography, Emin refers to Armenians living in eastern and southeastern 
Anatolia by this name, yet another indication of some of the cultural and linguistic fusion 
that had occurred among Armenians and Kurds in the region.  See Emin, The Life and 
Adventures of Joseph Emin, 298, 316-317. 





had inquired about the preparation of the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, that he could 
mobilize a force of ten thousand Armenian cavalry from Muş, yet another indication of 
the Armenians’ strength in Muş region given the fact that non-Muslims had traditionally 
been forbidden from riding horses.34  However, Georgian Prince Heraclius’ decision to 
withdraw support and Catholicos Simeon’s disapproval of Emin’s political activity 
eventually stifled the political ambitions of Bishop Jonah and Emin. 
In the 1780s Bishop Jonah was replaced by Astvatsatur Nshets, who continued a 
friendly relationship with the Kurds.  Murat Bey, Alaeddin’s son and heir to his power, 
visited Surp Garabet Monastery after it was destroyed in an earthquake in 1805 and 
promised Nshets that he would help provide the resources needed to rebuild it (it was 
rebuilt by two Armenian architects, one from Palu and the other from Bitlis) and restore 
the economy that revolved around it as a holy pilgrimage site.35  Murat also fended off 
İshak Paşa of Beyazıt (the son of Mahmud Bey) from raiding Muş crushing their forces 
near Eleşkirt.36  However, after Murat’s death in the early 1800s, struggle ensued 
between rival family members and the cordial relationship between Armenians and Kurds 
deteriorated greatly. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottomans also made greater concessions 
to Kurdish elites in the sancak of Beyazıt, a strategic border town near the Iranian border.  
In 1771, the Ottomans recognized Ishak Paşa as the mir-e miran (the prince of princes) 
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and appointed him to the position of mutasarrıf of Beyazıt with the privilege of holding 
the land as yurtluk-ocaklık until his death in 1800.37  Throughout his tenure, İshak Paşa 
vigorously attempted to outbid local rivals and expand his political domain.  In 1779, 
Ishak Paşa forcibly removed and imprisoned the Kurdish bey of Eleşkirt and replaced 
him with his relative Abdallah Bey.38  In 1789, he led cross-border forays into Iranian 
territory in order to subdue rival tribes and seize control of their lands.39  In spite of 
complaints against him from the Khan of Yerevan and the vali of Erzurum, the central 
Ottoman administration was generally hesitant to take any rash action against him lest 
they disrupt the delicate balance of power that existed between them and Iran.  State 
officials did, however, appear to try to limit the extent of İshak Paşa’s landholdings.  In 
1797 (notably after the collapse of the Zand dynasty in Iran) Yusuf Ziya Paşa, an 
important political ally of the sultan who was then the vali of Erzurum, attempted to 
alienate Tekman and Hınıs from İshak Paşa citing his alleged “injustice and cruelty” 
against the inhabitants of those regions as a justification for intervention, but to no 
avail.40 
Upon İshak Paşa’s death in 1800, periodic power struggles ensued between his 
sons for over two decades.  The Ottomans went to great lengths to keep the region under 
the control of the heir who appeared to be the most loyal to the sultan, the most capable 
of mobilizing force against foreign invasion, and the most capable of maintaining order in 
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the sancak of Beyazıt.  In 1800, the Ottomans recognized Mahmud Paşa as the legitimate 
heir to his father İshak Paşa’s yurtluk-ocaklık at Beyazıt.  During his tenure, political 
struggle intensified with the mutasarrıf of Muş, who attempted to rally the Ottomans to 
his side by accusing Mahmud of “oppressing the poor (fukaraya zulüm) in Hınıs and 
Tekman.” 41  Since Murat was a crucial ally to the central administration against the 
rebellion of Erzurum vali Gürcü Osman Paşa at that time and since Mahmud’s standing 
towards the rebel leader was unclear, the Ottomans decided to place the villages under 
the jurisdiction of the Muş mutasarrıflık.42 
Upon Mahmud’s death in 1806, the Ottomans appointed his brother Ibrahim Paşa 
as mutasarrıf of Beyazıt.43  However, since many complained that he was mentally 
impaired (aklı noksan), and since his nephew Behlül appeared to have more supporters, 
the Ottomans recognized the latter as the mutasarrıf in 1807.44 
It is noteworthy that Şehrizor, Muş, and Beyazıt were all located at the margins of 
the Kurdish-inhabited region of the Ottoman Empire.  This location proved strategic for 
the elites of all three regions for it spared them the burden of facing potential rivalry from 
neighboring Kurdish beyliks from one direction.  Since the house of Baban in Şehrizor 
faced no potential Kurdish rivals to the south, they managed to 1) concentrate their 
resources in absorbing territory held by the Kurdish beys of Soran to the north, which 
they accomplished in the mid-1600s, and 2) focus their efforts on occupying the lands 
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held by the Kurdish house of Ardalan in Sanandaj, Iran.45  The Kurdish beys of Beyazıt 
faced little challenge to their land and power from the east where a multiethnic Azeri 
Turk, Armenian, Assyrian, and Kurdish society competed with each other for power 
under the loose control of Iranian khans.  Furthermore, Ottoman-Iranian border 
diplomacy was more effective in the northern part of the Kurdish-inhabited areas than the 
southern part.  This allowed the beys of Beyazıt to focus their political and military 
efforts on bringing Eleşkirt, Hınıs, and Tekman under their control.  The beys of Muş had 
no significant Kurdish rival to the north (with the exception of local Kurdish ağas in 
Hınıs and Tekman, whose power was weakened by both the valis of Erzurum and the 
Kurdish beys of Beyazıt).  Thus, without a major northern rival they had more resources 
to spare against the Kurdish elites of Bitlis.  Once they managed to subdue them, they 
focused their energies on what would become a stalemate struggle against the beys of 
Beyazıt.  Since Kurdish beyliks in between these regions, such as the beyliks of Soran, 
Amadia, Bohtan, Hakkari, and Ridwan, were in essence surrounded with potential rivals, 
they did not manage to expand their influence and political domain until the Ottomans 
minimized the power of the beys of Muş, Beyazıt, and Şehrizor in the 1830s. 
 
Initial Centralization Efforts in Eastern Anatolia 
Russia’s victories against the Ottoman Empire in the 1768-1774 and 1787-1792 
wars provided impetus for reform of the traditional Ottoman military and bureaucratic 
system.  Sultan Selim III was most intent on replacing the old Janissary military corps 
with a new professional army, which he sought to fund with new taxes on a number of 
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commodities.  However, he also sought to reduce the power of valis in eyalets by 
reducing their term limits.  He commenced his military reform project by introducing the 
nizam-i cedid army almost immediately following signing the Treaty of Jassy in 1792.  
However, his reform efforts did not gain significant momentum until after he ousted the 
French from Egypt in 1801. 
The Balkans were the primary target of military reform where Selim III focused 
most of his efforts to replace Janissary elites.  However, the sultan was met with stiff 
resistance by ulema, esnafs, and Janissaries throughout the Balkans, particularly in 
northern Bulgaria, where a local rebel from Vidin, Osman Pasvanoğlu, led a rebellion 
against the sultan that lasted until 1807.46  Eastern Anatolia was not subjected to Selim 
III’s military reform to the same extent, largely because the Janissaries did not have as 
much control over the region and relied on Kurdish irregulars, or levends, for defense 
during times of war. 
The sultan’s modest attempts to implement political, military, and financial 
reforms in the region were widely unpopular.  Locals fiercely opposed the installment of 
the thirty-first military battalion (31’inci ordu ortası) in Diyarbakır in 1802.  The mufti 
Mesud Efendi and a group of esnafs (merchants and guildsmen) led a group of local 
inhabitants of the city of Diyarbakır to protest the new battalion as well as the central 
Ottoman authority’s new financial reforms.  The protestors, who were all Muslims with 
the exception of one Christian, expressed their discontent by destroying the local cloth 
press, mengenehane, which had become the symbol of Ottoman central economic control 
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over the city.  In response the central authorities exiled (or at least threatened to exile) 
128 persons, including Mesud Efendi and a number of other ulema and esnafs.  However, 
a local bey, Şeyhzade İbrahim Paşa, negotiated a deal with the Ottomans under which the 
protestors would be allowed to return on the condition that they lay down their weapons 
and pay damages.47  Fearing continued unrest, the Ottomans withdrew the thirty-first 
brigade in 1803; however, they exacted steep compensation from the local rebel esnafs 
and ulema for the economic havoc that they wrought and they managed to maintain an 
upper hand on the management of the cloth press.48 
Gürcü Osman Paşa was also opposed to Selim III’s aggressive reform efforts and 
decided to stage a revolt in 1802.49  The Ottomans, fearing the worst, enlisted the support 
of the mütesellim of Muş Murat Paşa, recently appointed Trabzon vali Tayyar Paşa, and 
Çıldır vali Selim Paşa to put down Osman Paşa’s resistance and arrest those responsible.  
Gürcü Osman Paşa was able to evade capture for a number of months by fleeing Erzurum 
and heading south where he armed a number of his followers, allied with Memooğlu, a 
local brigand (şaki) from Bitlis, and allegedly plotted a siege on Erzurum in 1803 (which 
never came to fruition).50  Osman Paşa was eventually captured by Murat Paşa, who 
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48 Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State 
(Leiden: EJ Brill, 2004), 170-172. 
49 BBA, HAT 47/2303/J, 29 Zilhicce 1216/2 May 1802; BBA, HAT 96/3869, 12 Recep 
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despite orders from Tayyar Paşa that he be kept alive, cut off his head and sent it to 
Istanbul.  The reason for his brutal display of power could have been to prove his 
successful capture and loyalty to the sultan, and also perhaps desire for revenge against 
Osman for emboldening his rivals in Bitlis, a region over which Murat’s family had long 
sought claim.  After Osman’s Paşa’s capture, the Ottomans appointed Tayyar Paşa as the 
interim vali of Erzurum, thus conjoining the eyalets of Trabzon and Erzurum, and 
annexed Hınıs and Tekman to Murat Paşa’s yurtluk-ocaklık land holdings.51 
The suppression of Gürcü Osman Paşa’s revolt appeared to escalate turmoil 
throughout Eastern Anatolia.  Valis and mutasarrıfs in the region began accusing each 
other of either plotting sedition or usurping power.  Most notably Tayyar Paşa accused 
the vali of Van Mehmet Sadık Paşa, with whom Murat had allied, of coming to power 
illegitimately through a forged decree (sahte ferman), oppressing and plundering locals, 
forming an opposition coalition with the semiautonomous beys of Mahmudi (Güzelsu, 
located between Van and Başkale) and Hakkari, and attempting to mint and circulate his 
own currency.  He enlisted the support of Emin Paşa, the former muhafız of Kars and 
Van, and his younger brother Derviş Paşa and his uncle Abdullah against Mehmet Sadık, 
who had seized much of their wealth.  In 1804 Tayyar captured Mehmet Sadık and 
beheaded him and the Ottomans installed Feyzi Paşa in his stead.52 
Tayyar Paşa’s vendetta in Van was met with great disapproval by Ottoman 
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authorities who, upon hearing of his excesses, ordered his removal.  However, Tayyar 
dismissed the order and built a strong resistance movement and the sultan and his general 
called for military and financial reforms.  He managed to draw the support of a great 
number of local beys and paşas throughout Eastern Anatolia and the Black Sea region (as 
far as Amasya and Diyarbakır) by rallying them against Sultan Selim III’s reform project, 
on the basis of its being Western innovation and contrary to Islamic law and tradition.53  
However, Ottoman forces succeeded in removing Tayyar Paşa from power in May 
1805.54  The central administration replaced Tayyar Paşa with Yusuf Ziya Paşa, an ethnic 
Georgian from northeastern Anatolia and close ally of the sultan who had served twice as 
Grand-Vizier and as the vali of Diyarbakır, Çıldır, and Erzurum.55 
The Ottoman central authority hoped that it could maintain order in Van with 
Feyzi Paşa in charge.  However, Emin Paşa, his brother Derviş Bey, and his uncle 
Abdullah Ağa rallied local supporters in Van against the newly appointed vali.  Feyzi was 
initially able to put down resistance and capture and execute Emin and Abdullah.  
However, Derviş Bey managed to escape with his followers to a nearby mountainous 
enclave and seize much of the wealth left by the former vali Mehmet Sadık Paşa.  In 
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1806, he stormed Van with his militia, killing Feyzi Paşa, and proclaiming himself both 
the “vali and the muhafız” of Van by “forged decree” (sahte ferman).56  Since the 
Ottomans did not want to risk sparking further conflict in its already vulnerable eastern 
regions, they recognized Derviş Bey as the vali of Van and gave him the title of paşa.  He 
held his position until the Ottomans forcibly removed him in 1819. 
Derviş Paşa’s stance on Selim III’s reforms are unclear.  Yet his rise to power in 
Van can be understood as an indirect product of the wave of resistance to Sultan Selim 
III’s reform efforts.57  Derviş Paşa’s usurpation of power broke the pattern of regular, 
nearly annual, rotations of valis (who comprised both locals and nonlocals) that the 
Sublime Porte had been undertaking since 1755.58  With the rise of the Qajar dynasty to 
power in Iran and Russian intrigues in the Caucasus, Derviş Paşa’s defeat of Fevzi Paşa 
came at an inopportune and tense period.  Ottoman authorities in Istanbul were forced to 
tread even more carefully in their policy-making in Van and had no guarantee of loyalty 
on the part of Derviş.59 
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Waning Central Control and Political Uncertainty 
Rebellion in Serbia in 1804 and widespread revolts by conservative political 
forces and the Janissaries in 1807 brought the Ottoman Empire to a state of political 
disarray.  To make matters more difficult for the Ottomans, they were greatly pressured 
by the French to declare war on Russia in 1806, a move for which they were greatly 
underprepared.  It is remarkable that the Ottomans were able to muster a force strong 
enough to mitigate, although not completely stave off, the Russian invasion of Wallachia, 
Bessarabia, and Moldavia in 1806.  Yet it was during the war that Russia began to 
penetrate the Caucasus thus placing Eastern Anatolia under her threat for the first time in 
history. 
Since the Russians were engaged in two simultaneous wars with Iran and France 
during the first half of 1807, Ottomans hoped that Russia would be weak enough in the 
Caucasus to make a push towards the Caspian Sea.  Sultan Mustafa IV, who succeeded 
his embattled cousin Selim III in May 1807, called Yusuf Ziya Paşa, the vali of both 
Erzurum and Trabzon, the Muslim emirs of Dagestan, and the Persian forces under 
Abbas Mirza to “jihad” against the Russians.60  Yusuf Ziya Paşa’s force of twenty 
thousand soldiers attempted to march on Gyumri, just across the border from Kars, to 
push back the Russians in June 1807.  However, Ukrainian Count Ivan Vasilyevich 
Gudovich’s force of only six thousand men held them off just before at Arpaçay.  The 
relative ease with which the Russians won the battle, sustaining only eighty-five 
casualties compared to over one thousand Ottoman casualties, dealt a large blow to the 
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morale of the Ottoman army in Eastern Anatolia.61  Russia’s peace with France in June 
1807 at Tilsit further dampened hopes of a successful campaign in the Caucasus.  Yet the 
Ottomans were strong enough to fend off a Russian advance into Akhaltsikhe in 1810.62  
When the war ended in 1812, neither side made any territorial gains on their border in the 
Caucasus.  Nonetheless, the war had an overall destabilizing effect on the region. 
Despite the motive of a common enemy, Iran and the Ottomans were unable to rid 
themselves of their suspicions for each other.  Tensions between Iran and the Ottomans 
escalated in 1811 when a Kurdish group in Beyazıt launched a raid into Qajar-controlled 
Azerbaijan, which resulted in the destruction of some fifteen villages, and the Ottomans 
appointed a vali to Baghdad who was hostile to the Qajars.  The Qajars declared these 
incidents grounds for war against the Ottomans and led an army of thirty thousand to 
sack Baghdad in 1812.63  They also dispatched a force (possibly an Iranian Kurdish 
group) towards Kars, Beyazıt, Malazgirt, and Muş; however, it consisted of fewer men 
and did not do much other than carry out a few raids and plunder some villages.64  
Local elites seized on the opportunity of the war to take greater control over 
affairs of the eyalets and sancaks.  In 1809 Şeyhzade Ibrahim Paşa, a local Kurdish leader 
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whose family held considerable political influence in the city of Diyarbakır, mobilized 
the city’s local population, forced the Ottoman-appointed vali Mehmed Şerif Paşa out of 
power, and proclaimed himself the vali.  One of İbrahim Paşa’s justifications for taking 
power had been the lack of regularity of order in the city due to the Ottomans’ frequent 
rotation of valis.  He claimed that this created irregularity of tax collection, and allowed 
some groups to try to exploit transitions of power for their own advantages.  Local esnafs 
also complained that the valis were brutish and abusive of their power and would often 
take from them without payment.65 
Relations between Kurds and Armenians in the area north of Lake Van appeared 
to deteriorate during the war.  This is largely because Muslims became increasingly 
suspicious of Armenians over their apparent sympathies towards Russia.  Armenians in 
Muş came under some of the harshest persecution during the war.  Their especially poor 
treatment is explained in part by the death of Murat Paşa, who had maintained a cordial 
relationship with the local Armenians, in 1807.  Divisions in Murat’s family over who 
would inherit his vast wealth led many family members to resort to desperate and austere 
measures in order gain leverage over one another and protect their futures.  In 1807, 
Murat’s brother, Yusuf Kamer Paşa, sought to increase his revenue by asking exorbitant 
sums from the Armenian clergy at Surp Garabet monastery.  When Prelate Hagop of Surp 
Garabet refused to give Yusuf the burdensome sum of money that he was demanding, the 
former sought to kill him.  Furthermore, he denied protection for Armenians against the 
burdensome demands of winter quarters (kışlak) to which seminomadic Kurdish groups 
traversing the region subjected them on an annual basis.  In spite of the plea of Prelate 
                                                          





Guravtsi, who replaced Hagop in 1808, for recourse against the abuses of Yusuf Kamer 
Paşa from the Ottoman government, state officials, who were occupied with the war 
against Russia, did nothing to alleviate the condition of the Armenians.66 
To avoid persecution by the Kurds, many Armenian religious elites began to try to 
raise money from Armenian peasants to pay the exorbitant sums that the Kurds were 
demanding and the win their good graces.  In 1813, Catholicos Ephrem at Echmiadzin 
sent out an encyclical to the churches of Muş, Van, and Beyazıt accusing them of 
venality, corruption, and abusing their power over the Armenian people.  He openly 
criticized Ghukas, the Catholicos of Aghtamar, of assuming power illegitimately 
(anorinagan).67  The toll that the political disorder in Muş had taken on the Armenians in 
Muş is expressed by Bishop Nerses in 1814: “the pitiless nations [azg] of the Kurds and 
other races have reduced our land of Muş to almost nothing leaving hardly a building 
standing.”68 
 
Suppression of Resistance: Recapturing the East 
 After signing the Treaty of Bucharest with the Russians in 1812, under which 
Bessarabia and most of Georgia was ceded to Russia while the Ottomans retained 
Wallachia and Moldavia as well as the towns of Akhaltsikhe, Anapa, and Poti in 
Georgia,69 the central Ottoman administration once again sought to centralize control 
over Eastern Anatolia.  Russia’s conquest of much of the southern Caucasus, and the 
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consequent erosion of a geographically rugged buffer zone between Eastern Anatolia and 
an expansion-bent Russian empire, gave Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) incentive and 
persuasive power among different Ottoman factions to embark on a new centralization 
campaign.  In addition, the fact that relations with Iran remained tenuous and somewhat 
strained due to the cross-border raids of many of the unruly Kurdish tribes was yet further 
motivation to increase the central presence on the eastern periphery. 
The Ottomans had managed to keep Erzurum under their control since the ouster 
of the rogue vali Tayyar Paşa in 1805.  Their ability to stand their ground in Erzurum is 
attributable to a number of factors including the city’s relative ease of geographic access, 
its economic prominence as a key trading post between Iran and Central Anatolia, and the 
fact that the Ottomans had long invested more military resources in defending their 
control of the city than any other area in Eastern Anatolia.  However, the roots of 
Ottoman power did not run so deeply in Van and Diyarbakır. 
Initially, Sultan Mahmud II treaded softly towards regaining central control over 
Eastern Anatolia.  His main concerns were Van and Diyarbakır, which by 1812 were still 
under the control of the usurpers Derviş Paşa and Şeyzade İbrahim Paşa, respectively.  
The sultan feared that excessive aggression might require too many resources and end up 
actually pushing locals to side with the opposition, thereby increasing the level of threat 
that they posed to state authority.  Hence, he tried to replace them with local figures who 
were popular among locals, but seemingly more loyal to the Ottoman state. 
This strategy failed in Van.  In both 1810 and 1812, the sultan appointed Abidin 
Paşa to replace Derviş Paşa.  While Abidin had widespread support within the city of 





meager efforts to unseat him from the valilik and force Abidin from the city.70  According 
to Seyda Efendi, a state-appointed inspector who toured Erzurum, Muş, Beyazıt, and Van 
in 1813, Derviş Paşa had managed to establish himself as a relatively independent ruler in 
the region.  He had close ties with the local Armenian community there and in fact his 
own treasurer and financier was a local Armenian by the name of Sarraf Hagop.  He even 
had his own money minted and circulated throughout the Van eyâlet.71 
In Diyarbakır, Şeyhzade İbrahim Paşa had enlisted the support of the local masses 
and a number of key social figures, including a high ranking clergyman Hacı Rağıb 
Efendi, to oust the widely unpopular Ottoman appointee Mehmed Şerif Paşa in 1809, his 
grip on the city’s politics was more firm that Derviş’s in Van.72  Yet, upon İbrahim Paşa’s 
death in 1813, the Ottomans were able to peaceably install Emin Paşa, an ağa from the 
Erzurum region,73  as the replacement vali and appease the family of İbrahim Paşa by 
offering them high-ranking positions in the provincial government.  İbrahim Paşa’s 
grandson Mehmed Bey was appointed to the position of mütesellim of the Diyarbakır 
eyâlet.74 
In areas designated as yurtluk-ocaklık lands, the Ottomans were more hesitant to 
centralize power for fear that local leaders might defect and perhaps strengthen the 
opposition leaders in Van and Diyarbakır.  The sultan’s strategy was therefore to secure 
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the loyalties of elites who held yurtluk-ocaklık lands by assuring them of the central 
government’s commitment to their semiautonomy and enlist their support against rival 
valis and an inscrutable Iran, in the event that it attacked.  In 1813, the Ottomans secured 
a strong alliance with Selim Paşa in Muş,75 whom they had appointed mutasarrıf in 1811 
to replace his uncle Yusuf Paşa.76 
Securing control over Beyazıt was a more difficult process for the Ottomans than 
Muş because of a power struggle between the descendants of İshak Paşa.  When his son 
Mahmud Paşa was appointed by the Ottomans to be the mutasarrıf, his brothers 
complained of unfair distribution of power and wealth.77  When Mahmud Paşa died in 
1806, the Ottomans divided the domains of Beyazıt by appointing İshak Paşa’s son 
İbrahim Paşa to be the new mutasarrıf of Eleşkirt and Beyazıt, while Mehmed Behlül 
Paşa (hereafter known as Behlül Paşa), the grandson of İshak Paşa and nephew of 
Ibrahim Paşa, was appointed mutasarrıf of Diyadin.78  The following year İbrahim Paşa 
was declared unfit for rule and the entirety of the Beyazıt yurtluk-ocaklık lands, including 
Eleşkirt, Diyadin, and Beyazıt, were given to Behlül Paşa.79 
Although public opinion of Ibrahim and Behlül appeared to be divided in the 
region, the Ottoman state was more suspicious of İbrahim, who was amassing the power 
of Kurdish groups in Iran and Eleşkirt, than Behlül.  In 1815, İbrahim Paşa mobilized a 
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force of about twelve thousand cavalry consisting of Kurdish groups from Khoy, 
Nahçevan, and Yerevan, to regain control of Beyazıt, which had put placed under the 
control of Behlül Paşa.  His strength was such that he managed to push back forces 
mobilized by the vali of Erzurum.80  İbrahim Paşa also attempted to besiege the fortress 
of Beyazıt in 1817 by rallying together tribes in Yerevan, Diyadin and Eleşkirt.  Yet 
Behlül Paşa was able to fend off his advances with the help of Ali Paşa, the muhafız of 
Kars.81 
Unrest in the Balkans between 1813 and 1817, particularly in Serbia where Prince 
Miloş Obreniviç led a large uprising against the Ottoman state, diverted the locus of 
Sultan Mahmud II’s centralization drive away from Eastern Anatolia for a period.  Yet 
the growth of the conflict between Derviş Paşa and elites in Hakkari and Muş drew the 
Ottoman state administration to intervene. 
Derviş Paşa’s rule in Van had arguably never been deeply rooted.  However, the 
circle of followers that Derviş had gathered around himself was strong enough to 
suppress local revolts, nullify the rulings of the state judiciary, and enforce his policies, 
albeit with brutal tactics.  Derviş Paşa had faced opposition since he took control of the 
Van eyâlet in 1806, but by 1815 opponents to his rule had grown in number and 
organizational capacity.  Sensing greater threat to his political position, Derviş Paşa 
embarked on a murderous campaign against the opposition, targeting not only overt 
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opposition members, but also their families.  More than four thousand fled Van taking 
refuge in Iran and the mountains of Hakkari.  Derviş Paşa’s forces pursued them out of 
fear that they would build alliances with outside rival leaders, build their forces, and 
come back to besiege Van.  Derviş Paşa also forged an alliance with the seminomadic 
Kurdish Sipki tribal confederacy who dwelled in Iran but migrated back and forth 
between the Iranian and Ottoman borders to find pasturage for their flocks and shelter 
during the harsh winters. 
Derviş’s attempts to penetrate the Iranian border was met with pushback from the 
Iranian government, who took Satmanıs fortress, located near Mahmudi in Ottoman 
territory, in retaliation and as prevention against further forays.  Skirmishes between 
Iranian leader Feth Ali Khan’s forces and those of Derviş Paşa ensued with neither side 
making significant gains.82  Remarkably, despite Iran’s incursions into Ottoman territory, 
Sultan Mahmud II, occupied with the revolt in Serbia, simply had the vali of Erzurum 
dispatch Derviş to fend off further incursions and then ask him to step down in 1816, 
which Derviş refused to do. 
The conflict between local leaders in Van escalated in 1817 when the bey of 
Hakkari, Mustafa Bey, sought the protection of the Iranian government against Derviş 
Paşa’s reprisals by offering to become an Iranian subject (tebaiyyet) along with those 
living in his domain.83  In response, Sultan Mahmud and the vali of Erzurum wrote the 
vali of Maraş and Selim Bey, the mutasarrıf of Muş, requesting their military support to 
help the state oust Derviş and install a new Ottoman vali in Van.  Derviş Paşa amassed 
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approximately thirty to forty thousand troops to push back against the Ottomans.  He also 
armed and organized members of the Sıpkı tribal confederacy whom he encouraged to 
drive into Erciş and Bulanık, territory held by Selim Paşa of Muş, escalating the already 
heated conflict between Derviş Paşa and Selim. 
Numbered among local allies of the state were İbrahim Yümni Paşa, a local leader 
of the Van region, members of the Şikaki tribal confederacy (likely rivals of the Sipki 
tribal confederacy, the bey of Mahmudi, and Selim Paşa of Muş who muster enough force 
to storm the city of Van in December of 1818.  In anticipation of being overwhelmed, 
Derviş Paşa fled with his supporters to Erçek, a mountainous enclave located east of Van.  
Accompanying Derviş were local ağas, the janissary leader Mustafa Ağa, and his 
Armenian financier, Sarraf Agop.  However, it is unclear how many Armenians 
supported Derviş Paşa.  Yet it is highly unlikely that Armenians who supported Derviş 
sought any sort of ethnic based independence.  As Derviş Paşa and his entourage were 
unwelcome guests in many areas, he was forced to relocate to a number of different 
places and resorted to attacking supporters of Selim Paşa.  In response Selim Paşa of Muş 
led his forces to take back Adilcevaz and Bulanık, which had been captured by the Sipki 
tribe.84 
Upon the untimely death of the vali of Erzurum in early 1819, Derviş Paşa led his 
contingents to storm Van and take it back.  The new rise of Derviş Paşa emboldened 
opponents of Ibrahim Yümni Paşa in the city of Van to rise up against him and usher 
Derviş back into the city.  Fearing capture and torture, İbrahim Yümni Paşa committed 
suicide.  Yet with the appointment of a new vali of Erzurum, Hafız Ali Paşa, the 
                                                          





Ottomans were able restore some order among their forces and advance once again on 
Van.  In a letter to Derviş Paşa, Hafız Ali promised to preserve his life, only exiling him 
to a distant island, and allow him to keep his wealth in exchange for a peaceful surrender.  
However, Derviş Paşa refused and continued his siege of Van.  Ottoman forces entered 
the city in August, 1819.  Derviş tried to flee but was captured and executed two days 
later. 
Between 1813 and 1818 Diyarbakır was under greater Ottoman control than was 
Van.  Sultan Mahmud II regularly rotated the valis between every six to twelve months 
and appointed members of the city’s elite Şeyhzade family to positions of political power 
in order to keep them content.85  During his journey to Diyarbakır in 1816, James Silk 
Buckingham, a British traveler, writes that the vali “Kullendar” (Kalendar Paşa) was 
under the direct command of Sublime Porte, and kept peace in the city with a force of 
about one thousand Turkish and Albanian soldiers.  He writes that although Kalendar 
Paşa had a reputation for being “severe,” that “judging from external appearances, there 
[were] few towns in which there seem to be more of personal liberty, competence, and 
comfort among all classes of people.”86  Between 1816 and 1817 Abdulgani Bulduk 
writes that the relations between the Ottoman valis and locals were quite peaceful.87 
Yet during the winter and spring months of 1819, unrest began brewing between 
the local population and central government officials.  To quell the unrest and restore 
order in the city, the Ottomans appointed Behram Paşa, a member of the Milan tribe, who 
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was supposedly involved in a longstanding rivalry with the Şeyhzade family.88  However, 
it is unclear how much the personal rivalry in and of itself explains the roots of the 
catastrophe that was to follow.  What is clear, however, is that Şeyhzade Mehmed Paşa 
feared the future security of his role in the Diyarbakır administration and established ties 
with a number of local merchants and ulema whom he convinced were at risk from the 
central government.  According to Ahmet Cevdet Paşa’s history, Behram Paşa announced 
only three days after his arrival to Diyarbakır as the vali that he would “kill, banish, and 
burn the property” of dissenters.89   However, Behram had miscalculated the degree of 
local supporters that the dissenters had, for they overwhelmed his security forces and 
forced him to take refuge inside the citadel, where they held him prisoner for 101 days.90 
The incident alarmed the central government who sent reinforcements in from 
neighboring provinces to disperse the rebels and free Behram Paşa.  The rebels were able 
to fend them off at the city’s gates for a number of weeks until late October when 
government forces poured into Diyarbakır and dealt a large blow to the rebels.  Nearly 
one third of the inhabitants of the city suffered casualties and seven to eight hundred 
families were exiled,91 including Şeyhzade Mehmed Bey, janissary leader İskenderzâde 
Öksüz Hacı Mustafa, the city’s mufti Mesut Efendi, and a number of merchants and 
traders.  The Ottoman army’s siege on Diyarbakır ravaged the local economy.  Five years 
after the incident, all exiles were allowed to return.92 
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1821-1823 Ottoman-Iranian War and its Aftermath 
The Ottoman Empire’s centralization efforts in Eastern Anatolia were brought to 
a halt in 1821 because it was facing great political instability on both its eastern and 
western fronts.  Greek rebels in the Peloponnese had risen up to fight the state, and rebels 
in Montenegro drove the Turks from the valley of Zeta.  The Ottomans also battled 
Abdullah Pasha to maintain control over the fortress of Akko and put down resistance by 
the valis of Damascus and Aleppo.  In the east many Iranian Kurds, backed by the Qajar 
government, continued their raids of the Empire via Beyazıt and Van.93 
A number of factors led to the decision of Iran to invade the Ottoman Empire.  
First Ottoman special forces went into Iranian territory to kidnap and behead a formerly 
high-ranking Turkish official who had been deposed on charges of treason and taken 
refuge in Iran.94  Second the vali of Erzurum had failed to contain local nomadic Kurdish 
populations from undertaking raids in Iranian territory which provoked great discontent 
among Iranian Kurds.  Third Shi’i pilgrims’ continual complaints of persecution by both 
Sunnis and Ottoman officials during their treks to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala led 
the Iranians to submit continual complaints to the sultan, whom they believed was not 
properly responding to the matter. 
Iran commenced their push into Ottoman territory by moving one military 
division towards Baghdad in the south and one division towards Erzurum in the north.  In 
November 1821 Hasan Khan Qajar took Toprakkale on the border near Beyazıt which he 
used as a base to launch assaults on a number of strategic Ottoman-held towns to the west 
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all the way to Erciş.95  He was unable to hold them for long due to a combination of 
pushback from local Kurdish and Ottoman forces who outnumbered them almost two to 
one.96  The Ottomans took many Iranian prisoners. 
Although the Ottomans were able to push back Iran, in part due to a particularly 
harsh winter, they were greatly alarmed and undertook to rearrange administrative posts 
in the region.  In December 1821 the Ottomans exiled the vali of Trabzon Salih Paşa to 
Tokat, because of a number of complaints that locals lodged against him, and replaced 
him with the then vali of Erzurum Hüsrev Paşa.  Mehmet Emin Rauf Paşa was appointed 
vali of Erzurum in his stead.  The Ottomans chose him on account of his knowledge of 
the terrain and military experience.  Rauf Paşa appointed Cabbarzade Mahmut Celalettin 
Paşa, the mutasarrıf of Muş, to administer over five kazas and six livas in Rauf Paşa’s 
domain.  They also reinforced Kars sending the muhafız Osman Paşa 2-3,000 foot 
soldiers, four howitzer canons, and ammunition.  The Ottomans tightly supervised all 
movement in the region.  No soldiers commissioned to Kars were to be sent elsewhere.  
Traders moving between Iran and the Ottoman Empire were stopped.97 
In the summer of 1822 Hüseyin Khan, the Persian military commander at 
Yerevan, took his force composed of one thousand regular regiments, two thousand 
riflemen (tufangi), and two thousand Kurdish cavalry and launched another offensive.98  
He managed to take Eleşkirt and advance his armies towards Bulanık, Hınıs, Varto 
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(located northeast of Muş), and Muş.  Hüseyin Khan wrote Osman Paşa of Kars 
demanding a prisoner exchange.99  Yet in spite of the Osman’s compliance the Iranians 
continued to advance into Ottoman territory.  Their progress was slowed towards the end 
of the summer because of an outbreak of an epidemic that sickened and killed many 
soldiers.100 
The Ottomans managed to maintain the loyalty and support of Mahmud Paşa at 
Van and Selim Paşa at Muş.  Although he was rumored to have proclaimed his allegiance 
to the Iranians during Iran’s initial invasion of Muş,101 Selim Paşa of Muş was a powerful 
and useful ally for the Ottomans.  During the 1810s he managed to expand his political 
domain into Bitlis, Hınıs, and Malazgird.  During the 1821-1823 Ottoman-Persian war he 
managed to mobilize a force of some 25,000 and keep the Persians from penetrating the 
Muş region.102  The Persians were also aware of his prowess and large number of 
followers.  Hasan Khan even offered to “change Selim’s name from Pasha to Khan,” 
implying that he sought to grant him a political privilege that would exceed that granted 
to him by the Ottoman Empire if he defected to Iran.  However, Selim declined 
maintaining his loyalty to the Ottomans and settled for a prisoner exchange.103 
The loyalty of the Kurds in Beyazıt was divided between Iran and the Ottoman 
Empire during the war.  Behlül Paşa sided with the Ottoman Empire while Abdülhamid 
                                                          
99 BBA, HAT 770/36179Ö, 3 Zilhicce 1237/21 August 1822; Simeon, ed., Divan 
Patmutyun Hayots, 10: 516. 
100 BBA, HAT 771/36183/E, 29 Zilhicce 1237/16 September 1822; Mehmet Ali Furugi, 
42. 
101 Erzurum vali Hüsrev Paşa to Grand Vizier Hacı Salih Paşa, BBA, HAT 826/37442/A, 
24 Sefer 1237/20 November 1821. 
102 Williamson, “The Turko-Persian War 1821-1823,” 96. 





Paşa sided with the Iranians.  Just before Iran captured Beyazıt, the Ottomans had tried to 
install Abdülhamid Paşa as the mutasarrıf and oust Behlül Paşa, on suspicion that the 
latter would side with the Iranians.  Behlül Paşa’s refusal to leave his position by taking 
refuge inside the fortress fueled Ottoman suspicion even more.  He was eventually 
captured by the Ottoman forces and detained in Erzurum.104  To the chagrin of the 
Ottomans Abdülhamid defected to the Iranian side in the summer of 1821, perhaps in 
anticipation that they would soon take the city.105  The Ottomans rewarded Behlül for 
helping take back Beyazıt by reappointing him to the position of mutasarrıf after the war. 
With conflict escalating in Greece, the Ottomans desperately sought to put an end 
to the war on their eastern front with Iran.  Britain also favored a truce; however, 
provincial governors kept demanding more military provisions to fight off a persistent 
Iranian onslaught.  The Ottomans attempted to coerce the Iranians into a truce by 
temporarily imprisoning Iranian visitors and traders and confiscating their wealth, hoping 
to inflict some economic damage to Iran.  This also led many Iranian merchants to 
demand peace.  Feeling the economic atrophy of the Ottomans’ policy and unable to take 
more land to compensate for economic losses, Feth Ali Shah was forced to call a truce in 
1823.  In June the vali of Erzurum Rauf Paşa met with Iranian representative Muhammad 
Ali Mirza to sign a peace treaty at Erzurum.106 
According to clause one of the treaty, neither Iran nor the Ottoman state was to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the other.  Iran was not to try to prop up or appoint 
governors in Baghdad or any region in Kurdistan.  Groups crossing the border to find 
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pasture for their flocks (yaylak) or to find a dwelling place for the winter (kışlak) were to 
pay a yaylak or kışlak fee.  If a dispute arose that involved parties who lived on both sides 
of the border, Iranian and Ottoman political officials were to meet to come up with 
solutions for its resolution.  Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that Iranian pilgrims to the 
holy Muslim shrines in Najaf and Karbala and in Mecca and Medina be given protection 
by the Ottomans. 
Articles 3 and 4 sought to restrict border crossing to a much greater degree.  
Article 3 stipulated that if members of the large Kurdish tribal confederations the 
Haydaranlı and Sıpkı tribes clashed across borders, that offenders be apprehended and 
taken to either Ottoman or Iranian authorities depending on their place of origin.  The 
Ottoman Empire was to allow passage to members of combative groups who desired to 
pass into Iran.  However, if they sought reentry into the Ottoman Empire, they were to be 
strictly forbidden.  The Iranian border authority was to forbid groups seeking to enter the 
Ottoman Empire from passage.  Article 4 stipulated that no state was to host political 
refugees.107 
The overall effect of the Treaty of Erzurum in 1823 was positive for the Ottoman 
Empire’s centralization project in Eastern Anatolia.  It helped make the border somewhat 
less porous than it had been before.  It further relieved them of the Iranian threat to a 
greater degree allowing them to focus their energies on containing the power of Kurdish 
groups.  However, it was an overall loss for the Kurds in the region.  The increased 
border security disrupted the cross-border transmigrations on which they relied for 
economic sustenance.  The effects of the war had also hurt the local economy, and the 
                                                          





Kurdish groups bore the responsibility of economic reconstruction, which they struggled 
to achieve, to a great degree.  The experiences of the Kurds with the Ottoman Empire 
during the 1821-1823 war embittered many of them towards the sultan and may have 
been a contributing factor in their reluctance to support the Ottomans during the 1828-
1829 war with Russia.  The impact of the war on the Armenians was negative.  Many of 
them were taken prisoner by the Iranians along with their Kurdish neighbors.108  The 
Ottoman patriarch of Istanbul, Boghos I, ordered Armenians in the empire to stand down 
and not rebel against the Ottomans.109  However, since Armenian groups had no political 
aspirations with the Iranians, the war had a neutral effect on their overall relationships 
with the Muslims. 
The war eliminated Behlül Paşa’s competitors for the mutasarrıflık of Beyazıt, 
allowing him to strengthen his control therein.  Since the Ottomans were weakened by 
the war, they continued to tolerate his strong position in the crucial border sancak.  In 
spite of occasional hints of suspicion from the central administration towards Behlül 
Paşa, the bey of Beyazıt remained an important ally to the sultan until his death in 1854.  
This is significant given the fact that many Kurdish elites near the Ottoman-Russian 
border leaned toward the Russians during the 1828-1829 war and rose in rebellion to the 
Ottoman state in the 1830s and 1840s. 
Between 1823 and 1828, there was a division in the house of Alaeddin.  Selim 
Paşa competed with another member in his family for power.  Selim Paşa, accused of 
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betraying the sultan, was pursued by the sultan’s men.  He fled Muş in late 1826.110  
Although he was able to avoid arrest for a number of months by taking refuge in the 
mountains between Bitlis and Diyarbakır, he was eventually captured in the spring of 
1827.  He died while being escorted by Ottoman officers to en route to Sivas, probably 
because someone killed him.111  He was replaced by his brother Abdurrahman, who had 
gained the trust of the Ottomans in the same year.112  This, however, did not put an end to 
the interfamily rivalries in Muş.  Emin Bey, the son of Yusuf Paşa and his brothers killed 
Abdurrahman only months after he was appointed mutasarrıf.113  Fearing reprisal from 
Ottoman authorities Emin fled with his brothers to Diyarbakır, where the Ottoman 
authorities did eventually catch them.  However, since the state authorities believed Emin 
Bey to be the strongest of the beys in Muş, they forgave his indiscretions, made him 
mutasarrıf of Muş, and bestowed upon him the title of paşa.114  During the interfamily 
rivalry, competing family members tried to sell the positions of bishop of Surp Garabet to 
the Armenians in order to raise money to attract Kurdish followers to defeat the 
competition.  Bishop Bedros notes that the when the Ottomans “started to gain control 
over the Kurds…the [Armenian] people were freed from this unbearable yoke.”115 
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The 1828-1829 Russo-Ottoman War 
Despite suffering a major naval defeat (the battle of Navarino) at the hands of 
Russia, France, and Britain in 1827, Sultan Mahmud II continued to defy the demands of 
the Great Powers to recognize the independence of Greece and Russia’s demand to 
restore privileges to Wallachia and Moldavia.  It was a heady move on the part of the 
sultan, who was under the false impression that he had achieved a strong enough political 
and military position to fight the Russians.  Only three months after ending its war with 
Iran, Russia declared war on the Ottomans in April 1828.  Initially the Ottomans 
welcomed the war as an opportunity to settle the score the Russians over their claims to 
the Straits and limit their influence on the Black Sea and in the Balkans.  Yet, with his 
military still in the process of reorganization, the sultan found himself ill-prepared to 
confront the Czar’s armies.  Mahmud II had been bracing himself for a standoff with the 
Russians in the Balkans and may have expected them to try to expand themselves further 
on the northern shores of the Black Sea (i.e., Anapa, which the Russians took on May 
15).  However, Russia’s march on Kars in June, 1828 came as a surprise.  Frank Russell 
notes that Ottoman unawareness of Russian intrigues was to the extent that on the eve of 
the Russian invasion of Eastern Anatolia, the mutasarrıf of Kars allowed traders to cross 
the border into Russia and sell their grain on the Georgian markets thereby indirectly 
provisioning the Russian military.116 
It is not exactly clear why the Ottomans were caught off guard on their eastern 
front.  For one they had informants from Iran tipping them off about Russia’s intent to 
                                                          





push into the Ottomans’ eastern flank during the Russo-Iranian war.117  One explanation 
for the lack of preparation against a Russian offensive from the Caucasus is that the 
Ottomans, having been in conflict in Iran most recently, believed Fath Ali Shah to be the 
greater threat than the Czar.  Lieutenant-General William Monteith, who was in Tiflis 
and Iran in 1828 and 1829 overseeing a settlement between the Russians and the 
Persians,118 subscribes to this view and writes, “the Turkish government appeared to view 
the humiliation of Persia [as a result of the Russo-Persian War 1826-1828] with 
satisfaction, little imagining it would tend to their own discomfiture.”119  Also given the 
fact that Russia had mostly left the Ottomans alone on their eastern front during the 1806-
1812 Russo-Ottoman war, and given the fact that the Russians were still in full control 
over their newly conquered territories in the Caucasus and had not yet fully settled 
matters with Iran, it seemed reasonable to expect that Russia would not launch a full-
scale invasion into the rugged mountainous territories of Kars and Ardahan.120  Another 
reason that the Ottomans were caught off guard is that the Russians appeared unprepared 
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for battle, with many of their soldiers still returning from Iran.121 
The Russians assembled troops in Gyumri in late May, 1828 and took Kars the 
next month.  After recovering from an outbreak of disease in late June and early July, the 
Russians proceeded to take Akhalkalak, Ahıska (Akhaltsikhe), Atskhur, and Ardahan in 
the north, and Beyazıt, Toprakkale, and Diadin in the south between July and September.  
The Russians owed the success of their campaigns in 1828 largely to Armenian and 
Azerbaijani militia members (opolchentsa), especially in the battle of Beyazıt in late 
August where they drove a militia of irregulars out of the citadel and helped take and 
secure prisoners.122  In October, Prince Chavchavadze, an ethnic Georgian, who was in 
command of the force penetrating southward, undertook a reconnaissance mission to the 
region just north of Lake Van, reaching as far as Patnos, and were on their way to 
Malazgirt, but decided to retreat with his troops back to Beyazıt when forces of Kurdish 
irregulars, led by Emin Paşa of Muş and Abdurrezzak Paşa (the brother of the toppled 
Paşa of Beyazıt, Behlül Paşa) began approaching them.123   
Feeling emboldened by the success of his campaign in 1828, Prince Paskevich 
expressed his desire in November of the same year to penetrate Anatolia as far as Sivas in 
the north and Diyarbakır in the south to be able to force the Ottoman army to take on two 
fronts.124  Combat resumed in January 1829 when the sultan called upon his subjects to 
wage a jihad against the Russians.  Between January and June he had his generals lead a 
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force of 80,000 to try to retake Kars and Akhaltsikhe, and another force of 50,000 under 
the command of Emin Paşa of Muş and İshak Paşa of Van to try to retake Beyazıt, held 
by a force of 2,000 Russians and 1,000 Armenians.125  However, in June the Russians 
won a crucial set of battles against the Ottomans who were trying to take back 
Akhaltsikhe, thus clearing the path for them to resume moving deeper into Ottoman 
territory.  General Paskevich took Erzurum on July 8, 1829, and Hınıs and Bayburt a 
week later. 
İshak Paşa of Van moved his forces into Beyazıt and was able to capture all 
except for the citadel.  He retreated upon notice that Erzurum had fallen.126  The Paşa of 
Van charged again in late July, hoping that the Russians were thinned out and stricken by 
disease.  However, he was still held off by Paskevich.  Kurds remained on the path 
between Van and Beyazıt sending in people to raid Armenian villages in the Beyazıt 
region.127  The Russians were pressured by their European allies and foes to fully halt 
their military operations against the Ottomans by mid-September and sign the Treaty of 
Edirne.  Under the treaty, the sultan was to recognize Russia’s acquisitions in the 
Caucasus (Akhaltsikhe, Ahıska, Nahçevan, and Yerevan) and concede increased trading 
rights to her in the Black Sea and on the Danube River.  The Russians were careful to not 
demand too many territorial acquisitions lest they disrupt the balance of power in Europe 
and provoke Britain, Austria, and/or France to declare war on them.  Hence, they returned 
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Kars, Beyazıt, and Erzurum to the Ottomans. 
While Russia officials politicized religious and ethnic identity in the Balkans, 
encouraging the Greeks and Serbs to demand autonomy and promoted themselves as 
protectors of Orthodox Christians against Muslim oppressors, they pursued a much 
different policy in Eastern Anatolia.  Since Muslims greatly outnumbered Christians 
throughout the southern Caucasus and northeastern Anatolia, they tended not to promote 
the idea of religious protection and freedom as a means of inciting Eastern Anatolians to 
revolt against the Ottomans.  Instead, the Russians promoted the idea of they were more 
capable of the Ottomans in bringing about security, order, and economic progress in the 
region. 
Prince Paskevich was cautious to not appear as a Christian liberator, but as a 
liberator from insecurity.  After Kars surrendered to Prince Paskevich’s forces in late 
June 1828, Paskevich established a council to administer the town which consisted of a 
Circassian chief Prince Beckowitz, the mufti, the kadi, and some principal inhabitants 
who were both Armenian and Muslim, and two Russians.  The police force continued as 
it did before and the Christians reportedly did not complain against the administration.128  
Prince Paskevich was also critical of political activist Bishop Nerses Ashtaraketsi for his 
austere policies against the Muslims in Yerevan, since it made it difficult to secure 
alliances among many elites of the local Zilanlı tribe in the region.129 
Russia had also learned from the earlier wars that the Muslim and non-Muslim 
Kurdish groups in many regions were not necessarily enthused supporters of either 
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regime.  Russian observers noted that during their campaigns in Caucasus between 1804 
and 1813 although many of the local Kurdish populations did not side with the Russians, 
they were reluctant to wage full resistance against their campaign.130  Seeing that the 
Kurds did not always have a deeply rooted religious or ethnic connection to their Muslim 
overlords, they either tried to persuade them through political promises or coerce them 
through threats to side with them against the Ottomans and Iranians. 
After the Russians declared war and won a few key battles against the Ottomans, 
they found an increasing number of Kurds submitted to them, promised neutrality, or 
even offered to accept an alliance with them.  The bey of Hakkari declared his neutrality 
right upon the outbreak of war.131  The Yezidi Kurds at Beyazıt submitted very quickly to 
the Russians at the battle of Beyazıt in mid-1828.  Hassan Ağa, a prominent leader in the 
Kurdish Zilanlı tribe (who dwelled predominantly around Yerevan), allied with the 
Russians.  Not all members of the Zilanlı tribe accepted an alliance with Russia, many 
fled across the Ottoman border.132  By early 1829, the Russians had four Muslim 
regiments formed primarily from the populations of Kars and Akhaltsikhe – one regiment 
was entirely Kurdish while another consisted largely of Yezidi Kurds led by Hassan 
Ağa.133 
Behlül Paşa, the mutasarrıf of Beyazıt, also appeared to entertain the idea of an 
alliance with the Russians, in order to preserve his status and his life.  According to 
Averyanov, Behlül Paşa did commit to helping the Russians and only appeared to be 
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fighting on the Ottoman side in order to avoid reprisals against him by Ottoman loyalists 
under his command.  He was taken into protective custody by the Russian forces after 
they defeated the weakly assembled Ottoman force.134  A memo from General Williams 
confirms that Behlül Paşa was trying to playing both the Ottoman and Russian sides to 
his advantage: 
This is the second pasha who has been taken in this manner; Bahlool Pash, the 
hereditary chief of Bayazid, having fallen into the enemy’s hands near Euch-
Kelissa [Üçkilise], about two months ago.  I should state to your lordship that, by 
Prince Paskiewitch’s official reports on the last war, this very Bahlool Pasha 
allowed himself to be taken prisoner in Bayazid, and, while in the enemy’s hands, 
exerted himself as an active partizan [sic] in their favour by intriguing with and 
rendering neutral several of the sultan’s Turkish subjects.  The similarity of the 
game played and playing by this man forces me to bring him to your excellency’s 
notive; the more so as several of the Kurdish bands of horse under Veli Pasha, 
during the recent unsuccessful operations of the Russian general-in-chief against 
Erzerum, disbanded and fled to their homes without firing a shot.135 
 
Kurdish groups further from the Ottoman-Russian border were often more wary 
of an alliance with Russia, but not completely opposed to the idea.  After Prince 
Chavchavadze withdrew his troops from Patnos, he managed to secure an agreement with 
Emin Paşa of Muş, who had helped the Ottomans drive him from the region, to maintain 
neutrality.  This dealt a major blow to the Ottomans who were deprived of some 12,000 
irregular cavalry under the command of Emin Paşa as a result.136  In December 1828, 
after the Russians had advanced deeper into Ottoman territory, Emin Paşa sent an 
Armenian to Tiflis to inform the Russian commander that he was willing to avail them of 
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his services.  Emin Paşa’s uncle, Ibrahim Bey, also met with the Russians in July 1829.137 
In time, Emin Paşa proved to be a fickle opportunist who played the Ottomans 
and the Russians to his advantage.  Emin Paşa withdrew his support from the Russians by 
the time they captured Erzurum in mid-1829.  Around the same time, other Kurds who 
had had hinted at either surrendering to the Russians or entering into an alliance with 
them also made an about face.  According to a letter that General Paskevich wrote in late 
July, the reason that these Kurdish groups did not maintain their loyalty to the Russians 
was that they heard that the British and French were coming to Istanbul and would not 
allow the Russians to hold the east.  Hence, they avoided the appearance of any loyalty to 
the Russians and figured that their lands would soon be returned to them.138  In 
September 1829, the Russians managed to advance on Muş, where they sought to punish 
Emin Paşa for his duplicity and replace him with Ibrahim Bey, who appeared to be more 
loyal to the Russians.  However, with the Treaty of Edirne stipulating Russian retreat, this 
plan never came to fruition.139 
During the war, the seeds of ethnic conflict were sown among local inhabitants.  
Emin Paşa ordered that Armenian villages be plundered in order to raise resources to be 
able to fight against the Russians, whom the Ottoman authorities had obligated him to 
fight.  According to a letter by a monk in the Surp Garabet monastery, Emin Paşa had 
developed a contingency plan in the event that the Russians stormed Muş, which 
involved plundering Armenian villages and fleeing west.  The Armenians were said to 
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have not resisted since they expected that Russia would soon occupy the region and that 
they would then become the new stewards of the lands evacuated by the Kurds.  The 
monastery at St. Garabet was plundered and pillaged.  However, after the war ended, 
Emin Paşa returned some belongings to the church, including their animals, in order to 
rebuild the monastery and make it a valuable source of income again.  Guravtsi, the 
Armenian bishop of the monastery, tried to arraign and try Ömer Bey, a Kurd who had 
participated in robbing the church.  However, Ömer had fled to Hınıs and local 
authorities did not try to apprehend him.140 
İshak Paşa, the muhafız of Van, also grew increasingly suspicious that the 
Armenians in Van would undermine Ottoman efforts to protect the city.  In July 1829, he 
sent a note to the vali of Erzurum, Salih Paşa, informing him that he was arming the 
unarmed in Van, warning Iranian merchants and affiliates with the Haydaranlı tribe 
confederation from coordination, and “would not fail to punish Armenian traitors” 
(Ermeni taifesinden hiyanet edeceklerin tecziyelerinde kusur edilmeyeceğine).141 
On the other hand, many Armenians aspired to liberate themselves from their 
Muslim overlords and persecuted Muslims in the regions that had come under Russian 
control.  In 1828, Armenian vigilante groups in the rural areas throughout the Kars 
sancak were reported to have destroyed the homes of Muslims and deprived them of 
access to food and resources in order to force them to migrate.142 
Some 100,000 Armenians from the eyalets of Van and Erzurum fled to Russian 
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territory during the war.143  Many fled due to persecution or fear of attacks from 
neighboring Muslims and out of hope of finding a better life in Russia.  However, a great 
many fled because of direct encouragement from the Russians and many of the Armenian 
priests to do so.144  Russia pursued a similar policy of attracting Christians to migrate to 
the southern Caucasus during the 1826-1828 war with Iran.145  Their aim was to create a 
majority Christian population in the region and thin out the Muslims there in order to 
maintain a foothold in the region and make it more difficult for the Ottomans or Iranians 
to regain control of the region by calling the Muslims to mobilize in the name of religion. 
The Ottomans, by contrast, did not appear to favor a policy of ethnic or religious 
“thinning” in Eastern Anatolia, largely because the majority of the population was 
Muslim and they did not believe the Armenians to pose a significant threat.  The sultan 
was actually opposed to the Czar’s policy of enticing Armenian migration, for fear that 
this policy would give Russia an upper hand in the Caucasus and make it difficult to 
control policy in his favor there.  Furthermore, local Ottoman officials grew concerned 
that the mass exodus of Armenians from Ottoman lands would deprive them of a tax base 
and labor to till the fields and take care of the land.  Hence, they often discouraged 
Armenian migration to Russia.146 
Much like the Kurds, the Armenians were divided during the war.  Armenians in 
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the Caucasus around Yerevan and those at Beyazıt more strongly supported the 
Russians.147  However, the Armenian patriarch at Istanbul and the Armenian elites around 
Van voiced their support for the Ottomans.  The reason for this has to do with the fact 
that many of the Armenian peasants lacked political clout and figured their lot to be 
better in territory controlled by the Russians.  By contrast, elite members of the Armenian 




 The policy of decentralization that the Ottomans pursued in Eastern Anatolia 
throughout much of eighteenth century was a relatively effective strategy against Iranian 
intrigues.  Through this policy, the Ottomans were able to incentivize peripheral Kurdish 
elites to maintain their loyalty to the sultan and free themselves of the need to divert 
precious human resources to build up a bureaucracy and a standing military there.  Since 
the Iranians were in a state of internal disarray through much of the 1600s and 1700s, 
they had little to offer Kurdish beys in Ottoman territory in order to persuade them to 
defect.  Furthermore, since the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia were largely Sunni Muslims, 
the Iranians’ appeal to the idea of Shi’i protection had no effect on them. 
Yet, the Ottomans’ policy of decentralization only worked in Eastern Anatolia on 
the conditions that the local beyliks remained small, beys governing the beyliks 
maintained control over the territory that the Ottomans allotted to them, and the Ottomans 
minimized rivalry among beyliks.  In essence, what had to exist was an ordered 
                                                          





decentralization under strong supervision of the central state.  Decentralization became a 
significant disadvantage to the Ottomans when the beys of Şehrizor, Muş, and Beyazıt 
began to increase their power and territorial acquisitions.  With insufficient resources to 
rein in local power struggles in the periphery, the Ottomans as well as the locals were 
forced to tolerate political instability and tension between competing elites. 
Another stipulation for a policy of decentralization to work was that the Ottomans 
had to maintain control over key garrison towns in order to supervise political activity in 
yurtluk-ocaklık regions.  Selim III’s foolhardy reform efforts in Eastern Anatolia led to a 
backlash by elites in Erzurum, Van, and Diyarbakır.  The loss of control over garrison 
cities in the east forced the Ottomans to delay much-needed stabilization efforts in the 
yurtluk-ocaklık lands.  Consequently, an environment of instability and intrigue prevailed 
for several decades, particularly in the areas north of Lake Van. 
Only two years after Mahmud II finally managed to topple rebel leaders in Van 
and Diyarbakır in 1819, he was forced into an attritive war with Iran, which further 
stalled efforts to restore order in the Eastern Anatolian periphery.  The Iranian-Ottoman 
war 1821-1823 was the first time that the Lake Van region was actually invaded by Iran.  
The Ottomans’ subpar performance during the war was disconcerting to local beys, who 
grew increasingly unsure of the sultan’s ability to protect their domains and honor the 
agreements that he had made with them.  With no gains made during the war, the 
Ottomans were forced once again to let local politics fester in a cauldron of tension and 
uncertainty.  So great was the disappointment of tribal leaders and beys in the Ottomans 
that many of them actually considered Russia as a favorable empire to the Ottomans 





Conflict in Eastern Anatolia between 1800 and 1829 was driven and dominated 
by the question of stability.  Elites rose to power on promises of providing a political 
stability more effectively than could the local Ottoman administrators.  However, 
international tensions and the overwhelming feeling of the need to make military and 
political reforms led the Ottomans to continually interfere in local politics and disrupt 
whatever order local magnates could establish.  Undelivered promises, unstellar 
performance on the battlefield and the diplomatic arena, and unpredictable policy-making 
led the Kurds to grow increasingly cynical towards the Ottoman administration.  Elites 
throughout Eastern Anatolia increasingly questioned the legitimacy of Ottoman political 
reform and their ability to provide order.  The attitudes developed by the Kurds towards 













REFORM, CENTRALIZATION, AND THE  
 
CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICTS  
 
IN EASTERN ANATOLIA: 1829-1847 
  
 Between the 1830s and 1840s, Eastern Anatolia certainly experienced a greater 
degree of violent political conflict that it had in earlier periods.  Conflict escalated 
between many local Kurdish groups and the Ottoman state resulting in high casualty 
numbers, particularly among the former.  Additionally, tensions increased drastically 
among Nestorian Christians and Kurdish groups in the southeastern Hakkari region 
culminating in the slaughter of thousands of Nestorian Christians.  These episodes of 
violence have prompted many to ask to what extent religious and ethnic differences 
fueled political friction and formed an ideological basis for violence.  Some have argued 
that Kurdish groups developed a greater sense of ethnic consciousness during this period.  
The revolt of the Kurdish leader Bedr Khan Bey against the Ottoman state in the 1840s is 
often portrayed as an ethnic revolt, and even sometimes as evidence of the existence of a 
sort of proto-Kurdish nationalism.  The massacres of the Nestorians in 1843 and 1846 are 
often explained as the result of the growing Muslim religious fanaticism that arose in 
reaction to the increased presence of foreign missionaries and British diplomats in 
southeastern Anatolia and Mosul.  This chapter attempts to explore the detailed context 





acknowledged that elites appealed more to religion and ethnicity as a means of 
mobilizing force against the state during this period, it is argued that these factors played 
only a secondary role.  Ideology was not a main driver of conflict, but rather power 
struggle and political survival. 
 
Renewed Attempts at Centralization 
 The Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 was a watershed event for the Ottoman 
Empire.  Russia’s victories in the Caucasus, Greece, and the Balkans also alarmed British 
politicians, leading many of them to reverse their noninterventionist policy beliefs.  
Moreover, the victories invigorated the proreform and procentralization camp in Ottoman 
politics, which was embittered towards many of the Kurdish groups in the east over their 
widespread defection against the Ottomans during the war and blamed their lack of 
loyalty to the sultan for the vulnerability of Eastern Anatolia. 
In 1830 the vali of Erzurum Ali Şefik Paşa wrote a memorandum to the Sublime 
Porte expressing his frustration over the fact that the inhabitants of Muş, Van, Beyazıt, 
Hınıs, Tekman, Malazgirt, Kığı, Tercan, and Erzincan were under continual threat of 
invasion from nomadic Kurdish groups and that it would be necessary to settle them and 
cordon off their migration routes.1  The vali of Diyabakir, Yahya Paşa, pursued and 
exiled many of the Kurdish tribes in the region in the same year.2  In April 1831, the 
mutasarrıf of Muş, Emin Paşa, was ordered to settle the nomadic tribes in Hınıs and 
Tekman, both under his authority, and “stimulate agricultural development” in the region, 
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which had been ravaged by the rivalries between Kurdish tribes and which was essential 
to rebuilding the society that had been wrecked by the Russian invasion.3  The overall 
effect of this centralization campaign was that independent Kurdish power-holders, both 
those who derived their power from the state and those who derived it from connections 
with Kurdish tribes, were greatly weakened and left competing among each other for 
what power was left. 
Additionally many of the Armenians vacated the region leaving their lands and 
possessions for Kurdish groups to compete over and occupy.  Former Armenian 
strongholds, such as the village of Hınıs and its environs, were abandoned, and as a result 
the Armenians lost much of the already waning political leverage that they once had in 
the north near the Russian border.4  In the Caucasus, however, Armenians were able to 
gain a gradually stronger demographic and political position.  Russian population surveys 
show that the population of Armenians in the Yerevan and Nakhchevan regions rose from 
about 25,000 in 1826 to about 82,000 in 1832 while the population of Muslims decreased 
from 117,000 in 1826 to 82,000 in 1832.  An increasing number of Muslims left the 
region and a correspondingly increasing number of Armenians migrated to the region 
throughout the nineteenth century.5 
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dearth of Armenians in the region after the war: “Khanoos formerly contained one 
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5 Bournoutian, "The Ethnic Composition of the Socio-Economic Condition of Eastern 





Almost immediately after the war with Russia, the Ottomans began to face a 
series of new crises on its border with Iran in the Van region.  Despite of the Treaty of 
Erzurum in 1823 which stipulated that both the Ottomans and the Iranians were to 
provide greater security and prevent Kurdish nomads from crossing the border and 
offering their services as mercenaries to rival Kurdish groups, the border remained 
porous.  In order to keep the peace at Van, whose inhabitants were still seemingly restive 
even after the removal of Derviş Paşa from power in 1819, the Ottomans appointed locals 
to serve in the local administration.  İshak Paşa, a local who had political ties with a 
number of Kurdish elites in the region, was appointed vali of Van in early 1826.  The 
Iranian government welcomed his appointment as a show of commitment by the 
Ottomans to the preservation of political unity between the two Muslim states.6  İshak 
Paşa continually showed loyalty to the sultan for most of his tenure.  He coordinated with 
the mutasarrıfs of Muş and Beyazıt to pursue Selim Paşa, the former mutasarrıf of Muş, 
who had gone rogue (hain-i padişah) and sought refuge in the fortress at Bitlis.7  İshak 
Paşa had also played a vital role in the Russo-Turkish war 1828-1829, during which he 
gathered a local military force to fend off the Russians’ southward military advancement 
from Beyazıt and attempted to retake territory lost to the Russians.   
Yet after the war, the Ottomans transferred him to Kars and appointed Timur Paşa 
the new vali of Van.  Although the Ottomans’ replacement of İshak seemed to be nothing 
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6 BBA, İE.HR 18/1680, 29 Zilkade 1241/4 August 1826. 
7 Van Muhafız İshak Paşa, Muş Mutasarrıf Ahmed Paşa, and Beyazıt Mutasarrıf Behlül 
Paşa to the Grand Vizier Mehmed Selim Paşa via Erzurum vali Galip Paşa, BBA, HAT 





more than a routine rearrangement of the valis, İshak Paşa was angered by the move and 
enlisted the support of the Zilanlı Kurdish tribe, who inhabited the region north of 
Beyazıt, to attempt to retake Van by force.  The precise motive of İshak’s resistance is 
unclear from the documents.  Yet given the fact that İshak was able to gain the support of 
the Kurdish bey of Müküs, Khan Mahmud, and the Kurdish bey of Hakkari, Nurullah, it 
is likely that he had been fostering ambitions to gain the kind of semiautonomous 
political status over Van that the beys of Müküs and Hakkari had over their respective 
regions.8  İshak’s attempts to retake Van were to no avail, a sign that the Ottoman state 
had entrenched its forces more deeply in the city and had either persuaded or coerced the 
majority of the local population to comply with its authority.  İshak took refuge first with 
Khan Mahmud whom he tried to coax to help him retake Van.  Yet despite the relatively 
formidable military force that Khan Mahmud was able to rally, numbering some three 
thousand cavalry and four thousand foot soldiers from a number of local Kurdish tribes, 
he was only willing to give İshak refuge and did not want to take the risk of invading 
Van.  Disillusioned with Khan Mahmud, İshak sought refuge with Nurullah Bey in 
Hakkari, but he was also unable to gain traction among the Kurdish tribes there to launch 
another offensive on Van.  Ultimately the Ottomans declared that İshak no longer 
constituted a threat and let him remain in Hakkari.  The İshak Paşa incident shows the 
fickleness of the loyalty of many Kurdish elites to the Ottoman state.  It is also further 
evidence that the Ottomans were facing a legitimacy crisis throughout eastern Anatolia, 
particularly in the southeastern regions of Hakkari, Mahmudi, Müküs, and Soran where 
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the beys were particularly strong and independent.9 
 
Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern  
Anatolia in the 1830s 
 The relations between Muslims and Christians throughout Eastern Anatolia 
experienced some strain as a result of the Russo-Ottoman War 1828-1829, particularly in 
the northeast where Muslim groups gradually gained control of land formerly occupied 
by Christians.  The realization that Christians could be used by Russia to take action 
against them emboldened Muslims to reassert their dominance. However, since Muslim 
groups were quickly able to gain the upper against Armenians in the north, and Christian 
groups in the Caucasus, with the aid of Russia, were able to gain the upper hand against 
Muslims, weaker groups submitted to stronger groups and violent conflict between 
Muslims and Christians was stemmed.  It should be noted that both the Russian and 
Ottoman states were not interested in completely ousting Muslims and Christians, 
respectively, from their territories since they relied on them as a source of income.  Both 
states, however, cautiously strove to uproot the mobilization of religious groups. 
 The Protestant missionaries Eli Smith and Harrison Gray Otis Dwight surveyed 
Eastern Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Iranian Azerbaijan between 1831 and 1833.  Their 
survey revealed that many local Muslims as well as the Ottoman state may not have been 
too keen on the Armenian exodus as a result of the war.  Muslims relied on the 
Armenians as a tax base and were forced to find some sort of economic replacement for 
them.  They wrote that “the Turks seem to regret the loss of their Armenian neighbors" 
                                                          





and that Erzurum was economically ruined as a result of their departure.10 
 Their survey also revealed that in some cases Muslims and Christians were united 
in their opposition to both the Ottoman state and Iran, and consequently looked favorably 
upon Russian intervention.  A Kurdish farmer in Urmia, mistaking them for Russians, 
told them:  
You are just the men I have been waiting to see for a long time.  Our government 
here oppresses, beats and kills us.  This is Kurdistan; the Kurds are many and the 
Kuzul-bases (Persians) are few.  When are you coming to take the country and 
allow us a chance to beat and kill them?11 
 
 Some communities tried to maintain or restore the social synthesis that had 
traditionally existed between Christians and Muslims.  Lieutenant Shiel reported in 1836 
that the Kurds of the Hakkari region “highly valued” the Armenians and other Christians 
because they attracted the Christians to inhabit the region and stimulate the economy: “A 
Kurd, the chief of a village, once boasted to me, that he had just enticed an Armenian 
priest to settle in his village; ‘for now,’ said he, ‘when I invite Christians to establish 
themselves here, and they inquire about a priest, I am able to say to them, here you have 
him.’”12  Horatio Southgate, an American missionary, reported on his journey to Mardin 
in 1840 that Muslims and Christians participated in joint religious services: 
Several Mussulman women came in immediately after prayers, with their children 
in their arms, which they presented to the priest, and kneeling themselves in 
humble attitude, had prayers read over them.  They then left a small charity for 
the Church, and departed in a reverent and becoming manner.  The priest assured 
me that Mussulmans sometimes join in the worship, and go through all the acts of 
devotion with the same regularity as the Christians, kneeling, bowing, and 
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prostrating themselves, but never making the sign of the cross, which is 
considered as the distinctive and peculiar badge of a Christian.13 
 
 It should also be noted that the Yazidi Kurds in southeastern Anatolia, who were 
highly heterodox Muslims, were known to have periodically enjoyed good relations with 
the Christians.  For instance a Yazidi chief, Mirza Aga of Redwan, a town southeast of 
Diyarbakır, built a church for the Armenians and housed their archimandrite, Ghazar Ter 
Ghevondian, who taught his children Turkish and Armenian.14 
 While the population of Armenians in northeastern Anatolia near the Russian 
dropped precipitately, albeit with some slow recovery over the next few decades, some 
Armenian communities further south continued to maintain a degree of 
semiindependence from the Kurds and the Ottomans.  Notably Armenian communities in 
Van, Zeytun, and the mountains southwest of Muş remained largely armed and capable 
of self-defense.  The British consul James Brant noted on his journey through Eastern 
Anatolia in 1838 that many Armenians near Hazro (half way between Muş and 
Diyarbakır), "carried arms and fought with Muslims."  He added that although they were 
subject to taxes by the surrounding Muslims they "were treated by their masters by an 
equal footing" due to their ability to mobilize force and fend off the Muslims.15  Ahmed 
Ağa, a Kurdish village chief of Lice, told Brant that when the Ottoman general Reşid 
Paşa brought in state forces to try to centralize control over the region in 1836 the 
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Armenians living near him were "as pertinacious as in their opposition [to Reşid Paşa] as 
the Mohammedans," although the Armenians insisted that the Kurds had forced them to 
fight the state.16 
 The overall absence of widespread Christian rebellions in Eastern Anatolia was 
highly significant, and a factor that contributed to the existence of far better relations 
between Christians and Muslims in Eastern Anatolia than existed in much of Greece in 
the 1820s, where Muslim and Christian communities became deeply polarized and 
engaged in massively violent attacks against each other.  Even though the Russians 
attempted to instigate the Christians in Eastern Anatolia to rise in rebellion against the 
Ottoman state, and even though many Armenians championed open revolt against the 
sultan, the spirit of rebellion did not spread among the Christians of Eastern Anatolia to 
the same extent as it did in the Balkans, for three main reasons. 
 First, the Armenians and Assyrians were not as concentrated as the Christians in 
the Balkans were and lived more diffusely among Muslims.  Pockets of Christian power, 
such as the Armenians in Van and Zeytun or the Assyrians in Tiyari and Jebel Tur, were 
isolated within large swaths of Muslim-majority land.  Thus Christian rebellions in these 
regions could not be as easily supported by outsiders.  Furthermore, the Christians in 
Eastern Anatolia who did rebel could not do so without the blessing of their Muslim 
neighbors.  If their Muslim neighbors shared a spirit of opposition with the Christians, 
Christian-led rebellion was possible, as was the case with Bishop Jonah of Muş who had 
secured the support of Kurdish bey Alaeddin in the mid-eighteenth century.  But without 
the support of local Muslim groups, Christian attempts to rebel against the state generally 
                                                          





foundered.  Hence during the Russo-Ottoman war 1828-1829, local Muslims throughout 
Eastern Anatolia, more of whom were hostile to Russia than sympathetic, stamped out 
virtually all attempts by the Christians to rebel.  Consequently Nerses Ashtaraketsi's 
rallying call for Armenians to support Russia and rise in protest against their Ottoman 
overlords did not have much effect beyond the Caucasus.  The migration of tens of 
thousands of Armenians to Russia after the war further weakened the power base of 
Armenians in northeastern Anatolia. 
The second reason why rebellion did not spread among the Armenians in Eastern 
Anatolia between the 1820s and 1840s was that despite the fact that the Armenian millet 
was centered in western Anatolia, it continued to have a great degree of control over the 
Christian inhabitants of Eastern Anatolia.  The Armenian millet was virtually 
impenetrable by the lower classes in Eastern Anatolia who might have favored rebellion 
against the Ottomans.  Instead, members of the Armenian amira class, who were strongly 
loyal to the Ottoman state (largely because they derived their wealth from the political 
status quo) had a tremendous degree of influence over the millet and practically selected 
the patriarch.  Influential figures in the Armenian millet discouraged rebellious activity 
and generally backed the sultan.  They exercised careful supervision over their appointees 
throughout Eastern Anatolia, who generally obeyed their orders.  For instance when some 
Armenians entered into an alliance with Bedr Khan against the Ottoman state in the mid-
1840s,17 Patriarch Matteos at Istanbul sent an encyclical to Armenian ecclesiastical 
leaders in Diyarbakır, Bitlis, Erzurum, Palu, and Van urging them to "avenge themselves 
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of their sufferings and give help and service to the Ottoman army."  Matteos even sent 
Armenians to join the Ottoman commander Osman Paşa against Bedr Khan.  Many 
Armenian inhabitants of Van reportedly helped attack Cizre in 1847.18  By contrast the 
Greek patriarch of Istanbul was far more limited in his ability to blunt the force of Filikia 
Eteria and other Greek rebel leaders, who inspired the Greeks in Morea to revolt against 
the state.  The Greek Patriarch's influence was especially limited over the Serbs, even 
though he had jurisdictional authority over them, largely because of their ethnic 
difference. 
The third reason that no significant wave of rebellion spread among the Christians 
in Eastern Anatolia was that Russia's policy toward the Armenians in the Caucasus 
generally limited the influence and spread of Armenian liberationism.  Russia occupied 
the Caucasus in order to use the territory as a platform to launch additional military 
campaigns deeper into the Ottoman Empire and Iran.  Russia was willing to concede 
some autonomy to the Armenian Gregorian Church in 1836 in the form of the 
Polozhenie, an imperial decree that specified a number of privileges that Russia would 
grant the Armenian church.  These privileges included exemption from taxation, the right 
to administer its own educational system, and security for a sizeable amount of property 
held by the church. But at the same time Russia kept the Caucasus under tight political 
supervision and tried to stem all Armenian political activity that challenged the authority 
of either the Czar or the Armenian Catholicos.  The Polozhenie had the positive effect of 
lessening the level of hostility among many of the Armenian clergy, while 






simultaneously edging out clergy who fostered liberationist ideals.19  The Armenians in 
the Caucasus had the further disadvantage of political isolation from other Christian 
powers.  Whereas the geographic position of the Serbs and Greeks was such that they 
could leverage Austria, France, and Britain against Russia, thereby achieving autonomy 
from the Ottoman state rather than coming under full Russian control, the Armenians in 
the Caucasus were in no such position and were at the mercy of Russian officials to 
ensure their more limited autonomy. 
The lagging economy in the Caucasus further stifled the appeal of the idea of 
liberation with the help of Russia.20  Robert Curzon noted that many Armenian migrants 
to Russia were greatly disenchanted with the Russian government's apparent inability to 
restore economic order: 
In the year 1829, Kars, Bayazeed, Van, Moush, Erzeroom, and Beyboort were 
occupied by the Russians, who evacuated that portion of the Turkish empire on 
the conclusion of the treaty of Adrianople.  Trusting to the protestations of a 
Christian emperor, sixty-nine thousand Christian Armenian families were 
beguiled into the folly of leaving Mohammedan dominions, and sitting in peace 
under the paternal protection of the Czar….by the sacrilegious hands of the 
Russian soldiers, who tried to destroy those temples of their own religion which 
the Turks had spared, and under whose rule many of the more recent had been 
rebuilt on their old foundations.  The greater part of these Armenians perished 
from want and starvation; the few who survived this sharp lesson have since been 
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endeavoring by every means in their power, to return to the lesser evils of the 




Uprising in the Southeast 
In 1831, Kör Muhammad Bey of Soran22 commenced what was to become one of 
the first major Kurdish uprisings against the Ottoman state in southeastern Anatolia.  Two 
main factors explain his decision to revolt: first, he was discontented with the fragmented 
politics of southeastern Anatolia and feared that his power would be challenged by rival 
Kurdish beys if he did not take the initiative.  Second the Ottoman seizure of control of 
Baghdad from the Mamluks in 1831 and from other Kurdish beys further north made him 
aware that his power could eventually be targeted by the state.  Ibrahim Paşa's invasion of 
Syria in 1831 and the penetration of central Anatolia in 1832 and 1833 gave Kör 
Muhammad a window of opportunity to mobilize local Kurdish followers and rise in 
revolt. 
Kör Muhammad Bey was a shrewd political leader who was skilled at rallying 
local support and singling out his rivals.  In 1814 he declared his father no longer able to 
manage the political affairs of the beylik of Soran and proclaimed himself the new leader.  
His bold move was greatly contested by his uncles who attempted to round up sufficient 
opposition to depose him.  However, Kör Muhammad Bey managed to secure the 
backing of a number of his father’s main supporters who helped him locate his rival 
family members and kill them.  They also helped him subdue a number of rival tribes in 
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the Rawanduz region. 
The paucity of sources on Kör Muhammad Bey makes it difficult to pinpoint the 
exact reasons that he was able to outbid his rivals.  Nonetheless based on the available 
material, it is clear that his strong vision of not only restoring the beylik of Soran to its 
former greatness but of expanding its borders helped him gain followers.  He took 
advantage of the political disorder of the Ottoman-Persian war 1821-1823 to penetrate 
southward, ousting the Baban ruler from power at Harir in 1822 and occupying Koi 
Sanjaq, Arbil, Altın Köprü, and Ranya by February 1824.  Unable to overtake Kör 
Muhammad, Ali Reza Paşa, the vali of Baghdad, conceded him his conquests and 
recognized him as a paşa.23 
The role that Kör Muhammad of Soran played during the Russo-Turkish War 
1828-1829 is unclear.  Yet it is likely that it was at this time that he either began to 
believe, or his previous belief was reinforced, that the Yazidis and Christians posed a 
grave threat to the region because they were more liable to have sympathies for non-
Muslim Russia.  The Yazidi Kurds in the neighboring regions of Sinjar and Shaikhan 
had, after all, good relations with the neighboring Assyrian and Armenian Christians.  
One of the Yazidi leaders tried to contact the Russians informing them of their 
willingness to side with them and even convened a joint Christian-Yazidi force of 1,500 
cavalry units and five thousand infantry to meet the Russians at Bitlis (although by the 
time they arrived the war was already over).  Notwithstanding Kör Muhammad’s 
awareness of Yazidi and Christian sympathies towards the Russians, his brutal actions 
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against them between 1832 and 1834 are evidence enough that his wrath was kindled 
against them.  In early 1832 Kör Muhammad and his loyalists stormed the plains near 
Amadiya and captured the Yazidi leader Ali Bey, whom he forced to convert to Islam.24   
Kör Muhammad managed to put up a strong defense against the Ottoman forces.  
Ali Paşa, the vali of Baghdad, even wrote to the Grand Vizier that he was so much 
involved in the struggle against Kör Muhammad that he was unable to provide soldiers to 
fight against Ibrahim Paşa of Egypt.25  Kör Muhammad of Soran is also said to have been 
in touch with Ibrahim Paşa and planned a joint operation with him against the Ottoman 
Empire.26  By 1834 Kör Muhammad managed to take Amadiya, Cizre, Zakho, Aqrah, 
Dahuk, Eruh, Tel Afar, and Sinjar.  He was able to quickly win some Kurds to his side 
through his political vision.  For instance he managed to win over the loyalty of Bedr 
Khan Bey of Cizre, whose revolt he may well have encouraged in the 1840s.  However, 
many Kurds, notably in Amadiya, Zakho, and Dahuk came under Kör Muhammad's 
control only after long sieges and were generally unwilling to submit to him.  The 
insurgencies initiated by more intransigent Kurds in Zakho, Dahuk, Amadiya, and Aqrah 
stalled Kör Muhammad's northward efforts at expansion further north for a period.27  Kör 
Muhammad was not the only Kurdish bey who sought greater autonomy from the 
Ottoman Empire, although he was probably the most prominent.  A mood of 
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noncompliance appeared to prevail among many of the Kurds throughout Eastern 
Anatolia, particularly in Dersim and parts of the southeast. 
In 1834, the valis of Mosul and Diyarbakır were not in a strong position to defend 
their cities against the Kurds in the southeast.  The vali of Erzurum, Esad Paşa, was tied 
up with trying to rein in the political disorder that had emerged in the northeast as a result 
of the Russo-Turkish War of 1829-1829.  He was particularly involved in trying to curb 
the power of Emin Paşa, the mutasarrıf of Muş, who had only a tenuous relationship with 
the state.  The Ottomans feared his potential defection, although he was compliant for a 
while.28  Timur Paşa, the vali of Van, was also relatively weak and occupied with trying 
secure the border and settle seminomadic migratory tribes.29  Hence the Ottomans 
commissioned Reşid Paşa, the vali of Sivas, to lead an army into Eastern Anatolia to put 
down Kör Muhammad and other noncompliant Kurdish leaders and to bring the region 
under central control.  In late 1835, Ince Bayraktar Mehmet Paşa, appointed as vali of 
Mosul, proved to be effective in stemming the growth and spread of rebellion among 
Kurdish groups.30 
Reşid commenced his campaign in the Kurdish strongholds nearest him, Harput 
and Dersim.  The Armenians around Harput and Çarsancak (modern-day Akpazar and 
Mazgirt in the Tunceli/Dersim region) warmly greeted Reşid Paşa as a liberator and 
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assisted him in carrying out his attacks against recalcitrant Kurds.  Reşid faced fierce 
resistance by Kurds in the Harput and Dersim regions, who had long enjoyed little 
interference from the state.  Yet Reşid forced the Kurds to surrender and showed that he 
was intent on bringing the region under central control by rounding up their ringleaders 
and having them hanged, impaled, or burned alive.  His harsh tactics against the Kurds 
won him the title of "Gavur Paşa" (infidel paşa), implying that Kurds may have seen their 
struggle against the Ottoman state in part as a religious conflict. 
Yet Reşid was sympathetic towards the Armenians.  According to Mgrdich 
Antranig’s history of Dersim, one of Reşid Paşa’s ideas was that if he removed the 
Armenians from Çarsancak and Harput, which were difficult to control because of their 
rugged terrain, he might be able to prevent Kurdish groups from regaining power in these 
regions by depriving them of their source of income, since the Armenians were the 
industrious profit producing class in the region whom the Kurdish overlords taxed.  
Therefore he ordered that the Armenians in the Harput and Dersim regions be relocated 
to Diyarbakır, which was under greater central control and which also had a thriving 
population of Armenians.  When the Armenian leaders refused to leave Dersim, he tried 
to entice them by offering to arm them and make one of them a paşa, which would entitle 
him and the Armenians under his jurisdiction to a greater number of privileges in the 
empire.  After three days of negotiation, the Armenian elites still refused, insisting that 
Reşid Paşa expel the Kurds and not the Armenians.  Reşid agreed to expel some of the 
more hostile Kurds from the region but took no further action.31  The incident is yet 
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further evidence that the Ottomans, in spite of several cases of Armenian resistance 
during the war with Russia in 1828, believed that it was the Kurds rather than the 
Armenians who posed a greater threat to the state in the east.  Ottoman leaders had 
confidence that the Armenian millet leaders were strong enough and ensconced enough in 
the empire to prevent the growth of an internal Armenian resistance movement like the 
Serbs in Belgrade or the Greeks in the Morea. 
 From Harput, Reşid Paşa proceeded southeast through Diyarbakır towards the 
crisis area of Soran.  A letter signed by a number of Kurdish dignitaries including beys, 
muftis, and shaykhs of Zakho, Amadiye, and Aqrah asking for his intervention against 
Kör Muhammad of Soran was further encouragement for Reşid Paşa. He wrote them 
back assuring them that the sultan’s army would not allow his loyal subjects to become 
the victims of a rebel and urged them make an entreaty to the vali of Baghdad, who was 
nearer to them, to encourage him to take action.32 
Soon after sending the missive, Ismail Paşa of Amadiya proclaimed himself the 
mutasarrıf of the small southeastern Anatolian village, which was gaining prominence 
due to its vulnerable position, under the pretext that locals demanded that he be the 
leader.  Although he insisted that he would assist the state in gaining control over the 
region, officials were skeptical of his true intentions and reprimanded him for not 
assuming power through official channels.  Ismail’s apparent usurpation of power 
strengthened Reşid’s resolve to penetrate the relatively lawless and restive region and 
dissolve what had become multiple forces of rebellion, many of which were emboldened 
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by the rise of the paşa of Soran.33 
In late 1835 Reşid stormed Garzan (modern-day Yanarsu located west of Siirt and 
south of Sasun), and put down resistance there with the help of the three thousand 
irregular soldiers recruited by the Kurdish bey Emin Paşa of Muş, who was then an 
invaluable Kurdish ally of the Ottoman Empire.34  It should be noted that Emin Paşa was 
not well liked by Esad Paşa of Erzurum, under whose jurisdiction the sancak of Muş lay.  
Due to a “continuous stream of complaints from the inhabitants of Muş about Emin 
Paşa,” Esad ordered his removal.  Reşid Paşa on the other hand liked Emin Paşa of Muş 
because he commanded the allegiance of the Kurds over a relatively large area, prevented 
the Kurds in the region from rebelling against the Ottoman state, and was capable of 
mustering a rather large force.  Therefore he petitioned the sultan to not remove Emin but 
to join his forces with Reşid’s.35  Mirza Ağa of nearby Rıdvan, the Yezidi chieftain who 
had written a letter to the Russians in 1830 pledging his allegiance to them against the 
Ottomans, submitted to Reşid Paşa for fear that the forces at his command were no match 
for those of the vali of Sivas.36 
Ibrahim Paşa of Egypt’s attempts to capture Baghdad by moving his troops via 
the northern Tigris in Syria in early 1836 forced Reşid Paşa to set aside his campaign 
towards Soran and fend him off at Urfa, thus staving off any further aggravation of the 
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already exuberantly rebellious Kurdish population in northern Iraq.37  Reşid Paşa 
resumed his campaign in the spring of 1836 by ordering a division of his forces to put 
down the rebellion of Mirza Ağa at Silvan, and another division to confront the Azizan 
family at Cizre. 
Cizre had long been one of the most remote areas from Ottoman authority.  Its 
rugged terrain certainly made it a difficult place for the sultan’s military to penetrate.  Yet 
since it was distant from areas where the rivals of the Ottomans exercised power, such as 
the Russians and Persians in the Caucasus, the Persians in Azerbaijan, the Mamluks in 
Baghdad, and Muhammad Ali in Egypt, it was not deemed a particularly strategic area to 
control and was one of the last regions in Eastern Anatolia to be recognized as hükümet 
land, which had the most independent status.  Indeed it was greatly due to the isolation of 
both the city and its immediate environs from various centers power that the region itself 
became one of the strongest centers of Kurdish power under the leadership of Bedr Khan 
Bey in the 1840s. 
The inhabitants of Cizre were particularly unruly and unaccustomed to the 
passage of outsiders. Sir John Kinnier was imprisoned at Cizre by the local bey and 
“heavily fined” during his travels in the mid-1810s.38  In a letter to his brother, Reşid 
Paşa noted that the religious class, the Kurdish shaykhs, commanded tremendous respect 
among the region’s inhabitants; so much, that when “two tribes were fighting each other 
and a shaykh intervened, the two tribes would immediately lay down their weapons and 
return to their places of residence.”39 
                                                          
37 Hakan, Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde Kürtler, 76-77. 
38 Shiel, “Notes on a Journey from Tabriz, Through Kurdistan,” 87. 





Yet since the ruling Azizan family, one of their prominent members being Bedr 
Khan Bey,40 had allied themselves with Muhammad Paşa of Soran when he penetrated 
the area in 1835, its capture became a priority for Reşid Paşa and his forces.  Cizre was 
no easy conquest for Reşid.  The Cizre rebels were remarkable marksmen and were able 
to take refuge in a number of mountain fortresses for several months before Reşid’s army 
was able to subdue them.  It was only after they completely demolished the Said Bey 
fortress that they were able to force Bedr Khan Bey to surrender.41  Reşid wrote that since 
the Cizre region was “formidable, with its villages and fortresses especially robust and its 
people brave and warlike, it was extremely difficult to take.”42 
Reşid Paşa’s campaign throughout eastern and southeastern Anatolia had been 
successful at providing security to the region.  This is verified by Lieutenant Shiel who 
reported that during a journey to the region in the summer of 1836 a mullah of Tilaberi, a 
village five miles south of Zakho, told him that it would have been impossible to travel in 
the region before the soldiers of Reşid Paşa contained it due to the prevalent instability 
and the grave suspicions of outsiders harbored by local Kurdish groups.43  Consul Brant 
provides further verification of the successes of Reşid Paşa and his successor Hafız Paşa 
in securing Eastern Anatolia.  He avers that the Ottoman state managed to instill political 
order to the extent that those Armenians who had been facing persecution by Kurdish 
groups were able to resume social activity uninterrupted by anxiety-stricken and vengeful 
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After taking Cizre, Reşid Paşa proceeded onward to Soran to put down 
Muhammad Paşa, whose actions had instilled the Kurds with a new political 
consciousness and had emboldened many of them against the state.  In this regard it is 
somewhat ironic that by the time Reşid reached Soran in the spring of 1836, Mehmet 
Paşa’s forces had been worn thin because of resistance against them by Kurds whom his 
forces had subdued in Dahuk, Zakho, and Aqrah and were not capable of putting up the 
redoubtable front that Reşid was expecting.  Therefore Muhammad withdrew and quickly 
surrendered.  al-Gurani believes that a significant reason for Kör Muhammad's swift 
decision to withdraw was Reşid’s persuasion of the mufti of Soran, Mulla Mohammad 
Khati, to back the sultan against local resistance.  The mufti allegedly issued a fatwa 
declaring that “whoever fought against the army of the caliph would be considered an 
unbeliever and would therefore be divorced from his wife.”45  Since the mufti’s words 
held greater sway among the local Muslim Kurds of Soran than those of Kör Muhammad, 
they were loath to carry on rebellion against Reşid.  Another reason that Muhammad Paşa 
of Soran quickly surrendered was that Reşid was a skilled negotiator and persuaded him 
that if he discontinued his rebellion he would be treated well and later restored to his 
position as the mütesellim of Soran.   
Kör Muhammad of Soran was captured in December 1836 and taken to Istanbul.  
But in June 1837, Sultan Mahmud II ordered his release and allowed him to return to 
Soran with the new title of ferik, Major General.46  The sultan’s decision appears to have 
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been based on the agreement that was struck with Reşid Paşa under which Kör 
Muhammad would be restored to his position in the Soran region provided that he submit 
to the state and maintain the peace.  The decision was also based on the Ottoman policy 
of catch and release, according to which state forces would capture a strong rebel leader 
only to show that the state was capable of putting down his resistance, but then 
renegotiate terms with him and allow him to continue his tenure in his former political 
position on condition of his loyalty to the state. 
Yet two significant factors prevented the sultan from being able to transfer Kör 
Muhammad, the most powerful Kurdish leader in decades, back to Soran.  First, Reşid 
Paşa died unexpectedly in Diyarbakır from cholera in January 183747 and was replaced 
by Hafız Paşa, an ethnic Circassian.  The specific policy that combined military force 
with diplomacy that was being implemented throughout Eastern Anatolia and Iraq was 
largely based on the ideas of Reşid.  The respect that Reşid commanded among the valis 
throughout Eastern Anatolia and Iraq was crucial for the success of the policy.  The 
second reason Kör Muhammad could not be restored to power was that Ali Paşa, the vali 
of Baghdad, was opposed to the sultan’s decision to appoint him to the position of ferik 
and tried to stall efforts to bring him back to Soran.  On the pretexts of needing further 
investigation of Kör Muhammad and continued opposition to his return expressed by 
many local Kurdish groups, he persuaded Hafız Paşa to have him detained temporarily at 
Amasya, where he died of unknown causes.48  His brother Resul Paşa was appointed as 
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mutasarrıf of Soran in his stead. 
 
Hafız Paşa's Military Campaign 
The strategy of the Ottoman campaign in Eastern Anatolia changed with the 
appointment of Hafız Paşa to the position of vali of Sivas.  Hafız was originally a palace 
slave who worked his way up in the military by fighting against Greek rebels in Morea in 
the 1820s, fighting against the Russian army in 1829, and leading a military regiment into 
Albania in the mid-1830s.49  His political philosophy was markedly different from that of 
Reşid; he was a strong advocate of the dissolution of the old social orders on the 
periphery, the abolition of irregular militias to fight battles, and the direct recruitment of 
the different ethnic groups into the military.  Hafiz is portrayed in many histories as 
austere and merciless against Kurdish rebels.  The Russian historian D. Georg Rozen 
believes Hafız Paşa to have killed some fifteen thousand Kurds and imprisoned six 
thousand others during his military campaigns in Eastern Anatolia between 1837 and 
1839.50  A European observer remarked that the suffering of the Kurds as a result of  
Hafız Paşa’s campaigns resembled something of the “torture of the convicts in Dante’s 
Inferno.”51 
Hafız Paşa’s military campaigns were indeed brutal.  He had little tolerance for 
opposition and was swift to order a kinetic military action at the first sight of resistance.  
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Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of casualties and damages that his 
campaigns inflicted, there is little doubt that he was much less of a proponent of 
diplomacy with Kurdish rebels than was his predecessor Reşid.  This is evidenced in his 
bloody campaign that he led against a number of Yazidi rebels in the Garzan, Telafar, 
and Sinjar regions in the summer of 1837.  Unlike Reşid who merely cowed rebels into 
submission but then left the ringleaders in place, Hafiz made sure to have them either 
exiled at best or put to death at worst.  After forcing Yazidi rebels to surrender at Telafar, 
Hafız rounded up some three thousand Yazidi boys to be relocated elsewhere in the 
empire and incorporated into the military, a testament of his belief that different ethnic 
and religious groups could be absorbed and assimilated into the Ottoman system in much 
the same way as he had been himself. 52 
Further evidence that Hafız Paşa believed that ethnic assimilation into the military 
system, somewhat akin to an expanded devşirme system, would solve many of the 
problems of disloyalty throughout Eastern Anatolia lay in the fact that he also mentioned 
to Helmut von Moltke while accompanying him on his military expedition to Malatya in 
1838 that he thought it a good idea to try to incorporate the Christian Armenians into the 
military.  However, von Moltke urged him against it, thinking that the Armenian recruits 
would be subject to ethnic discrimination by the Kurds and hence would not be able to 
rise in the ranks of the military, would be easily discouraged, and would not make 
effective soldiers.53 
Brant writes that based on a report from Ahmad Ağa, one of the Turkish men in 
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the service of Hafız Paşa, that Hafız and cooperating Ottoman administrators subjected 
the Kurds and Armenians around Diyarbakır to heavy taxation in order to finance the 
state’s centralization operations. According to Ahmad Ağa, the burden of the impositions 
was so much that the people “were in a state barely removed from starvation.”  Brant 
writes that Ahmad Ağa “believed Hafiz Pasha was ignorant of this, and he attributed the 
heavy drains on the people to Sa’du-l-lah Pasha of Diyar-Bekr.  No one, however, dared 
to state the fact to Hafiz Pasha.”54 
Hafız Paşa was arguably more successful at subduing Kurdish rebels than Reşid 
Paşa had been.  While both were effective at providing security to what had become a 
lawless region in Eastern Anatolia, Hafız Paşa arguably employed much stronger force 
against the Kurds:  
 [In 1829] the Russians were…advancing, and the encumbrance of [Armenian] 
emigrants with their families did not suit them.  At that period the Kurds regarded 
the Armenians as partisans of the invaders, and made no scruple in plundering and 
often murdering them.  Since the operations of Reshid Mohammed Pasha and of 
Hafiz Pasha, and particularly since the enrolment of the militia of this Pashalik, 
the Kurds do not venture to rob openly, and even instances of secret theft have 
become rare: the effect of the last measure has imposed a moral restraint on this 
wild race, which is extraordinary when it is considered how few the numbers of 
the militia are (in this Pashalik not many hundreds), how recently the system has 
been introduced, and how inefficient the force yet is, from the imperfection of 
their equipment and discipline.55 
 
Hafız Paşa’s main function was to subdue pockets of ongoing resistance among the 
Kurdish groups more thoroughly many of whom Reşid Paşa’s forces had only 
temporarily contained.  Hafız’s initial strategy was to divide his military into two 
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detachments allowing him to penetrate Bohtan and the area around Nineveh 
simultaneously.  This prevented groups from being able to build alliances as had Kör 
Muhammad with the Kurds at Cizre earlier in the mid 1830s. 
Hafız first took his detachment to Sinjar in May 1837 where he attempted to 
subdue Yazidi rebels with the help of the vali of Mosul.  The Yazidis were able to 
withstand the joint force temporarily by hiding in caves.  However, Ottoman soldiers 
managed to storm many of the caves, kill all the men, and take the women and children 
captive.  Hafız managed to capture more than six thousand individuals whom he had 
resettled to the plains of Nusaybin, Mardin, and areas around Diyarbakır.  Yet since the 
Yazidis did not blend with the local population because of their different religion, 
entreaties were made for them to be able to return to the Sinjar region, which Hafız 
accepted.56 
After the surrender of Sinjar one detachment of Hafız Paşa’s force marched on 
Tel Afar in the south and another detachment on Cizre and Garzan.  They were able to 
take Tel Afar after a three-month siege, in which both sides suffered numerous casualties.  
The Yazidi rebels there eventually surrendered due to a lack of ammunition.  Garzan and 
Cizre proved to be much more difficult to take.  With the arrival of winter and the harsh 
weather, the Ottoman military took a break until the spring of 1838. 
The final frontier for Hafız Paşa was the region due south of Lake Van where 
Khan Mahmud held a strong enclave.  Khan Mahmud had managed to expand his 
family’s control over a large swath of land ranging from Müküs (modern-day 
Bahçesaray), Mahmudi and Hoşab Kalesi (in modern-day Güzelsu), and Gevaş.  He 
                                                          





appointed his brothers to govern over these regions.  It is not known why Khan Mahmud 
had been able to amass territory during a period in which the Ottomans were desperately 
trying to centralize control.  Part of it may have had to do with the fact the Ottomans 
thought the Kurds in Soran and Cizre, with whom Khan Mahmud did not ally, to be a 
greater threat.  Also Khan Mahmud’s seemingly unchallenged rise to power may have 
had to do with the fact that the domain that he ruled over was geographically distant from 
any of the strong centrally controlled valiliks of the time.  The vali of Van during the 
1830s was relatively weak and focused solely on keeping control over the city of Van, a 
politically volatile environment. 
Much like Emin Paşa of Muş and Behlül Paşa of Beyazıt, Khan Mahmud may 
have managed to derive much of his wealth from the relatively rich Armenian religious 
and merchant classes in the region.  In his domain lay the monastery of Aktamar, located 
on an island in Lake Van, not far from Gevaş, which was home of the Armenian 
Catholicos of Akdamar, who held the highest ranking clerical position in the Gregorian 
Armenian church in the whole southeastern Anatolian region.  Consul Brant reports that 
the Catholicos of Akdamar, who had declared his independence from the Supreme 
Catholicos of Echmiadzin, had to bribe Khan Mahmud for his position.  Akdamar was a 
significant pilgrimage site for Armenians and as such was a region of significant 
economic activity among Christian groups, who were able to afford the large demands 
placed upon them by the neighboring Kurds.  As a result their relations were relatively 






The beys of Hakkari and Cizre felt threatened by the growth of Khan Mahmud’s 
power in the region.  Müküs had never been a significant center of Kurdish power.  But 
his capture of Hoşap Kale, the castle at Güzelsu located near the border with Iran 
between Hakkari and Van, and his capture of territory near the emirate of Bohtan aroused 
the suspicions of Bedr Khan of Cizre and Nurullah Bey of Hakkari who decided to 
launch a counterattack against him.  Khan Mahmud appealed to the vali of Erzurum, 
Osman Paşa, for help against the collaborating Kurdish elites.  Osman alerted Hafız Paşa 
to Khan Mahmud’s desperate situation and the two used the opportunity as a means of 
centralizing control over the region south of Lake Van.  They had Khan Mahmud and his 
brothers exiled to Beyazıt, but then allowed them to return two years later. 
Ibrahim Paşa’s campaign into northern Syria in 1839 deterred Hafız Paşa from 
continuing his centralization campaign throughout Eastern Anatolia.  In June Hafız Paşa 
met Ibrahim’s 40,000 strong force at Nizip, between Aintab (Gaziantep) and Urfa, with a 
force of 50,000 regular soldiers and 30,000 irregulars.  Despite outnumbering Ibrahim 
Paşa’s army, Hafız’s overall lack of organization and military supplies made it too 
difficult to withstand the blow dealt by Ibrahim.  The battle lasted only two hours, but 
resulted in over four thousand casualties.  It was an embarrassing defeat for the Ottomans 
who had been desperately trying to enhance their military while holding onto what little 
control they had over a region that seemed to be constantly eluding them. Other 
participants in the Battle of Nizip were Emin Paşa of Muş and Bedr Khan of Cizre who 
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both led a force of Kurdish irregulars, although it is unclear how much their individual 
forces contributed.  According to Brant, Emin Paşa ended up betraying Hafız Paşa.58  
Bedr Khan withdrew his forces early from the battle and retreated to Cizre where, taking 
inspiration from the rebel force of Ibrahim Paşa, he made preparations for a new political 
campaign to achieve greater autonomy in Cizre and expand his power over the 
neighboring regions.59 
 
Bedr Khan: The Sources of His Power 
 Bedr Khan, the leading bey of Cizre between 1838, when he defected from Said 
Bey’s local militia at Cizre and submitted to Hafız Paşa’s forces,60 and 1847, when he 
was captured and exiled by the Ottomans, has been portrayed in a number of different 
lights.  He is most noted for being the most successful of all the Kurdish beys at amassing 
power in Eastern Anatolia and more notoriously for spearheading a series of brutal 
massacres of Assyrian Christians in the Hakkari region in 1843 and 1846.  In many 
histories of Kurdish nationalists and Kurdish sympathizers he is depicted as a hero who 
struggled for the liberation of the Kurds from a tyrannical Ottoman state.  But in the 
histories of many Assyrian nationalists and Assyrian sympathizers Bedr Khan is depicted 
as a villain who was intolerant of the religious diversity around him. 
The nature of Bedr Khan’s power and the means by which he achieved it has long 
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been a topic of great debate among scholars.  Historians generally agree that Bedr Khan’s 
power was in large degree attributable to the Ottoman state, which allowed him to expand 
his influence and control in the region as the sultan and his administrators were in the 
process of devising a new strategy to maintain control against centrifugal forces 
throughout the empire.  Histories that focus on and are generally sympathetic to the 
Kurds tend to attribute Bedr Khan’s acquisition of power to his ability to arouse the 
Kurds in the region to a collective consciousness of their inferiority in relation to the 
Ottoman Empire, and to motivate them to improve their lot.  Histories sympathetic to the 
Assyrians attribute the rise of Bedr Khan’s power to the Ottoman state itself.  By looking 
at Ottoman sources it appears most likely that Bedr Khan derived his power not so much 
directly from the Ottoman state, but from the grassroots, since the campaigns of Hafız 
Paşa wiped out many of Bedr Khan’s potential rivals.  But the scope and brutality of his 
campaigns also gave Kurds throughout Bohtan, Behdinan, Müküs, and Soran a shared 
traumatic experience for Bedr Khan to seize upon in uniting them against the Ottoman 
state. 
In Western and Ottoman reports from the late 1830s and 1840s, Bedr Khan 
appears neither as a proto-Kurdish nationalist nor as someone who was bent on 
exterminating all the Assyrian Christians in the region.  Instead his political ideology 
seems rather shallow, and his main motivations for consolidating power and killing the 
Assyrians along with rival Kurdish groups appear to be rooted in his anxieties over what 
he believed was the looming state of anarchy in the region. 
Bedr Khan’s rise to power is virtually unprecedented among the Kurds in 





Nehri in the east, Mardin in the West, Sinjar in the south, and Gevaş in the north, in 
essence nearly the entire region between Diyarbakır, Van, and Mosul.61  The reach of his 
power is especially significant given the fact that his center of power was Cizre, which 
had long been a relatively insignificant hinterland whose inhabitants were difficult to 
unite due to their religious and ethnic diversity.  Yet the fact that Cizre was distant from 
the centers of Ottoman power is one of the reasons why Bedr Khan was able to amass 
power somewhat unchallenged by the state.  Yet the question remains why he was able to 
gain such power when other Kurdish elites throughout eastern and southeastern Anatolia, 
who likely desired the power that Bedr Khan managed to achieve by 1846, could not. 
The first reason lay in the fact that Bedr Khan was exposed to more personalities, 
areas, and political events than other Kurdish leaders in the region.  He had come into 
contact with Kör Muhammad Bey of Soran during his campaigns in 1835, an experience 
which allowed to him witness first hand that expansion by the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia 
despite increasing Ottoman control was indeed possible.  Although Kör Muhammad was 
routed by 1836, Bedr Khan’s brief alliance with him and his experience of Kör 
Muhammad ‘s political efforts was enough to plant in his head the idea of a far-reaching 
Kurdish political domain that was semiautonomous from the state.  It is quite likely that 
his experience at the Battle of Nizip in 1839 also contributed to the formation of his 
political vision.  It was there that he further witnessed the military inadequacy of the 
Ottoman Empire against Ibrahim Paşa, and learned that the legitimacy crisis of the 
empire extended well beyond Cizre. 
The second reason he was able to come to power was that Ottoman officials saw 
                                                          





him as the member of the Kurdish elite who was the most compliant with their orders in 
Cizre.  When Reşid Paşa besieged Cizre in 1836 and it became apparent that the Kurdish 
rebels could no longer hold out, Bedr Khan submitted to the Ottomans.  His brother 
Seyfeddin Bey, who at that time probably held greater power than Bedr Khan and was in 
charge of the rebel force at Cizre, fled to Baghdad where he entered into the service of 
the vali there.62  As a reward for his submission, Bedr Khan was given the symbolic title 
of miralay (colonel), but no soldiers.63  By 1838, when Hafız Paşa marched against Cizre, 
Bedr Khan seems to have deferred to another local Kurdish elite Said Bey.  Yet it was 
because of this deference that Hafız’s forces attributed the rebellion of Cizre to Said, 
whom they removed from power, and not Bedr Khan, whom they ended up keeping in 
power.64  Hence because of his continual appearance as a subordinate during rebellions 
rather than as the leader of the rebellion he managed to evade being targeted by the 
Ottoman forces. 
The third reason for Bedr Khan’s rise to power is that the rivals in his immediate 
environment were quelled either by his own force or by the Ottoman army. He 
consolidated power in the immediate environs of Cizre during the 1820s by gaining the 
support of local tribes and by dealing a harsh blow to his opponents.  He had Brahim Ağa 
of the Miran tribe killed because he would not recognize his authority.65  Reşid and Hafız 
managed to severely weaken the power of the Kurdish groups in Sinjar, Garzan, and 
Müküs.  By 1839 he was one of the few Kurdish elites in the region whose status had not 
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been severely weakened by the Ottoman state. 
Perhaps one of the most important factors explaining Bedr Khan’s ability to 
amass power was his ability to make a case for the unity and mobilization of the Kurds in 
the region based on the shared trauma brought on them by the Ottoman state.  The 
campaigns of Reşid and Hafız may have been a temporary tactical success, but they were 
a strategic failure.  Instead of bringing infrastructural developments to the region that 
would endear locals to the state, the administrators simply used brute force to try to 
subdue the Kurds.  What made matters worse was that after the application of force, they 
continued to face a legitimacy crisis perhaps even worse than what they had faced before, 
and ended up having to turn to the very Kurdish elites whose patrons they had crushed to 
govern.   
 
Reasons for the Massacres of Assyrian Christians 
 The reasons for killing of the Assyrian Christians, also referred to as the 
Nestorians or Nestorian Christians, in the villages around Hakkari in 1843 and 1846 have 
been a matter of great debate among scholars.  One of Hirmis Aboona’s66 main claims is 
that the massacres were in essence an extension of the centralization project that Sultan 
Mahmud II and his son Sultan Abdülmecid I were undertaking with the help of the valis, 
particularly Ince Bayraktar Mehmet Paşa, often referred to as just Mehmet or Muhammad 
Paşa.  His argument is that Muhammad Paşa of Mosul managed to centralize control over 
the area north of Mosul and coerce Bedr Khan to comply with his orders.  While the 
violent undertaking against the Assyrians of the Tiyari region (modern-day Çığlı Bucağı) 
                                                          
66 His work is the most extensive analysis of Bedr Khan and the massacres of the 





in 1843, and later of the Assyrians in Tkhuma (modern-day Cevizli Köyü) in 1846, was 
part of an initiative created by Bedr Khan, it coincided with the general interests of the 
vali of Mosul and was therefore given his stamp of approval.  In fact Bedr Khan did not 
carry out the massacre without first seeking his approval.67  He also attributes some of the 
violence to the political activities of the missionaries who “stirred up and created much 
hostility between the different tribes, on the one hand, and between the meliks and the 
patriarch, on the other.”68  His sources include both accounts byAmerican and British 
missionaries who traveled and lived in the region, and the reports of British government 
officials who also traveled throughout the region and closely monitored the political and 
social activity there.  His explanations mirror their beliefs. 
 Wadie Jwaideh also devotes a number of pages to the analysis of the massacres of 
Assyrians.  He attributes the massacres to a wider range of reasons than Aboona.  The 
leading Kurdish mirs of the region, Ismail Paşa of Amadiya, Nurullah Bey of Hakkari, 
and Bedr Khan of Bohtan, were all hostile towards the tribal Nestorians because they 
refused to submit to their authority or pay them tribute, and even engaged in blood feuds 
with members of their tribes.  Yet, because the Assyrians in Tiyari, Tkhouma, and Aşita 
were too powerful to subdue, they faced a longstanding political stalemate with them and 
were forced to tolerate their autonomy from their authority.  However, a number of 
political and religious divisions that arose in the Assyrian community in the 1840s 
weakened them and provided a window of opportunity for the Kurdish mirs to attack 
them.  Nurullah Bey, the mir of Hakkari who had formerly enjoyed good relations with 
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the Assyrians, grew hostile to them because he suspected many of them of allying with a 
local Muslim rival against him.  Jwaideh also highlights the political role of the 
missionaries as a catalyst for ethnic tensions in the region, citing specifically the 
construction of a mission building in Hakkari—which local Kurds mistook for a military 
fortress or kale—strategic military outposts for Kurdish militias throughout Eastern 
Anatolia—as one of the leading causes of political “agitation” between groups.  He also 
believes the Ottoman government to have been complicit in the attacks against the 
Assyrians and that it was both in the interests of the valis of Erzurum and Mosul to 
subdue the Assyrians in the mountains south of Hakkari, even if that required dealing 
them a harsh blow.69  His sources are also based on mainly the accounts of Western 
religious and government observers who lived and traveled in the region.  A number of 
other English-language explanations for the massacres are based on similar sources and 
account for similar factors behind the massacres, albeit with different weight given to the 
various different factors. 
In recent years there have been a couple of Turkish dissertations that have mined 
the Ottoman archives in order to shed new light on Bedr Khan Bey the Ottoman state and 
their roles in the massacres of Assyrians.  These ostensibly downplay the role of the 
Ottoman government in the massacres and instead highlight Bedr Khan as the 
mastermind behind the onslaught who acted in defiance of official orders.70 
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Overall analyses of the massacres of the Nestorians tend to mimic the arguments 
made by contemporary observers, many of which are satisfactory, but lack any in-depth 
analysis of a number of crucial questions regarding the logic of violence, especially 
within the broader context of the numerous conflicts and power struggles occurring 
among various actors at the time.  Among the most significant questions that need 
answering are: why was the violence in the mountains south of Hakkari so severe, when 
other Assyrians throughout the region were untouched?  If the complicity of the Ottoman 
government in the massacres can indeed be proven, what was their motive and why did 
they consider the Assyrians to be such a major threat, especially when they had been 
concentrating their forces to suppress the Kurdish mirs who could mobilize a much larger 
force and therefore constituted a much greater threat to the Ottoman centralization project 
than the Assyrians? 
 To answer these questions it is important to begin with a brief synopsis of who the 
Assyrians were and the state of their relations with their Muslims neighbors.  Ethnic 
Assyrians lived throughout southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, being most greatly 
concentrated in Mosul, Diyarbakır, Urmiye, Hakkari, and the mountainous area between 
Hakkari and Mosul.  They only constituted a majority of the population in a handful of 
villages mainly located to the south of Hakkari.  Their society consisted of both tribes, 
many of whom were armed, self-protecting, rent-seekers, and peasants (rayah). 
The tribes living in the mountains were self-governing and enjoyed de facto 
autonomy not only from the Ottoman authority but the authority of neighboring Kurdish 
tribes.  Justin Perkins, an American missionary who lived among the Nestorians for some 





Christians in the early 1840s, before the massacres of the Assyrians took place:  
The least populous districts of these Nestorians, as Gavar, Somai, Chara, 
Mamoodiah, and some others, are subject to the Koordish tribes who dwell in the 
same districts, and by whom (being by far the most numerous) the Nestorians are 
severely oppressed and often plundered.  Other districts, as Diz, Jeeloo, Bass, 
Tehoob [Tkhouma], and Tiaree, have a larger Nestorian population, and are more 
independent of their Koordish neighbors.71 
 
Henry Ross, a British traveler, notes that the Assyrian tribes in Tiyari would often 
descend on the neighboring districts of Berwari and Amadiya to plunder both Muslim 
and Christian villages “indiscriminately.”  The Christian raiders were more prone to spare 
the lives of fellow Christians, but would “invariably murder…as many of the Koordish 
[sic] men as they could, but respected the women.”72 
Grant reports stories to the effect that the Kurds around the region greatly feared 
the Nestorians in the mountains south of Hakkari.  On one occasion his Kurdish guide 
would not let him travel into the mountains of Tiyari because the Nestorians had cut off 
the heads of seven Kurds of Soran and hung their bodies over a bridge as a warning for 
them not to cross their territory.73 
The Assyrians adhered to a number of Christian theologies, including the 
Jacobite, Nestorian, and Catholic theological traditions.  The Assyrians were first 
introduced to Catholicism by Jesuit missionaries in the mid-sixteenth century who 
continued to proselytize them up until the late seventeenth century.74  They were referred 
to as Chaldeans.  By the mid-nineteenth century Percy Badger estimates the number of 
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Chaldeans to have been about twenty thousand throughout all of southeastern Anatolia 
and northern Iraq.75  They were most greatly concentrated in Diyarbakır, Mosul and 
many of the villages between Mosul and Hakkari.  The different Christian groups were 
often in conflict with one another, although they were often forced to share the same 
church building to worship.  Layard noted in Mosul that during a joint service between 
Jacobites and Nestorians both parties praying “as enemies under the same roof.”76 
 Western observers report that the Assyrians spoke several different dialects of the 
Assyrian language throughout the region, some of which were mutually unintelligible and 
whose distinction had deep historical roots.77  In addition many Assyrians did not speak 
either Syriac, Turoyo, neo-Aramaic, or other Assyrian dialects.  Dr. Grant reported in 
1839 that none of the Jacobite Christians (of Assyrian origin) of “[Diyarbakır], Mardin, 
[and] Mosul, speak the language of the Nestorians, Arabic being their common medium 
of communication.”78  Many Assyrians also spoke various Kurdish dialects, probably 
mostly Kurmanji towards the west and Sorani towards the east, as is indicated by Asahel 
Grant.79  This is an indication that the Assyrians were largely confined to their individual 
and somewhat isolated communities and did not interact greatly with each other.   
The Nestorian patriarch, who held the title of Mar Shimun, held the greatest 
ecclesiastical authority in the Nestorian church (also known as the Church of the East) 
                                                          
75 George Percy Badger, The Nestorians and Their Rituals (London: J. Masters, 1852), 1: 
174-176. 
76 John Joseph, Muslim-Christian Relations, 54. 
77 Arthur John Maclean, Grammar of the Dialects of Vernacular Syriac (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1895), xv-xvi. 
78 Letter from Dr. Asahel Grant, Diyarbakır, June 24, 1839, Missionary Herald 36 
(1840), 130. 





and resided in Qodchanis near Hakkari.  Smith and Dwight estimate some forty thousand 
families to have been under his control in the Hakkari region alone.80  However, the 
ethnic Assyrians in Tiyari, Tkhouma, Aşita and a number of other Assyrian villages, 
despite being almost entirely Nestorian Christians, were governed by meliks, or tribal 
leaders and were thus not entirely under the authority of the Mar Shimun. While they 
regarded the Mar Shimun at Qodchanis as their spiritual leader, they appeared to make 
their political decisions independently, although they may have sought his symbolic 
approval on occasion to legitimate some decisions.  The Mar Shimun would frequently 
visit the Tiyari region and generally had good relations with the meliks.  One of the 
meliks of Tiyari provided refuge for the Mar Shimun in 1841 after his house was burned 
by a band of Muslim Kurds from Hakkari.81 
The paucity of sources makes it difficult to establish definite trends in the 
relations between the Assyrian Christians and the Muslim and Yazidi Kurds throughout 
southeastern Anatolia and Iraq.  Yet it can generally be said that in areas where tribal 
rivalry was intense and seminomadic Kurdish groups competed for space, the Assyrian 
Christians often became targets of raids.  In regions where the Kurdish groups were more 
united, Assyrian groups enjoyed more protection, provided they paid tribute to their 
Kurdish overlords.  In Hakkari, the Assyrians had a natural geographic protection from 
the seminomadic Kurdish groups and were able to acquire the protection of the mir of 
Hakkari.  It is likely on account of the Hakkari region’s physical isolation from 
transmigrations that the Mar Shimun based his patriarchate there.  Henry Ross wrote that 
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Nurullah Bey of Hakkari “had always seemed on good terms with” the Mar Shimun.  
When he traveled to Erzurum in 1840 to meet with the vali to “tender his allegiance” he 
“delegated his authority to the Patriarch who administered the district until his return.”82 
The Yazidis of Sinjar had friendly relations with the Assyrians.  Before the 1830s 
the chief of the Yazidi shaykhs of Sinjar used to annually visit the Assyrian town of 
Alqosh, where the Chaldean Iliyas line of patriarchs (the Catholic rivals of the patriarchs 
in Qodshanis) had resided for centuries before moving to Baghdad to seek official 
protection in the early nineteenth century,83 to receive “the blessing of the Nestorian 
[Chaldean] patriarch.”84  In other areas where the Kurds ruled semiautonomously, such as 
Amadiya and Cizre, there were other pockets of Assyrians with multiple religious 
traditions. 
The Kurdish groups seemed to give little importance as to the religious affiliations 
of the Assyrian Christians provided they did not interfere with the Kurds’ political aims.  
In fact they may have regarded religious diversity as a positive aspect of the Assyrians 
since it created multiple religious leaderships who competed for followers and funds, 
which in turn increased the demand for protection and the ability of the Kurds to collect 
higher fees from them.  Furthermore religious divisions kept the Assyrians divided and 
unable to mobilize their forces. 
The question remains what factor in particular triggered the crisis between the 
Muslim Kurds and Assyrians especially in the mountains to the south of Hakkari.  The 
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missionaries have commonly been blamed for exacerbating the conflict between the 
Kurds and the Assyrians.  Missionary fever had caught hold among many Protestants in 
the US and Britain at exactly the same time that the Ottoman state was trying to 
centralize control on its periphery in the 1820s and 1830s.  The excitement of western 
expansion and exploration spurred the missionaries to sow the seeds of their belief in 
hitherto untilled soil.  In addition they believed that the Assyrian Christians, who dwelt 
among Arabs, Kurds, Persians, and Turks, would make good potential missionaries 
themselves since they could proselytize an ethnically diverse population.85 
Western missionaries first began surveying Eastern Anatolia, western Iran, the 
Caucasus, and northern Iraq in the 1830s.  Smith and Dwight traveled throughout the area 
between 1831 and 1832 and established a missionary base at which to preach to the 
Nestorian Christians at Urmiye, in Iran.  Justin Perkins traveled to Urmiye in 1834 where 
he stayed intermittently for over thirty years.  Dr. Asahel Grant (hereafter referred to as 
Dr. Grant) was an American missionary and the third known Westerner to enter the 
mountains of Hakkari.  He was preceded by Tavernier in 1699 and Friedrich Schultz, 
who was sponsored by the academy of Paris to undertake an expedition to Hakkari in 
1829, but was killed by Kurds in Hakkari on suspicion of being a foreign spy.86  It is then 
quite remarkable that Asahel Grant was apparently able to establish a good relationship 
with the mir of Hakkari, Nurullah Bey, whom Layard accuses of being the killer of 
Schultz.87  Grant refers to him as his “old friend,”88 and managed to established positive 
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relationships with a number of other Kurds and Assyrian Christians, both the meliks of 
the Tiyari region and the ecclesiastical leaders, in the region. 
The massacres of the Nestorians cannot be understood without considering the 
multiple conflicts taking place in the region.  Each conflict seemed either to trigger a new 
one or to escalate preexisting tensions into a conflict in such a way that the ultimate result 
was the massacre of thousands of Nestorian Christians and the emergence of Bedr Khan 
Bey as the most powerful Kurdish elite in southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq. 
The first significant conflict was between different Kurdish tribal groups on the 
Ottoman-Persian border.  First a famine hit the region in 1840, forcing many to migrate 
in search of food and pasture for their flocks.89  Southgate believes that some four to five 
thousand Kurds in Diyarbakır perished as a result of the famine.  He believed that the 
Armenians were affected by the famine as well, but that they were more cared for by 
their own.90  Also in the early fall of 1840, members of the Zeylanlı and Celali tribal 
confederations, which resided primarily in Iran, crossed into Ottoman territory near Van 
and Beyazıt and raided a number of villages, destroying property and stealing flocks and 
crops.91  The precise motives of these raids are not specified, but they do not seem to 
have been much different from those of earlier periods that involved simply tribal rivalry.  
Conflicts between Kurdish groups in that region were expected and nothing out of the 
ordinary.  When the Kurds of Berwari, due south of Tiyari, forbade the mountain 
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Assyrians from using the region for pasture, tensions escalated into violent conflict, 92 
although this particular incident was significant enough to heighten tensions between the 
Ottoman state and Iran.  Locals near the border began to fear that another conflict 
between the two states was imminent.  Grant writes in July 1841 that the Kurds in 
Hakkari “confidently believed” that Persia was making “preparation[s] for a war with 
Turkey [which was]…about to commence.”  So much was their belief that they braced 
themselves for a Persian attack by “renounc[ing] their shortlived [sic], nominal allegiance 
to Turkey, and…form[ed] an alliance with Persia.”  He adds optimistically that the war 
would give “the Koords and Nestorians… a common enemy to fight” and help them 
“more easily settle their own quarrels.”93 
Although a war between the Ottoman and Persian states did not materialize, it 
may have either caused a division or exacerbated preexisting tensions between Nurullah 
Bey and his nephew Suleiman Bey.  Suleiman was the son of the former mir of Hakkari, 
but on his death Nurullah gained the support of locals and seized control illegitimately.  
After international tensions flared, Nurullah accused Suleiman Bey of taking advantage 
of the situation to usurp his authority.  Suleiman Bey managed to enlist the support of the 
Mar Shimun against Nurullah and asked Bedr Khan and Khan Mahmud for additional 
support, which they refused to give.94  Yet Nurullah opted to not kill Suleiman Bey for 
fear that he would provoke a segment of the Kurdish population in Hakkari to undertake 
reprisals against him thereby further weakening his power.  So he kept him under close 
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Nurullah saw the Mar Shimun’s decision to side against him and refuse to pay 
him tribute—as had been his long held custom—as betrayal.  In response he sought 
reprisals against him and other Nestorians loyal to him.  In early October 1841 Nurullah 
managed to rally the support of Kurdish groups from Van, Cizre, and Hakkari to 
“subdue” the Nestorians loyal to Suleiman and the Mar Shimun.  The Mar Shimun’s 
house was burned and he was forced to take refuge in Diz.96  The force tried to penetrate 
the tribal Assyrians in the Tiyari region but were pushed back.  The mountain Nestorians 
retaliated by invading the district of Berwer to the south and driving away flocks, but 
“without further bloodshed.”97 
During the political commotion in Hakkari another conflict was occurring 
between Bedr Khan Bey of Cizre and the Ottoman state.  Since the Ottomans’ 
embarrassing defeat at the hand of Ibrahim Paşa in 1839, the state had begrudgingly 
recognized the authority of Bedr Khan over Cizre and its environs in the region of Bohtan 
and held back from launching a full invasion of his territory for fear of sparking further 
crisis in a region over which they had only tenuous control.  Yet, in order to prevent Bedr 
Khan from expanding his base of power and wealth, Ottoman officials attempted to 
divide his domain between the valis of Diyarbakır and Mosul.  Cizre had long been under 
the jurisdiction of the eyalet of Diyarbakır.  However, Ince Bayraktar Muhammad Paşa, 
the vali of Mosul who had proven himself to be a formidable foe of the semiindependent 
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Kurdish groups, ambitiously tried to convince the Sublime Porte to have Cizre placed 
under his jurisdiction. According to Percy Badger, the vali of Mosul sought to seize Cizre 
by convincing Said Bey, the nephew of Bedr Khan, that he would place him in power if 
he killed his uncle.98  However, Bedr Khan was able to escape. 
It is commonly believed that Grant’s decision to have a mission home built in 
Aşita in 1842 sparked fears among Kurds.  Sarah Shields refers to this building as the 
“final straw” that escalated the tensions between the Kurds and tribal Assyrians to 
violence.99  Not all believed this.  Percy Badger, Grant’s Anglican rival, baselessly 
accuses Grant of naively suiting the Kurds’ interests of installing a fortress in the 
independent Assyrian enclave that would assist their eventual takeover of the region.100  
Of course the building may indeed have aroused suspicions.  Nurullah Bey wrote to 
Grant informing him that many Kurds thought the building to be a fortress to be used to 
strengthen the Assyrians’ military advantage, while others thought it to be a bazaar that 
would take away business from local merchants.  Yet Grant managed to allay his fears 
and even wrote an official statement that he would not be involved in any government or 
market affairs, with which Nurullah seemed “satisfied.”101 
The Assyrian Christians became increasingly divided between 1841 and 1843 and 
began to experience internal conflicts that weakened them at a most inopportune moment.  
First the Mar Shimun was fighting off the intrigues of the Catholics who tried to persuade 
him to enter into communion with Rome, which would have effectively  forfeited his 
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ecclesiastical independence.  Mutran Yusef, the Chaldean bishop of Amadiya, and a 
Dominican monk, went to Aşita to try to persuade the Mar Shimun and several of his 
clergy through dialogue, bribery, and “political assistance from France,” to “submit to the 
Roman See.”  However, being under no duress he refused.102  Nonetheless the incident 
shows that Catholic missionaries were indeed active in the region and that the Mar 
Shimun faced competition with them for members and the collection of money.   
One of the Nestorian Assyrian meliks Shemasha Hinno of Lezan, located a couple 
of miles east of Aşita, was at odds with the Mar Shimun over a number of policy issues.  
In addition he was not particularly keen on the Assyrians dwelling in nearby Tiyari, 
located some ten miles to the north.  When the Mar Shimun excommunicated Shemasha 
for his disobedience and tried to have him banished, he rebelled and wrote to Bedr Khan 
informing him of his desire to join him against the Mar Shimun.  Bedr Khan was elated at 
the news and sent him gifts and exempted him from the payment of a protection fee. 
Kusha Jindo, another Nestorian from Salaberka, located a couple of miles from Lezan, 
also fell out of favor with the Nestorian patriarch and swore his allegiance to Nurallah 
Bey of Hakkari against the Mar Shimun, which Nurullah accepted.103  The rivalries 
between the Nestorian Assyrians in the various mountain villages further weakened their 
position vis-à-vis the Kurds. 
The Mar Shimun had long had rivals within the Nestorian community but had 
generally been able to protect himself from their intrigues by paying a protection fee to 
client Christian and Muslim tribes.  His headquarters in mountainous Hakkari was further 
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protection from Assyrian groups against him.  But why did the Mar Shimun become 
hostile to the Kurds?  It is highly likely that the advent of the missionaries increased his 
confidence that he would receive backing from foreign powers. Although all Assyrians 
were technically under the jurisdiction of the Armenian millet, they operated rather freely 
since they were very distant from Armenian authority.  In addition the areas where they 
were concentrated were not populated by many Armenians who could keep them in 
check.  The independence of the Mar Shimun, however, came at a cost.  He was forced to 
fend for himself in many ways in a society that was politically divided and rooted in 
tribalism.  He lacked the guaranteed backing of the Ottoman authorities enjoyed by the 
Armenian patriarch of Istanbul.  Hence he held out the hope that deliverance from his 
Kurdish overlords would be achieved through his alliance with foreigners, which only 
aroused the Kurds to suspect his true political aims. 
Another conflict was that between the state and Bedr Khan.  The vali of 
Diyarbakır, Zekeriya Paşa noted in June 1841 that Bedr Khan had some thirty to forty 
thousand soldiers under his command.104  Between 1839 and 1842, the vali of Diyarbakır 
was changed four times, an indication that internal politics continued to hinder the 
implementation of full state control in the city.105 In Mosul, in contrast, Ince Bayraktar 
Mehmet Paşa had a firm grasp over the city and managed to subdue the elite Jalili family 
who had been in power in the city for over a century, as well as several semiautonomous 
tribes around the area.  Because of his stronger presence in the region, the revenue that he 
generated was much greater, and consequently his army was much more powerful.  For 
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this reason the Sublime Porte agreed in June 1841 to have Cizre removed from the 
jurisdiction of the floundering Diyarbakır eyalet and placed under the jurisdiction of the 
vali of Mosul.106 
Almost immediately after making the jurisdictional change, Bedr Khan wrote a 
letter of protest to the vali of Diyarbakır informing him that the vali of Mosul had tried to 
extirpate the mütesellims of Zakho and Tel Afar and threatened their families.  He 
demanded the payment of high taxes and restricted the passage of seminomadic tribes, 
disrupting their livelihoods in some cases.107  In addition a petition signed by the 
mütesellim, kadı, and muhtar of Cizre was sent to the vali of Diyarbakır, which was then 
sent to the Sublime Porte, which complained of further excesses committed by the vali of 
Mosul.  It made the case that an agreement had been reached in 1836 between Reşid Paşa 
and the Azizan family that Cizre would be under the jurisdiction of the Diyarbakır eyalet 
and requested that the Sublime Porte honor it.  The petitioners made sure to swear their 
allegiance to the sultan.108 
The authorities were reluctant to comply with Bedr Khan’s request to transfer 
Cizre back to the Diyarbakır eyalet.  They were well aware that his insistence that Cizre 
be placed outside the jurisdictional authority of Ince Bayraktar Mehmet Paşa and back 
under the authority of a much weaker eyalet of Diyarbakır was a ploy to enable him to 
increase the radius of territory that he controlled.  However, the near simultaneous revolts 
of Khan Mahmud of Müküs and Ismail Ağa of Amadiya against the central state in early 
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1842, which were not mutually coordinated, made the Ottomans second-guess their 
policy initiative to subdue Bedr Khan.  They feared that if Bedr Khan were to ally with 
the Kurdish rebels the revolt might expand to overwhelming proportions.  Luckily for the 
state, Bedr Khan hesitated to join forces with the rebel beys.  Bedr Khan had a negative 
history with the family of Khan Mahmud, particularly his brother Abdal Han, against 
whom he allied with the Ottomans when they revolted in 1838.  The Ottomans suspected 
Bedr Khan of supporting Ismail Ağa, but he vehemently denied this.109 
The revolts of Khan Mahmud and Ismail Ağa at first proved difficult for the 
Ottomans to contain.  The Helaci and Rojeki tribes under the leadership of the vali of 
Erzurum, kaymakam of Muş in conjunction with the Şikaki and Mihamdi tribes in the 
Mahmudi tried to take Gevaş but were forced to retreat to Tatvan by Khan Mahmud and 
his brother Han Abdal, who had the backing of a number of Kurds from Muş.110  Their 
increasing fear that Bedr Khan would participate led them to give in slightly to the Cizre 
bey’s demands.  Authorities told him that they would reconsider their decision to place 
Cizre under the jurisdiction of Mosul. 
However, once the Ottomans managed to gain the upper hand over the rebel 
Kurds, Bedr Khan Bey acquiesced to Ottoman demands.  He assured the valis of Erzurum 
and Diyarbakır that he would make an effort to put down the revolts, particularly that of 
Khan Mahmud, but he was slow to act.111  The Ottomans were able to contain but not 
fully suppress Khan Mahmud and Ismail Ağa.  Khan Mahmud’s main advantage was his 
brother’s fortification at Mahmudi.  Ismail Ağa managed to outbid Ottoman forces by 
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securing the alliances of a number of shaykh and ağas throughout Hakkari and Soran. 
In late 1842 Ottoman authorities decided to keep Cizre under the jurisdiction of 
Mosul and Ince Bayraktar in power since the revolt of the Kurds in Müküs and Amadiya 
continued to pose a threat and the vali of Diyarbakır was weak. 112 Furthermore they kept 
Ince Bayraktar at Mosul while replacing Vecih Paşa of Diyarbakır.  Bedr Khan was 
incensed at the political maneuvering of the Ottomans, whom he now believed were 
unwilling to the actually help him.  When he threatened rebellion in 1843 he caught the 
attention of the Sublime Porte and the Sultan who strongly urged the transfer of Cizre 
back to Diyarbakır in order to placate him. 113  Yet by then the Kurdish bey of Cizre’s 
cynicism at Ottoman governance had grown to the extent that he no longer desired to deal 
with their game-playing.  In addition the alliance that he managed to forge with Khan 
Mahmud of Müküs gave him a new surge of confidence. 
One of the most provocative acts of the mountain Assyrians, according to the vali 
of Erzurum, Kamil Paşa, was their invasion of the Kurdish village of Sersepi, in which 
they killed a number of Kurds, including two Kurdish seyyids (supposed descendants of 
the prophet Muhammad), and converted a mosque into a church.  The bloodied shirts of 
the victims that the relatives of the seyyids sent to Bedr Khan provided him with a solid 
justification for invasion and a symbol around which to stir the collective sense of 
outrage among the Kurds.114  According to Ali Paşa, the vali of Baghdad, Khan told him: 
The Tiyari Nestorians killed about fifty seyyids [likely using the term seyyid here 
to bestow honor on all Kurdish victims of Assyrian violence] and they did this 
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with the provocation of the English government.  They did not submit to the bey 
of Hakkari and took his possessions right in front of him.  I knew that this would 
have a bad result and that it would be a headache for the Ottoman state.  Since it 
is impossible to move cannons and carriages through the region and since the 
revolts are increasing day by day, I no longer have the patience and can no longer 
tolerate this.  Hence in the name of the sultan I am setting some limits [to their 
power].115 
 
It is intriguing that Bedr Khan claimed to be expanding his power in the name of the 
sultan even though there is no direct evidence that the sultan and Sublime Porte 
sponsored, let alone sanctioned, his move against the Assyrians. 
Bedr Khan was undoubtedly one of the shrewdest Kurdish political leaders of his 
time and place.  The political discourse that he appealed to in his letters and his political 
actions show that he was an attentive observer of the political and social environment 
around him and had a keen sense of who his potential enemies and allies were.  His 
apparent acumen suggests that he had a political vision that was more carefully 
articulated than that of other Kurdish leaders.  It was within the parameters of this vision 
that he specified targets for violence.  
 
The Invasion of Diz, Tiyari, and Aşita 
 Bedr Khan Bey commenced his military campaign against the Assyrian Christians 
in the mountainous enclave of Tiyari in mid-July of 1843.  He had been planning the 
invasion for months and patiently awaited the most advantageous moment to move his 
men into the region, a moment when he would be least vulnerable from defections either 
from other Kurdish beys or from Kurds within his own ranks.  In December 1842 Bedr 
                                                          






Khan, his general Zenal Bey, and Ismail Ağa of Amadiya, who had recently escaped 
from captivity in Mosul, went throughout Berwari attempting to rally Kurdish groups 
against offending mountain Assyrians.  Bedr Khan Bey even sent the Mar Shimun a letter 
bidding him join him and his forces.  The Mar Shimun rejected his request and informed 
the vali of Mosul of Bedr Khan Bey's intentions.  According to Badger, the vali of Mosul 
used this as an opportunity to build an alliance with the Mar Shimun and win over 
Tiyari.116 
 After securing the vital alliances of Nurullah Bey of Hakkari, Ismail Ağa of 
Amadiya,, and Khan Mahmud of Müküs, Bedr Khan Bey felt himself sufficiently 
prepared to confront the formidable Nestorian foe.  Dr. Grant makes it apparent in his 
letters that he was aware of Khan Bey's plans to invade Tiyari a few weeks in advance.  
He reports that Khan Bey had “spoken of [his] building in Asheta” and identified it as a 
threat.  But upon meeting Grant personally, Bedr Khan Bey assured him that his mission 
house would be spared destruction and that all Assyrians who took refuge with him 
would not be harmed.117  According to Percy Badger, Dr. Grant had heard of Bedr Khan 
Bey's plans to invade the Assyrian mountain villages as early as December 1842 and 
began transporting many of his belongings from Aşita to Mosul in anticipation of 
catastrophe.118 
Bedr Khan Bey began his invasion from the north at Diz, which had served as 
residence of the Mar Shimun and his family since his house was torched in 1841.  He 
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then marched his forces south to Tiyari and Aşita.  Despite their attempts to defend 
themselves, the Assyrian villagers were overwhelmed by the joint Kurdish force.  Bedr 
Khan Bey and his men were reportedly excessively brutal, destroying homes, mutilating 
corpses, and throwing them into the Zab river.  Those whom they did not kill, they held 
as captives.  Although the Mar Shimun managed to escape and flee to Mosul with his 
brother, his scribe, and an entourage of three or four men, his mother was captured, 
dashed to pieces, and tossed in the river.119  They also captured his niece and held her as a 
slave.120  Many Assyrians were able to flee into the mountains and destroyed bridges to 
keep the Kurdish force from pursuing them. 
Not all Assyrians in the mountains were pursued by the joint Kurdish force.  Bedr 
Khan spared the inhabitants of Zawitha and left their possessions and inhabitants 
untouched.  The rais of the village apparently "rendered some service" to Bedr Khan in 
order to secure his preservation.121  The Assyrians in Tkhuma sided with the Kurds 
against the Assyrians in Tiyari.  Their involvement may have been linked partially to 
their historic rivalry, but it is also likely that they pledged allegiance to the Kurds out of 
fear.  An Assyrian melik explained to Layard: "it is true...that when Nur-Ullah Bey [of 
Hakkari] joined Bedar Khan Bey in the great massacre, the people of Tkhoma marched 
with the Kurds against us; but could they do otherwise?  For they feared the chief of 
Hakkiari."122 
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According to Asahel Grant, Ottoman forces dispatched by the vali of Mosul were 
present just south of the Tiyari region at the time of the violent engagement.  However, 
they did not participate in the violence.  Christian Rassam, the British Vice-Consul in 
Mosul and brother-in-law of the Anglican missionary George Percy Badger, believes that 
the Ottoman force was there to strengthen Bedr Khan Bey's forces and block the 
Assyrians from escaping capture.123  Indeed Ince Bayraktar Mehmet Paşa may have been 
intent on subduing the independent Assyrian enclave as part of his centralization 
campaign, but there is no evidence that he had coordinated the attack with Bedr Khan.  
Furthermore there is no evidence that his forces were ordered to partake in the violent 
attacks against the Assyrians.  Given the state of the relationship between the Ottomans 
and the British at the time, it is likely that the Ottoman force was present to contain the 
violence and keep it from spreading further south in order to show itself to be 
maintaining order.  The British at the time backed a strong central Ottoman state and 
monitored political activity on its periphery to make sure that the Ottomans kept 
opposition movements in check.  Fearing embarrassment and vulnerability, Ottoman 
leaders were intent on appearing to be complying with British suggestions, even if they 
did sometimes secretly pursue their own agendas.  Yet the Ottoman force did not invade 
Tiyari primarily because it did not want to spark further troubles with Bedr Khan Bey, 
who was capable of rallying the support of Kurds in the south against the Ottoman state. 
Some Assyrians managed to assemble a resistance in Aşita in late October and 
early November 1843 to push back the men of Bedr Khan Bey and Zenal Bey.  They 
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managed to wound Zenal Bey and kill approximately sixty of his men.  However, with 
the help of Bedr Khan, Zenal soon gathered a force of two hundred armed cavalry to 
stamp out the rebels and regain control over Aşita by capturing the fortress-like mission 
house and using it to their strategic advantage.  At the behest of Consul Rassam, the Mar 
Shimun sent a secret message to his followers in the mountains, telling them to stand 
down and avoid all conflict with Kurdish groups, whether they be Bedr Khan's forces or 
agriculturalists and pastoralists in Berwari, in order to not provoke the stronger Kurdish 
force to undertake more violence.  Consul Rassam lamented the meager attempt of the 
Assyrians to beat back the Kurds remarking, "thus, these poor Christians are instigated to 
bring ruin upon themselves by a few designing men whose only object is self 
aggrandisement."124 
Stories of brutality were abundant among survivors.  They reported that the joint 
Kurdish force under Bedr Khan would kill women and children, burn people alive, and 
torture captives.  In addition they reported that the Kurds burnt churches, demolished 
homes, and ravaged fields.  Assyrians fleeing to the mountains destroyed bridges in order 
to prevent the Kurdish aggressors from pursuing them.  The exact number of victims is 
perhaps impossible to determine; however, figures range from 3,800125 to as high as ten 
thousand.126  Thousands were taken into captivity.  Bedr Khan also attacked Jacobite 
Christians in Jebel Tur, who were also reputedly self-governing in much the same way as 
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the Nestorian Christians in Tiyari.  He killed the Jacobite Primate of Midyat and 
subjected much of the population to forced labor.127   
 
Negotiating New Power Sharing 
 British officials feared that if the Ottoman authorities did not intervene quickly 
and keep Bedr Khan from assuming greater power and killing and enslaving more 
Christians, that Russia or France might consider exploiting the situation to their own 
economic and political advantages on the global playing field.  Hence it was not long 
after the first wave of violence in the region that Stratford Canning and Christian Rassam 
strongly urged the Ottomans to ramp up their efforts to contain Bedr Khan and prevent 
further bloodshed of Christians.  Yet the Ottoman authorities repeatedly insisted that 
Bedr Khan was too powerful for them to overcome easily and that even if they did 
manage to bring him down they would continue to face rebellion from other Kurdish 
beys.  Consequently both the Ottomans and the British conceded that the best option was 
to pursue open negotiations with Bedr Khan to try to persuade him at least to free 
Christian captives and allow them to return to their lands. 
 Although Bedr Khan enjoyed more power in southeastern Anatolia than any other 
member of the Kurdish elite had done over the past century, he sensed that his power was 
delicately balanced and that many Kurdish and Assyrian strongmen were patiently 
awaiting the opportunity to challenge him when he was most vulnerable.  Therefore he 
was loath to take any measures that might empower the mountain Assyrians and initially 
did not heed the demands of the vali of Mosul to release captives.  Consul Rassam 
                                                          





managed to persuade Bedr Khan to release only sixty captives in late 1843, but reported 
that there were over five hundred captives being held around Cizre.128 
 Bedr Khan appears to have softened his stance as a new power vacuum emerged 
after the untimely death early in 1844 of İnce Bayraktar Mehmet Paşa, the vali of Mosul 
whose personality was key to maintaining order in the Mosul region and parts of 
southeastern Anatolia.  Security in the region temporarily collapsed after his death.  
Sabahettin Bey, the brother of İsmail Ağa of Amadiya, escaped from prison in Mosul, 
and subsequently rallied together başıbozuks from Mosul, police officers from Dohuk, 
and tribes from the Amadiya region to rise in revolt.  Bedr Khan quickly dispatched a 
force of five hundred soldiers to put them down, which they were able to do with relative 
ease.  But the incident made the bey of Bohtan painfully aware that his power would not 
go uncontested even by family members of his allies and led him to begin accepting the 
idea that his negotiating power vis-à-vis the Ottoman state might be limited.  Ironically, 
the incident convinced Kemal Efendi, the vali of Erzurum, that Bedr Khan could be a 
valuable asset in the region in terms of his ability to install internal security.129 
 Although Bedr Khan continued to balk at the idea of releasing all the Assyrian 
captives in his position and withdrawing his forces from the Tiyari mountains, he began 
to show signs of giving in to external demands by attempting to negotiate a deal with the 
Mar Shimun.  In March 1844, he sent the Nestorian patriarch warning him "against 
listening to proposals made by 'Osmanlees' who he said were notorious for lying, that if 
Mar Shimon would put himself in Bedr Khan Bey's hands, he should be reinstalled in the 
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mountains, and all his affairs settled to his satisfaction."  However, the Mar Shimun 
informed him that he was committed to back whatever decision the Ottoman state made 
concerning him.130 
 R.W. Stevens, the British consul in Samsun, was commissioned to go with Kemal 
Efendi, the vali of Erzurum, to meet with Bedr Khan in April 1844.  Stevens was 
generally impressed with Bedr Khan and convinced that the claims circulated by 
Christians and others of renewed violence against the Assyrians were unfounded and 
exaggerated, but he also demanded that Bedr Khan release all Christians.  Bedr Khan was 
taken back by Stevens' demand and his overall reasoning for intervening.  He was 
puzzled as to why the British would take so much interest in the Nestorian Christians 
especially when they did not come to the Kurds' aid when they were under attack by the 
Nestorians.  The new vali of Mosul Şerif Paşa strongly urged Bedr Khan to comply with 
the British, informing him how they had helped the Ottomans drive the Egyptian 
governor Muhammad Ali and his forces from Syria: "if you do not leave these Christians 
tranquil, England will tell our government, either punish Bedr Khan Bey, or let us do so, 
and you may depend upon it, they will get at you, for they carried war into China 5,000 
hours from their Country."131   
As a result of continual pressure from the British and the Ottoman authorities, 
Bedr Khan became increasingly convinced that the threat to his power was potentially 
much greater from outside than from within and by 1845 released a great number of 
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prisoners, allowed many Assyrian Nestorians to return to their lands, and withdrew many 
of his forces from the Tiyari region.  In exchange the British and Ottomans appeared to 
be content to leave Bedr Khan alone as long as he maintained peace in the region. 
 Bedr Khan governed based on a set of more profound political and economic 
principles than other Kurdish beys both past and present.  He had constructed two 
factories at Cizre to produce weapons and ammunition and sent individuals to Europe to 
learn about Western military technology and organization.  Bedr Khan was quick to 
rebuild the ravaged economy around him.  Consul Rassam wrote that that Bedr Khan had 
already begun rebuilding villages in Jebel Tor in early 1844 and bringing their fields 
under cultivation.  He remarked that an "air of prosperity pervaded the mountainous 
region."132  According to Armenian observers, Bedr Khan sought to establish a sea-faring 
business in Lake Van and replacing sailboats with regular ships to better connect the 
riparian cities.133  Bedr Khan also had coinage minted and circulated with his name and 
title Emir-i Bohtan Bedr Khan inscribed on it.134 
 He was a staunch Sunni Muslim and relied on his interpretation of sharia law to 
orient his politics.  He was a deft negotiator and had a keen sense of how to balance the 
competing forces around him.  British missionaries who visited the region in 1845 
reported that "nearly every chief in northern Koordistan came to make their respects to 
him, bringing him presents of money, horses, mules, and other valuable property."  
                                                          
132 FO 195/228, Rassam to Canning, 13 January 1844, cited in Shields, Mosul Before 
Iraq, 225, ft. 94. 
133 Shahbazian, Kyurto-Hay Badmutyun, 88. 
134 Malmisanij, Cizira Botanlı Bedirhaniler ve Bedirhani Ailesi Derneği'nin Tutanakları 
[The Bedr Khan Family of Cizre/Bohtan and Proceedings of Their Institution] (Istanbul: 





Additionally they reported that Bedr Khan managed to establish security in his domain to 
a much greater degree than existed in other Kurdish-inhabited regions: 
The guilty under his government find no escape.  Bribery, favoritism, &c., which 
too often, in these countries, pervert the course of justice, and nullify the force of 
law, are unknown here.135 
 
Additionally Bedr Khan appeared to help settle disputes between Christians.  When 
Assyrians of Tkhuma raided other Assyrians returning to their homes in Tiyari in late 
1844, Bedr Khan sent a letter to the Tkhuma inhabitants, warning them that he would 
"proceed against them if they did not desist."  Stevens commended Bedr Khan for his 
efforts remarking: 
the Buhtan Chief deserves some credit for his conduct on this occasion.  It is 
rather discouraging to see that, now the Mohammedans have abandoned their 
persecutions in the mountains, the Christians are beginning to fight among 
themselves.136 
 
 Bedr Khan viewed religious diversity as a significant source of political division 
and favored a policy of forced assimilation.  He sought to convert Yazidis to Islam by 
both persuasion and threat of violence, and converted many of his Nestorian captives to 
Islam.137  According to Shahbazian, a Armenian member of the Dashnak party who wrote 
about Bedr Khan in 1911 based on earlier Armenian sources, Bedr Khan “viewed the 
Kurds and the Armenians equally,” basing his belief “on the contradictory idea that they 
were [originally] of one blood" but had become divided religiously and ethnically.  He 
believed that by erasing their religious distinction he could blend them with the Kurds to 
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create a nation of "warriors."  The Armenians did not share Bedr Khan's vision and sided 
with the Ottoman army against him in 1847.138 
 By 1846, Bedr Khan had gained greater power than any Kurdish bey in 
southeastern Anatolia in the previous hundred years.  His domain, which was based on 
Cizre, extended from Mardin in the west to Nehri in the east, Gevaş (on Lake Van) in the 
north to Sinjar in the south.  However, the towns of Soran, Muş, Bitlis, Van, Diyarbakır, 
and Mosul remained outside his control.   
 
Further Loss of Control 
 Bedr Khan and the Ottoman state continued to have competing interests despite 
reaching a compromise.  Although both entities avoided direct conflict with each other, 
they tried to influence the Kurdish beys living next to the territory held by Bedr Khan.  In 
1845 the Ottoman state began trying to impose the tanzimat reforms in the eyalets of 
Diyarbakır, Erzurum, and Van.  The aim of the reforms was to extend greater control 
over the periphery, generate more revenue from taxes, and modernize the military.  To 
accomplish this, the state created a greater number of administrative divisions in the 
eyalets and appointed outside officials to govern over the land instead of local families.  
Additionally the state undertook cadastral surveys to assess the ability of the inhabitants 
to pay taxes and began to lift many of the tax exemptions and exemptions from military 
service that some Kurdish groups had previously enjoyed. 
The state's reforms were met with opposition both from the traditional power-
holding classes who felt that the reforms threatened their power and from the religious 
                                                          





class who felt that the reforms were based on Western innovation and ran counter to 
sharia law.  Upon hearing word of the state's plan to implement the tanzimat in Van, 
Mustafa Bey, a descendent of Timur Paşa, who had served as the vali of Van throughout 
much of the late eighteenth century, spearheaded a revolt.  Mustafa Bey's followers 
proclaimed him the new kaymakam in place of the Ottoman appointee Sırrı Paşa.  
Mustafa persuaded his followers by insisting that the tanzimat would turn them into 
"Franks."139  He won the support of many landholders by telling them that the state 
intended to dissolve their yurtluk-ocaklık holdings.  Most notably Mustafa Bey had the 
strong support of Khan Mahmud, the bey of Müküs, who provided him crucial military 
backing.  Khan Mahmud and his brother Han Abdal, the bey of Mahmudi, patrolled the 
area around Van to prevent outsiders from penetrating the city and to keep informers in 
the city from leaving the area to rally outside help.  He captured and killed the kethüda of 
Van and an Armenian priest who tried to send messages to Erzurum petitioning for 
outside intervention from the state.140 
The rebels in Van were able to keep the revolt secret for long enough to secure the 
support of a number of local men and key elites in the region.  Between June and 
September 1845, the vali of Erzurum, Bekir Sami Paşa, repeatedly attempted to send 
military reinforcements to put down Mustafa Bey and replace him with another 
kaymakam who could command the allegiance of many of the locals.  Realizing that the 
rebels might rally Kurdish groups from Iran to bolster their movement, Bekir Sami tried 
to enlist the support of local Kurdish elites from the border region who had close ties to 
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border tribes.  He persuaded Tayfur Bey, of the local Van family of İshak Paşa, a rival to 
Timur Paşa's family, to serve as the kaymakam, to entice locals to support the sultan, and 
lead an Ottoman force against the rebels.  When Tayfur Bey failed to rally enough 
support, Bekir Sami Paşa had him removed and looked to others.  He even appointed 
Behlül Paşa, the Kurdish mutasarrıf of Beyazıt who had been a key ally of the Ottoman 
state since the 1810s, to serve as kaymakam for a brief period.  However, despite the fact 
that some Kurdish leaders were on the side of the state, the rebel force had strong local 
support and could not easily be overcome.141  The shortage in revenue caused by the 
rebels' refusal to pay taxes made it difficult for the state to pay their military at Erzurum 
and consequently more difficult to mobilize force to put down the rebellion.142   
Bedr Khan secretly supported the rebellion, which he saw as an opportunity to 
expand his power base, although he initially denied it to Ottoman officials.143  Yet Bedr 
Khan's vision went beyond mere expansion into the city of Van.  In early 1846 he appears 
to have entered into an agreement with other Kurdish elites, notably Khan Mahmud, the 
rebels in Van, Nuruallah Bey, several other Kurdish beys in Bitlis, Muş, and Hizan, and 
beys as far north as the Çıldır region, to perpetuate resistance to state centralization 
efforts, particularly to the tanzimat.  Bedr Khan was to a play a key role in the alliance 
and managed to use it to expand his influence northwards.  The alliance aroused the 
attention of the British and Russian consuls who urged the Ottomans to take measures 
against it.144 
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The force of Bedr and the Kurdish alliance was sufficient to cow many leaders 
into submitting to him against the state.  He intimidated Kurdish groups in Bitlis and Muş 
into backing him and the alliance over the Ottoman state.  When Kurds in Kisan pushed 
back at Bedr Khan to the extent of wounding some of his aides in the summer of 1846, he 
sent a force of four hundred to burn the village of the dissenters and kill select leaders.145  
Additionally Şerif Bey (a descendent of the powerful Kurdish Bey Alaeddin of Muş who 
had risen to power in the mid-eighteenth century), who had announced his allegiance to 
the Ottoman state in 1845 against the rebels in Van, came to side with Bedr Khan in 
1846.146 
State officials met in August 1846 to discuss how to deal with Bedr Khan's 
expanding power base and the continued anti-tanzimat sentiment in the region.  Officials 
decided that the forces at Erzurum were unreliable since many of them sympathized with 
the rebels, and that it would be necessary to assemble an armed force of regulars and 
especially başıbozuk irregulars from central and western Anatolia, and even the Balkans, 
in order to be able to engage Bedr Khan.  However, at the same time, they decided to 
postpone any military engagement with Bedr Khan and other Kurdish rebels until after 
winter.147 
Tensions escalated between Bedr Khan and the Assyrians when Assyrians from 
Baz, Jilo, and Tkhuma, whom Bedr Khan had been unable to disarm, skirmished with 
Kurdish villagers to the south.148  This group of Assyrians allegedly raided several 
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Kurdish villages and killed a number of Kurds including Bedr Khan's men.149  Yet the 
perpetration of violence and oppression was not a one-sided affair.  Assyrians had been 
complaining increasingly of the heavy taxation imposed both by Nurullah Bey and Bedr 
Khan.150  Additionally it was rumored that Assyrians attempting to leave Tkhuma and 
traverse the Berwar region to the south were being killed.151 
The Mar Shimun and the Assyrians in Tkhuma had been making appeals to the 
vali of Mosul to bring them under his jurisdiction and relieve them of the burden of Bedr 
Khan.  They promised to be loyal tax-paying subjects in exchange for his protection.152  
Bedr Khan appears to have begun making plans to invade the region of Tkhuma in 
September 1846 after Shaykh Mahmud of Mosul and Shaykh Yusuf of Zakho made a 
declaration of jihad against the Assyrians of Tkhuma and called the Bey of Buhtan to 
action.153  The seeming success that Bedr Khan had had in expanding his power base 
throughout much of Eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq in 1846 gave him confidence that 
he would be able to stamp out the Assyrian force with near impunity. 
In October and November 1846, Bedr Khan stormed the village of Tkhuma 
killing about one thousand individuals and forcing thousands of others to flee southward 
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toward Mosul and eastward into Iran.154  According to the vali of Mosul, Tayyar Paşa, 
some even took refuge among Kurdish tribes in the region, a further indication that 
severe tension between Assyrians and Kurds was mainly limited to the area between 
Hakkari and Amadiya.155  Bedr Khan sought to decimate the villagers and completely 
destroy their lands.  He demolished their houses, burned their fields, chopped down trees, 
and ruined their irrigation system.156 
British officials were greatly upset by the renewed massacres of Assyrians.  At the 
same time, even though some of them believed the state to be turning a blind eye to the 
incident, they were generally under the impression that the Ottomans lacked the capacity 
to intervene and destroy Bedr Khan's power.  Nonetheless, the consuls urged the 
Ottomans to make immediate preparations to extend full control over Eastern Anatolia.  
Consul Rassam even suggested that the Ottomans try enlisting the support of the Jacobite 
Assyrians in Jebel Tur to help bring down Bedr Khan.  They had proved to be an 
invaluable asset to the Ottoman military against Kör Muhammad Paşa in the 1830s and 
would once again prove particularly useful against Bedr Khan in 1847.157 
 
Declining Power in the East 
 
The Ottomans dispatched one of their senior civil servants, Nazım Efendi, to meet 
with Bedr Khan in late 1846.  He left Istanbul before the Tkhuma massacre occurred and 
arrived after it, but he was not there to discuss reparations for the Assyrians or to act on 
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behalf of the British.  He was there to survey the area, determine Bedr Khan's 
capabilities, and try to negotiate a new power-sharing agreement with the Kurdish bey.  
At the negotiating table, Bedr Khan announced his willingness to submit to the state with 
the hope of gaining Nazım Efendi's favor.  He even told Nazım that he would be willing 
to make a formal submission in the presence of shaykhs, muftis, and other local elites.158  
He announced that if the state recognized his authority, he would be willing to collect 
taxes from the population under his jurisdiction and pay the revenue to the vali of Mosul, 
and that he would gather soldiers for the Ottoman army when required.159  Nazım left 
Cizre believing that Bedr Khan was much weaker and more vulnerable than he appeared 
and that the best course of action for the state would be to leave him in power at Cizre.160  
However, the authorities in Istanbul, bent on centralizing control over Eastern Anatolia, 
dismissed Nazım Efendi's recommendation and ordered Müşir (General) Osman Paşa to 
march on Bedr Khan on March 17, 1847.161 
Bedr Khan was said to have a force of some sixty thousand at his command,162  
but according to Osman Paşa, his military consisted largely of private militias who were 
gathered on an ad hoc basis and were highly unorganized.163  To maintain such a large 
military, Bedr Khan subjected the peasantry to high taxes resulting in an overall increase 
of discontent with him and his rule.  Between January and April, as the Ottomans were 
preparing for battle, an increasing number of those dwelling in Bedr Khan's domain 
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defected to the Ottoman side. 
Bedr Khan resorted to an eleventh-hour effort to try to deter the Ottomans from 
marching on him by making an appeal to the British.  He sent a letter by the hand of 
Shaykh Yusuf of Zakho to the British consul in Baghdad proposing a set of conditions to 
persuade the consul to urge the Ottomans to cease their endeavors against him.  Bedr 
Khan stipulated that he would release all Assyrian captives, recognize the Mar Shimun as 
the patriarch of the Nestorian Assyrians, and regard Christians and Muslims as equals, on 
the condition that the British and Ottomans would no longer meddle in his affairs or those 
of the Assyrian inhabitants of Tiyari and Tkhuma. He also swore allegiance to the sultan 
and promised to carry out his decrees; however, he demanded that locals read the khutba 
in his name.164 
The Ottomans pursued a two-pronged strategy in bringing down Bedr Khan.  First 
they mobilized a force consisting of regular and irregular soldiers from Istanbul, the 
Arabian peninsula, Sivas, Harput, Trabzon, Aleppo, Urfa, Diyarbakır, Muş, and several 
other regions. Osman Paşa led the campaign against Bedr Khan from the south and Ferik 
Ahmet Paşa and Ferik Ismail Paşa from the north. 165  Second they negotiated with 
Kurdish beys close to Bedr Khan and attempted to persuade them to defect.  The line of 
logic that state negotiators appealed to was that the state’s military force was larger than 
that of Bedr Khan and that his demise was inevitable.  They also reminded the beys that 
the Ottoman state had British support to back them if necessary.  They promised to 
protect the position of the beys who defected from Bedr Khan and give them a number of 
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political privileges.  The Ottomans first persuaded Şerif Bey of Muş, the brother of the 
late Emin Bey, the former mütesellim of Muş between 1836 and 1839, and his brothers to 
side with the Ottomans against Bedr Khan and the rebels in Van in April.166  Perhaps 
Şerif Bey had never been fully on the side of the rebels, but many state officials 
continued to doubt his loyalty despite his pledge of allegiance to the state and his 
participation in the battle against Bedr Khan in June.167  Once state forces started to come 
closer to Bedr Khan's domain in late April and early May 1847, Ottoman officials 
managed to persuade Yezdan Sher Bey, Bedr Khan's nephew, to defect.  His defection 
was particularly acute for Bedr Khan since he was able to inform Osman Paşa of his 
uncle's military strategy, allowing the former to gain an upper hand.168  Later in May Han 
Abdal, the brother of Khan Mahmud who governed Mahmudi, and Fazıl Bey, one of 
main rebels in Van, defected.169  Nurullah Bey in Hakkari defected in June, partly 
because, like other Kurdish beys, he believed Bedr Khan's fall was imminent, and partly 
because he had been involved in periodic jurisdictional disputes with him and sought 
greater power from him.170  The vali of Diyarbakır, Hayrettin Paşa, also tried to turn the 
religious shaykhs in the Cizre region against Bedr Khan by claiming that it was their 
religious duty to uphold all the official decrees of the Ottoman sultan-caliph, but it is 
unclear whether or not the shaykhs turned away from Bedr Khan.171  The vali of Erzurum 
found a crucial ally in Mahmud Efendi, a Kurdish hoca from Beyazıt who had 
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considerable influence on the ulema throughout Eastern Anatolia.  He accompanied the 
Ottoman military on its campaign in Hakkari and Van and acted as a negotiator and 
translator.  He was captured by Khan Mahmud, but released after fifteen days.172  Khan 
Mahmud was one of the few powerful Kurdish beys to remain with Bedr Khan until his 
surrender. 
The Ottoman force of nearly twenty-five thousand encroached upon Bedr Khan's 
territory in late May.  According to Brant, the British consul, Bedr Khan announced to 
the Ottomans that he would be willing to submit to their authority, but that he refused to 
go to Istanbul.173  Osman Paşa dismissed Bedr Khan's plea as an excuse to buy himself 
time to remobilize his forces and reassert his authority and decided to lead his men into 
Cizre on June 9.  However, Bedr Khan managed to flee Cizre with a number of his men 
and tried to regroup his forces.  With the help of Khan Mahmud and Zeynel Bey, he 
launched an attack on the Ottomans two days later but was beaten back.  His force 
suffered 180 losses while the Ottomans suffered only eighteen.174  The Ottoman victory 
caused many of Bedr Khan's supporters to fear eventual defeat and either to side with the 
Ottomans or disperse.  Some of Bedr Khan's more tenuous allies sought refuge in Iran, 
notably Resul Paşa, the brother of Kör Muhammad Paşa, whom the Ottomans had 
appointed mütesellim of Soran after his brother died and who had offered some support to 
Bedr Khan.  Ottoman officials maintain that Bedr Khan even corresponded with the 
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Iranians in an attempt to ask for asylum.175 Desperate for support, he even offered to arm 
the Assyrians in Tiyari and Tkhuma if they would join him in fighting the Ottomans; 
however, his plea was in vain.176 
Despite the seeming disarray of his force, Bedr Khan remained defiant and 
confident that he could withstand the Ottomans by taking refuge at Orak Kale, one of his 
most impregnable fortresses in the mountains near Şırnak.  He had boasted earlier in a 
letter to Ferik Ahmed Paşa that the fortress was in such a position that he doubted that the 
Ottomans would be unable to dislodge him: 
Do what you are going to do, you can come and see.  I have a strong well fortified 
fortress by the name of Orak that could not be successfully captured even if three 
kings marched upon me.  I will fight you until my energy is exhausted.   Even 
though I may not have enough strength to endure [combat], I can take refuge in 
my fortress.177   
 
He took refuge in Orak Kale with five hundred of his men and his family on June 26 and 
was able to inflict a number of casualties upon Osman Paşa's brigade, leaving 29 killed 
and 115 wounded.  However, he was ultimately unable to withstand the Ottomans' 
superior technological and organizational advantage and was forced to surrender on July 
4.178  Subsequently the Ottomans were able to move into the Kurdish-inhabited territories 
with relative ease and force the weak and leaderless beys to surrender to their authority.  
Ottoman forces managed to move into Van in mid-July and seize the Van fortress in early 
August, putting an end to a rebellion that had lasted for nearly three years.179 
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 After capture, Bedr Khan was eventually taken to Istanbul where the sultan 
bestowed rewards and honor upon him for his bravery before exiling him and his family 
to Crete.  His kind treatment at Istanbul can be interpreted as an attempt by the state to 
placate his Kurdish sympathizers.  Officials appeared to believe that cruel treatment of 
such a highly revered leader could make it more difficult for them to win the loyalty of 
the political heavyweights of Eastern Anatolia.  Bedr Khan tried to assure the Sublime 
Porte that he was ‘unaware’ that the government was trying to implement a policy of 
centralization in Eastern Anatolia (a reference to the tanzimat), a somewhat disingenuous 
plea given his collusion with Khan Mahmud and the rebels at Van.  But he added that he 
"was surprised" at the government's treatment of him given the fact that Reşid Paşa had 
been more harsh toward his family during his invasion of Cizre in the 1830s.180 
The conflict between the Ottomans and Bedr Khan did not appear to result in a 
great amount of carnage and violence.  The number of casualties on both sides were 
relatively few, many fewer than during the Ottoman campaigns against the Kurds in the 
1830s and trifling compared to the number of casualties suffered during the Ottoman-
Egyptian wars.  A number of factors explain the seeming relative lack of violence in the 
conflict between the state and Bedr Khan.  First Bedr Khan did not expect to gain a 
military victory over the Ottomans, but rather a political victory.  Although Bedr Khan 
wanted to give the illusion that he had much more force than he actually did, both he and 
the Ottomans knew that he was not as strong as he claimed to be.  The Kurdish bey of 
Bohtan merely held revert to the old power-sharing order in the Kurdish east. 
                                                          






Second, the Ottomans were successful at persuading many Kurdish elites not to 
back Bedr Khan thus obviating the need for excessive force.  Third, the Ottomans were 
not invested in the conflict as a means of self-preservation, as had been the case with 
Ibrahim Paşa of Egypt who threatened to take Istanbul, but rather as a calculated bid 
against a force that posed no direct threat to them.  Once the state had stemmed the threat 
of Muhammad Ali Paşa and his son Ibrahim Paşa in Egypt in Syria in 1840 by driving 
them out of the region with the help of the British, they prevented them from bringing 
southeastern Anatolia under their control.  Consequently the Ottomans felt that they 
could bide their time in preparing to confront the Kurdish force.  The campaigns of Reşid 
Paşa and Hafız Paşa during the 1830s were more violent against the Kurds largely 
because they felt a much more pressing need to stem the tide of revolt before it became 
unmanageable. 
Fourth, the state found it in their interest to win the hearts and minds of the local 
Kurds and sought to minimize inflicting harm upon them.  Osman Paşa went to great 
lengths to avoid harming the villagers and especially their lands.  He even offered 
compensation to villagers whose lands were ruined during the battles against Bedr Khan.  
He also had his soldiers attend to lands that were abandoned by fleeing locals.181 
 
Conclusion 
The power struggle between the state and local forces as a result of the Ottoman 
state's continued centralization campaign was a significant factor in, if not one of the 
main drivers of, all major political conflicts in Eastern Anatolia during the 1830s and 
                                                          





1840s.  Indeed a similar power struggle between state and local groups as well as among 
locals themselves had been among the root causes of violent political conflict in Eastern 
Anatolia between 1800 and 1829.  Hence the questions that are begged are why political 
conflict was more violent than it had been before and why it was most widespread in the 
region south of Lake Van, particularly Müküs, Soran, Cizre, Van, and Hakkari, and not in 
northeastern Anatolia. 
Indeed it would be reasonable to expect that political tensions existing in 
northeastern Anatolia would escalate into widespread violent conflict given a number of 
factors.  The region had been substantially destabilized as a result of the Russo-Turkish 
War 1828-1829.  Its inhabitants were multiethnic, multireligious, and divided by class, 
much as they were in southeastern Anatolia.  Furthermore many of the Kurdish elites in 
the northeast held lands as semiautonomous yurtluk-ocaklıks and would have been 
greatly resistant to attempts by the state to centralize control. 
The absence of more widespread conflict in northeastern Anatolia 1830-1847 can 
be attributed to a number of factors.  First, the Ottomans made it a priority to place a 
large number of troops and nonlocal administrators in Erzurum since it was vulnerable to 
Russian invasion.  Second, the availability of more land due to the evacuation of tens of 
thousands of Armenians from the region created new opportunity spaces for economic 
control over which the Kurds and an influx of new Muslim migrants from Russia in the 
region competed to fill.  The increased state presence combined with the increased 
number of rivalries jockeying for power made it difficult for any single local elite or 
group of elites to amass a power base that was large enough to challenge the state.  Third, 





seeking groups and weakening their potential to mobilize against the state or other 
Muslim groups.  Consequently the state and many local groups identified the Armenians 
as more of a benefit to their economic position (hence they encouraged many Armenians 
to stay in the Ottoman Empire or to return from Russia to their lands) and less of a threat 
to their political power.  Fourth, feuds among Kurdish elites in Muş and Beyazıt 
continued after the conflict with Russia and the Ottoman authorities were able to play 
rivals against each other and thus weaken them.  Due to their lack of control over their 
respective domains, Kurdish magnates in Muş and Beyazıt were less prone to side with 
Bedr Khan and tended to support the state as was the case with Şerif Bey of Muş (despite 
the fact that he briefly defected) and Behlül Paşa of Beyazıt. 
The larger scope of conflict in southeastern Anatolia in the 1830s and 1840s can 
be ascribed to the following factors.  First, the Ottoman state did not deem the region a 
major threat immediately after the Treat of Edirne in 1829 and diverted its forces from 
there.  The state allocated its resources to expelling the Mamluks from Baghdad in 1831, 
stabilizing the border in northeastern Anatolia, and trying to defend Syria and central 
Anatolia from the campaigns of Ibrahim Paşa between 1831 and 1833.  The weakened 
state presence opened an opportunity space for Kör Muhammad Paşa of Soran, who had 
deftly fended off local rivals, to take some inspiration from Ibrahim Paşa and expand his 
domain.  Second, the urgency perceived necessary by the Ottoman authorities to 
centralize control over the region, lest it fall into the hands of Ibrahim Paşa, led them to 
employ over-hasty and mismanaged tactics of imposing its control.  Feeling an 
unprecedented level of threat from Kurdish groups in the southeast, the state resorted to 





against the Muslim inhabitants of southeastern Anatolia between 1836 and 1839 created a 
sense of shared trauma that subsequent elites, particularly Bedr Khan and Khan Mahmud, 
were able to seize upon in order to mobilize their forces. 
Third, Bedr Khan was a deft maneuverer whose political vision was more far-
reaching than that of other Kurdish elites.  His aim was to achieve autonomy in a large 
political domain while appearing to be an ally of the state.  He focused not on direct 
resistance to the state, but on building alliances with locals—arguably by appealing to the 
idea that both the Ottoman state and the political disorder that its policies towards the 
region was causing posed the greatest threats to the inhabitants of Eastern Anatolia—and 
dissolving power among local rivals.  Bedr Khan also identified the Nestorians in the 
mountainous regions of Tiyari and Diz as threats to his political ambitions, largely 
because of their ability to lobby British support.  He pursued mass violence against the 
Nestorians largely because they were his most powerful rivals in the region and most 
unwilling to submit to his authority.  He may have also felt a sense of urgency to subdue 
them before either the Ottoman state, or the British, used the mountain Nestorians against 
him. 
Religion and ethnicity undoubtedly played a larger role in the conflicts of the 
1830s and 1840s than they had in earlier periods.  Both Kör Muhammad Paşa and Bedr 
Khan Bey identified religious difference as a threat, at least to the extent that religious 
institutions could be used as vehicles of resistance against their political wills.  Both tried 
to convert prominent Yazidi leaders to Islam, and Bedr Khan also tried to convert his 
Nestorian captives to Islam.  Their aim of conversion was not, however, rooted in an 





coerce them into political submission.  For if one converted to Islam, they could then be 
subject to Islamic law: in particular, if they tried to reconvert to Christianity they could be 
branded as an infidel and legitimately persecuted.  Yet it should be noted at the same time 
that Bedr Khan was tolerant of non-Muslims in his domain so long as they submitted to 
his rule.  Hence his main target was less the Nestorians as a whole than the Nestorians in 
specific regions. 
Many Kurds were undoubtedly assertive of their ethnic identity and used it as a 
tool to rally force and challenge the state.  It is significant that the Ottoman officials often 
referred to southeastern Anatolia as Kurdistan and even created an eyalet called 
Kurdistan after capturing Bedr Khan in the hope of winning the Kurds' loyalties.  
However, family and tribal identities among speakers of different Kurdish dialects often 
transcended their ethnic identity.  Hence the appeal of Kurdishness as means of 














STATE AND LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF ETHNIC  
 
AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS, 1847-1869 
 
 The Ottoman defeat and capture of Bedr Khan in 1847 tipped the domestic 
balance of power in Eastern Anatolia the former’s favor.  Throughout the 1850s and 
1860s, the Ottoman state managed to increase its power to limit the capabilities of 
indigenous Kurdish groups to mobilize their forces, at least on a scale commensurate with 
that of Bedr Khan.  The series of new military and administrative reforms that the 
Sublime Porte implemented during this period were also effective at mitigating the 
tensions along state-local lines that had prevailed during the first half of the nineteenth 
century and had often led to local rebellion against the Ottoman state.  State officials 
managed to bring the key garrison cities of Diyarbakır, Van, and Erzurum as well as 
several rural areas around Lake Van (including Muş, Bitlis, Beyazıt, and Siirt) under 
greater central control.  Although skirmishes between Kurdish tribes persisted, 
particularly on the border with Russia and Iran, officials managed to keep those from 
flaring into larger conflicts.  However, this period is undoubtedly marked by the 
persistence of a number of social cleavages, if not the emergence of new tensions, among 
the local Eastern Anatolians themselves.  Additionally, new rifts grew between the 
Ottoman state and the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia.  The scale, nature, and origins of 





scholars.  One camp of scholars sees the tensions as stemming from the top-down and 
attribute tension and conflict between Muslims and Christians to Ottoman state rigidity in 
implementing changes to provide necessary security.  Another camp believes the tensions 
to originate from the bottom-up and asserts that the ambitions of local actors were drivers 
of conflict, whose resolution required more resources than the Ottoman state was capable 
of providing.  This chapter reassesses tension and conflict during this period and attempts 
to provide a nuanced view as to its nature and origins.  Its main theme is that the tension 
that existed in Eastern Anatolia between 1847 and 1869 was a result of the competing 
visions of reform and progress among Ottoman administrators.  While some 
administrators were committed to providing a new central order and balance of power in 
the Kurdish-inhabited provinces, other administrators, under the heavy influence of 
European advisers, promoted reform for Christians as a priority over resolving the 
lingering tensions that existed between state and local actors.  Promised reforms took too 
long to fulfill, thus raising expectations of both local Christians and Muslims beyond the 
capability of the Ottoman state administrators to satisfy. 
 
Competing Visions over Eastern Anatolia 
 Between 1830 and 1876, both the British and the Ottomans viewed Eastern 
Anatolia as a crucial buffer zone that kept central Anatolia at a distance from both 
Russian and Iranian threats.  Both agreed that the Ottoman Empire’s perpetual control 
over Eastern Anatolia was important in maintaining the delicate balance of power 
between the Ottoman state and its neighbors, which if ruptured, could greatly destabilize 
the Ottoman Empire and leave it vulnerable to foreign invasion and domestic rebellion.  





Ottoman Empire and Persia so as to prevent the conflicts and disputes which had arisen 
from generations of contested jurisdictions and to confirm a permanent peace in that 
region for the benefit of humanity and commerce.”1  Yet, Britain and key Ottoman 
administrators differed over what method to pursue in keeping Eastern Anatolia under 
control of the Ottoman state. 
For the British, international politics was of paramount importance when figuring 
out a strategy towards Eastern Anatolia.  British officials, notably Stratford Canning, 
Henry Bulwer, and John Russell viewed Christian rebellion as one of the main threats to 
the integrity of the Ottoman state.  They greatly feared that Russia would gain a strategic 
advantage in the Ottoman Empire by pushing the issue of Christian protection and 
representation.  Although Armenians and Assyrians had not undertaken any major 
rebellion on the scale of the Greeks and the Serbs, the coordinating efforts that Russia 
had undertaken with Armenians in the Caucasus gave them reason to believe that they 
could instigate a rebellion among Armenians in Eastern Anatolia.2  Hence, British 
officials pushed political reform for Christians as a priority.  Britain believed that if the 
Ottomans made promises of equal rights to its Christian populations then this might deter 
Christians from seeking Russian protection and stem the spread of separatist sentiment.  
While the British did perceive the Kurds as a threat, they appeared more concerned over 
the threat that Kurds posed to Christians throughout Eastern Anatolia, and their indirect 
threat to destabilizing the international arena, than the threat that they posed to the 
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For the Ottomans, domestic politics and balancing state and local power in 
Eastern Anatolia took precedence over international politics.  The Sublime Porte believed 
that whatever threat the Christians in the region posed was less than the threat posed by 
the Muslim Kurds.  Whatever claims of conquest over the Kurds Ottoman officials made 
in the aftermath of Bedr Khan Bey’s capture and exile were mere posturing.  Documents 
reveal that throughout the 1850s and 1860s, the Ottomans continued to fear Kurdish 
rebellion and make political concessions to them in order to appease them.  The Ottoman 
concern over the Kurdish threat can be understood against the backdrop of its failed 
centralization attempts of the 1830s.  Ibrahim Paşa’s invasion of Syria and Cilicia 1831-
1833 and Kör Muhammad Bey’s revolt in Soran prompted the Ottomans to undertake 
hasty, if not rash, action to impose a swift central order on the Kurdish-inhabited regions 
between 1834 and 1839.  However, the heavy-handed and violent tactics employed by 
Reşid Paşa and Hafız Paşa against suspected Kurdish rebels in the area south of Lake 
Van only ended up providing fodder for Bedr Khan’s rebellion during the 1840s.  After 
the Great Powers helped drive Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim Paşa out of the 
Levant in 1840, the Ottomans no longer felt the need for haste and favored a policy of 
calculated centralization over swift, aggressive centralization in Eastern Anatolia.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that the Sublime Porte tolerated Bedr Khan’s consolidation of 
power in the southern Lake Van region between 1843 and 1847, and did not take action 
against him over his massacres of Assyrian Christians in 1843 in spite of European 
pressure to do so. 





placement of the Kurdish-inhabited regions in Eastern Anatolia under the nominal 
authority of the vali of the Kurdistan eyalet did not spell an end to a decentralized Eastern 
Anatolian region.  On the contrary, it seems that the state’s centralization efforts ushered 
in an era of greater competition for power, wealth, and status among larger numbers of 
competing Kurdish elites.  It is impossible to prove whether a strong central Kurdish-led 
autonomous enclave would have emerged had the Ottoman state not dissolved Bedr 
Khan’s power.  However, his rise to power by building alliances with various Kurdish 
groups throughout the region between 1841 and 1847 suggests that the prevailing 
political culture of tribalism in Kurdish society did not preclude Kurdish elites from 
acquiring organic power and expanding their control over territory.  The Ottoman state’s 
creation of a Kurdistan eyalet in 1847 is an indication that they believed the issue of 
foremost importance in the region was bringing the Kurds in line with state interests. 
 
New Centralization: The Eyalet of Kurdistan 
 
After Ottoman military officials defeated Bedr Khan and exiled him, they drew up 
plans to reorganize the Kurdish-inhabited regions in the Erzurum, Diyarbakır, Mosul and 
Van eyalets.  Commander (Müşir) Osman Paşa along with other key administrators 
proposed the idea that the sancaks of Van, Muş, Hakkari, the kazas of Cizre and Mardin 
be merged with the eyalet of Diyarbakır to create the eyalet of Kurdistan.  On 12 May 
1847, Esad Muhlis Paşa, the vali of Mosul and former vali of Erzurum, was appointed the 
first vali of the Kurdistan vilayet, which was officially created on December 28 of the 
same year.3  Ottoman officials reached a decision after considerable deliberation to make 
                                                          





the town of Ahlat the administrative center of the eyalet.  The rationale behind such a 
decision was that Erzurum, Mosul, and Diyarbakır were too distant from the Kurdish-
inhabited regions to provide effective administration.  Furthermore, Ahlat was relatively 
close to the border where administrators could more effectively monitor political activity 
in Iran.4  During the deliberations, state officials repeatedly revealed their disdain for the 
Kurds and their intention to rule them with an “iron fist.”5 
The Ottomans announced the creation of the Kurdistan eyalet to Kurdish 
inhabitants throughout Eastern Anatolia before the Ottomans actually achieved central 
control over the regions that the eyalet was to encompass.  The announcement can be best 
understood as a tactical maneuver devised by Ottoman officials both to intimidate elites 
from attempting to continue resistance and to appease them with an agreement.  State 
officials championed the capture of Bedr Khan as Sultan Abdülmecid’s “conquest of 
Kurdistan” and rushed to inform the remaining elites of how swiftly they could put down 
local resistance attempts.6  At the same time, by giving the eyalet the name of Kurdistan, 
the Ottomans appeared to be respecting latent Kurdish ethnic claims to the region.  
Although the Ottomans as well as local Kurds had long referred to the Kurdish-inhabitant 
regions as Kurdistan, this was the first time that the term was used to refer to an eyalet. 
The four most prominent elites who remained in power after the capture of Bedr 
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Khan were Nurullah Bey of Hakkari, Abdal Bey of Müküs (the brother of Han Mahmud 
who had sided against Bedr Khan early on), Şerif Bey of Muş, and Yezdan Sher Bey, the 
nephew of Bedr Khan, all of whom had sided with the Ottomans against Bedr Khan.7  
The Ottomans were fully intent on either toppling these elites or phasing out their power 
soon after exiling Bedr Khan.  Yet they wanted to make sure that the beys could secure 
little recourse from the Iranians, other local Kurdish tribes, or from each other before 
leading a charge against them.  Nurullah Bey was the most vocal against the Ottomans.  
In mid-1848, he declared independence from the eyalet of Kurdistan after he acquired 
support from Muhammad Shah of Iran, one of whose wives was a sister to one of 
Nurullah Bey’s wives.8  However, the Qajar Shah’s death in September of the same year 
deprived the Kurdish bey of Iranian security and allowed the Ottomans to undertake a 
front against him in the spring of 1849, when they ousted him and replaced him with 
Ferik Izzet Paşa.9  Since Müküs was in a less strategic position than Hakkari, Abdal Bey 
was in a more difficult position than Nurullah Bey.  Just as Bedr Khan believed that the 
power of Assyrian Christians in Tiyari, Aşita, and Tkhuma would be his weak point in 
centralizing control over the region south of Lake Van, Abdal Bey of Müküs, he believed 
that the local Armenian magnates made him vulnerable.  He also saw in the Christians 
opportunities to enrich himself to be able to provide supplies and material incentives for 
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his militia.10  Şerif Bey of Muş was also suspicious of Armenians around him and sought 
to occupy their lands by sending his recruits to stake their position on them.11 
It was not long after announcing its creation that state officials mandated the 
application of the tanzimat reforms in the Kurdistan eyalet.  Virtually all of the yurtluk-
ocaklık land-holding arrangements that had traditionally allowed Kurdish beys quasi-
autonomy from state control were terminated in the eyalet.  Furthermore, power-holding 
Kurdish beys were restricted from serving as the kaymakams of the individual kazas.12  
Additionally the Ottomans attempted to increase their revenue by dispatching a state 
appointee to gather data on the demographics of the population, assess its wealth, and 
collect taxes from the region.  Between 1847 and 1853, revenue from much of Eastern 
Anatolia appears to have increased,13 partly because taxes formerly paid to Bedr Khan 
and other Kurdish elites removed by the Ottomans in 1847 were now paid directly to the 
state.  Yet, the increase can also be attributed to the fact that Ottoman officials, in a bid to 
fund their expensive reform project, often placed locals under increased pressure to pay 
taxes that they had not been used to paying, for instance the iane-i umumiye (public 
assistance tax), which officials began to impose on locals 1852.  Given ongoing local 
resistance to the implementation of the tanzimat and increasing international tension, 
state officials appear to have reduced taxes on Eastern Anatolia just before the outbreak 
of the Crimean War.14   
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The methods of tax collection as well as the moral character of the tax collectors 
varied from region to region.  İzzet Paşa, whom the Ottomans appointed as the kaymakam 
of Hakkari after ousting Nurullah Bey in 1849, was repeatedly accused of trying to enrich 
himself.15  However, Ismail Kamil Paşa, appointed in his stead, travelled throughout the 
villages of the Hakkari region in order to convince ağas and shaykhs that some taxes 
were merely temporary.  He also promised monetary gifts and political rewards for 
compliance.16  The kaymakam of Van, Mehmet Reşit Paşa, was reported to be a just 
administrator and collected taxes fairly.17 
After the last large local Kurdish potentate Nurullah Bey was overcome, the 
Ottomans managed to bring Diyarbakır, Hakkari, and Dersim under the more complete 
control of the eyalet.18  The administrative districts of Mardin and Cizre were united into 
a single district and placed under the authority of Mustafa Paşa, the former kaymakam of 
Van.  The eyalet’s administrative center was Ahlat from 1847 until Mehmed Esad Paşa’s 
death in 1851.19  Yet since Ahlat’s inhabitants were somewhat callous with regard to the 
state officials which made it difficult to implement a strong administrative apparatus, the 
Ottomans subsequently decided to make Diyarbakır the administrative capital of 
Kurdistan from 1851 to 1867, when its name was changed back to the Diyarbakır 
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eyaleti.20  State yearbooks (salname) between 1847 and 1867 show that the Ottoman state 
managed to root itself more strongly in the administrative affairs of the region than it had 
previously.21  The beys appear to have been sapped of the strength that they had 
traditionally derived from the state’s backing. 
 
Ottoman-Christian Relations 1847-1853 
It was in the interests of the sultan to show signs of benevolence towards the 
Christian populations in Eastern Anatolia during the 1840s and 1850s.  Since the 
Christians were proactive in business, they were helpful for the local economy and 
provided a valuable tax base.  Furthermore, the sultan was well aware of the Christian 
groups’ abilities to attract attention to their plight from the West.  He faced a great deal of 
criticism from many British officials for not protecting the Nestorian Christians in Tiyari 
from Bedr Khan.  In 1847, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire demanded a 
larger investigation into the causes of the treatment of the Nestorian Christians, Jacobite 
Christians, and Yezidis.22  The sultan wanted to comply with the ambassador’s demands 
for justice since he realized that his empire had become largely reliant on the British for 
backing against the Russians. 
A number of operations suggest that the Ottomans were indeed committed to 
ameliorating the situation of Christians in the east.  In 1849 the vali of Kurdistan 
Mehmed Esad Paşa had a number of Jacobites, Nestorians, and Yezidis released from 
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captivity and returned to their lands of origin.23  However, he kept those who had 
converted to Islam in their original places of conversion so as to not arouse the anger of 
the locals who believed that a convert’s turn from Islam back to their original faith was 
an offense worthy of death.24  The Ottomans invited the Nestorian patriarch, the Mar 
Shimun, who had been in refuge at Urmiye, Iran to come back into the Ottoman Empire 
through Başkale, a town near the Iranian border that was within a day’s walking distance 
of Hakkari, which he accepted.  Field Marshal Mehmed Reşid Paşa of the Army of 
Anatolia Division additionally requested that the state give the Mar Shimun a stipend.25  
Another significant instance of the Ottoman state’s attempt to reconstruct Christian 
society from the damage that it had suffered as a result of Bedr Khan’s rule was the vali’s 
order in 1855 to recover the wealth and possessions that Bedr Khan Bey had stolen from 
the Christian churches during the mid-1840s and return them to the Christian 
community.26 
The removal of Nurullah Bey from the region by the forces of Ottoman 
commander Ismail Kamil Paşa, the recognition of the Nestorians as a separate millet from 
the Armenian Gregorian millet in 1846, and their efforts to restore order in the Nestorian-
inhabited region were all greeted with enthusiasm by the Assyrian Christian leaders.  A 
letter from the Mar Shimun in 1850 shows that he and other Assyrians were content with 
the state of protection that the Assyrians in the Hakkari region enjoyed as a result of the 
Ottomans’ seemingly successful centralization attempts.  The Armenians equally praised 
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the Ottomans for their efforts to rein in Kurdish excesses.27 
Yet despite the fact that the Ottomans had managed to extricate rebel power-
holding families and increase their presence in even the most rugged of areas in Eastern 
Anatolia, the state continued to face a legitimacy crisis among the Kurds for two primary 
reasons.  First the state’s attempts to settle the seminomadic tribes limited the economic 
viability of their pastoral livelihoods.  Many tribes ignored the valis’ injunctions to settle 
and continued their lives of seasonal transhumance.  Yet because of the state’s increased 
presence in the region and their stricter enforcement of policies, they were forced to 
develop more creative ways of pastoralism.  Second, the state increased the tax burden on 
Kurdish groups.  This led the most powerful of the Kurds to extort higher sums of 
payment from their client peasantry, both Christian and Muslim. 
It was not long after the Ottomans expelled the powerful Kurdish beys that a state 
of anarchy in the region appeared to prevail, whose victims were the powerless peasantry.  
Locals began charging the Nestorian Christians in the Hakkari the cizye tax, from which 
the Ottoman state had exempted them.  Some of the Nestorian chiefs in the Tiyari region 
requested that the Ottoman state grant concessions (imtiyaz) to the Mar Shimun.28  
However, their refusal to pay it provoked the rent-seeking Küban tribe to undertake a 
series of violent raids against them.29  Although the Ottoman authorities were able to put 
them down, raids on Christian properties were becoming a recurrent problem.  The 
reasons for what appeared to be increasing raids is partly rooted in the growing power-
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struggle between Kurdish groups.  Part of their military strategy against each other was to 
undermine each other’s economic base, which usually consisted of Christian, as well as 
Muslim, peasantry from whom they collected taxes. 
Another intriguing phenomenon occurring throughout Eastern Anatolia during the 
early 1850s was the suspicion with which Kurds began to treat Armenians.  This was 
particularly the case in adjacent regions of Muş and Sasun, where high numbers of 
Armenian villages were located with little government security.  For instance, on one 
occasion in 1846, Kurdish leader Haci Keleş invaded Sasun and killed two Armenian 
priests and seven Armenian laypersons.  A priest named Khachadur from the Sasun 
region made an appeal to the Ottoman government to have the alleged killer tried in a 
court of law.30  On another occasion in 1850, the vali of Kurdistan reported that members 
of the Kurdish Almanlu tribe in the village of Kasür (near Muş), headed by a person by 
the name of Şaro, would beat Armenians “without reason,” and in consequence, he had 
the tribal chief exiled.31 
Additionally the Armenians complained of seemingly increased Kurdish raids.  
The Armenian ecclesiastic leaders appeared to have become increasingly involved in 
lobbying support from the Ottoman state and foreign powers on behalf of Armenian 
peasants throughout Eastern Anatolia.  A letter from Bishop Gabriel of the Aghtamar 
monastery on an island in Lake Van to Catholicos Nerses Ashtaraketsi in Echmiadzin on 
May 16, 1852 made a strong plea for the deliverance of the Armenians from the yoke of 
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the “ruffian and barbaric” Kurdish tribes who were abundant around Lake Van.  
According to the letter, linguistic differences between Kurds and Armenians made 
communication, let alone negotiation, a difficult if not impossible process for the 
Armenian peasants, leaving them at the mercies of the more powerful Kurdish groups.  
Since they had frequently become the targets of Kurdish raiders who sought a relatively 
quick and easy source of booty and to damage the source of income for rival Kurdish 
tribes, a palpable fear had overtaken many of the Armenian Christians.  Bishop Gabriel 
bade Ashtaraketsi make his utmost efforts to politically intervene and help free the 
“plebeian” (ramik) Armenians from their bleak social state.32  Although Catholicos 
Ashtaraketsi had a reputation of being politically active, and had a “great tendency for 
independent action” in spite of Russian Polozhenie (state regulations passed in 1836 that 
limited the political powers of the Armenian ecclesiastics),33 his hands were too tied by 
Russian policy for him to take overt political action in Ottoman territory. 
The Kurds appeared to be aware of the growing political prowess of Christian 
clergymen in the region and tended to avoid extorting or attacking Armenian peasants 
who were located within a short distance from an influential clergyman.  A report from 
the vali of Kurdistan states that Kurdish marauders primarily targeted the most vulnerable 
peasants who were the least likely to have swift recourse through a clergyman or 
European official.  He states in a report in 1852 that some groups of Armenian peasants 
in the Van sancak who lived without a representative priest or church requested aid in 
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moving to a location with a church; however, they were blocked by local Kurdish 
groups.34 
The outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 hampered the Ottoman state’s efforts 
towards improving relations with non-Muslims in the east.  The war stalled efforts to 
restructure the administration of Eastern Anatolia and provide the needed political order 
in the wake of the exile of the major beys.  Many Kurdish groups took advantage of the 
disorder to prey on the Muslim and non-Muslim peasantry.  Furthermore, the Russians 
sought to turn the Ottoman Christians against the sultan and the British increased 
pressure on the state to institute further reforms. 
 
The Crimean War 1853-1856 
Tensions had been mounting for several months between the Sublime Porte and 
Russia prior to the outbreak of war, which originated largely in the escalation of a dispute 
between Russia and France over the Holy Places in Jerusalem.  Russia’s claim as the 
guardian of the Holy Places stemmed from her victory in the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman 
War, as a result of which she forced the Ottomans to sign the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, 
which granted the Russians some representative privileges on behalf of Orthodox 
Christians in the Empire.35 
France began to challenge Russia’s position after Napoleon III won the election of 
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1848 and established the Second Republic.  In order to win the public vote and bring 
about unity in tumultuous French politics, Napoleon III appealed to the radical Catholics, 
who asserted France’s increased role as protector of the Christians.  Since the radical 
Catholics’ claims coincided with Napoleon III’s desire to assert greater control over the 
Mediterranean, he pressured the sultan, through his ambassador Charles La Valette, to 
grant France guardianship rights.  Although the sultan was initially inclined to honor the 
earlier treaties with Russia, he reversed his position in late 1852 upon the news that the 
French had dispatched a gunboat towards the region and after the British chargé 
d’affaires convinced him that the French possessed naval power that was superior to that 
of the Russians.  In response to the Ottomans’ concession to the French, Czar Nicholas I 
ordered the mobilization of 128,000 troops and began to draw up plans to invade and 
capture much of the Balkans and Istanbul.36  Fearing the response of Britain and France 
and his potential inability to overcome them, the Czar hedged his bets with regard to a 
full-scale invasion of the Ottoman Empire.  However, when he sent Russian troops into 
Moldavia, then recognized as an autonomous principality under Ottoman suzerainty, in 
July 1853, the British and French sent warships to the region.  Confident that the 
Ottoman Empire would have the full backing of the British and French, Sultan 
Abdülmecit I declared war on the Russians on October 4, 1853 beginning with campaigns 
into the Danube region and the southern Caucasus.37 
Three reasons explain the Sublime Porte’s decision to launch a campaign on its 
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eastern front.  First, even though Russia’s focus during the early 1850s was the Danube 
region, northeastern Anatolia and the Caucasus had proven to be vulnerable to Russian 
invasions during the 1806-1812 and 1828-1829 wars.  Second, the profitable Trabzon-
Tabriz trade route experienced significant growth throughout the 1840s, which benefitted 
both the Ottoman economy and the sultan’s relationship with the British.  Russian 
occupation of Erzurum and Beyazıt could potentially rupture the trade route.38  Third, 
Ottomans believed the sizeable Muslim population of the Caucasus to be natural allies 
who could potential help the Ottomans secure territory as far as the Caspian Sea.  The 
Sublime Porte repeatedly attempted to make contact with Shaykh Shamil in Daghestan, 
hoping that he would help push the Russians out of the region.39  
The British were ambivalent towards the idea of an Ottoman offensive in the 
Caucasus.  On the one hand, they feared an Ottoman campaign would offset the delicate 
balance of power among rival Kurdish elites and the Ottoman state.  Internecine conflict 
could break out in the region thus destabilizing politics and even harming agricultural 
yields.  On the other hand, the British believed that if they bolstered an Ottoman invasion 
of Georgia that they could potentially drive the Russians, who would “find few friends 
among the natives,” out of the region.40 
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As during the Russo-Ottoman war 1828-1829, the Muslims on the border region 
were divided in their loyalties.  Muslims and Armenians around Yerevan, on the Russian 
side, appeared willing to side with the Czar upon the outbreak of the Crimean War in 
October 1853.  Armenian and Muslim groups alike supplied the Russian forces with 
militias to help fight against the Ottomans’ Caucasian offensive.  Muslim attitudes 
towards Russia in the Kars region were arguably more divided than those in Russian 
territory.  Yet after the Russians won crucial victories at the battles of Akhaltsikhe and 
Başgedikler, on November 26 and December 1, respectively, an increasing number of 
Muslims appeared to come out in support of the Czar.41  Kurdish irregulars (başıbozuks) 
proved their lack of commitment to the Ottomans especially at the Battle of Başgedikler, 
where they reportedly fled the battlefield upon the first bursts of Russian gunfire.42  The 
Kurdish irregular soldiers’ reluctance to fight for an Ottoman victory is understood given 
the fact that the state-appointed paşas in command were reportedly given little food and 
inadequate resources to withstand harsh winter conditions.  Charles Duncan, a British 
captain serving in the Erzurum and Kars region during the Crimean War, accuses 
Ottoman officers of “robbing the military chests at a time when the troops were actually 
starving.”43 
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After the Ottomans’ embarrassing defeat at Başgedikler, about a dozen Kurdish 
chiefs traveled to the Russian military base at Gyumri and announced their defection 
from the Ottoman to the Russian side.  Mikhail Loris-Melikov, an Armenian in the 
service of the Russian military, was put in charge of managing relations with Kurdish 
groups and organizing them within the Russian military.  His most noteworthy converts 
to the Russian side were Ahmet Ağa of the Zılanli tribe and Kasım Khan, who had 
previously held the rank of kapıcıbaşı in the Ottoman army, and was given equivalent 
rank and compensation by the Russians.44 
In late July, Selim Paşa attempted to storm Yerevan, but was fended off by 
General Wrangel, who pursued Selim Paşa and his men into Ottoman territory.  Although 
Selim escaped to Van, Wrangel managed to capture Beyazıt.  With the Russians having 
positioned some twenty thousand soldiers at Kürükdere in preparation for an 
advancement on the Ottomans’ key garrison of Kars, the Ottomans began to panic and 
undertook an ill-prepared and ultimately unsuccessful attack on the outpost.  Commander 
Bebutov, an ethnic Armenian, defeated some thirty thousand Ottoman soldiers with a 
force of eighteen thousand, including five hundred Kurdish cavalry, and four to five 
thousand Kurdish infantry.  The battle resulted in high casualties on both sides.  The 
Ottomans lost between five and eight thousand, and the Russians three thousand.  
Furthermore, nearly ten thousand irregulars, mostly Kurds, fled back to their lands during 
the battle.  The Ottomans stripped a number of paşas of their appointments as a result of 
their defeat, including Mustafa Zarif Paşa, and had them replaced with different officers.  
                                                          






Lucky for the Ottomans, the revolt of Shaykh Shamil in Chechnya and Daghestan led 
Russian strategists to withdraw from Beyazıt and hold their position on the Caucasian 
front.45 
In the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat at Kürükdere, increasing numbers of Kurds 
from the Hayderanlı and Celali tribal confederacies on the borderlands announced their 
defection to the Russian side.  Russian officials were willing to accept the Kurds, but 
were suspicious of their depth of their commitment to Russia’s aims in the region.  A 
Russian report indicates fickleness on the part of many Kurdish leaders.  In the report it is 
claimed that Ali Ağa, a Hayderanlı chief, wrote to Russian officials after their victory at 
Kürükdere saying that “[he] and all of the Hayderanlı are ready to submit to the Russians 
and act as one with them.”  However, the reports claim that it was later revealed that Ali 
Ağa intended to return his loyalties to the Ottomans in the event that the lands captured 
by the Russians were returned to the Ottomans.  Ali Ağa was also attempting flight to 
Iran, which was neutral during the war.46  The attitude of Ali Ağa was not uncommon 
among other Kurds, indicating that many Kurds believed that the Ottomans had an upper 
hand against the Russians with British and French support. 
The battle of Kürükdere exposed the disorganization and corruption of the 
officers in command and led to a greater crisis of confidence within the Ottoman army.  
With decreasing faith in their own officers, the Ottomans looked increasingly to 
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European military advisers as a source of guidance.  Foreign advisers had accompanied 
the Ottoman military on campaigns since the beginning of the war.  But with Britain 
frustrated over the Ottoman forces’ seeming inability to drive the Russians out of 
garrison border towns in the Caucasus, additional British advisers arrived in Eastern 
Anatolia to oversee military efforts.  The Ottomans were deeply torn over the role of the 
Europeans in devising war strategies.  On the one hand, there was a general agreement 
that the advisers were a necessity, since Britain and France were crucial allies against 
Russia.  On the other hand, Ottoman military officials feared the reaction of conservative 
religious elements among the locals, who tended to see the foreign officers as interlopers.  
They did not want to appear as if completely under the orders of foreign advisers.  An 
attitude of European military tactics as “innovation” is made apparent in the memoirs of 
Ottoman Commander Zarif Mehmet Paşa.47 
In summer 1855, the Russian forces under General Muravyev prepared to 
penetrate the Ottomans’ eastern border once again.  Unlike the war of 1828-1829 where 
the Russians could take a number of easy battles, the Ottoman forces were better armed 
during the Crimean War and were fairly good marksmen, even if their officer corps was 
lacking in organizational skills and disease had weakened their ranks.  Muravyev worked 
through Armenian informants from Kars, who kept him abreast of the Ottoman military 
position in the garrison.  When he launched his assault on Kars in 1855, his assessment 
was remarkably accurate.48 
Colonel Atwell Lake remarked of his general suspicion of Ottoman officers, 
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whom he blamed for their defeat at Kars: 
The Turkish soldier…is a brave, loyal, long-suffering, hardy fellow, and if well 
led, is inferior to no soldier in the world.  The national decay occasioned by the 
venality, the rapacity, and intrigue combined with the indolence and sensualism of 
the higher orders of Turkish officials, has scarcely yet reached the over-worked, 
ill-paid, and maltreated commonalty, who are often preserved by their very 
poverty and sufferings from the crimes, vices, and abominations which degrade 
their social superiors.49 
 
Two letters from the Assyrian Patriarch in the environs of Van indicated that a 
“general Kurdish rebellion could take place if we went there.”  He added, “do not rely on 
the Kurds for anything, for they do not go far from their homes and are only capable of 
robbing their neighbors.  Those who are of our Kurds are only trustworthy from time to 
time.”50 
The Yerevan regiment attempted correspondence with Bedr Khan’s nephew 
Yezdan Sher, who had launched a rebellion against the Ottomans.  The leader of the 
regiment sent a letter encouraging Yezdan Sher and whatever other Kurdish allies he 
could find to rebel against the Ottoman state.  However, the letter was intercepted by 
Ottoman officials and did not reach the Kurdish bey.51 
Consul Brant reported to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on August 3, 1855 that after 
the Russians seized Köprüköy, Veli Paşa retreated to Erzurum, leaving the area between 
Erzurum and Köprüköy without security forces.  The French Consul reported from his 
visit to Pasin, located approximately ten miles west of Köprüköy, that “all the villages [in 
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the region] were abandoned, the cattle left at the mercy of the Koords, who were driving 
them off, and then burning the houses.”  He further lamented the loss of property and the 
food shortages that would likely ensue from failure to cultivate and harvest the land.52  
After capturing Kars, commander Muravyev planned an advancement on Erzurum, 
where, according to his intelligence, there were only fifteen thousand poorly equipped 
and untrained Ottoman soldiers.  He estimated capturing the city by June 1856; however, 
the Allied invasion of Crimean offset his plans.53 
 After the declaration of war, some fanatical Muslims attacked Christians and 
foreigners who were subjects of the Sublime Porte.  In response, Grand Vizier Mustafa 
Naili Pasha sent an order to the governors to prevent such treatment of the Christians.  He 
wrote that the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire were heart and soul together with 
Muslims in the current war against Russia.  It was very unbecoming to look with 
suspicion and hostility at such loyal subjects who had been showing their loyalty and 
righteousness.  The perpetrators of such acts of violence against them were “fanatics and 
feather-brains, who cannot distinguish between good and evil and who cannot tell friends 
from enemies.”54 
The Ottomans appeared in some instances to restore order in Eastern Anatolia and 
repair the damage that was caused by the başıbozuks.  For instance on one occasion they 
located a group of ten Armenian children abducted by başıbozuk chief Topal Hacı 
Süleyman Ağa in Mardin, who had been brought from Erzurum and Beyazıt to 
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Diyarbakır and then Mardin.  They had the children brought back to their parents.55 
 
The Revolt of Yezdan Sher 
 
 In spite of the additional support that French and British provided to Ottoman 
forces, several groups in regions that were not close to the zones of international warfare 
exploited the weakness of the Ottomans during the war.  During the Crimean War, 
rebellions broke out on the Ottoman western frontier in Epirus, Crete, and Thessaly,56 its 
southeastern frontier in Cizre, and its southern frontier, in the Hijaz.  The reasons for the 
revolts were not interrelated.  The revolt in Epirus was an attempt on the part of Greek 
rebels to expand the independent Greek state that had been created in the Morea in 1830.  
The revolt by sharifs and ulema against the Ottomans in 1855 was provoked by the 
Ottomans’ continuing measures against the slave trade in the Red Sea.57  Finally, the 
revolt of Yezdan Sher in Cizre in 1854 was rooted in his deep displeasure with Ottoman 
state policy in the Kurdish inhabited areas in the aftermath of the capture and exile of 
Bedr Khan Bey in 1847. 
 The revolt of Yezdan Sher Bey exemplifies the ongoing crisis of legitimacy that 
the Ottoman state was facing among the Kurds in southeastern Anatolia.  Yezdan Sher 
had been instrumental in leading the Ottoman state to capture his uncle Bedr Khan Bey in 
1847.  The motive for his betrayal of Bedr Khan is unclear.  It could have been over a 
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combination of factors including a falling-out between him and his uncle, the feeling of 
vulnerability because of encroaching state forces, or perhaps even out of the hope of 
gaining power himself, even at the expense of his uncle’s capture.  Whatever his motive, 
the state rewarded him by appointing him the mütesellim of Cizre and a salary of 3,500 
kuruş after Bedr Khan’s capture and exile in 1847. 
However, it was not long after that the state relegated Yezdan Sher and placed 
him under the more direct authority of an Ottoman kaymakam, Mustafa Paşa.  To keep 
him content they kept paying him a salary and giving him secondary jobs.  This handling 
of Yezdan Sher was probably the result of Grand Vizier Koca Mustafa Reşid Paşa’s 
advice to Sultan Abdülmecid that the Ottoman state should not completely disaffect 
Yezdan Sher, but allow him seeming positions of influence while quietly displacing his 
real authority.58  The Ottomans tried to keep him out of Cizre.  In 1849, they appointed 
him to unimportant administrative positions first in Istanbul and then Mosul.  It is likely 
that Yezdan Sher perceived this as the state’s dismissal of his importance and led him to 
seek an opportunity to challenge their renewed assertion of authority. 
 With the advent of the Crimean War, the Ottomans became more reliant on 
Yezdan Sher to provide them with much needed manpower from a still unruly Eastern 
Anatolia.  While he was at Mosul in early 1854, Yezdan Sher was appointed by the state 
as a military official and was charged to gather a force of nine hundred soldiers from the 
Cizre and Bohtan regions.  However, Yezdan Sher, bitter towards the Ottoman authorities 
for trying to curb his power by appointing outside administrators over him, saw this as an 
opportunity to amass power and begin the initial stages of what would gradually become 
                                                          





a revolt.  When he reached Cizre, he wrote to the kaymakams of Siirt and Mardin 
informing them that he was some 200,000 kuruş short of the money needed to recruit 
soldiers and that he would remain in Cizre until they sent him the money.  He also began 
making increasing demands upon the Ottoman Empire without directly threatening 
revolt, although it was strongly implied.  He demanded that the Ottomans keep him in 
charge of the political and economic affairs of Cizre and Bohtan and allow his family, 
which was at Mosul, to come back to Cizre.  He also demanded that the Ottoman state 
appoint Said Bey, who appeared to be one of his loyalists, to the office of müdür over 
Şirvan, a town located within a day’s walking distance east of Cizre.  Finally, he 
demanded that the Ottoman state remove their troops from Garzan and Midyat and 
release all of his men that they had taken captive in those regions.  He still maintained 
that if these conditions were met that he would remain loyal to state command and gather 
soldiers to fight against Russia.59 
 When it became apparent that the Ottoman state would not grant him his requests, 
he declared an open revolt in November 1854, which came as an unwelcome surprise to 
many British and Ottoman officials.  The state-appointed kaymakam of Mardin, Osman 
Paşa, remarked in dismay in a letter to higher ranking Ottoman authorities that “Cizre and 
Bohtan are slipping from our hands!”60  British army physician Humphrey Sandwith, 
who was serving as inspector general of the hospitals in northeastern Anatolia at the time 
of the Crimean War, remarked that “when intelligence arrived of the revolt 
of…Ezdinsheer Bey [sic], or his having already taken possession of Jezireh, and 
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hundreds of wild mountaineers flocking to his standard, we all stood aghast.”61  By mid-
December, Hilmi Paşa, the mutasarrıf of Mosul, noted that he believed the rebels to 
number some fifteen to twenty thousand.62  He noted that the rebellion made it difficult to 
collect taxes and fight the Russians, and that the matter was too pressing to wait until 
spring to resolve.63 
Even though the Ottomans had been increasing their administrative and military 
presence in southeastern Anatolia, they had been struggling to quell a wave of banditry 
that had been going on since the early 1850s.64  The lack of a legitimate central leader 
whom the Kurdish groups revered and feared made the Ottomans’ task of maintaining 
social order all the more difficult.  Yezdan Sher’s revolt was met positively by local 
Kurdish groups throughout southeastern Anatolia.  He managed to bring Cizre, Bohtan, 
Siirt, Garzan, and Şirvan under his control with relative ease by December 1854.65 
 The Russians were privy to Yezdan Sher’s disaffection and encouraged his 
perseverance against the Ottoman state and bade him ally with them.  In late August 
1854, the Russian commander of the Yerevan oblast wrote an appeal to Yezdan Sher for 
his help against the Ottomans in the war.  In the letter he wrote that “the Russians had 
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long extended a hand of concert towards the Kurds.”  He added: 
Why do you delay in accepting our offer?  For what purpose are you gathering 
forces?  Do you not think that the protection from the Ottoman Empire will be 
little when it is destroyed? You are a knowledgeable man.  You have many 
Kurdish tribes who respect and revere you.  Give permission to your cavalry and 
order them to go about your business, [and not the Ottoman state’s].  I promise 
you that I will protect and strengthen your rights and governance.  You will see 
that we are true friends and honorable allies.66 
 
Letters from Russian General Likhutin confirm that Yezdan Sher was anxious to 
accept the Russians’ bid for an alliance and sought to move his forces northwards with 
the hope of meeting them at Bitlis.  By January 1855 he managed to take control of 
Müküs as well as Bitlis, penetrating further into Kurdish-inhabited territory than had his 
uncle Bedr Khan.67 
The British consul in Diyarbakır described the situation in February 1855:  
Ezdeen shir Bey has lately attacked the district of Mediat which he has plundered 
and almost totally ruined.  The Government troops, consisting solely of Bashi 
Bozuks, under a certain Abdullah Bey made little or no resistance, a portion 
returned to Mardin, and Abdullah Bey with the rest retired to his native village 
Sour between Mediat and Mardin, plundering all the villages on his way.  He then 
tendered his resignation of his command which was accepted by Osman Pasha, 
Caimakam of Mardin without any kind of enquiry into his conduct…Troops, sent 
from Baghdad to Mosul to the amount of about three thousand regulars and four 
thousand bashi bozuks, are now said to be on their march towards Jezireh.  His 
movement has caused Ezdeen shir Bey to withdraw from Mediat towards that 
place and has prevented a threatened attack on Mardin.68 
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Yezdan Sher was said to have dealt his immediate opponents a cruel and direct 
blow, without much thought for the morality of his actions.  He crushed many Yezidi 
rebels whom he mistrusted.  He captured many of their children and distributed them 
among his followers as slaves.69  He is said to have been equally as harsh with Kurdish 
dissenters.  Nonetheless, Yezdan Sher appeared to welcome loyalists regardless of ethnic 
or religious affiliation.  According to Russian reports, many Greeks, Assyrians, Arabs, 
Kurds from other families and tribes, and even Yezidis joined his ranks.70 
Perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects of the Crimean War and the revolt of 
Yezdan Sher was that the Nestorian Patriarch, the Mar Shimun, agreed to an alliance with 
the Kurdish bey.  It is likely that Yezdan Sher pushed for the alliance due to the fact that 
he regarded the Ottoman state to be a greater threat, and did not want a war with the 
Nestorians to be a distraction.  The Mar Shimun appeared to be an opportunist during the 
war, appealing to whatever force would be most advantageous to his situation.  
Throughout the war he made appeals to the both the Russians and the British, promising 
them his backing in return for their support.  After the Ottomans had captured Yezdan 
Sher, he claimed that the latter’s men persecuted the Assyrians, perhaps in a bid to appear 
as a helpless victim and make good with the Ottomans.  After the Crimean War, the 
sultan did not seek any punitive action against the Mar Shimun, in spite of his attempts to 
ally with the Ottomans’ enemies, and allowed him to remain in Julamerk.71  A note from 
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Dwight W. Marsh, who traveled throughout Eastern Anatolia during the Crimean War, 
confirms that the Mar Shimun had several Kurdish allies in the region:  
Mar Shimon, the Nestorian Patriarch, yesterday was welcomed to the valley with 
the roar of guns, martial music and the presence of a large and enthusiastic 
gathering.  The Koords, Resh Agha and Chellabi Agha, with their armed men 
from Gawar, had arranged themselves on the mountain slope, and just as Mar 
Shimon emerged from the ravine they gave him a grand salute, which was 
responded to by the Jeloo troops accompanying the patriarch.72 
 
According to Russian reports, Yezdan Sher managed to amass a force of sixty to 
one hundred thousand loyalists.73  Although this is likely an exaggerated claim, it is 
noteworthy that the kaymakam of Mardin, Osman Paşa, believed Yezdan Sher’s force to 
have outnumbered that of his uncle Bedr Khan Bey during the mid 1840s.74 
To deter him the Ottomans tried to enlist the support of the religious elites in the 
region.  In order to keep Yezdan Sher from taking Siirt, Kenan Paşa, the kaymakam of 
Siirt, sent Shaykh Ibrahim Efendi, Mufti Mustafa Efendi, and others to dissuade the 
Kurdish bey from pushing onward with his revolt.  Yet Yezdan Sher remained steadfast 
in his resolve to restore his former political glory.  He even threatened to pursue Kenan 
Paşa and his family if he did not relent in his attempts to prevent him from seizing control 
over the region.75 
Hilmi Paşa, the mutasarrıf of Mosul, coordinated a plan to counter the revolt that 
gained the support of the valis of Baghdad and Kurdistan and Major General (mirliva) 
                                                          
72 Dwight W. Marsh, The Tennesseean in Persia and Koordistan (Philadelphia: 
Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1869), 205. 
73 Ibid., 257. 
74 Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War, 370. 
75Letter from the vali of Kurdistan Vezir Hamdi Paşa to Grand Vizier Koca Mustafa 
Reşid Paşa, BBA, İ.MVL 353/15435, 11 Rebiyülevvel 1271/2 December 1854, cited in 





Mehmet Paşa.  The plan was to bring five thousand soldiers, including başıbozuk 
(irregular cavalry), from the north and the south in order to surround Yezdan Sher and 
keep him from spreading the revolt in any direction.76  Ottoman forces succeeded in 
securing the alliances of a number of key figures living in the vicinity of Cizre and 
managed to dealing a game-changing blow to Yezdan Sher’s forces at the small town of 
Dirun in late February, located just outside Cizre; however, Yezdan Sher managed to 
escape.77 
The British and French grew increasingly concerned about the revolt of Yezdan 
Sher, especially since the allocation of Ottoman soldiers to put down the revolt could 
have blunted the force against the Russians on the eastern flank.  General William 
Fenwick Williams, the British commissioner with the Ottoman army in Anatolia during 
the Crimean War who commanded the Ottoman army during the defense at Kars in 1855, 
had met Yezdan Sher in 1849 when he was in the region as a British representative at the 
border negotiations between Iran and the Ottoman Empire.  At the time he believed 
Yezdan Sher to have been an “oppressed man” and unjustly treated by the Ottoman 
Empire.  He even offered him refuge at the British consulate at Mosul. 
Upon the staging of the rebellion in Cizre and Siirt, General Williams thought the 
incident to be a skirmish between the irregular başıbozuk soldiers at Siirt and Ottoman 
commanders.  However, with time it became clear to him that it was indeed Yezdan Sher 
who was responsible for the uprising.  He wrote to Lord Stratford Canning telling him to 
urge the Sublime Porte to not dispatch soldiers from the Kars and Erzurum regions to put 
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down the revolt, but instead soldiers from Istanbul.  Although the Ottomans agreed to 
this, it was not long after that Şükrü Paşa, the officer in command at Toprakkale, on the 
northern frontier with Russia, dispatched infantry, cavalry, and artillery from Toprakkale 
towards southeastern Anatolia.78  Irate at the Ottomans’ seeming noncompliance, British 
officials acted on their own accord to try to persuade Yezdan Sher to stand down.  
General Williams sent Mahmud Efendi, a Polish convert to Islam who was an officer in 
the Ottoman military, to meet with Yezdan Sher and tell him that the protection of his life 
would be ensured by the British if he would end the revolt.  Yezdan Sher, fearing that his 
movement was waning due to losses incurred by the Ottoman state and that he would 
eventually be met with even more violent pushback from Ottoman authorities after the 
conclusion of the war with the Russians, agreed and went to Mosul.  He and a number of 
his followers were later exiled to the Balkans. 
Many British observers paint Yezdan Sher’s surrender as a victory for British 
politics and skill at negotiation.  Indeed the British played a key role in dissuading 
Yezdan Sher from continuing the revolt, but this ignores the Ottomans’ political and 
military efforts to curb the revolt prior to British intervention. 
After Yezdan Bey’s capture, Kurds at Siirt, who were formerly loyal to Yezdan 
Sher, pled with the Ottoman officials to spare them and allow them to continue to live on 
their lands.  Kurds in the Garzan region also quickly submitted to the Ottoman state.79 
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Diverse Kurdish Loyalties 
 
 During the Crimean War, as was the case during the Russo-Ottoman War 1828-
1829, many Kurdish groups proved to be fickle allies of the Ottomans.  The Russians 
made a strong bid to rally their allegiance.  The Russian commander of Yerevan wrote to 
the Kurds in Van bidding them not take up arms against the Russians on the pretext that 
the Russians do not “conduct war against peaceful inhabitants.”  He told them to submit 
to the Russians and they would enjoy the same benefits of peace and continued prosperity 
that a number of other Kurds who complied with the Russians’ orders had received.80  He 
also sent similar missives to Shaykh Abed of the Haydaranlı tribe, a number of shaykhs 
and beys in Kurdistan, including Derviş Bey and Shaykh Abdal, Kurdish elites in 
Diyadin, and Musa Ağa of the Celali tribal confederation, with similar requests.81 
 The Russians’ approach to attracting the Kurds witnessed a marked change from 
before.  During the 1828-1829 conflict the Russians had often tried to woo Kurdish 
loyalties through bribes and gifts.  While the Kurdish tribal elites were more than often 
willing to accept these offers from the Russians, their loyalties always remained in 
question.  In many cases they would not deliver on their promises and their loyalties were 
largely contingent upon their somewhat last-minute perception of which side had an 
advantage.  During the Crimean War, the Russians were more loath to draw the Kurds to 
their side through bribery.  Colonel Likhutin thought the giving of money and gifts to the 
Kurds to be a waste of money and effort.  Instead he believed the threat of reprisal was a 
more effective tactic at ensuring the long-term compliance of the Kurds.82 
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 Members of the Celali tribal confederation, who resided near Karabulakh and 
Beyazıt, were the first to announce their submission to the Russians.83  Their proximity to 
Russia explains their promptness in pledging allegiance to the Czar.  Other Kurds near 
the border were also more inclined towards making an alliance with the Russians.  The 
motivation behind their loyalty was often not so much out of some organic devotion to 
their political cause, but out of fear of being targeted by the much stronger and more 
organized Russian government if they did not comply.  Yezdan Sher’s seeming eagerness 
to pronounce his loyalty to the Russians was more the result of political short-
sightedness.  He was under the belief that he could somehow achieve autonomy over 
southeastern Anatolia more easily under the Russians than under the Ottomans, when in 
fact it is highly unlikely that the Russians would have allowed him such had they 
managed to extend their control as far as Cizre. 
In a report from General Wrangel to Prince Bebutov in July, 1854, Wrangel 
reports that before the Russian army managed to take Beyazıt on July 19, 1854, many 
Kurdish irregulars appeared to be fleeing the battlefield once Russian victory became 
increasingly apparent.  Two thousand Ottoman soldiers were killed in the battle and 450 
were wounded.  Many Kurdish irregulars fled south to Van.  Others hid in the mountains.  
Armenian groups from the Yerevan region played an instrumental role in the battle.84 
Not all Kurds near the Russian-Ottoman border tended towards the Russians.  
Behlül Paşa, mutasarrıf of the strategic border town of Beyazıt, was committed in his 
devotion to the Ottoman state.  The Ottomans had allowed him exceptional privileges that 
                                                          
83 Ibid., 1: 101. 






they had not given to other Kurdish beys.  During the initial tanzimat reforms and the 
consequent centralization campaigns of the 1830s and 1840s, Behlül’s hold on the 
Beyazıt region was left virtually untouched.  He was one of the few Kurdish elites to 
maintain his land entitlement of yurtluk-ocaklık.  When the Ottomans began to limit his 
salary since during the early 1850s, he made repeated requests for an increase in his pay.  
Once the Crimean War began, the Ottomans appeared to have complied.85  Behlül Paşa 
remained loyal to the Ottomans for the entirety of the war, and they gave him special 
posthumous commendation for his service against the Russians in 1856.86 
 
Dissolution of Power Among the Kurds  
After the Crimean War 
 
After the Ottomans managed to capture and exile Yezdan Sher Bey in 1855, they 
appear to have successfully dissolved enough power among Kurdish groups to prevent 
any local elites from staging a major uprising, or at least not large enough to garner 
widespread international attention.  However, it cannot be said that the Ottomans 
managed to fully centralize control.  One of the greatest indications that the state was 
unable to implement effective control over Eastern Anatolia was the difficulty that they 
faced in effectuating land reform in the region. 
In 1858, the Ottoman Land Law decreed that all lands in the Empire be surveyed 
by state appointees and that landholders be registered in the tapu office.  The aim of the 
decree was to identify all actual landholders, facilitate land administration, and more 
easily resolve land disputes.  In many cases lands that were previously recognized as 
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yurtluk-ocaklıks were repossessed by the state and auctioned off to local bidders.  It was 
hoped that by redistributing these lands, the state would be able to impose a more regular 
system of revenue collection and would empower a greater number of local groups to 
counter elites’ attempts to amass power against the state. 
In reality, the process of surveying and registering lands was ineffective at 
achieving the desired result of economic and political regularity.  Baer notes that the 
Ottoman administration implemented reforms on an ad hoc basis and gave poor 
instructions to locals as to their responsibilities and the new procedures.87  The new land 
code did not often take into consideration the ways in which the locals lived and did not 
provide them with attractive and profitable alternatives.  For instance while the land code 
recognized many of the mobile possessions of seminomadic groups, such as tents and 
livestock, as private property, it did not recognize agricultural lands, across which the 
seminomadic groups moved back and forth to provide pasture for their flocks, as their 
quasiprivate property since they were not there long enough to claim it as their own.  This 
only added to the stress upon seminomadic groups whom the state had long been 
pressuring to settle in permanent locations.  The state made orders without consideration 
of how tribal groups were able to carry on their socioeconomic livelihoods in an effective 
way.  In consequence, many of the more powerful groups reverted to fee collection from 
less powerful agricultural groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in order to cover their 
                                                          
87 See Gabriel Baer’s analysis of land redistribution in Egypt, “The Evolution of Private 
Landownership in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent,” in The Economic History of the 







Article 18 of the Tapu Law stipulated that lands that exceeded “five hundred 
dönüms” held by a single landholder be auctioned off by the Ministry of Finance.  Local 
authorities were to auction off lands to the highest bidder who could purchase the land on 
lease for a year but then extend it to ten years.89  Yet in spite of the stipulation, bidders 
appeared to remain on paper only, and many exploited the system.  The British Consul at 
Aleppo noted that many locals who entered state service as “members of the municipal 
council and court of justice” often obtained miri90 lands either for themselves or for other 
local elites to whom they were beholden at a low price.91  For instance, when the 
Ottomans attempted to implement a tapu land registry in Hakkari in 1858,92 the person 
they appointed to the registry was the brother of a local mufti with whom he collaborated 
to restore the lands of Hakkari under more central control of local leadership.93  The 
Ottomans eventually ended up reverting back to granting the Kurdish leader Nurullah 
Bey a yurtluk-ocaklık over the land, since the tapu registry seemed unfeasible there.94 
The Ottomans also attempted to redistribute land holdings in Palu, another area 
which had been recognized as a hükümet under the control of Kurdish beys for centuries 
and a yurtluk-ocaklık for much of the nineteenth century.  The Ottomans attempted to 
seize all of the land in their possession and auction it off to villagers who desired to 
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purchase it.  However, two beys of Palu, who were members of the tapu council, 
managed to play the Ottomans’ ambitions to their own advantage.  They forced the 
villagers to recognize them as the chief landowners and did not recognize the Ottomans’ 
demands that they hold two-thirds of the lands for auction.  The beys also demanded a 
number of fees from the villagers including the öşür tax and icare-yi zemin (rent tax). 
When the villagers complained to the Ottomans of the situation, state officials undertook 
an investigation.  However, the result of the investigation was that the accused beys were 
granted tapus to the lands.95 A similar situation occurred in the village of Hazro, near 
Diyarbakır, in 1863 where local elites obtained offices in the land registry and exploited 
the Ottomans’ trust by not carrying out real redistribution of lands.96  In both cases, the 
Ottomans seemed to have scrapped their attempts to implement land reform, or at least 
put them off for a later time, and reestablish the yurtluk-ocaklık. 
The venality of state officials in charge of Eastern Anatolia was another issue that 
hindered the implementation of both justice and central control.  In 1862, Consul Taylor 
compiled a list of “monies taken as bribes” by Hacı Kamil Paşa, the vali of the Kurdish 
eyalet, from local Kurdish elites in Eastern Anatolia “in return for appointments or 
services in their favor.”  The highest bribe on the list is 110,000 piasters from the meclis 
and kaymakam of Mardin to have the vali of Kurdistan at Diyarbakır dismiss complaints 
that were lodged against them by locals and in order to “obtain [his] favor and support.”  
The highest individual briber on the list was Şir Bey of Şirvan who gave the vali of 
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Kurdistan 80,000 piasters to be “made the mudir of Shirvan and a medjlis member of 
Saert.”  Fettah Bey of Garzan bribed the vali 60,000 piasters to have his brother made the 
müdür of Garzan and to obtain permission to leave Diyarbakır, where he was being held 
by state authorities to answer complaints against him.  Süleyman Bey of Çapakçur 
(modern-day Bingöl) paid the vali 75,000 piasters to have authorities dismiss complaints 
from locals against him.  Another significant bribe was 70,000 piasters from Ahmed 
Ismail Efendi of Diyarbakır to be made a member of the meclis in the city, which gave 
him significant decision-making power in local political and economic affairs.  Other 
bribes came from elites in Siirt, Cizre, Silvan, Lice, and a few other towns mainly 
throughout southeastern Anatolia, in the region that had been controlled by Bedr Khan 
fifteen years prior, and in the mountains nearby Diyarbakır to the northeast.  Other 
Kurdish-inhabited areas such as Muş, Hakkari, Van, and Beyazıt, appeared to be more 
calm.  The reasons for the bribes were for political appointments and dismissals of 
charges against various individuals.97 
It is intriguing that the Ottomans had summoned many of these beys to appear 
before a court to answer to charges of oppression and corruption against them in 1861.  
Most notably Şir Bey of Şirvan and Abdülfettah Bey of Garzan were called to Diyarbakır 
and had their political positions occupied by another Ottoman appointee.98  Yet having 
offered bribes they were reinstated into their political positions and their unjust and 
abusive rule went unchecked even amidst myriad complaints.  Even a takrir submitted to 
the Ottoman meclis by the Armenian patriarch of Istanbul in 1864, which concerned only 
                                                          
97 BBA, HR.TO 238/22, 31 December 1862, cited in Gözel, “The Implementation of the 
Ottoman Land Code of 1858 in Eastern Anatolia,” 175-176. 





the oppressions of Fettah Bey of Garzan, was virtually ignored by authorities.99 
When the vali of Kurdistan allowed Şir Bey to return as the müdür of Şirvan, 
many of his local opponents were infuriated.  Frustration was such that it appeared to 
transcend religious divisions.  An Armenian monk (rahip) by the name of Guzar 
“slandered” Şir Bey and collaborated with two other Kurdish warlords, Mahmud Bey and 
Nehruz Bey, to try to “provoke the local populace” against him.  Yet their efforts were to 
little avail.  Şir Bey managed to have the Armenian monk exiled to Vidin in the Balkans.  
He also had Mahmud and Nehruz expelled from the region.100 
The Ottomans finally had the repressive beys of Şirvan and Garzan prosecuted in 
1867 after they dissolved the Kurdistan eyalet and had it placed under the jurisdictional 
authority of the valis of Mosul, Diyarbakır, Van, and Erzurum.101  From then onwards, 
the state appeared to have been somewhat more committed to the establishment of justice 
in the region, even if it was slow and often ineffective.  It is notable that during the 1870s 
the Ottomans took wider strides towards the implementation of public order and managed 
to fend off more successfully the excesses of seminomadic tribes.102  Yet the Ottomans 
appeared only to be treating the symptoms of the dissolution of power in Eastern 
Anatolia, and were faced with challenges on several fronts which kept them from being 
able to make sweeping changes in the region that would have remedied its causes.  The 
outbreaks of violence against Christians during the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878 are a 
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testament to the Ottomans’ loose security implementations. 
 
The Assyrians and Conflict 
 
 In some ways, the Assyrian Christians were arguably in a better position than 
many of the Armenians throughout Eastern Anatolia after the Crimean War.  The threat 
of mass violence against the Assyrian Nestorians in the Hakkari region was greatly 
reduced with the removal of Bedr Khan Bey of Cizre and Nurullah Bey of Hakkari from 
power in 1847 and 1849, respectively, since they were in a stronger geographic position 
and had a stronger military tradition than the Assyrian and Armenian Christians.  Hence, 
a much greater degree of military force and coordination was needed among marauding 
Kurdish tribes to be able to subdue these Nestorian Christians. 
Another political advantage that both Catholic and Nestorian Assyrians had which 
the Armenians did not enjoy to the same degree was more immediate representation from 
the clergyman whose lived more closely to the Assyrian lay persons and had a strong 
connection with the French consul in Mosul, who lobbied on behalf of the Catholic 
Chaldeans in the region, and the British government, who lobbied on behalf of the 
Nestorian Christians.  Since the massacres of Nestorians in the mid-forties, in reaction to 
which the Mar Shimun fled to Mosul and later Urmiye in Azerbaijan, the British Foreign 
Office referred to the Nestorians as a religious community in “whose welfare they feel 
much interest.”103  In order to not be outbid by the French, the British government urged 
the Ottomans to make accommodations for the return of the Mar Shimun to Qodchanis, 
near Hakkari, so that the Assyrians felt less prone to turn to Catholicism as a means of 
                                                          





gaining the protection of the French.104  The Ottomans obliged and gradually gave the 
Mar Shimun increasing privilege and status in the empire.  By contrast, the lot of the 
Armenians in Eastern Anatolia was made much more difficult due to the fact that the 
individuals who were supposed to represent them to the sultan and stand up for their 
welfare were primarily elite Armenians living in western Anatolia, whose financial 
interests were generally too tied up in the political integrity of the Ottoman state for them 
to concern themselves too greatly with the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia. 
 In 1843, the Ottomans, at the behest of foreign powers, created separate Chaldean 
and Nestorian millets who technically were no longer under the authority of the 
Armenian millet leaders in Istanbul.105  Theoretically, this gave them the power to enter 
into direct negotiation with the sultan.  However, it is likely that both the Armenians and 
the Ottoman state authorities continued to intervene in their affairs well into the 1860s.  
Ubicini writes that in 1864 it was proposed to the Ottomans that the Nestorians be 
separated from the jurisdiction of the Gregorian Armenian Patriarch and be able to have 
their own patriarch, or milletbaşı, who headed the millet, but the authorities took no 
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action.106  Nonetheless, because of British and French backing, the Nestorian and 
Chaldean Assyrian communities were allowed to continue their succession arrangements.  
The heads of their millets were not appointed or subject to removal by the sultan, but 
were determined by their longstanding religious leadership-selection traditions. 
 Jacobite Christians in the areas of Tur Abdin and Mardin did not enjoy separate 
protections, largely because they lay outside the radius of interest of both the French and 
the British.  Yet many of them appeared content to adhere to the Armenian millet, which 
had become more stridently active on behalf of Armenian Christians in Eastern Anatolia 
during the late 1860s and early 1870s, as a means of legal protection against the abuses 
committed by Muslim tribes and even by the state authorities.  When the Ottoman state 
proposed creating a separate millet for them in 1873 headed by the Jacobite patriarch 
Bedros, “the majority of his coreligionists disavowed him, refusing to break their link 
that bound them to the Armenians, with whom they had a common cause, despite their 
doctrinal differences.”107 
 Despite their slightly advantageous position to that of the Armenians, the 
Assyrian Christians still dealt with a number of conflicts both among themselves, and 
with fragmented Kurdish tribes.  Catholic Assyrians sought to stake their claim on the 
Assyrians around Diyarbakır, Mosul, and Cizre.  In 1858, the state authorities were 
petitioned to intervene to prevent the Chaldean Assyrians in Cizre, who formed a 
majority of the Assyrian Christian population there, from pressuring the Protestants, 
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Jacobites, and Nestorians from converting to Catholicism.  Koca Musa, a local Kurdish 
elite, also persecuted those Christians who would not accept Catholicism because they 
could seek legal exemption from paying taxes to the Chaldean leader, from which the 
Kurdish elite could then enrich himself.108 
 The rivalries between the mountain Nestorians in Tkhuma and Tiyari continued to 
occur periodically over rights to use summer pastures for their flocks.  On one occasion 
in 1859, a dispute between Nestorian Christians grew to the extent of almost fatal 
violence.  The kaymakam of Hakkari, Kenan Paşa wrote a letter to Major General 
(mirliva) Abdurrahman Paşa suggesting to him that the intensity of the rivalry could be 
best mitigated “not by sending reinforcements,” but “an arbitration officer” (arabulucu 
bir memur).109  However, the military leaders did not oblige and instead sent troops to 
quell the conflict.  The success of the intervention is debatable since renewed conflict 
broke out a year later.110 
The Assyrians, particularly those who lived on the plains away from ecclesiastical 
representation, were also frequently exposed to the raids of unruly Kurdish tribes.  A 
group of Nestorian Assyrians sent a petition directly to Queen Victoria to urge the 
Ottomans to provide greater protection against the threatening and exploitative treatment 
of Kurdish groups.  Earl Russell told his ambassador to the Ottoman Empire to ask the 
sultan to take steps “at once to relieve [the Nestorians] from the oppression to which they 
are subjected.”111  The Ottomans appear to have obliged the requests of the British and 
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sought to present evidence of compliance.  Kenan Paşa wrote the British consul at Mosul 
in 1861 that the soldiers under his command were dispatched to “prevent incidents from 
arising between the Nestorians and the Kurds.”112  The Ottomans also sought to endear 
the Nestorian leaders to the state to keep them from submitting complaints to the British.  
In 1860 they awarded the Mar Shimun with special state commendation.113  In 1861 the 
state granted the Nestorian chief of Hakkari, Reis Revil Efendi, the honor of the mecidiye 
nişanı, a prestigious award often given to courageous military commanders.114  In the 
face of continuing tax and fee collection abuses perpetrated by Kurdish groups in charge 
of tax collection over the Nestorians during the early 1860s, the sultan put the Mar 
Shimun in charge of tax collection for the Nestorian community in 1865.115  The salary 
that the Mar Shimun received from the Ottoman state continually increased throughout 
the second half of the nineteenth century, especially during the 1890s.  In 1892, his yearly 
salary was increased from 1,500 piasters to 2,500 piasters.116 
The Ottomans showed themselves to be a somewhat effective protector of the 
Assyrians and managed through its increased military presence in southeastern Anatolia 
during the late 1860s and 1870s to establish some semblance of political order in the 
region.  While such protections were arguably tenuous, they were sufficient to prevent 
significant outbreaks of violence comparable to those which had marred the Assyrian 
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inhabitants during the 1840s.  Furthermore, the Assyrians appear to have been spared 
violence during the 1877-8 Russo-Turkish War. 
It should be noted that the Ottoman government also appeared to protect the 
Assyrian converts to Protestantism more effectively than the Armenian converts.  Much 
like the Armenian Gregorian clergymen, the Mar Shimun was indeed preoccupied with 
the seemingly rapid conversion rates of Assyrians to Protestantism.  Missionaries report 
that Assyrians in Gevar accused the Mar Shimun of corruption.  When Mar Shimun 
visited the region and “tried in vain” to persuade and even compel Protestant converts to 
turn to the Nestorian faith tradition, Ottoman authorities made it clear to the Mar Shimun 
that “he could not persecute.”  The missionaries added, “the Government has acted in 
fairness thus far, and has made no objection whatever to the preliminary steps for a 
Protestant community.”117  The Assyrian converts, reports Mr. Shedd, were under a great 
deal more persecution in Urmiye than those in the mountainous areas where the 
Assyrians tribes were more prevalent.  He attributed this to their more tolerant attitude, 
although much can be said for the fact that the tribes were afflicted much more with a 
collective memory of the brute violence that they experienced in the 1840s and perhaps 
felt more indebted to the British for protection. 
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Postwar Transformations in the Eastern  
Anatolian Armenian Community 
 The end of the Crimean War spelled a new phase of political activity and tensions 
in the Ottoman Armenian community.  One of the main catalysts for these tensions was 
the Ottomans’ renewed effort towards political reform, which was largely sponsored by 
the British.  British negotiators, primarily Stratford Canning, drew up a new plan of 
action that they demanded that the sultan implement before the Allied Powers met with 
Russia in Paris for postwar talks.  Britain’s hope was that the new plan, which promised 
equality between Muslims and Christians, would deprive the Russians of a pretext for 
diplomatic intervention on behalf of the Ottoman Empire’s Christian subjects and would 
attract an increasing number of Christians to maintain loyalty to the Ottoman state and 
not side with separatist movements.118  Feeling a sense of indebtedness to Britain for her 
role in the war, the sultan made the essentially British-designed plan an imperial decree, 
called the Hatt-ı Hümâyûn or Imperial Reform Edict, on February 18, 1856. 
Both Muslim and non-Muslim elements of Ottoman society were divided over the 
new decree.  Many of the more conservative Muslim elements of the Empire decried the 
Hatt-ı Hümâyûn as near heresy and a dangerous break from traditional Ottoman patterns 
of governance, which they believed were established on an Islamic foundation.  They 
pointed to the fact that the Hatt-ı Hümâyûn of 1856 made no mention of the Qur’an or 
Islam as had the Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif of 1839.  Furthermore, they were angered by the 
decree’s abolition of the cizye tax on non-Muslims and its stipulation that Christians 
serve in the military.  On the other hand, more politically liberal Ottoman elites 
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welcomed the decree as an important step towards the implementation of a modern form 
of government.  Some Ottoman officials tried to play both sides of the issue.  For 
instance, to other Ottoman officials, Reşid Paşa criticized the new decree, arguing that 
“Muslim opinion [would] object to [it].”  However, to European officials he strongly 
praised the decree, claiming that its political stipulations were not enough.119 
Elite Armenians in Istanbul feared that the decree’s declaration of equality for all 
Ottoman subjects, which effectively put an end to the traditional legal distinction between 
Muslims and Christians, would result in the dismantling of the traditional millet structure 
and consequently disempower them.  In contrast, many Armenians of the rayah (peasant) 
class and the merchant/artisan class welcomed their potential empowerment which the 
Armenian community and the security against injustices that the decree promised 
them.120 
Political divisions among Ottoman subjects and administrators kept state officials 
from fully implementing the stipulated ideals of the decree.  Since neither the Muslim nor 
the Christian inhabitants of the Empire were particularly keen on a multifaith military, 
Christians were in practice exempted from military service on the condition that they paid 
the bedel-i askeri fee, which served as a sort of replacement for the cizye tax, historically 
imposed on non-Muslims living in Muslim-controlled areas, which the 1856 decree had 
abolished.121  
Ottoman officials and Kurdish elites in Eastern Anatolia ostensibly attempted to 
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limit the degree to which Armenians influenced political decision-making.  Between 
1856 and 1908, the number of Armenians in the service of the Ottoman state varied from 
province to province.  In provinces where Armenians were not as numerous and not 
located near the border, such as Diyarbakır, Mamuretülaziz, and Bitlis (after it was 
created as a separate vilayet in 1875), Armenian influence in local government grew 
significantly.  According to Mesrob Krikorian, Armenians in the Diyarbakır province 
during the last half of the nineteenth century served in “posts in the political 
administration, justice mechanical works, finance, public health, education, and the 
secretariat”; however, “in the administration of public life they were mostly subordinate 
officials, very rarely being given high position.”122  By contrast, in provinces that were 
more highly populated with Armenians and that were near the border with Russia, 
Ottoman officials were more wary and restrictive of Armenian participation in 
governance.  Regarding the province of Van, Krikorian notes, “whereas in other 
provinces [the Armenians] worked…in technical, educational, agricultural, medical and 
police departments, their contribution in Van in these fields of public life was small.”123 
Armenians living in areas that were not heavily populated by Kurds and under 
stronger central control were allowed greater participation in public life.  Armenians in 
the provinces of Sivas and Trabzon were more influential than Armenians in Erzurum 
and Van in finance, justice, and political administration in spite of the fact that they were 
not as numerous.124 
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The Hatt-ı Hümâyûn’s stipulation that the Ottoman state should treat all subjects 
without “distinction of class” and place the “temporal administration of the Christian or 
other non-Muslim communities” under the “safeguard of an Assembly to be chosen from 
among…both ecclesiastics and laymen” was unpopular with much of the Armenian urban 
aristocracy.125  They feared that the proposed reforms would create a “state within a 
state” which would weaken their sociopolitical position in the Empire.126  On the other 
hand, Armenian liberals moved quickly to implement the proposed reforms.  In 1857, 
they drafted a constitution, which the joint ecclesiastical-civil millet assembly accepted, 
but it lasted only two months.  During the next two years, the Armenian intelligentsia 
made some revisions of the constitution in order to gain more supporters.  A different 
draft was accepted by the newly convened millet assembly in 1860, which lasted for 
sixteen months.  However, infighting between liberal and obscurantist elements of the 
Armenian millet prompted the Sublime Porte to intervene and suspend the constitution.  
A third and last draft of the constitution was finally approved in March 1863 after 
Ottoman Foreign Minister Ali Paşa bade the Armenian Patriarch revise and amend the 
1860 draft.  The 1863 constitution subordinated the patriarch and the ecclesiastical and 
civil councils to the Armenian National Assembly.  However, the stipulations regarding 
membership of the assembly greatly favored the Armenian bourgeoisie of Istanbul, who 
were to hold occupy eighty of 140 available seats in the assembly.  The clergy held only 
twenty seats and the Armenian provinces only forty.  Even with the new arrangements, 
the Porte, the Armenian amira class, and amira-backed clergy, including Patriarch 
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Stephan, were still loath to implement the reforms.  But mounting pressures from Britain 
and from within the Armenian millet forced them to action.  In order to force the 
patriarch and the Porte to implement the draft, some Armenians vandalized the 
Patriarchate in Kumkapı.127 
During the heated negotiations for reform in Istanbul, communities of Armenians 
throughout the east agitated for change on their own terms.  The promised reform had the 
effect of heightening Armenian expectations for political improvement throughout 
Cilicia, Central Anatolia, and Eastern Anatolia.  However, the state was reluctant to 
implement reforms in many regions because they estimated that the more conservative 
elements of the Muslim population would react to them more strongly. 
An insurrectionist spirit was most present in the Armenian strongholds of Van and 
Zeytun during the early 1860s.  In the spring of 1862, some 20,000 Armenians and Kurds 
gathered from the Van region engaged in combat with the local government.  It is unclear 
what exactly provoked the conflict, but a notable fact about the incident is that 
Armenians and Kurds joined forces and that many on both sides died.  However, the 
conflict did not capture international attention.  Nersisian asserts this as evidence of a 
Kurdish-Armenian union against the Ottoman government.  However, given the history 
of the Armenians and Kurds, it may have been another internecine conflict more than a 
purely antigovernment uprising.128 
The 1862 Zeytun rebellion, which occurred right after the rebellion at Van, 
captured more international attention, and much more has been written about it.  The 
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Ottomans had previously honored the autonomy of the Armenians in the region of 
Zeytun.  During the 1830s, the Ottomans commended the Zeytuni priest Der-Ohan Der-
Hagopian, also known as Deli Keşiş, for successfully repelling the troops of Ibrahim Paşa 
of Egypt.129  However, since state officials were scrambling for new sources of revenue 
in the aftermath of the Crimean War, they looked to the Armenian communities of 
Zeytun, whom they claimed were in arrears to the Ottoman state from years of tax 
exemption.  In 1860, Armenian elites in Zeytun submitted the following list of grievances 
to the Porte.  1) They were overtaxed.  The bedel-i askeri was 100,000 kuruş, the ağnam 
tax was at 50,000 kuruş, the state tax, which they had not paid in years was raised to 
25,000 kuruş.  2) Their lands were being usurped by Muslim migrants from Russia and 
other parts of the Ottoman Empire whom state officials settled in the Zeytun region.130 
A number of Armenians drew inspiration from France’s intervention in Mount 
Lebanon on behalf of the Maronite Christians in 1861, which resulted in the creation of a 
semiautonomous mutasarrifiyya of Lebanon, which was under the control of an outside 
Christian and had France’s guarantee of protection.  In the same year, Prince Levon, an 
Armenian from Hajin with strong kinship ties to Armenians in Zeytun, went to Paris to 
petition Napoleon III to push the Porte to create a like political entity for the Armenians 
in Zeytun.  Napoleon III allegedly entertained the idea at first,131 although he demanded 
that the Zeytuntsi Armenians enter into communion with the Catholic Church, like the 
Maronites had done centuries ago. 
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News of the political aspirations of Prince Levon spread quickly among Armenian 
Gregorian ecclesiastics, local Muslims of Zeytun, and the Sublime Porte, all of whom 
condemned his actions.  The Armenian Church and church-supporting amiras bade the 
Zeytuntsis not accept communion with the Catholics lest it embolden other Armenians to 
reject their ecclesiastical authority in favor of hopes of foreign governments.  J. Aramian, 
an Armenian amira from Istanbul, reacted to some Zeytuntsi Armenians’ entertaining the 
idea of adopting communion with the following passage: 
A nation that wants autonomy (ishkhanutyun) and completely attacks another 
authority and severely insults it; this nation, we say, has no other future than 
slavery.  Because by such means every individual combats and suppresses one 
another thus prompting complaints and chaos emerges….  When the people and 
the Patriarch are at odds, then disorder ensues….  One day it is the Armenians of 
Zeytun who become Catholics, then another day it is the Armenians of Hajin, then 
another day those of Elbistan, then those of Bitlis, Erzincan, etc.  There cannot be 
an ishkhanutiun for us Armenians because the ishkhan is us, and if a crown is 
presented to us, then all of the Armenians should put their heads under it.132 
 
The Sublime Porte ordered the mutasarrıf of Maraş, Ali Paşa, to begin gathering 
forces to thwart potential rebellion by revolutionary Armenians.  Trepidation pervaded 
many, but not all, the Muslim communities of Zeytun, particularly the recent Circassian 
and Crimean Tatar immigrants, who feared Armenian persecution and domination in the 
event that the Armenians achieved autonomous control over Zeytun.  Widespread conflict 
was sparked in July 1862, when a Turk from Ketman was killed.  Local Muslims accused 
Armenians of murder and retaliated by murdering an Armenian from the nearby village 
of Alabaş.133  Conflict escalated when the Armenians of Alabaş, who claimed that 
Muslims were encroaching on their land and unjustly expanding control over it, launched 
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a full invasion of Ketman, killing sixteen people, including children as young as five, and 
abducting the village’s women.134  News of the horrific events were made known in late 
August in Tasvir-i Efkar, a widely read periodical circulating in Istanbul, as well.135 
In the aftermath of the Ketman incident, calls for rebellion and independence 
increased among Armenians throughout Zeytun.  The growing agitation prompted the 
Porte to order Aziz Paşa to organize some forty thousand soldiers in the region to march 
on Zeytun.  Aziz’s forces consisted of about twenty thousand Kurdish, Avşar, and 
Circassian başıbozuks who torched villages and plundered and ransacked churches.  Most 
of the Muslims in the Zeytun region sided with the Ottoman force except for the 
Turkmen Kozanoğlu tribe, who pledged neutrality.  However, the başıbozuks, many of 
whom even sold their houses to “buy mules to transport the women of Zeytun back with 
them” underestimated the organizational capabilities of the force of some five thousand 
Zeytuntsi Armenians, who managed to rout a large number of state forces and force them 
to retreat.136  In the aftermath of an embarrassing defeat, the Ottomans brought together 
an even larger force to subjugate the Zeytuntsis.  Before their arrival, however, a 
delegation from Zeytun reached Istanbul where they petitioned the Armenian Patriarch 
and several amiras to persuade the Sublime Porte to halt all operations.  Fearing foreign 
intervention and international embarrassment, the Sublime Porte ordered troops to stand 
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down.  However, since the Zeytuntsis did not secure an agreement with France, and since 
the amira class and many of the Gregorian clergy saw their leanings towards the Pope as 
a sort of betrayal, they had little leverage against the Ottoman authorities and agreed to 
restore order to its former state. 
The Zeytun revolt, nonetheless, was championed as a huge success among 
Armenians throughout the Ottoman Empire, Russian, and Europe.  In Tiflis, Armenian 
patriots and mainly youth groups used the opportunity of the Zeytun incident to 
encourage resistance.  In the journal “Crane of the Armenian World” they called upon 
Armenians throughout the Ottoman Empire to join Russian Armenians in solidarity: “we 
are happy that our brave Zeytunis’ uprising (avrrek) has crushed [the Turks].  However, 
the participation of the Armenians of Russia is not enough to alleviate the bitter situation 
of the poor and destitute orphans and widows left by the Armenians who have come 
under the sword of the Turks.”137 
Rebellion spread to Muş in 1863, where Armenians rose up against local Kurdish 
groups.  Emboldened by the promulgation of the Armenian Constitution, the Armenian 
inhabitants of Muş rose in open revolt against local Kurds.  Upon threats of retaliation, 
local Armenians sent a delegation to Istanbul to expose the abuses of the Kurds, demand 
that the Sublime Porte provide the Armenians with reparations for their losses to local 
Kurdish marauders, and protect them against oppression.  Yet upon its arrival in Istanbul, 
the Armenian delegation from Muş was met with indifference by the Grand Vizier Fuat 
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Paşa who dismissed their complaints as trivial and unworthy of serious attention.  
Pushing the issue further, the delegates threatened to abandon their lands and migrate to 
Russia unless the Porte took action.  Yet the delegation’s importuning left Fuat Paşa only 
more irritated, and he responded that they “could go where they pleased and that the 
Russian territory would be perfectly open to them.”  Three hundred families from the 
Muş sancak decided to migrate to Georgia upon hearing of the Ottoman state’s apathy 
towards their plight.138 
Consul Taylor wrote a report in the same year confirming that increasing numbers 
of Armenians throughout Eastern Anatolia were contemplating migration and conversion 
to Catholicism: 
I must call your attention to the statements contained in Mr. Taylor’s dispatch to 
your Excellency of the 1st of July, respecting the ill-treatment to which the native 
Christians of the Pashalic [sic] are subjected, and the serious consequences to the 
Porte which may result therefrom.  Mr. Taylor states that so severe is the 
oppression [the Christians of Diyarbakır] experience, that large numbers will 
probably join the Latin Church, in order to obtain the protection of the French 
Consulate; and, further, that about 1,400 families are preparing to emigrate to 
Russian Armenia.139 
 
In hope of gaining foreign protection against local abuses, Armenians also converted to 
Islam and Protestantism.  A letter from Boghos Tumayants, an Armenian clergyman in 
Erzurum, in 1876 reveals that an increasing numbers of Armenians were turning to Islam 
in hopes of sparing themselves from persecution.  The converts from Muş, who 
numbered about five hundred, wrote to him saying, “we are becoming Turks [ge 
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dajeganank, implying that they are converting to Islam], [therefore] we are becoming 
free; this we do because we have no leader or patriarch to care for us.”140  Tumayants’ 
letter also notes that many Armenians desired that the sultan indicate locations that they 
might settle in order avoid persecution.141 
 Conversion to Islam typically came at a high cost for many Armenians.  
Community Muslim leaders had converts change their names, placed them under scrutiny 
to make sure they were no longer practicing Christianity, and subjected them to the local 
Muslim norms.  Although they were not technically discouraged from speaking in 
Armenian, they were discouraged from continuing to associate with their former 
confessional communities, and tended to adopt the Kurdish and Turkish languages.  
Gregorian Armenians often rejected converts to Islam as heretics and traitors.  Although 
Ottoman law technically forbade punishment of anyone who departed from or converted 
to another faith, Eastern Anatolia was beyond the reach of the law, and Armenians who 
converted back to Christianity from Islam were still subjected to ostracism, harassment, 
and death threats. 
 Conversion to Protestantism was becoming an increasingly popular option for 
Armenians, who were attracted to the missionaries by the educational opportunities and 
potential recourse against abuses that they provided them.  Although Protestant converts 
never constituted a large percentage of the Armenian community in any particular place, 
many members of the Gregorian clergy treated them with suspicion and disdain.  
Patriarch Stephan had Armenian evangelical clerics arrested and put in jail.  He also 
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issued an order against participation in Protestant activities and sought to punish those 
who tried to conceal information about Protestant activities.142  In 1848, Reverend 
Schneider reported that many Armenian converts to Protestantism “were cast into prison, 
several were bastinadoed…multitudes were thrown out of their houses, some by their 
wives—and some by their neighbors.  A few have been exiled.”143 
Protestants gained more freedom in 1850 when the British pushed the sultan to 
decree the creation of the Protestant millet.  The millet granted a Protestant Agent, who 
was a lay Armenian, nominal authority over the millet.144  Despite the efforts of the 
Sublime Porte to provide a form of protection for the Protestants, the Gregorian clergy 
continued to persecute them throughout the 1850s and 1860s. 
Persecution was particularly acute in Eastern Anatolia where venal, corrupt 
Ottoman officials accepted bribes by Armenian clerics not to report acts of persecution 
and to prevent Protestant victims from mobilizing support on their behalf.  In a visit to 
Van in 1851, British lieutenant Frederick Walpole wrote:  
The Pasha of Van during my stay was represented as one of the old school; he ate 
money to any extent, and his exactions had made all men his enemies.  The 
Armenian bishop had bribed him to set his sublime face against the Protestant 
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converts; this, however, he found dangerous work.  The bishop could bring no 
charge either against them, or against their teachers; the latter rather endeavouring 
to teach them in their church, than to lead them from it: but the Armenians are 
represented as being bigoted to the last degree.145 
  
In 1860, a group of missionaries assigned to the Eastern Turkey mission wrote that the 
Protestants continued to be heavily persecuted by both Gregorians and Muslims, and that 
the local authorities even denied the existence of the Imperial Decree of 1856: 
We need not multiply instances to indicate the power of the more influential 
Christian sects to employ, by means of bribes, the Turkish officials to oppress the 
smaller sects, especially the Protestants; nor need we multiply instances to show 
that there is still strong feeling of hatred on the part of the Moslems against 
Christians generally….  Pashas have used the influence of the mollahs to excite in 
the mosques public sentiment against the Christians….  In the Diarbekir Pashalic 
several pashas have to the English Consul entirely denied both the reception of 
any such document as the Hatti Humayoun and also its existence in the archives 
of the Diarbekir Pashalic….  In the region of Marash and Aintab, so grievous is 
the military tax that Christians would prefer to enter the army.146 
 
In some cases, the Ottoman authorities reportedly attempted to defend Protestants, 
but the Gregorian Armenians insisted on persecuting Protestants nonetheless.  During the 
late 1860s in Eğin, near Kharput, a mob consisting of Muslims demolished the frame of a 
church under construction and beat a Protestant to death in spite of the local meclis 
appointing a police force to guard the church.  The meclis and the paşa acquitted the 
defendants on the grounds that they did not destroy anything since the church was not 
completely constructed.  In Erzurum an Armenian vartabed named Mempre threatened to 
have the vali of Erzurum removed if he attempted to defend the construction of a 
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Protestant church there.  Policemen “demolished the front wall.”147  At Bitlis in Sept. 29, 
1869, a Protestant was beaten by Armenians “on his way to procure the evidence of 
certain Mussulmen who had been eye-witnesses of the previous transaction.”  The vali 
“with remarkably impartiality” had all parties placed under arrest.  However, under 
pressure of the leading Armenians in the community, he set the guilty free.148 
A complaint from the Protestant leader in Diyarbakır reveals a few incidents in 
which Protestant Armenians were subjected to mistreatment by both Armenian Gregorian 
and Ottoman authorities in small localities.  In Diyarbakır vilayet in the kaza of Hayriye, 
a leader in the Protestant church by the name of Bedros was taken in captivity because of 
some debts that he owed.  The müdür of Hayriye, Said Bey, took him to the meclis where 
he gained the approval of the meclis members to have him beaten, bound, and 
imprisoned.  Although he was allowed to return home after spending a significant amount 
of time in prison, he was unable to recover from the physical effects of torture in prison 
and died.  In Siirt, a leader of the Armenian Gregorian church by the name of Ove forced 
Protestants to come out of their shops and houses and subjected them to persecution in 
the streets.  He accused one fifty-five-year-old Protestant man of killing someone while 
he was only three years old.  As punishment he was forced to pay 30,000 kuruş and had 
his property confiscated.149 
Catholics reportedly participated in the persecution of the Protestants as well.  
Seven Protestant Christians were persecuted in Mardin on July 28, 1868 “at the 
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instigation of the Roman Catholic Patriarch Pillibos, with the connivance of Ismail Pasha, 
“the vali of Diyarbakır.”150  It should be noted that Catholics were more established in the 
Ottoman system than the Protestants, even in locations where they were fewer in number 
than Armenian Protestants.  Missionaries in the Eastern Turkey Mission report: “in 
Kharput, though the Catholics are only one-fourth as numerous as the Protestants, civil 
head is acknowledged to be more powerful than the pasha.  Being promptly and 
vigorously sustained in all his demands by the French Embassy, he always triumphs.”151 
When Migirdich Khrimian was elected Patriarch of Istanbul in 1869, he shifted 
the focus away from the alleged threat of the Protestants and onto the plight of the 
Armenian rayah class.  Clerics who thought similarly to Khrimian began to champion a 
change away from persecution to simply competing alongside the Protestant 
organizations.   Garegin Srvantsiants, an influential thinker and ecclesiastical leader in 
Istanbul, believed that the answer to the divisions that were occurring within the 
Armenian community was in developing the education system throughout the millet.  He 
believed that via education the Gregorian church would gain popularity among the 
Armenians.  Srvantsiants believed that the Armenian nation had become paralyzed and it 
was necessary to treat them with what he called two kinds of physicians.  One physician 
“for the spirit” who would consist of ecclesiastics, and one physician “for the body” 
which would consist of patriotic (hayrenaser) ishkhans.  These two classes, represented 
by the [metaphor of] two powerful physicians, must take the paralytic with the right and 
left hand, and revive the Armenians.”152 
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It is noteworthy that not all Armenians and Kurds were in conflict with each 
other.  Bayrbutian asserts that union was a result of the “Muslim working peasantry 
relating to the Armenian peasantry’s social struggle and desiring a victory for the 
Armenian peasantry with hopes that it could possibly improve their condition as well.”153  
Very often, the Armenians and the Kurds would gather together against the government.  
Such was the case in 1864 Armenians and Kurds in Sasun jointly resisted Ottoman 
Turkish forces.154 
Yet given the long list of grievances assembled by Armenian clergymen in the 
East which they submitted to the Sublime Porte and the Armenian National Assembly, 
Kurdish-Armenian alliances appeared to be more the exception than the rule.  Reports 
continued to emerge in the Armenian community that Kurdish tribes plundered, harassed, 
threatened, and extorted villagers throughout Eastern Anatolia.  It should be noted that 
other Muslim and/or Kurdish villagers were also the victims of marauders and bandits, 
but Armenians had more of an organized network through which their voices could be 
heard.  By contrast, Muslim villagers had little recourse against other Muslim aggressors.  
A letter from the inhabitants of Muş in 1864 contains a long list of the types of abuses 
that the Kurds committed against Armenians.  They scattered flocks, abducted women, 
forced women to convert to Islam, extorted money and resources from villagers, 
committed acts of arson, beat up Armenians (sometimes for just mere amusement), 
threatened violence against informers, conducted night raids into villages, raided and 
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ransacked churches, and even killed some Armenians.155  A most telling reaction to the 
Ottoman reform efforts came in a letter from the Armenian inhabitants of Muş to the 
Sublime Porte in 1868: 
We give our thanks to our most helpful and omnipotent Ottoman Empire…and 
the Tanzimat and promised reforms [teşkilat], which were designed to provide 
freedom and security.  However, our unfortunate land of Muş has benefitted 
neither from the Tanzimat nor the teşkilat.  We are still pestered, harmed, and 
oppressed unsparingly by barbarians.156 
 
 Another incident that exposed the general failure of the Ottoman state to provide 
security for Armenians was the continued seizures of Armenian land in Çarsancak 
(modern-day Akpazar located between Harput and Dersim) by local Kurdish groups.  In 
1865, Armenians complained that twenty-four local derebeys had demanded heavy taxes 
upon them and forced them to accept high-interest loans to help pay off their debts.  If 
they were not able to pay, the Kurds would justify taking ownership of their lands and 
imposing a form of debt bondage upon them.157  In response to the complaints, the 
Sublime Porte commissioned Derviş Paşa to go to Çarsancak and investigate the matter.  
However, the Armenians expected nothing to come of the investigation and decided to 
send a delegation to Istanbul to demand that seven derebeys be brought to Istanbul to 
stand trial and that the Armenians’ holding privileges over their lands be restored.  The 
delegation’s efforts were to no avail.  The Sublime Porte argued that the derebeys had 
held their lands for a long period of time and that the Armenians were merely mortgagees 
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of the properties in question.  Therefore the former maintained the privilege of reducing 
the latter’s access to it.158  A British soldier, Frederick Millingen, who was in command 
of a regular army unit in the Van region, reports that some members of the delegation, on 
charges of making excessive demands, were held in jail for a brief period until they 
promised to return to Çarsancak.159  The Çarsancak case was a reflection on the 
unfortunate fact that increasing numbers of Armenians were losing their lands and access 
to resources to cunning, threatening Muslims and Kurds in Palu and Harput. 
The Ottoman state’s seeming failure to deliver on its promises of security and 
equal treatment for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia coupled with the lackluster results 
of millet reform led many Armenians to begin entertaining the idea of looking abroad for 
support.  In 1868, the British and Ottoman authorities discovered that an Armenian 
bishop in Erzurum named Harontion was collaborating with political activists in the 
Russian government.  He received payment from wealthy Russian bureaucrats to keep an 
eye on events in Eastern Anatolia.  He helped Armenians in Van, Bitlis, Muş, Erzurum, 
and Arapkir obtain Russian passports and had allies in the clergy, such as Bishop 
Iknadiyos of Van, who took a pro-Russian stance.160 
 In spite of Harontion’s activities, many Armenians, particularly from the middle 
class, were hesitant over the idea of summoning Russia as a liberator.  Evidence of this 
lay in the fact that Khrimian, after he was elected Patriarch in 1869, went through the 
conduits of the Ottoman state in order to pursue reform.  However, throughout the 1870s, 
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especially after rebellion and conflict broke out in the Balkans and in parts of Eastern 
Anatolia, an increasing number of Armenians drew closer to Russia.  The ongoing plight 
of the Armenian rayah class, in spite of millet reform, made many Armenians 
increasingly cynical towards the Armenian Constitution of 1863 as well.  Many began to 
believe that real reform had not actually been achieved, but that the Constitution was a 
façade.  The influential Armenian novelist Raffi remarked that the Armenian Constitution 
was merely a “weapon in the hands of the Ottoman government to distract Armenians 
from their real problems.”161 
On September 4, 1869, the National Assembly elected Khrimian Patriarch of 
Istanbul against the will of the sultan and his grand vizier, who both saw him as an 
agitator moving against the current of state interests.  On his way to Istanbul, he toured 
Erzurum and its environs, where he heard the protests of disenfranchised villagers and 
gathered takrirs to present to the Armenian National Assembly and ultimately the 
Sublime Porte.  Khrimian’s election marked a significant change in the Armenian millet.  
It was an indication of further transformation within the Armenian community away from 
upper-class/middle-class divisions between Armenians towards the question of the 
rayahs in Eastern Anatolia and the Armenian nation.162 
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 Divisions among Ottoman, British, Armenian, and Kurdish leaders over the 
question of how to manage the tensions that had arisen in Eastern Anatolian society 
during the 1830s and 1840s led to a new set of unexpected tensions, which the various 
different actors lacked the resources to mitigate.  At heart, Ottoman administrators were 
committed to ‘conquering Kurdistan’ through a calculated strategy of centralization, but 
it did not amount to much.  Worried that administrative reforms conducted too rapidly 
and forcefully could rupture the delicate balance of power that existed between the 
Ottoman state and the Kurds, state officials moved with extreme caution, slowing seizing 
the reins of power behind a thin façade of renegotiated autonomy for Kurdish groups. 
During the 1850s and 1860s, the British remained committed to the idea of liberal 
reforms for non-Muslims with the hopes of undermining the legitimacy of Russia’s 
claims for diplomatic intervention into the Ottoman Empire.  The British victory against 
the Russians during the Crimean War gave them political leverage over the Ottoman 
Empire, whom they steered in a direction that Ottoman officials were reluctant to pursue.  
In the minds of many British administrators and liberal Ottomans, the tanzimat reforms 
were meant to be a politically liberal effort that would effectuate a drastic transformation 
of the sociopolitical landscape of the Ottoman Empire.  However, to many of the 
Ottoman administrators, especially Ali and Fuat Paşa, the architects of the tanzimat 
reforms, the tanzimat were simply an excuse to expand the bureaucracy and bring the 
heretofore semiautonomous Kurdish groups under their wing.  Ultimately, the Ottomans 
sought a modernized military, with conscription and the latest technology, through 





placed under the direct command of the Ottoman brigadier general. 
Armenian leaders were committed to consolidating their power within the broader 
Armenian community, which had been ruptured by several external and internal forces 
between the 1820s and 1840s, and holding onto the traditional order through which they 
had dominated the millet between 1750 and 1850.  However, since the Ottomans were 
under pressure by the British and many liberal Armenians to deliver on their promises, 
the Armenian community was forced to undergo considerable transformation.  Yet it was 
in the midst of that transformation that lower-class Armenians gained a voice in 
Armenian politics, right at the very time that Kurdish society was becoming increasingly 
fragmented and competitive over limited spaces of power.  Since Kurdish society lacked 
a central leader around which to rally, they were greatly divided among themselves over 
which direction to pursue.  Some of the peasant Kurds supported the Armenians and 
sought alliance with them.  On the other hand, many of the seminomadic groups, who had 
been forced by the Ottoman state to settle, as well as many of the traditional Kurdish 
elites, who remained in power after the Ottomans exiled Nurullah Bey in 1849, increased 
the burden on the Armenian peasantry as a means of alleviating their resource deficits. 
The Eastern Anatolian peasantry was first caught in the crossfire between 
competing Kurdish elites.  After the Crimean War, several peasant-landlord conflicts 
ensued.  As Istanbul and the European powers became increasingly involved in these 














LATENT POLARIZATION ALONG RELIGIOUS  
 
AND ETHNIC LINES, 1868-1878 
 
The term polarization is often used in scholarship with the meaning of growing 
tensions and mistrust between at least two large groups of people that lead them to divide 
themselves along particular identity lines.  The term is frequently used, and aptly so, to 
describe the state of Eastern Anatolian society during WWI.  Sizeable numbers of Turks 
and Kurds in powerful positions grew so resentful and mistrustful towards Armenians in 
general that they sought to forcibly remove them by either by killing them, deporting 
them, or by erasing their religious and ethnic identities by compelling them to convert to 
Islam and cease using the Armenian language.  At the same time, large numbers of 
Armenians had grown so resentful towards Muslims, Turks, and Kurds that they were 
willing to help Russia invade and occupy Eastern Anatolia, organize volunteer units with 
the aim of killing and harassing civilians and combatants, and stage rebellions with the 
aim of achieving dominance over a particular region.  Yet, scholars continue to debate the 
reasons for polarization, its extent, and the time at which it began to occur.1  It is the 
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argument of this chapter that the experience of Eastern Anatolian society during the 
1870s can best be described as a latent ethnic and religious polarization.  A confluence of 
factors, including political and economic instability in the Ottoman Empire, increasing 
international diplomatic intervention, the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman war, political 
activism among Christians, and other factors caused actors to imagine larger communities 
based on a shared ethnicity and religion and to place primacy on ethnicity and religion as 
the principal markers of individual identity. 
 
Crisis at the Head 
Deepening religious and ethnic divisions in Eastern Anatolia cannot be 
understood without taking into consideration the political and economic instability that 
the Ottoman Empire faced during the 1870s.  This period of instability was partly a ripple 
effect of the political and economic shocks in both Europe and in Istanbul. Bismarck’s 
victory against France in 1870 and his successful efforts to reunify Germany affected 
Istanbul indirectly by diverting the attention of Britain and France from the Ottoman 
Empire, thus opening space for Russia to reassert itself in global politics.  At the London 
Convention of March 1871, Russia managed to annul the stipulation of the Treaty of 
Paris that forbade Russian warships from sailing in the Black Sea.2  In the wake of this 
victory, Russia began reasserting its role in the Ottoman Empire as a protector of 
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Orthodox Christians.  While Grand Vizier Ali Paşa, one of the main architects and 
implementers of the tanzimat reforms, stood his ground against Russia’s diplomatic 
advances, Ottoman policy toward Russia changed after his death in September 1871.3  
Mahmud Nedim Paşa (nicknamed Nedimoff on account of his Russian sympathies) 
appointed as Ali Paşa’s successor, maintained a close relationship with the Russian 
ambassador to Istanbul, Nikolai Ignatiev, and moved the Ottoman Empire closer to 
Russian interests. 
The Great Depression, which began in 1873 and lasted until 1879, in Europe and 
North America deprived the Ottomans of sufficient inflows of foreign capital and slowed 
overall trade, thrusting the Empire into a recession.  By 1875, the Ottomans defaulted on 
their loan payments and were forced to declare bankruptcy.  The Ottoman Empire would 
not be able to emerge from its depressed economic state until as late as 1896.4  It should 
be noted that the economic crisis does not entirely explain the political destabilization in 
the Empire during the 1870s.  Sultan Abdülhamid II was able to maneuver his way 
around the West, at least in relation to Eastern Anatolia, and to achieve many of his 
political aims in spite of poor economic growth up until 1894, when foreign diplomats 
pressured him to draw up a new reform project in response to an outbreak of violence at 
Sasun.  Nonetheless, the crisis came at an inconvenient political time for the Ottomans, 
and appeared to exacerbate already existing crises and to stifle any momentum for 
change. 
Between the death of Ali Paşa, who had firm control over policy-making and 
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policy-enforcement in Istanbul, in 1871 and the succession of Sultan Abdülhamid II to 
the throne in 1876, the Sublime Porte was in a state of turmoil.  In a period of just under 
five years, the Grand Vizierate changed hands eight times.  Leading public officials 
attempted to outmaneuver each other and manipulate politics to their own advantage.  
Mahmud Nedim Paşa, who served as Grand Vizier between September 1871 and July 
1872 and between August 1875 and May 1876, attempted to steer the empire away from 
the trajectory of political liberalization that it had been pursuing since 1839 and 
especially after the Crimean War.  He favored restoring power to the sultanate, sought to 
dismiss and replace statesmen who promoted the policies of Ali and Fuat, and tried to 
encourage more reactionary sentiments among Muslims against the tanzimat.  Mahmud 
Nedim maintained a cordial relationship with the Russian consul Nikolai Ignatiev, looked 
more toward Russia as an ally, and sought to distance the Ottomans from Britain, who 
had been instrumental in the implementation of the tanzimat.5 
In July 1872, Sultan Abdülaziz replaced Mahmud Nedim, whom his political 
opponents accused of corruption and duplicity, with Midhat Paşa, a champion of political 
liberalization who had a long association with the Young Ottomans and who would play 
a key role in authoring and promoting the Ottoman constitution of 1876.  Only three 
months later, the sultan decided to appoint Mütercim Mehmet Rüşdi, an advocate and 
architect of the tanzimat reforms, in his stead.  In February 1873, Sakızlı Ahmet Esat 
Paşa, a Turk from Chios, was appointed Grand Vizier.  In April 1873, the sultan 
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appointed Şirvanlızade Mehmet Rüştü Paşa, a Kurd raised in Amasya whose family was 
from the Eastern Anatolian town of Şirvan.6  In February 1874, Hüseyin Avni Paşa, who 
played a key role in military reform during the 1860s and who was a bitter rival of 
Mahmud Nedim Paşa, was appointed Grand Vizier.  Sakızlı Ahmet Esat Paşa was 
appointed Grand Vizier for a second time in April 1875 and Mahmud Nedim was 
appointed again in August 1875.  In May 1876, Midhat Paşa, Hüseyin Avni, and 
Mütercim Mehmet Rüşdi staged a successful coup d’état against Sultan Abdülaziz, whom 
they replaced with his nephew Murad V.  Sultan Abdülaziz reportedly committed suicide 
on June 4, 1876 (although rumors circulated that he was assassinated).  Immediately after 
the coup, Mahmud Nedim was exiled to Çeşme.7 
On the surface, political strife at the Sublime Porte appeared to be driven by 
ideology.  Mahmud Nedim favored a stronger role for the sultan in decision-making 
(against the Sublime Porte, who had dominated decision-making throughout the tanzimat 
period).  Nedim’s rival Midhat Paşa, on the other hand, favored a constitutional 
monarchy.  However, a deeper look into the facts reveals that personal ambition was a 
significant reason for the power struggle in the Sublime Porte, and probably 
overshadowed whatever ideological motivations were at play.  Both Mahmud Nedim and 
his political rival Şirvanlızade Mehmet Rüştü Paşa had ties with the Khalidi-Naqshbandi 
Sufi movement.  Both Hüseyin Avni and Nedim were absolutists and favored increasing 
the power of the sultan over the Sublime Porte.  However, both were engaged in a power 
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struggle against each other until Hüseyin Avni’s death at the hands of Sultan Abdülaziz’s 
brother-in-law, Çerkes Hasan, in 1876.  Nedim’s exiling of Hüseyin Avni to Isparta in 
1871 deeply embittered the latter against the former.  Abdülaziz’s reappointment of 
Nedim to the Grand Vizierate in 1875 led Hüseyin Avni to take his anger out on the 
sultan by plotting a coup against him.8  Even if ideology did not necessarily play a role in 
all the personal struggles between high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats during the 1870s, 
competing ideological forces did divide much of Ottoman society during the 1870s, 
particularly in Eastern Anatolia.  The various political and economic crises that Istanbul 
faced during this period diverted its attention from the periphery and made it increasingly 
difficult for it to implement reforms there. 
 
The New Administrative Reform Effort, Cause and Effect 
In 1867, the Sublime Porte began undertaking a series of new administrative 
reform measures in Eastern Anatolia.  The strategy behind the project was to increase the 
number and types of administrative divisions in the region while integrating an increasing 
number of locals into the administration activity.  The reform project was in large part the 
application the stipulations of the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 and was consistent with 
Ottoman Empire’s policy of calculated (re)centralization.  The hope of the Ottoman 
leaders was to meet the competing demands of the British, the Armenians, and the Kurds, 
while at the same time achieving their own political aims.  A number of factors spurred 
Ottoman administrators towards reform in the region.  First, the changing nature of the 
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Armenian community, which included the unprecedented rebellions of the early 1860s, 
the promulgation of the Armenian constitution, and the traditional Armenian elite’s loss 
of control over the Armenian community, made many Ottoman administrators fear that 
ideas of rebellion would spread in the community.  Second, administrators worried that 
Iran and Russia could exploit the growing political instability in the region to their 
advantage.  Third, the British had begun more closely monitoring political activity in 
Eastern Anatolia and the Sublime Porte wanted to show the British that they had indeed 
carried out reforms there. 
The first project of the new administrative reforms was to apply the Teşkil-i 
Vilayet Nizamnamesi, also commonly known as the ‘Law of Vilayets’, promulgated in 
1864.  The objective of this new reform was to replace the eyalet system with a system 
that created more administrative subdivisions.  While the traditional eyalet system had 
only the sancak subdivision, the vilayet system would include the administrative levels of 
liva, kaza, and nahiye.  The mutassarıf, an administrator appointed by the Porte, would 
oversee the affairs of the liva, which was also often referred to as the sancak, a 
terminological carry-over from the previous system.  He was responsible for the political, 
financial, and military affairs of the liva and was to report to the vali of the vilayet.  The 
liva was divided into several kazas governed by kaymakams.  Kazas were subdivided into 
nahiyes, village clusters under the direction of muhtars.  In 1871, an amendment was 
made to the law that redefined the powers of the administrators, making the kaymakams 
less involved in financial and military matters.9  The central treasury would be in charge 
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of tax collection and the serasker would be more directly in charge of conscripting men 
to the military.10  The hope of the amendment was to bring military and financial 
administration more within the purview of Istanbul and thus reduce corruption. In fact, it 
made it more difficult for the central administration to collect taxes and acquire soldiers 
and relatively more easy for locals to dodge official demands.  This was because state 
administrators reduced the roles of local middlemen, which made them less inclined to 
cooperate.11 
The first step towards administrative reform in Eastern Anatolia was to turn the 
four Armenian-inhabited eyalets in Eastern Anatolia into a number of smaller more 
centrally governed vilayets.  In 1867, the Sublime Porte did away with the Kurdistan 
vilayet and created the Diyarbakır vilayet in its stead.  The Sivas and Erzurum vilayets 
were created in the same year.  In 1875, the Ottomans created the vilayets of Van and 
Bitlis, thus splitting the Van eyalet into two.  A sixth Armenian-inhabited vilayet, the 
Mamuretülaziz Vilayet, was created in 1879.  These would become known in Ottoman 
official parlance as the vilâyet-i sitte, meaning the Six Vilayets, where a large number of 
Armenians dwelt alongside Muslims, and where the reforms stipulated in both the San 
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Stefano Treaty of 1878 and the subsequent Berlin Treaty of 1878 were to be undertaken 
for Armenians. 
In some nahiyes, typically areas that were formally recognized as hükümet lands, 
the Ottomans granted special privileges to select Kurdish groups.  In these areas, Kurdish 
groups achieved power on a par with, and in some cases exceeding, that of the state 
appointees.12  Part of these privileges included de facto landownership on a scale beyond 
the norm.  For instance, state officials granted the Kiki tribe administrative authority over 
fifty villages in the Diyarbakır region, all of which were inhabited by members of the 
tribe.13  Many Kurdish groups used government privilege to try to acquire landholdings 
and restore the traditional social order that had prevailed in Eastern Anatolia before the 
1840s.  In a letter to the vali of Van in 1875, the Armenian Patriarch Nerses II noted, “it 
has been ascertained that some Kurdish beys and Muslim ağas have managed to seize 
fields that have been tilled and worked by our rural population, and to turn them into 
ocaklıks.”14 
In the spirit of the Hatt-ı Hümayun Imperial Edict of 1856, the Ottoman 
government established increasing numbers of multireligious administrative councils 
throughout Eastern Anatolia.  In 1869, the Sublime Porte founded new councils for the 
livas of Mardin and Hakkari.15  In 1874, the Ottomans included Christian leaders from 
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the Armenian Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Chaldean, Greek Orthodox, Armenian 
Catholic, Syriac Catholic, and Protestant communities on the Diyarbakır administrative 
council.  In 1876, the Ottomans expanded the council of Mardin to include leaders from 
the six different Christian communities.16 
The increased inclusion of non-Muslims in local administration was a 
controversial matter.  While some Muslims saw these policy changes as generally 
innocuous, or even welcome, others saw this as weakness on the part of the Ottoman state 
and a violation of the traditional Muslim-dominated order.  In areas where Armenian 
political activity was strong, such as Van and Muş, Muslim groups were even less 
receptive to reform measures and feared that they would only serve to embolden 
Armenian activism.  Judging by the various political trends between 1870 and 1915, there 
appeared to be a correlation between growth in reactionary attitudes toward equal rights 
among Eastern Anatolian Muslim communities, central government weakness, and the 
growth in Armenian political activism.  The conflagration at Van in 1876, perpetrated by 
local Muslims against Armenians (an unprecedented act in Van where Ottoman 
administration was strong) came at the tail end of the Balkan crisis right before the 
gathering of international diplomats in Istanbul to discuss reform in the Ottoman Empire.  
Armenian revolutionary activity had been growing around the city since 1872.  The mass 
violence perpetrated by many Muslim groups against the Armenians between October 
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and December of 1895—which occurred right after Sultan Abdülhamid II announced that 
he would implement a set of reforms that he had drawn up with Britain, France, and 
Russia for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia—is also further evidence of an increase in 
local Muslim hostility to Armenians corresponding with perceived weakness in the 
Ottoman central government and the rise of Armenian revolutionary activity.17 
Alongside administrative reform efforts, Ottoman officials began attempting 
educational reform in Eastern Anatolia during the 1870s.  Funds were set aside for the 
expansion of rüşdiye schools even into remote areas of the newly created vilayets and 
nahiyes.  For instance, in 1875, the Ottomans earmarked funds and appointed instructors 
for rüşdiye instructors in the villages of Edremit and Zebostan, located in the Van 
vilayet.18  Similar measures were undertaken for the Diyarbakır vilayet around the same 
time.19  As was the case with land administration, state officials hoped to strike a balance 
of power with locals with regard to educational administration.  The state-appointed 
instructors were most often local graduates from seminaries and not appointees from 
more distant locations.20  However, the political and economic crises that the Ottoman 
Empire was facing during the 1870s forced it to slow, if not entirely put off, educational 
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reform efforts.  Between 1869 and 1876, funds for education were cut in half.21  
Nevertheless, the efforts made towards educational implementation in Eastern Anatolia 
are yet another testament to the grand vision of peripheral integration that the tanzimat 
administrators had in mind and their determination to implement reform even amid a 
multitude of shocks and stresses. 
 
Relations Between the Ottoman Administration  
and the Locals 
Between 1869 and 1878, Ottoman valis in Eastern Anatolia varied in their 
relationships with the locals and their attitudes towards reform.  There are also variations 
in the ways in which they were perceived by different local and foreign actors.  Some 
valis were accused of turning a blind eye to atrocities committed by some Kurdish 
Muslim groups and purposefully allowing disorder to prevail.  Burnaby noted in his 
travelogue to Eastern Anatolia in 1877 that many of the “Pachas,” referring to the valis 
and other men appointed by the Sublime Porte to oversee affairs in Eastern Anatolia, took 
bribes from conniving Kurdish elites.  He wrote that at times when these men were 
ordered to dispatch troops to put down Kurdish rebellions would “purposefully leave one 
or two defiles open” to allow the Kurds to escape.  In order to save face, they would then 
send a telegraph back to the Sublime Porte falsely reassuring Istanbul that “perfect order 
reign[ed] throughout the district under [their] command.”22 
In 1871, Consul Taylor criticized the vali of Erzurum of deliberately ignoring the 
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Sublime Porte’s orders to arrest and detain Shaykh Ubaydullah, who was accused of 
committing injustices against Christians:  
Notwithstanding repeated order of the Porte for this man's trial and punishment, 
consequent upon the repeated complaints of the Nestorians, the fanatical feelings 
of the Vali prevailing over his sense of justice and true policy induced him to give 
this criminal, who ought long ago to have been consigned to the bagnio for life, a 
public entry into the town, escorted by public troops and high functionaries.  
During his stay here the fanatical party, headed by the Vali, treated him more like 
an inspired being, a man sent from God, than anything else, and on his departure 
furnished him with such recommendations as induced Aali Pasha, in the face of 
his previous order for Obeyd Ullah's arrest and trial, to declare his innocence of 
all the atrocious crimes he or his people, through his instigation and preaching, 
most undoubtedly committed.23 
 
In some instances, the Porte did try to extricate corrupt and venal valis.  In 
February 1869, the Porte ordered the removal of Abdullah Paşa from Van on charges of 
misconduct, embezzlement, and venality, and replaced him with the mutasarrıf of Kars.24 
Other valis were more committed to a vision of reform and were more willing to 
use heavy-handed tactics against dissenting locals.  Kurt İsmail Hakkı Paşa, a Kurd from 
Kars, was an ardent supporter of the idea to reform Eastern Anatolia.  As an administrator 
in Çıldır, Muş, Van, Hakkari, Dersim, Siirt between 1845 and 1856, he routinely 
attempted to facilitate reform in the region by limiting the movement of seminomadic 
tribes through direct settlement and state supervision.  In 1856, he was sent to Diyarbakır 
to help the military settle tribes.  In 1865, was appointed as a commander in the Fırka-yı 
Islahiye (The Reform Division), a bureaucratic division created in 1865 that played both 
administrative and military roles in putting down rebel activity and settling the tribes in 
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the regions of Kozan, Gavurdağı, Zeytun, Kürtdağı, Akçadağ, and Dersim.25  Inspired by 
the his experiences in the Fırka-yı Islahiye, Kurt İsmail Paşa asked the Sublime Porte to 
be sent back to Diyarbakır where he hoped to bring together a joint military-
administrative effort to settle the tribes in the vilayet, balance power between groups in 
the region, and help integrate non-Muslim groups in the region.  He was appointed in 
1868 and remained there until 1875.26 
Kurt İsmail Paşa founded Diyarbakır’s first newspaper, Diyarbakır Gazetesi, 
which was published in Turkish in both Ottoman and Armenian script.  He helped make 
improvements to the legal and education systems in Diyarbakır, establishing a court of 
appeals and a department of education.  He helped develop the bureaucracy and 
infrastructure by establishing the municipality of Diyarbakır, a provincial council, a 
public works department, and a telegraph department.  Moreover, he attempted to 
improve security, which had been in a dire condition, by organizing a gendarme 
regiment.  He received praise from the British, Ottomans, and locals for his commitment 
to improving the overall situation in the city and the vilayet.27 
Hasan Paşa, the vali of Van during the 1870s, also appeared committed to 
implementing reform and reducing the power of Kurdish tribal groups.  Yeremia 
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Devgants, an emissary of Patriarch Migirdich sent in 1872 to survey the abuses 
committed against Armenians in the region, praised Hasan Paşa for his attempts to 
control tribes and bring justice to the attackers of Armenians.  In his travelogue of his 
journey to the Van region and ‘Upper Armenia,’28 he mentions an occasion when Hasan 
Paşa went out to meet the Kurdish marauders as they were raiding villages on their way 
to Van.  Upon meeting Shaykh Jelaluddin, Hasan Paşa went to kiss his hand.  However, 
Jelaluddin reviled Hasan Paşa and did not even give him his face since he believed him to 
be an “Armenian-lover and a gavur.”29  Hormuzd Rassam, an ethnic Assyrian in the 
service of the British government who journeyed through Eastern Anatolia in 1877, also 
praised Hasan Paşa as well as Abdurrahman Paşa, then vali of Diyarbakır: 
Both Abd-ar-Rahman Pasha, the government-general of Diarbekir, and Hasan 
Pasha, the governor-general of Wan, were trying all they could to remedy the evil 
[of atrocities committed by some Kurdish Muslim groups]; but with the staff they 
had at their command, and for want of funds, it was impossible for them to 
establish the required reform or enforce order in the disturbed districts.30 
 
Burnaby confirms the weak position of many Ottoman administrators in their 
efforts to combat the repeated outrages committed by marauders throughout the region.  
He remarks that an Armenian, who gave him information about the crimes that mountain-
dwelling seminomadic groups, said that “he liked the Pacha at Van,” (referring to the 
vali) but noted that the he “was powerless to prevent these attacks.”  Burnaby’s Armenian 
contact went on to estimate that there were five thousand well-armed Kurdish marauders 
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taking refuge in the mountains and across the Ottoman border in Iran who were capable 
of outmaneuvering any government force.  “Artillery could not be transported in those 
regions,” claimed the contact.  He added, “the troops at the disposal of the Government 
were too few to be of any real assistance.”31 
The fact of the matter was that there was tremendous pressure upon the Ottoman 
administration of Eastern Anatolia from multiple sides.  The Sublime Porte pressured 
administrators to make centralization a priority, which risked alienating Kurdish groups.  
Many of the Kurdish elites pressured administrators through bribes, pleas, passive 
aggression, and threats of violence to allow them free reign of the region.  Finally, Britain 
and some Armenian groups (usually political liberals who supported the cause of the 
peasantry) pressured administrators to prosecute violators of the law, undertake political 
reform, and protect the Armenians.  Even with delicate political maneuvering, 
administrators could hardly avoid offending one group or another. 
 
Continued Power Struggles 
 The removal of the major Kurdish beys from Eastern Anatolia by 1850 created a 
power vacuum that the Ottoman state was able only partially to fill.  Between the 1850s 
and 1870s, an increasing number of smaller Kurdish elites competed with each other for 
power and resources.  For most of this period, the Ottomans focused on containing the 
spread of rebellion against the state, but it generally lacked adequate administrative and 
military capacity to implement controls and security to protect the local populace.  The 
administrative, political, and military initiatives that the Ottoman state undertook between 
                                                          





1864 and 1871 did show signs of improvement.  However, the political and fiscal crises 
in Istanbul during the 1870s stalled the momentum of these initiatives.  Consequently, the 
competition between Kurdish groups for control over land and resources continued 
almost unabated.  Since no single Kurdish group was capable of dominating the other 
through direct combat, they sought a more indirect method of undermining their rivals’ 
power by attacking their economic base.  Economic losses triggered others to engage in 
more theft and ravage.  Hormuzd Rassam describes this vicious cycle in his travelogue: 
In the lowlands, especially in the plains of Bitlis and Moosh, the Christians 
complained of the constant arbitrary demands of their Mohammedan neighbors, 
who were continually exacting whatever they chose; and if their orders were not 
complied with, they would either punish the poor people by incendiary or night 
robbery, or set the Koordish brigands to attack them.  On asking the 
Mohammedan villagers about these complaints, they did not deny the reported 
misdeeds, but said, as they were tyrannized over by other more powerful tribes, 
they considered it right that they should in turn recoup themselves from those who 
were beneath them.  Some went so far to say that, as the Turkish authorities 
oppressed them, they were obliged to turn to their neighbors for contribution.32 
 
A letter from Garegin Srvantsiants, a politically active cleric, reveals another instance of 
Armenians caught in the crossfire between competing Kurdish groups.  He notes that 
while traveling through the village of Kvars in the Çabakçur sancak, the local Armenians 
complained of being “oppressed by both the Boğulna Kurds and Abdal Ağa,” whose 
nearly annual skirmishes imposed a significant burden on them.  However, since the local 
Armenians were armed and organized, they were able to fend off some of the advances of 
the Kurds.33 
The peasantry, both Muslim and Christian, bore the brunt of these power 
struggles.  They were sedentary and lacked the weaponry, social organization, and 
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administrative knowledge to defend themselves adequately.  Many tribal groups appeared 
to be in an effort to restore the power, prestige, and wealth of the earlier beyliks.  They 
often tried to turn the lands that they occupied into tapu (land that was officially 
registered in their names).  Yeremia Devgants, an Armenian who was commissioned by 
the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul to conduct a survey of Armenian society in Eastern 
Anatolia during the early 1870s, notes that many of the Kurds around Nakhchevan, 
“Jelal34 and other Kurds…appropriated large tracts of land and soil from the poor 
villagers and made it tapu.”35  In other cases, Kurdish beys managed to control land 
without officially registering it as tapu land.  Such was the case with Abdal Ağa of 
Çabakçur, who in 1868 “was the lord of much land without having made it tapu.”36 
To make matters even more difficult for the peasantry, many armed seminomadic 
Kurdish groups also resorted to extorting high taxes from them.  The aforementioned 
Abdal Bey of Çabakçur would take half of the crops that villagers produced and 
randomly take whatever he pleased from the Armenians.  He would do the same to 
travelers passing through land under his control.37 
The Ottoman state added to the woes of the peasantry.  In order to offset the 
economic crisis of the 1870s, state administrators made great strides to collect back taxes 
from many de facto exempt areas.  For instance, in 1875, the Ottomans demanded that the 
Heriki tribe and Nestorian Christians make payments on thirty years of arrears in taxes 
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and relinquish their monopolistic control over the tobacco industry in southeastern 
Anatolia.38 
Many Armenian peasants were forced to labor for free and became de facto 
slaves, who were bought and sold.39  An 1869 petition (takrir) signed by several 
Armenians and submitted to the Istanbul patriarchate succinctly sums up many of the 
atrocities to which Armenian peasants were subjected: 
A violent group attacked the village of Shadakh [Çatak], after imposing a fine of 
five hundred, four hundred, and then three hundred kuruş.  They also steal flocks 
of sheep and run.  The local Kurds come later and pillage, but the marauders 
abduct them.40 
 
A noteworthy aspect of this particular petition is how local Kurdish groups were both 
perpetrators of atrocities against Christians, and the victims of more powerful tribes who 
sought to overrun them. 
The security situation was particularly dire near the border, where competition for 
land and resources between Kurdish groups was especially fierce.  The poor 
circumstances forced many Eastern Anatolian Armenians to migrate to Russia in search 
of relief.  Over the course of the 1850s and 1860s, Armenians left the town of Beyazıt, 
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where they once had a much larger presence.41  Political corruption was another reason 
that Armenians contemplated migration.  Devgants notes that “some of the villagers 
thought of migrating to Russia because of the seizures [of land], and because the…beys 
of the vilayet were members of the assemblies and did everything according to their own 
whims.”  He added quite aptly: 
Thus, the Armenians had no legal power to [challenge them] nor the time to 
protest, when poverty’s end dominates them, they…start to protest, but vainly.  
And thus the Armenians are stripped of their rights, first through ignorance, then 
through carelessness.42 
 
The Ottoman government was not keen on the departure of cultivators from the region.  
They viewed them as beneficial to not only the economy, but also to the balance of 
power.  Their presence in the rural regions kept the land tilled and productive, and it also 
kept Kurdish tribes divided.  When Armenian peasants emigrated, it opened up space for 
Kurdish groups to occupy more land and thus increase the ratio of Muslims to Christians 
in the region.  In some cases, it increased the possibility of land disputes between Kurdish 
groups.  In response to reports of Armenian emigration from Pasin, located about twenty-
five miles east of Erzurum, the vali of Erzurum, Samih Paşa, commissioned the 
kaymakam of Pasin to visit the villages from where the Armenians were beginning to 
migrate.  His task was to convince them to stay in their villages and have them sign a 
pledge of loyalty to the sultan.  They were also to pledge that “they would never desire to 
depart the glorious Ottoman Empire.”  However, many refused and migrated.43 
Ottoman documents reveal numerous attempts to endear Christians to the 
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government’s reform efforts and increase security.  There are cases of the Ottoman state 
attempting to intervene to help Christians against their attackers.  In August 1869, the 
Sublime Porte granted Hosep Efendi, a monk who was in charge of millet affairs in the 
Van region, a nişan or medal of honor for his “service and loyalty” to the state.44  In 
1869, the Ottoman state attempted to implement some political reforms for the Nestorian 
Christians around Hakkari, promising them greater political privileges and legal 
protections.45  Reports from Muş in 1868 recorded that tribes were brought under control 
and agitations against Christians in the area were stemmed.46  The archives are replete 
with similar reports throughout the 1860s and 1870s, but they give little information as to 
the effectiveness of the actions taken, and it is more than likely that some administrators 
in Eastern Anatolia embellished reports about the state of security.  The myriad reports 
written by Western observers and Armenians that detail patterns of harassment, theft, 
pillage, plunder, rape, abduction, assaults, and murder serve as evidence that Ottoman 
authorities were generally doing too little to ensure security. On a visit to Muş in 1869 
Consul Taylor reported that the state of security and the economy had deteriorated greatly 
from when he visited the town six years before: “[In 1863,] the villages seemed well 
peopled, and the crops, though damaged by locusts, in far greater variety and profusion 
than [in 1869].” 47 
Muslim victims of oppressive tactics generally lacked the means and knowledge 
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to seek restitution through official channels.  Instead of seeking recourse through the 
Ottoman courts or the Great Powers, they looked to local ağas, beys, and shaykhs for 
protection.  Before the 1850s, beys, such as Bedr Khan Bey, played a crucial role as a 
protective force against disorder.  Since the scope of their power extended over large 
areas, they were able to moderate intertribal disputes and balance power against 
government control.  However, after the 1850s, smaller beys lacked the power to provide 
long-lasting stability and invested much of their time and resources in power struggles 
against other small beys.  Shaykhs came to play an important role as mediators between 
tribes, especially after the fall of large beyliks.  Shaykh Ubaydullah, for instance, 
commanded the allegiance of dozens of different competing tribes in the regions of 





Between 1800 and 1850, the Armenian peasantry had little recourse against either 
local or state abuses of power, and their grievances fell on few supportive ears either in 
the Armenian community or in the Ottoman state apparatus.  The Armenian elites in 
Istanbul either knew little of their plight or believed that there were more pressing matters 
to attend to within the Armenian community, and that by attending to those matters that 
the problems of the peasantry would be lightened.  In addition, many Armenian elites 
turned a blind eye to the condition of the peasantry, not wanting to endanger the status 
quo.  Some Armenian clerics during this time were sympathetic to the peasants’ plight; 
                                                          






however, they were largely apolitical and sought to give them solace through religious 
ritual.  While a few clerics, such as Nerses Ashtaraketsi, did undertake political action for 
the cause of the peasantry, influential actors in the Ottoman Armenian community 
worked hard to curb his influence during this period. 
Missionary activity, the cultural flowering of the Armenian community in the 
western Ottoman Empire, and the expansion of education among the Armenians between 
1830 and 1860 were all factors that contributed to expanding the political consciousness 
of Eastern Anatolian Armenians and altering the mood of the general Armenian 
community more towards political liberalization.  The Armenian cleric Migirdich 
Khrimian was particularly instrumental in shifting the attention of both the larger 
Armenian community and the international community to Eastern Anatolian Armenians.  
Born in Van in 1820, Khrimian grew up in an environment plagued by frequent political 
and social tumult.  He witnessed the struggles between local elites for power over the 
city, the anti-tanzimat riots of the 1840s, the decline of the Armenian elite, and growing 
friction between Kurds and Armenians.  Since his father died while he was young, his 
uncle funded his education at the Varag monastery near the city of Van where he studied 
literature, history, and classical Armenian.49 
His passion for learning and education led him to move to Istanbul in 1847 where 
he became a teacher.  While there, the blossoming literati culture in the Armenian 
community helped shape his thoughts and ideas.  Within this culture were persistent calls 
for the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire to learn and master the Armenian language 
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(many Armenians in the western Ottoman Empire did not speak Armenian), become 
proficient in the sciences, and come together because of their shared ethnicity.  The 
emerging trend within this culture was one of political liberalism with secularist leanings.  
Ethnic greatness took precedence over religious greatness.  Religious and class divisions 
within the Armenian community were to be overcome.  The various advocates of cultural 
change in Istanbul at the time did not, however, call for political autonomy.  They tended 
to stress the idea of transformation within the traditional Ottoman millet structure.50 
Khrimian was impressed by the politically liberal ideas from the West that were 
permeating the Armenian middle class.  He too desired to be active in bringing about 
transformation within the Armenian community and through the channels of the Ottoman 
state (rather than in opposition to it, as had been the trend pursued by many in the Greek 
and Serbian communities of the Ottoman Empire), albeit much more inclusive of the 
Eastern Anatolian peasantry.  After visiting Jerusalem, Cilicia, and Van between 1850 
and 1853 and serving as vartabed at Aghtamar on Lake Van for a year in 1854, he 
returned to Istanbul in 1855, where he began publishing Ardzvi Vaspurakani (The Eagle 
of Van), a periodical that dedicated to a message of liberal reform, national unity, and 
sympathy for the plight of the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia.  He returned to Van in 
1856 to serve as Prior of the Varag monastery and transferred the central location of 
publication and distribution of Ardzvi Vaspurakani to Van in 1858.  The periodical 
continued until 1864.51 
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In Ardzvi Vaspurakan, Khrimian and other liberal writers advanced the idea of the 
nation as a timeless entity that needed to be restored.  For Khriminan, the Armenians’ 
sense of national unity and solidarity had deep roots, dating back to their adoption of 
Christianity in the 300s.  Although this sense continued to exist among the Armenians in 
the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, it had become dormant.  The collective 
Armenian conscience needed to be reawakened not just through a cultural revival, which 
had been taking place among the elite and middle class Armenians living in the Western 
Ottoman Empire, but through social reform. 
Khrimian had a penchant for writing.  He composed elaborate stories and poems 
through many of which he conveyed his sorrow for what had become of the Armenian 
nation and constructed a social vision for change and transformation.  He was careful in 
his writing to not direct overt and sharp criticism toward state authorities and Armenian 
millet authorities.  Yet, a subtle, but powerful, discontent for them is strongly embedded 
in his narrative.  For instance, in a fictional dialogue between an urban Armenian elite 
and peasant, the peasant reacts to the pomp of urban elite by saying, “your laws are like 
traps in which the poor and the weak peasants are caught.  You suck our bloods like 
spiders through bribery, restrictive measures, prohibitions, and other forms of 
injustice.”52 
In 1862, Khrimian was appointed to the position of Prelate of Muş.  While there, 
he continued his pattern of advocacy by publishing the periodical Ardzvi Darono (The 
Eagle of Daron/Muş).  While the periodical was similar to Ardzvi Vaspurakan in its 
                                                          
52 Ardzvi Vaspurakani 10 (1862): 289-308, cited in Liberadian, Modern Armenia: People, 





design, content, and message, it was arguably much more overt in its political advocacy.  
The periodical elicited an angry response from many of the Armenian elites, many of 
whom petitioned the Armenian patriarch to close down its publication.  In a letter to the 
Armenian patriarch in 1863, several Armenian elites in Istanbul accused Khrimian of 
trying to incite a riot against the Ottoman government: 
The Ardzvi is trying to make the case that the Armenians are prisoners in the 
hands of the Kurds and other oppressors among them and over them.  It draws 
attention to the nation-hating (azgatyats) and treacherous Armenians from whom 
the rest of the Armenian nation supposedly needs to be freed.53 
 
Khrimian continuously championed the cause of the Armenian peasantry in 
Eastern Anatolia.  During the early 1860s, he unsuccessfully advocated change to the 
Armenian constitution so that the peasantry in Eastern Anatolia would be more 
proportionally represented in the Armenian National Assembly.54  In the same period, 
Khrimian traveled throughout the regions of Van and Muş listening to the stories of the 
unfortunate, downtrodden masses of Armenians and gathering reports of complaint 
(takrir), which detailed all of the abuses committed by Kurdish groups and Ottoman 
officials.  He encouraged clerics to gather lists of grievances to submit to both Armenian 
authorities in the millet as well as Ottoman authorities.  During his travels, Khrimian tried 
to convince Kurdish groups to align their interests with his.  While some agreed, Kurdish 
religious figures, who were filling the power vacuum left after the Ottomans toppled the 
major beys in the 1840s, were generally resistant to his ideas of a union.55 
By the late 1860s, Khrimian had gained a tremendous amount of support and 
                                                          
53 Poghosian, Sasuni Patmutyun, 63-64. 
54 Libaridian, Modern Armenia, 58-63. 





popularity among the Armenian community.  A sufficient number of largely middle class 
Armenians in the National Assembly had become enamored of his message to elect him 
Patriarch of Constantinople in 1869, which he reluctantly accepted.  His election was 
nothing short of controversial, both in the Armenian community and in the Ottoman state.  
The lingering Armenian elite, who although small in number had substantial political and 
social influence, resented Khrimian’s thrust.  The Sublime Porte, keen on maintaining the 
status quo, acquiesced in Khrimian’s election, fearing strong reaction from British and 
Russian officials and possible rebellion in the Armenian community if they attempted to 
bar his assumption of power.56 
As Patriarch, Khrimian continued to do as he had previously done, pushing 
reform through the proper channels.  His method had the support of much of the 
politically active Armenian community, which set it apart from many elements within the 
Serbian and Greek communities, who had pursued a path of separatism.  Khrimian was 
careful not to appear to challenge the sovereignty of the Ottoman state.  He promoted the 
idea of a state within a state, much like the traditional millet system, except with a more 
diverse power distribution among the Armenians and with greater protection on the part 
of the state.  He preached a strong message of populism, promoting the idea that the goals 
of the people who governed Armenian society within the Ottoman state should align with 
the needs and interests of the larger Armenian population.  In his inaugural speech as 
patriarch, Khrimian said, “for me the interests of the state and the nation are the same.”57  
Khrimian was a strong supporter of the Armenian Constitution and sought to use it as a 
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tool of political liberalization from the hold of the traditional Armenian elite on power.  
His opponents had long been inveighing against his attempt to use the constitution to 
forward his political aims.  In 1863, political rivals wrote letters of protest to the 
government in which they claimed that beneath his rhetorical appeal to constitutionalism 
he fostered “a secret aim to provoke the Armenians, to preach against government power, 
and to cause the people to rebel.”58  The mood of many of the elites toward him in 1869 
was similar. 
One of the first items on Khrimian’s agenda as patriarch was to compile a list of 
grievances submitted by Armenians throughout the Empire against abuses committed by 
government officials and local Muslim groups and individuals, and submit them first to 
the Armenian National Assembly for review and approval, and then to the Sublime Porte 
as a petition for drastic security and policy reform.  This list was based on 529 takrirs 
(letters of petition or complaint) that had been compiled by Armenian ecclesiastics and 
other Armenian authorities in all areas inhabited by Armenians between March 14, 1849 
and March 21, 1869.  The petition contained four categories of complaints.  The first 
category was a list of tax abuses committed by Ottoman officials (many of whom were 
local Kurds with strong ties to dominant local tribes).  The Armenian Patriarch had 
received complaints that taxes were being imposed on the dead and that military 
exemption taxes were being imposed on those who were too young or too old for military 
service.  Villagers commonly complained of officials backing nonofficial local Kurdish 
tribes in tax collection, often at extortionate rates.  Tax collectors often extorted villagers 
of their resources by assessing lands based on perceived potential production rather than 
                                                          





actual production.  Furthermore, Armenians were forced to give some of their produce to 
a general stock kept at a warehouse, which was intended for the use of peasants affected 
by poor harvests. However, in the ten years that it functioned, hardly any Armenians in 
need actually benefitted from the stock.  Assessors often deliberately overvalued the 
lands of non-Muslims, and cultivators were forced to pay according to these over-
assessments. For instance one piece of land that was registered by the kassam at a value 
of 59,090 kuruş was estimated by assessors to be worth 527,942 kuruş, nearly nine times 
the original stated amount.  High interest rates on loans forced many peasants to default, 
and as a result officials and local ringleaders justified confiscating their lands.  Some 
were forced to pay taxes for years of exemption in the past and were forced to sell 
property to pay.  Officials would sometimes make arbitrary demands and assessments.59 
The second category of complaints concerned abuses of power by government 
officials.  Plaintiffs claimed that officials commonly kept Armenians from being able to 
bury their dead.  They forced the peasantry into corvée labor for little pay.  Zaptiyes 
extorted money from the peasantry and would secretly enter houses and churches and 
steal their valuables.  Convicts were appointed to positions of power and Armenians were 
routinely excluded from town councils. The town councils would support actions to 
convert women and children to Islam by force, local notables controlled who was 
selected to be on the municipal councils, and kadis would deprive the rightful heirs of 
their inheritance.  The Armenian Patriarch believed that since the livelihood and career 
advancement of most members of councils were dependent on their ties to these notables, 
the notables operated a sort of shadow government that showed the semblance of fairness 
                                                          





in decision-making, but was in reality an elite-dominated form of oppression.60 
The third category of complaints was in regard to the administration of justice.  
No Christian witnesses were allowed to testify in court for cases involving Christian 
victims of Muslim perpetrators, which allowed perpetrators of all sorts of crimes to go 
unpunished.  Victims of oppression and abuse often declined to give the names of those 
who had perpetrated crimes against them, fearing reprisals that would be even worse than 
the abuses.61 
The fourth category of complaint was concerning the overall lack of effective and 
efficient channels to administer justice.  The bishops and the councils were limited in 
their ability to address injustices.  The National Assembly could only submit complaints 
to the Patriarch, and the Patriarch could then submit them to the Sublime Porte.  The 
Patriarchate and National Assembly lost power after the Sublime Porte instituted the 
process of istilam, or official inquiry, wherein the Sublime Porte would give valis orders 
to attend to the grievances submitted by inhabitants of their vilayets.  The governor would 
in turn order the mutasarrıfs and kaymakams of their respective vilayets to look into the 
matters at hand.  These lower functionaries would often neglect or downplay the 
significance of the cases and would force plaintiffs to sign documents of satisfaction, or 
satisfaction pieces, which would claim that the case had been attended to and the 
concerns had been resolved.  Those who refused to sign were threatened with punishment 
and even death.62 
Between the twenty years that Armenian clerics compiled and submitted lists of 
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grievances, most takrirs came from the vilayets of Diyarbakır and Erzurum, one hundred 
and fifty-eight and one hundred and thirty-six respectively, mostly out of the sancaks of 
Muş, Harput, and Diyarbakır.  During this period, eighty-three takrirs were submitted 
from the vilayet of Sivas, forty-four takrirs from Aleppo, nineteen from Adana, fourteen 
from Trabzon, thirteen from Syria, one from Aydın, two from Ankara, thirty-eight from 
Bursa, one from Kastamonu, and nine from Rumelia.  These figures show that although 
the greatest number of incidents occurred in Kurdish-inhabited areas, Armenians faced 
widespread persecution in the largely Turkish-inhabited regions of Central and Western 
Anatolia as well.63 
The report listed a number of suggestions for the Sublime Porte to take in order to 
remedy the injustices.  These included the inclusion of Armenians in the Ottoman armed 
forces, census and tax reform, the cessation of the collection of arrears, increased checks 
and balances to guard against power abuses, stricter enforcement of laws, elections of 
Armenians to local councils, tighter security along the Iranian border, the disarmament of 
locals, and political reforms within the Armenian National Assembly and church to 
ensure fair representation of the interests of the Armenian peasantry.64 
A sizable number of members of the Armenian National Assembly were 
unsympathetic to the tone of the report and refused to support a motion to submit it to the 
Sublime Porte, fearing that Ottoman officials would seek to remove them from their 
positions in retaliation.  However, some opposing members agreed to submit a revised 
report of complaints to the Sublime Porte on the condition that the Assembly should 
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refrain from overt criticism of state officials.  The revision was finalized and submitted 
on April 11, 1876.  It directed its criticism mostly towards Kurdish groups and some low-
ranking state officials in Eastern Anatolia and suggested that the government step up 
measures to monitor Kurdish activity.  However, beleaguered by the political tumult in 
the Balkans and pressure from the Great Powers at the time, the Sublime Porte ignored 
the report. 
 
Abuses of Armenians 
Notably absent in both the first and second reports was any overt criticism of 
leading figures in the Armenian millet.  However, in numerous letters and writings, 
Khrimian and his liberal followers were highly critical of the leading figures of the 
Armenian millet including many higher clergy. Yeremia Devgants, a close ally of 
Khrimian, who surveyed the situation of the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia in the early 
1870s, divided the oppressors into two camps, “internal and external.”  “The internal 
oppressors,” he noted, “are from among ourselves.”65 
Among these internal oppressors was a group of conservative Armenian elements 
consisting of clerics and ishkhans, led by Boghos Melikian, who was elected bishop 
(vartabed) of Van in the 1850s.  They maintained close ties to the Ottoman government 
and local Kurdish groups, and tried to stamp out efforts to liberalize the educational 
curriculum and to secularize the millet.  Critics accused Melikian of corruption, asserting 
that he took bribes from Ottoman officials and Kurdish elites, and other “thieves, bandits, 
and oppressors” in order to overlook abuses committed against Armenian peasants in the 
                                                          





Van region.  In an 1869 article in the Ottoman Armenian newspaper Manzume-yi Efkar, 
Yeremia Devgants criticized Melikian as “the godfather of the Kurds” for his strong ties 
with corrupt Kurdish elites.66  Armenian millet leaders in Istanbul were hesitant to take 
strong action against Melikian, but eventually responded to pressure from within Van and 
decided to banish him from Van in 1860 and relocate him to the Erzurum region, where 
he maintained ties and contacts.67  Opponents of Melikian, such as Migirdich Khrimian, 
Yeremia Devgants, Raffi, and other liberal-minded Armenians consisting of students, the 
literati, the peasantry, and merchants, labeled Eastern Anatolian supporters of Melikian 
‘Boghosians’ and called themselves ‘Aboghosians,’ meaning anti-Boghosians.68  The 
followers of Melikian maintained a strong foothold in the Van region throughout the 
1870s and 1880s, and systematically used physical abuse, even on women and children, 
to punish dissenters and cow the Armenians in Van into submission.  He helped organize 
the exile of liberal educator Migirdich Portukalian from Van in 1883, and was suspected 
of involvement in the exile of Khrimian as well.  Some Armenians in Van claimed that 
Melikian was more to blame than the Kurds for injustices committed against poor 
Armenians in the region.69  Melikian was not the only corrupt powerful Armenian in 
Eastern Anatolia.  Khrimian records that he encountered others like Melikian while in 
Muş.  Nshikian notes that the primate of Erzurum, Bishop Harutiun, also had strong ties 
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with Kurdish elites and abused his power.70 
Khachatur Shiroyan, who served as the Catholicos of Aghtamar at various times 
between the early 1870s and 1896, was another influential member of the clergy in the 
Van region who was the subject of liberal criticism.  Like Melikian, he was a staunch 
defender of the religious and political traditions of the Armenian Gregorian elites and 
reportedly resorted to austere measures to stamp out efforts to propagate liberal 
education.  One of the inhabitants of the village of Gevaş describes Shiroyan’s efforts 
against Armenian petitioners for education: 
We gathered a number of the leading men of the villages to ask the Catholicos to 
build a school for our children and bring in educated clerics to teach them.  The 
Catholicos promised to respond to our request the next day.  That night, 
Catholicos Khachadur dragged a coat of arms that he had obtained from the 
Sublime Porte through the mud and put it on us.  In the morning, when we went to 
him, he blew fire and flames at us and called us criminals and threatened to turn 
us in to the government.71 
 
Yeremia Devgants was particularly critical of Shiroyan.  He accused him of 
murdering Catholicos Bedros72 in order to usurp his position.  Shiroyan managed to 
persuade the court to acquit him by accusing two local Kurds of committing the murder.  
As Catholicos of Van, he was reportedly venal and corrupt, taking bribes from 
wrongdoers (both Armenians and Kurds) to overlook crimes, extorting from Armenian 
peasants, and awarding himself a large salary (five times what his predecessor had taken).  
Devgants calls Shiroyan a hypocrite, paying lip service to liberal causes when 
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convenient, but bolstering a corrupt and oppressive governing system.  According to 
Devgants, Khachadur and another local bishop (Bishop Hagop) falsely protested against 
the oppressive Kurds of Çatak and Shaykh Jelaleddin of Müküs, with whom he actually 
had good relations.73  Devgants did take some satisfaction in the idea that Shiroyan had 
isolated himself: 
[Shiroyan] now sits as a jail bird at the patriarchate and continually protests 
against the oppressors of the people, sometimes he forces his will upon the 
people, to a much worse degree than foreign oppressors, and with severe 
inhumanity beleaguers the villagers.74 
 
However, to the chagrin of liberal Armenian activists, Shiroyan managed to surround 
himself with his friends and allies and win the support of Ottoman officials to remain in 
his position until his death in 1896.  He celebrated the birthday of Sultan Abdülhamid II 
with praise in 1895.75 
 British Consul Taylor puts forth similar criticism of many Armenian elites, 
blaming the members of the Armenian National Assembly for indifference, “wilful 
apathy,” and “silence” on injustices.76 
 
Reverberations of Conflict 
It had not been since the massacres of Assyrian Christians in Tiyari, Aşita, and 
Tkhuma in the 1840s that the British had given much attention to the Christians in 
Eastern Anatolia.  The Russians had been vigilantly monitoring the situation of the 
Armenians throughout the 1850s and 1860s, which they hoped to exploit for their own 
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political advantage against the Ottomans, but were not in a position to engage in another 
international conflict with the Empire.  The crisis in Lebanon in the early 1860s had 
occupied British (and French) attention, but they did not appear to be greatly concerned 
with the Armenians even during the revolts in Van, Zeytun, and Muş between 1862 and 
1864.  The British appeared content to let Ottoman policy in Eastern Anatolia, as well as 
in relation to other Christian minorities, stand as it was as long as Russia did not appear 
to constitute an immediate threat.   
However, the crisis in the Balkans in 1875 drew British attention to the conditions 
of the Christians in the empire and the Ottomans’ endeavors to protect them from abuses.  
In Bosnia, conflict between Christian peasants and state tax collectors arose resulting in a 
number of deaths on both sides.  The British government intervened politically in 1875 
urging the Ottomans to make reforms that would provide relief for the Christian peasants.  
They were satisfied with the Ottomans’ proposals to lower taxes and appoint both 
Christians and Muslims to local decision-making councils.  Yet when the rebellion 
continued, the Sublime Porte sent reinforcements to subdue the opposition, causing 
thousands of Christians to flee across the border into Austria, Serbia, and Montenegro.  
This crisis in the Balkans resulted in an increase of petitions for foreign intervention, thus 
causing negotiators throughout Europe to prepare for international discussion and the 
possibility of war.77 
Disenchantment over the foreign policy of Britain in relation to the Ottoman 
Empire had been growing among many influential British opposition politicians. 
Gladstone and other Liberal Party members accused the Conservative government of 
                                                          





turning a blind eye to the Ottoman state’s alleged apathy and neglect. They considered 
that propping up the Ottoman Empire to stave off Russian expansion indirectly allowed 
the sufferings of Christians to continue.  An outbreak of conflict in Bulgaria in 1876, 
which culminated with widespread violence in the Batak region leaving hundreds of 
Christians and Muslims dead, vindicated the criticism of liberal British politicians toward 
the Ottomans and their conservative backers. 
The Balkan crisis led many officials to inquire more deeply into the state of the 
Christians in Eastern Anatolia.  Consul James Zohrab was instrumental in calling the 
attention of high-ranking British officials to the dire situation of the Armenians in Eastern 
Anatolia.  He attributed the rampant injustice committed by both government officials 
and nonstate Kurdish elites to “fanaticism, cruelty, and dishonesty,” which he described 
as “the only incentives to action which move[d] the men who are sent to administer this 
unhappy country.”78  While he maintained that the administrators at Istanbul did not share 
the same “fanaticism,” they were “indifferent” toward the plight of the Eastern Anatolian 
peasantry and more concerned about reaping a continuous stream of revenue than helping 
the socially disadvantaged.79  He claimed that there was an ongoing crisis of injustice in 
Eastern Anatolia that warranted the same degree of attention, if not more, than the crises 
in the Balkans.  Based on a letter that he had received from a missionary at Van he wrote: 
“were the cruelties perpetrated by the Koords known in Europe, the Bulgarian atrocities 
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would be thrown into the shade.”80 
For Zohrab, the state of injustice in which the Armenians lived was more 
attributable to the political culture of the local Kurdish elites than to the officials 
appointed by the central government, who struggled to maintain control over the Kurds.  
He notes in a letter to the Earl of Derby (the Foreign Secretary) an incident that spoke 
volumes about the knowledge and political logic of many Ottoman officials at the time in 
dealing with the Kurdish elites.  Thus a Catholic Armenian girl from Muş, who had 
allegedly expressed interest in converting to Islam, was being held at Erzurum.  It had 
become commonplace for local Muslims in Eastern Anatolia to make allegations that 
Christians intended to convert to Islam in order to 1) pressure particular Christians to 
adopt Islam, thus forfeiting their protection by the Armenian millet and foreign 
governments and 2) harry Christian families whom they suspected of noncompliance and 
disloyalty.  When Zohrab informed the vali of Erzurum of the girl’s desire to return to 
Muş to rejoin her parents, the vali told him that “it was his duty to prevent bloodshed; 
that the return of the girl to Moosh [sic] would probably bring on events which would 
necessitate a movement of troops, while her murder would be related in all the papers of 
Europe as an evident proof that the Hatti-Humayoun had not been put in force and 
remains a dead letter.”  The vali’s remarks are telling of the pressure that Ottoman 
officials felt from the British over the question of their adherence to the tanzimat reforms 
and the fact that they were unable to implement any major reforms in the predominantly 
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In other accounts, Zohrab notes many occasions on which Ottoman officials 
appeared to fear the consequences of forceful intervention in Kurdish-held territory.  In 
his memoirs of his travels through Eastern Anatolia in 1876, Fred Burnaby tells of a 
conversation that he had with Consul Zohrab in which he told a story in which a Kurdish 
robber “attacked a Turkish merchant” near Harput (modern-day Elazığ).  The merchant 
was able to fend off the robber and wound him, whereupon the robber fled and took 
refuge with a nearby shaykh, Miri Mehmed.  In pursuit of the bandit, a colonel of the 
military division of Erzurum invited the shaykh for dinner to coax him to deliver the 
robber into official hands.  When he refused, the colonel threatened him with arrest for 
obstructing justice.  However, when higher ranking Ottoman authorities received word of 
the potential detention of the shaykh, they ordered the colonel to release him for fear of 
inciting locals to riot.82  Zohrab also claimed that in the case of rebellions and refusals to 
deliver criminals to state justice, Ottoman officials in the Kurdish regions would dispatch 
troops to intimidate the Kurds from staging outright rebellion, but would “purposefully 
leave” an open space for them to escape.  They would then send “telegraphs back to 
Constantinople that perfect order reigns throughout the district under [their] command.”83 
It is unclear how or if there was any correlation between the crises in the Balkans 
and violence in Eastern Anatolia, although it is certainly the case that many Muslim 
refugees from the Balkans (and the Caucasus) were sent to Eastern Anatolia later in the 
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nineteenth century. It is difficult to ascertain to what degree Kurdish groups would have 
had an understanding of international politics and its potential effects on them.  
Nonetheless it appears that Kurdish groups were capable of informing themselves of the 
potential impact of international politics on their immediate environment through a 
number of conduits.  Kurds near the Ottoman border with Russia were able to inform 
themselves of Russia’s stance toward the Ottoman Empire through direct contact with 
them.  These Kurds may not have had direct conversation with the Russians, but could 
gauge international relations through patterns of interaction.  Kurdish elites near the 
border were often the recipients of gifts and bribes by Russian officials, according to 
Consul Zohrab in a conversation with Burnaby.  In response to Burnaby’s question of 
which side the Kurds would join in the event of a war with Russia, he replied: “They will 
go with the side which pays them the most money…. many of them are known to be in 
Russian pay, and presents are continually being sent by the authorities in the Caucasus to 
the chiefs in [the environs of Erzurum].”84 When Russia increased its gifts and bribes to 
Kurdish groups, this was interpreted as a sign that it was giving more serious 
consideration to an invasion of Eastern Anatolia.  Kurdish groups near the border were 
the first to know of Russia’s increased interest in invasion, and the word gradually spread 
to Kurdish groups more distant from the border.  
A telling incident that indicates the Kurdish groups’ knowledge, or at least their 
general sense, of growing tensions between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was the 
widespread arson that took place in the city of Van in December 1876. Zohrab reported 
on December 18 that the “town of Van…suffered much from a fire…[which] was the 






work of an incendiary.”  He further stated the “Christians believe[d] [the fire to have 
been] done by the military for the sake of plunder,” since the Muslims made off “with 
goods out of the burning shops.”  He exculpated the vali of Van from blame since he was 
at the time sick with “typhoid fever.”85  In a follow-up memo on December 26, Zohrab 
reported that some eight hundred to one thousand shops were destroyed in the fire, with 
both troops and “Koords” looting the shops who “carried off the booty to the 
mountains.”86  He sent another memo to Derby on the same day reporting that other fires 
had taken place in a number of other villages throughout Eastern Anatolia not long after 
the fire at Van.   
Nonetheless the fire at Van was particularly significant.  Like Erzurum and 
Diyarbakır, Van was supposed to be more heavily fortified and better protected from 
banditry, unlike most of the countryside.  The economic activity of the relatively large 
Armenian community in the city was seen as generally beneficial to the local economy, 
and Armenians and Kurds in the city had relatively good relations.  The scale of the arson 
and plunder is an indication that the act was well-coordinated between the Kurdish 
groups living in the environs of Van and the military, many of whom were probably 
Kurds themselves.  It is likely that the act was not perpetrated simply to plunder goods 
and acquire wealth, but also to deal a major blow to the local Armenian community.  By 
burning their property, the Kurds in effect seized the property, since it drove down its 
value so much as to force the Armenian owners to abandon it altogether and find another 
                                                          
85 Consul Zohrab, Erzurum, to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 18 December 1876, 
Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, Turkey no. 15 (1877), no. 3, 3. 
86 Consul Zohrab, Erzurum, to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 26 December 1876, 





locale, if not another profession. 
The incident at Van in December 1876 was such a significant turning point in 
Kurdish-Armenian relations that it prompted Khrimian, himself a native of Van, to 
publish a pamphlet entitled Vankuyzh (the catastrophe of Van) in which he laments the 
mass fire and its effects on the Armenian community.  In the pamphlet he openly 
criticizes the Ottoman government’s tolerance of violence against the Armenian people 
and insinuates that there is hope in salvation through Russia and other foreign powers.  
“For five whole centuries,” he writes, “[the Ottomans] have lived with the Armenians 
who have become their loyal yoke-bearing ox to till the ground.”  The Armenian nation, 
he continues, had “borne the scourges” of the Ottoman Empire and yet remained a 
subservient and obedient people.  Yet he urges the Armenian ashkharh (nation) to lift up 
its head because “spring is near…and the swallow will deliver you from the throes of the 
Turkish nation and the day of revival has arrived, and you shall see at that time how that 
pile of ashes will sprout from barrenness and become green, and your prosperity will be 
greater than it was before.”87  The pamphlet was a precursor to one of his most popular 
and influential pamphlets entitled Haykuyzh (the catastrophe of the Armenians), which he 
wrote in early 1877.  Khrimian published these pamphlets with the help of his Armenian 
associates in Tiflis since the Ottomans sought to stifle their distribution for fear that they 
would arouse greater opposition among the Porte’s Armenian subjects. 
It is significant that Zohrab differentiates between Ottoman appointees who 
exploited the Armenians and those who tried to prevent exploitation and promote justice.  
He notes that the vali of Van at the time of the fire, Hasan Paşa, was a just figure who 
                                                          





sought to maintain security for the Armenians in the region in spite of his inability to 
maintain control over the semiindependent Kurdish militias who comprised many of the 
troops under his command.  In his memoir of his journey to Eastern Anatolia in 1877, 
Hormuzd Rassam echoes Zohrab’s commendation of Hasan Paşa as well as 
Abdurrahman Paşa, the vali of Diyarbakır.  He laments that they were unable to 
undertake a reform overhaul in the region because of “the want of funds.”88   
Zohrab also notes that Samih Paşa, the head of the fourth military division in 
Erzurum at the time, was open to the possibility of greater Armenian representation in the 
local politics of Van.  One of Samih Paşa’s ideas was to appoint an Armenian muavvin 
(high-ranking assistant) who would serve as an assistant to the vali, in order to help 
habituate the local Muslims in the region to a Christian in a position of government 
authority.  He expressed hope that this would pave the way for a potential Christian vali 
of Van who could govern both Muslim and Christian locals effectively with little 
opposition.  According to Zohrab, Samih Paşa “believe[d] a Christian would prove a 
better administrator for [the Van] province than a Mussulman.”89 Consul Zohrab painted 
other Ottoman authorities in a more negative light.  For instance he characterizes Nazim 
Bey, an Ottoman official who was dispatched to Van to investigate the fire, as 
disingenuous, if not deceptive, for claiming that the conflagration in Van was 
“accidental,” that Christians were also active in pillaging properties, and that shops 
owned by Muslims were also burned in the fire.90 
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 It should be noted that the fire at Van occurred a mere five days before the 
Istanbul conference of 1876-1877 which began with Sultan Abdülhamid II’s 
promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution, which granted equality to Christian subjects.  
Of course, those responsible for the fire would have been most unlikely to have any 
foreknowledge of the imminent promulgation of the Constitution. However, the crisis in 
the Balkans compounded with the accession of Sultan Abdülhamid II and the noticeable 
increase in the diplomatic presence of the Russians and British, undoubtedly created a 
new aura that led the Kurds to the belief that harsher tactics against the Armenians would 
be necessary to preempt them from benefitting from the reforms in the direction of 
gaining any significant political authority. 
 Zohrab discerned a pattern of increased violence against Armenians early in early 
1877.  In late January, Reverend George P. Knapp sent a telegraph to Zohrab informing 
him that a “panic in [the] Bitlis district” was taking place that resulted in “several 
murders,” the devastation of many villages, and the desertion of lands by Armenians out 
of fear of Kurdish attacks.  He added that the inhabitants of the Bitlis region, both 
“Mussulman [and] Christian, watch[ed] armed in their barricaded houses.”  Zohrab 
believes that what was taking place was a collaboration of several Kurdish tribal elites 
from Bitlis, Muş, and Mutkan for the purpose of looting and pillaging property in order to 
intimidate the inhabitants to flee and then to seize the properties. When Zohrab informed 
Samih Paşa of the incident and requested that he send troops, the latter replied that if he 
provided soldiers to protect “every town which was [then] menaced by Koords, he would 





people of each town to provide their own police force.91 
 On March 15, 1877 Zohrab reported that the persecution of Christians at Erzurum 
had grown to unprecedented levels, which was significant given that Erzurum, like Van, 
was supposed to be under more thorough-going Ottoman protection.  Many of the 
perpetrators were Ottoman military officers who would reportedly “go to shops, and take 
goods at their own prices; the least remonstrance on the part of the owners results in 
abuse and blows; people are beaten, and the Christian religion is openly cursed.  This is 
done in the presence of the soldiers who crowd the streets, and they follow the example.”  
Similar actions were committed in Gümüşhane in that same year. In late March the 
British Foreign Secretary ordered all consular officials to immediately submit a detailed 
report of all abuses committed against Christians throughout the empire.92 
 
Dersim: A Last Frontier in Eastern Anatolia? 
 The Dersim region (present-day Tunceli) is worthy of mention because it was one 
of the last regions in Eastern Anatolia that the Ottomans managed to place under their 
tenuous central control during the tanzimat period.  Nestled in the Taurus mountains 
between Erzincan and Mamuret Ülaziz (modern-day Elazığ), Dersim differed in a 
number of ways from other Kurdish/Armenian-majority areas.  The predominant dialects 
spoken in Dersim during the nineteenth century were two more or less mutually 
intelligible dialects called Kirmanjki (not to be confused with Kurmanji) and Zazaki, 
which, although still considered Kurdish dialects by the locals (as they self-identified as 
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Kurds), were greatly different from the Kurmanji and Sorani Kurdish dialects spoken 
further southeast.  Furthermore, many of the inhabitants of Dersim were Alevis who did 
not identify with Sunni Islam.  
The rugged terrain of the region provided small groups with natural defenses from 
outside intervention, which meant that a large number of small tribes and families 
managed to hold power over various subregions.  Power-sharing in Dersim was much 
like that in Hakkari before the advent of the foreign missionaries (which left an indelible 
mark on the political consciousness of the Hakkari region’s inhabitants).  Also since 
Dersim was not close to the border with Russia and not vulnerable to military 
penetrations from Iraq or Egypt, the Ottomans did not try to keep power centralized 
around a single powerful family as they did in Muş and Beyazıt. 
The administrative reforms in Dersim began in 1848.  In 1851, Ottoman 
authorities created the Dersim sancak, which was placed under the jurisdiction of the 
Harput eyalet, and regularly rotated a number of prominent local elites in and out of the 
administrative office in the sancak in order to prevent any one elite from amassing power 
and to discipline rebellious behavior.93  Not long after its creation, the Dersim sancak 
experienced a great deal of instability and unrest.  Groups resorted to plunder and murder 
as a means of gaining power and wealth in an increasingly uncertain environment.  The 
state frequently sent in outside forces to intervene in heated and often bloody disputes 
between local groups.  During the Crimean War the state ratcheted up pressure on Dersim 
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to pay dues and provide soldiers, but many resisted.  The land had been ravaged because 
of power struggles that were a significant cause of a famine in 1855.94 
After the Crimean War the state stepped up its efforts once again to rid the region 
of brigands and rebels and bring it under more central control.  The state’s efforts were 
popular among many disempowered groups who were the targets of local bandits.  In 
1857 a group of people from the region sent a letter of thanks to Ismail Paşa, the vali of 
Harput, for his efforts in protecting them from the excesses of the Koçgiri tribe.  The 
letter was likely an attempt to woo officials to appoint one of them to a position of power 
rather than an expression of solidarity with the Ottoman state’s political vision.95  Yet 
despite state efforts to rein in unrest, social conditions remained bleak. 
The driving force behind the state’s political venture into Dersim was partly the 
need to increase its revenue and number of military recruits, but also to stem the rise of 
political elites and movements.  The growth of Bedr Khan’s influence during the 1840s 
had shown the state that the Kurds were indeed capable of mobilizing a formidable force 
against it.  With Russia eagerly seeking opportunities to embolden local opposition 
against the Ottoman state, the sultan did not want to take chances. 
During the 1850s and 1860s it became increasingly apparent that the state’s 
ineffective efforts to implement its administrative apparatus in the region were 
insufficient to stem the rise of powerful elites.  In 1863 a number of local religious and 
lay Kurdish elites, foremost among them being Şah Hüseyin, Gulabî, Mansur, and 
Shaykh Süleyman, gained increasing power, influence, and wealth.  Şah Hüseyin, the 
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müdür of the influential Koçgiri tribe96 controlled 366 villages by 1863.97  He and other 
elites would often acquire land through unlawful seizure and flout official orders to desist 
from abusing their power.  The state would often respond to their defiance by exiling 
them to other parts of the empire.  Thus Şah Hüseyin was exiled to Vidin in Bulgaria in 
1863, and others were exiled to places such as Yemen, Basra, and Sinop.98 
The exile of elites was a risky activity.  Elites often commanded a certain degree 
of legitimacy from the locals that state officials were hard pressed to gain for themselves.  
Also they were often militarily strong enough to maintain political order, even if it was 
usually through brutal and unjust means.  By removing the elites, the state created power 
vacuums that multiple competing forces tried to fill.  For instance in 1860 a land dispute 
emerged between the Şeyh Hasanlı tribe and the Pilevenk tribe who sought claim over 
Sağman.  Both sides resorted to violence, theft, and property destruction to try to force 
the other side to relent.  Another land dispute arose in 1862 between an alliance between 
the Suroğlu and Bahtiyar tribes and the Kabeşoğlu tribe over rights to land use in the 
Kemah region.  The state dispatched forces to try to resolve the conflict, but it was only a 
modest effort that ended up having little effect.99  The Ottomans would usually end up 
allowing elites to return from exile to help reconstruct the social order. 
Shaykh Süleyman, one of the leading religious figures of the region, remained a 
perpetual menace for the Ottoman state.  By the 1860s he is said to have enjoyed the 
allegiance of some five thousand individuals.  Ali Bey, the grandson of Hüseyin Bey, 
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acting as tax collector for the Dersim district, faced significant difficulty in persuading 
those loyal to Shaykh Süleyman to pay full taxes to the Ottoman state and to comply with 
the conventional laws of conscription.100  The mounting tension between the Kurds and 
the Ottoman state is illustrated further by the fact that the shaykhs of Dersim refused to 
negotiate.  When the sultan ordered Ahmet Muhtar Pasha to hold talks with the leading 
shaykhs and beys in Dersim to try to persuade them to give their allegiance to the 
Ottoman state, only Hüseyin Bey, the son of the aforementioned Ali Bey, and Gülâbi 
Bey, the kaymakam of Mazgirt, participated.  Notably absent were Shaykh Süleyman and 
Mansur Ağa, another powerful figure in the Dersim region.  Gülâbi Bey’s participation 
was not met well by the shaykh class, who ambushed and killed him on his return.101 
During the 1870s the Russians, hoping to sway the inhabitants of Dersim to its 
side because of its strategic location near Erzurum, sought Shaykh Süleyman as an 
ally.102  Sultan Abdulaziz commissioned Samih Pasha to go to Dersim in 1875 to entice 
the Kurdish leaders to side with the Ottomans against Russia. Having infiltrated tribal 
politics more than the Ottoman state expected, the religious class remained obdurate in its 
resistance to the Ottoman state. Shaykh Süleyman managed to accumulate a large number 
of weapons from the Russians and to mobilize a formidable force of 12,000 soldiers, 
comprising the militias of numerous tribes, against the Ottoman forces.  Despite his 
resistance to the Ottoman state, he was eventually routed and exiled.103 Ottoman attempts 
to take control of Dersim and Russian victories in Kars and Beyazid during the war gave 
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the Dersimi tribes impetus to engage Ottoman forces once again in the summer of 1877.  
The Fourth Ottoman brigade entered a number of villages in the Toshik mountains to 
drive out rebels, but local religious elites called upon Armenian and Kurdish groups to 
take up arms and fend off the ‘Turkish invasion’.104 
 
The Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878 
Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on April 24, 1877.  The idea of 
another invasion of Ottoman territory through the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia gained 
force with the crises in the Balkans in 1875 and 1876.  Nikolai Ignatiev, the Russian 
ambassador to Istanbul between 1864 and 1877, had secretly been trying to promote Pan-
Slavism since his appointment to the Ottoman capital.  He originally promoted the idea 
that Austria-Hungary was the greatest threat to the Balkan Slavs and that by fostering a 
strong relationship with the Ottomans, Russia could keep the Habsburgs at bay and 
eventually turn the Ottoman Empire into a satellite state.105  However, Ignatiev gradually 
lost his patience with the sultan and secretly began trying to subvert Ottoman attempts to 
implement any reforms that might appease the Christian Slavs.  He tried to form alliances 
with antireform officials such as Nedim Paşa, who was opposed to seemingly pro-
Western policies that would strengthen the position of Christians in the empire, and 
fomented separatist sentiment among Christian Slavs in 1875 and 1876.  With the failure 
of the Istanbul Conference in January 1877 and Russia’s concomitant acquisition of 
Austria-Hungary’s permission to move its troops through Romania, which had been an 
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impediment to Russia during the Crimean War, Ottoman officials began to brace 
themselves for what appeared to be imminent war.106  Since many British politicians, 
mainly of the Liberal Party, were hardened against the policy of maintaining Ottoman 
integrity and preferred nonintervention against a Russian invasion, the Ottomans were 
left on their own to defend themselves against the Czar’s forces. 
Russia’s strategy was to penetrate the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia 
simultaneously.  They caught officials by surprise in the east and managed to capture 
Beyazıt without resistance, forcing local forces to completely abandon the already 
dilapidated town, only two days after the declaration of war on April 26.  On May 17 the 
Russians took Ardahan by assault.107  
Local Kurdish groups appeared to have been anticipating a Russian invasion and 
were preparing to seize control of what regions that they could.  Many of them doubted 
the Ottomans’ capacity to protect them both from the Russians and from Russian-backed 
Christian groups and began to act independently of Ottoman command.  Shaykh 
Jelaluddin of Hızan, who had a reputation of switching allegiance back and forth between 
the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran, took “advantage of the war provoked by Russia… 
plundering and murdering right and left.”108  The vali of Van, Hasan Paşa, almost lost 
control over Kurdish groups in the Van province, many of whom, he believed, sought his 
capture.  Consul Zohrab wrote that Hasan was “obliged to secure his own safety by 
keeping secret and changing constantly the place he sleeps in, generally selecting the 
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place of some poor remote Christian.”  He braced himself for a Kurdish attack on Van 
that he feared could result in the “massacre of the people” by placing “twelve guns…in 
position in the citadel” and pointing them toward the streets.109 
The Russo-Turkish war exposed the fragmented loyalties of different groups and 
that while there was certainly a deep distrust of Christians, ethnicity and religion were not 
always determinants of interaction between groups.  Kurdish groups did not generally 
appear deeply committed to the Ottoman state, and instead tended to pursue their own 
political aims. Some Kurds, especially near the Russian border, tended to be more hostile 
towards Armenian groups, whom they deeply mistrusted.  A missionary in Van reported 
to Consul Zohrab in July 1877 that Kurdish groups near Beyazıt and Başkale were killing 
Christian noncombatants.  However, the missionary noted that the Kurdish groups who 
“came and stripped every village” were generally “from Persia,” while Kurdish groups 
living on the Ottoman side, notably Shaykh Ubaydullah’s men, “passed through villages 
without doing serious injury.”  Nonetheless, Armenian villages on the border with Iran 
were mostly deserted and many Armenians fled toward Russia and Iran.  However, the 
Armenians living in Başkale did not flee since there was a kaymakam, a state appointee, 
there who had the power to detain and punish rebel groups, a sign that some state 
officials were intent on protecting the Armenians and bringing justice to marauders.110 
Those Kurdish groups who did commit the ravages were more brutal than they 
had habitually been.  James Creagh noted that the in town of Eleşkirt, near the Russian 
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border, “churches were ransacked, plundered, or defiled; and fierce bigotry, brutal lust, 
and avarice ran riot.”111  He adds that in the vicinity of Eleşkirt, “Armenian villages were 
silent and empty [and] no signs of life or movement enlivened the deserted plains.”112  
The motivation for the destruction of churches is unclear.  On the one hand, it can be 
interpreted as a sign that some groups had begun to see the mere presence of Christianity 
as a threat since it served as rallying call for the Armenians against the Ottomans.  On the 
other hand it can be interpreted as a tactic used by some Kurdish groups against local 
rivals to deprive them of their client agrarian class.  The desertion of agrarian Armenians 
had catastrophic consequences for the land, since it was left untilled and put the Kurdish 
groups who relied on the cultivators for taxes and provisions at a disadvantage. 
 Many Kurds in the Beyazıt region were greatly hostile toward Russians and 
Armenians.  On June 19 Faik Paşa and about eight thousand Kurdish irregulars under his 
command attempted to retake the city from the Russians.  According to Boswell, Faik 
Paşa and Ismail Paşa, a Kurdish Ottoman commander from the Digor region, attempted 
to starve the Cossack brigade by depriving them of their water supply.  Although some 
1,200 Cossacks willing surrendered and laid down their weapons, the irregulars 
attempted to kill them all.113  Also, in a show of spite, marauders, according to an 
unnamed Protestant Armenian at Van, killed some 480 persons at Beyazıt and took 340 
women and children into captivity for “base purposes.”114  The massacre stopped once 
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regular soldiers arrived on the scene.  Survivors of the massacre were escorted to Van 
from where they were given shelter in Maku, a few miles across the Iranian border. It 
should be noted that local Muslims at Beyazıt did not participate in the violence against 
the Christians.  In fact according to Boswell, who is particularly critical of the Kurds and 
the Ottoman state, the Kurdish irregulars even hurt Muslims who had been taken captive.  
Also Muslims sheltered many Christians in their homes from the violent onslaught of the 
irregulars.  The Armenian observer attributes the benevolence of these Muslims to the 
fact that many local Christians had sheltered them when the Russians invaded.115  
It cannot be asserted that all Kurds inherently desired the departure of the 
Armenians.  A missionary in Bitlis reported that Ottoman officials near Bitlis 
collaborated with “nomadic” Kurds to fend off an invasion by the Motkanlı tribe, who 
sought to free prisoners from their tribe who were being held for murdering an Armenian 
and to plunder the villages in the environs of Bitlis.  The “nomadic” Kurds, probably 
agriculturalists without attachment to predominant tribal confederations such as the 
Motkanlı, expressed their intention to protect the Armenians from plunder and potential 
assault since “they were their customers, and bought the produce [that] they brought into 
the city.”116  Divisions among these “nomadic” Kurds blunted the effectiveness of the 
joint force.  Nonetheless this instance is an illustration that many Kurdish groups 
envisioned a future with their Armenian neighbors, enjoyed friendly relations with them, 
and hoped to restore the status quo ante after the war. 
Since the Ottomans—particularly Samih Paşa who had served as vali of Erzurum 
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twice and as vali of Trabzon and Aleppo between 1871 and 1876117—were well aware of 
the Kurds’ fickleness and anticipated the defection of some beys to Russia in the event of 
a war, they sought to secure stronger alliances with them in 1876.  Samih Paşa sought the 
support of one of the leading figures of the Hayderanlı tribe at the time, Ali Ağa, and 
gave him gifts and awards.  Samih made him the müdür of one of the kazas between Van 
and Beyazıt, a position which gave him control over many of the inhabitants of the 
Beyazıt region.  In exchange, Ali Ağa promised to furnish two thousand cavalrymen from 
the Hayderanlı tribe to the Ottoman army.118  Ali Ağa’s appointment harked back to 
Ottoman strategy in relation to the Kurds during the earlier part of the nineteenth century, 
which was to offer exceptionally large political privileges in exchange for loyalty.  
However, Ali Ağa’s power arguably extended over a much smaller radius than that of 
earlier Kurdish beys.  The Ottomans also attempted to entice Ismail Hakkı Paşa to their 
side by appointing him to a powerful position in the military.119 
As was the case in earlier wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, many 
Kurds living near the border sided with the Russians, since many Kurdish groups near 
Kars had long been pro-Russian.  One the most intriguing allies of Russia was Yusuf Bey 
of Digor, a village located near the Ottoman-Russian border between Kars and Beyazıt, 
who was the nephew of Ismail Hakkı Paşa.  He was also of the Hayderanlı tribal 
confederation and was “bought over by the Russians” in 1876.  He supplied the Russian 
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army with grain during the war.120 
Manzur Ağa and Nafiz Ağa of the Dersim region also contacted the Russian 
consul in Erzurum on the eve of the war informing him of their willingness to join the 
Russians against the Ottomans, but they received no reply.121  It does appear that the 
Russians were well aware of many Dersim inhabitants’ opposition to the state.  But 
because of their distance from the Russian-Ottoman border, the Russians did not initially 
attempt to foster a strong relationship with them.122  Nonetheless, many Kurdish elites in 
the Dersim region were emboldened by the Russian invasion and decided to wage a 
campaign of their own against the Ottoman state in 1877.  Ahmet Ağa, the head of the 
Koç Uşağı tribe, led a band of rebels to occupy Kemaliye and Çemişgezek.  Despite the 
fact that the Ottomans were engaged in combat with Russian forces in Kars and needed 
all the troops they could muster from the provinces, they found the rebellion to be of such 
concern that they had Osman Bey, the kaymakam of Eğin, dispatch a regiment in order to 
retake the cities.  Ahmet Ağa was able to fend off the state forces for a period by forming 
an alliance with Alişan Ağa of the Ferhat Uşağı tribe, but he was eventually captured and 
exiled to Sinop.123 
Rebellions spread throughout the Dersim region well beyond Kemaliye and 
Çemişgezek.  The Kırgan tribe stormed Hozat and Mazgirt during the war and plundered 
much of the region, even burning down the military barracks.124  Many Kurdish rebels in 
central Dersim lodged themselves in the Toshik mountains from where they frequently 
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launched attacks against Ottoman forces.  The Kurdish rebels managed to enlist the 
support of a number of Kurdish tribes and Armenians and engaged in a standoff with the 
sultan’s forces that lasted two weeks.  Unable to penetrate the natural mountain fortress, 
the Ottoman military resorted to burning Kurdish properties and destroying their supply 
line to try to starve them out.  The move was successful in forcing rebels to migrate from 
the mountains and flee toward Khut-Tirs where state forces were able to attack them.125  
Throughout the war, Dersim remained a thorn in the side of the state.  The state was 
generally able to keep rebellions in check and contain recalcitrant inhabitants long 
enough to keep the spirit of opposition from spreading into neighboring regions, thus 
increasing the area’s vulnerability to Russian penetration. But, as in other regions, the 
Ottomans did not win the hearts and minds of the population and were forced to make 
some political concessions to Kurdish elites in order to maintain their loyalty. 
Not all Armenians were necessarily well disposed towards the Russians.  The 
Armenian Patriarch Nerses informed Sir Henry Layard, the British ambassador in 
Istanbul, that an Armenian Archimandrite refused to call upon Armenians to side with the 
Russians.  Consequently the Russians burned his monastery, which possessed a “valuable 
collection of Armenian ecclesiastical manuscripts.”126  It is also apparent that many high-
ranking figures in the Armenian millet were not particularly keen on Russia and feared 
that they might fare no better under them than under the Ottomans.  Sultan Abdülhamit II 
was able to appoint a number of pro-Ottoman Armenians as aides-de-camp during the 
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war and promoted some to the prestigious rank of müşir.127  The Armenian Patriarch 
Nerses Varzhabedian and a number of Armenian “notables” accepted the invitation by 
the sultan to have Armenians enrolled in the civic guard “for the defense of the country.”  
However, they came under great pressure from Armenians in the National Assembly to 
rescind their decision.128  
It was also very clear by the end of 1877 that painful socioeconomic measures 
were being taken against the local population as a result of the oppressive demands of the 
war.  Ottoman demands for money and food from locals throughout Eastern Anatolia 
were more than the population, many of whom had been forced out of their homes, could 
bear.  Consul Zohrab notes that hundreds of Muslims and Christians in Erzurum were 
“starving” as a result of the conflict and made demands for food aid.129 
By January 1878, the Russians sought to penetrate Eastern Anatolia more deeply.  
This was more difficult than penetrating the Balkans, not only because of the rugged 
terrain of Eastern Anatolia, but also because there was a higher concentration of 
discontented Muslims, who placed greater demands on the Russians for military 
reinforcements in the occupied areas.  A Muslim revolt in Kars in early January held 
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Russian forces back briefly,130 although in a letter dated January 20, 1878, Major-General 
Loris-Melikov informed the Grand Duke of Russia that Russian forces had managed to 
penetrate the regions around Olti and Hınıs and “firmly install their administration there.”  
Furthermore he wrote that they had managed to “gain influence over the Kurds 
(priobresti vliyaniye na Kurdov)” to the extent that none of them showed any resistance 
to the Russians on their march from Eleşkirt and Hınıs toward Malazgirt with the 
exception of a few whom Loris-Melikov believed to have been “instigated by the 
Ottomans.”131 
The continued Russian successes against the Ottomans in December and January 
deeply concerned the British.  By December, it was clear that trepidation had begun to 
grow among the British that any deep Russian penetration of the Ottomans’ eastern front 
would pose a significant threat to them in the future. Sir Henry Layard wrote from 
Istanbul that a Russian occupation of “Kars, Batoum, and Van would give Russia such 
advantages in any future war with Turkey, or Persia, as to place the northern provinces of 
the latter country, and the whole of the Turkish territory in Asia, at her mercy.”132  On 
January 31 the British forced the Russians and Ottomans to accept an armistice. 
Yet in spite of British political intervention in the conflict, the Russians continued 
to press westward.  On February 19, 1878, some nine thousand Turkish forces fled 
Erzurum in anticipation of a Russian invasion.  By February 28 it was clear that Russian 
forces were installed in the city and that local Armenians were proclaiming victory. A 
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British doctor in Erzurum reported that “the Armenian population makes no secret of 
their satisfaction at being delivered from the rule of the unspeakable Turk.  They at once 
make friends with the [Russian] soldiers, and are proud to be seen in company with them; 
in face their behavior is utterly contemptible and quite worthy of their traditions.  It 
remains to be seen, though, whether they will be one whit better off under the 
Russians.”133 
Britain sent her navy to preempt Russia, as its forces were six miles west of 
Istanbul, and eventually forced the Ottomans and the Russians to end the conflict with the 
signature of the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3, 1878. 
 
Negotiating the Future 
Before Britain intervened to put an end to Russian encroachment and force the 
signing of a treaty, the various local actors had been hedging their bets as to how best to 
negotiate the future of Eastern Anatolia to suit their individual interests.  The Russian 
government desired to keep as much of Eastern Anatolia as possible under its full control 
to use the region as a launching pad for future forays into the region.  While it sought the 
support of the Armenians to put political pressure on the Ottoman government for 
increased freedoms, it was not particularly keen on the idea of an independent Armenian 
state, since it could potentially limit its control over the affairs of the region. 
The Armenians were divided over how their collective future could best be 
negotiated after the war.  While nearly all Armenians appeared to welcome Russia as an 
instrument in helping to remedy many of the grievances suffered by the larger Armenian 
                                                          






community, many were not keen on the idea of coming under Russian control.  Sometime 
during the war, the Armenian National Assembly met in private under the leadership of 
Patriarchs Nerses and Izmirlian.  It prepared a memorandum and sent it to Catholicos 
George IV whom they asked to look it over and then forward to the Czar.  The authors of 
the memorandum expressed their hope that “Greater Armenia [Mets Hayk], whose border 
extends to the Euphrates, not be returned to the Turks, but that it be considered a part of 
the Czar’s domain, being united with the province of Ararat.”134  The memorandum went 
on to ask the Czar to grant the Armenians the same privileges that they had granted the 
Bulgarians and not evacuate her soldiers (under the expectation that future circumstances 
might oblige Russian forces to leave the region) until reforms had been made.  It also 
requested that Armenians be appointed to high political office, receive military training, 
and that Kurds and Circassians be settled and not be allowed to serve in the police force, 
at least initially.135 
Patriarch Izmirlian remained committed to the idea that the best future 
arrangement for the Armenians could most realistically be achieved by pledging 
allegiance to Russia’s rule.  He considered that Russia was most interested in making the 
region a “vassal state” under its suzerainty and that some form of Russian control in the 
future was a more likely possibility than a fully independent Armenia.136  Patriarch 
Nerses on the other hand was more wary of Russian rule.  In a letter to Prince Gorchakov 
on February 3, 1878, he wrote that he desired to “live in [an] Armenia under our own 
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rule, free from the oppression of another state, where we can preserve our homeland.”137 
Even Armenians in Echmiadzin were greatly divided over their stances toward 
Russia.  For instance, Catholicos George IV had no issue with being under the Czar’s 
control, while his assistant Vahram Manguni, who influenced many of the Catholicos’ 
policies, was hostile toward the Czar and sought independence.138 
The inclusion of an article about the Armenians in the Treaty of San Stefano was 
largely due to the efforts of Patriarch Nerses, who made a last-minute entreaty to the 
Grand Duke Nicholas to make a provision for the Armenians.139  Urged by Count 
Ignatiev to comply with the Patriarch’s request, Article 16 was created.  It states: 
As the withdrawal of the Russian troops from those parts of Armenia now under 
their occupation and the return of those territories to the administration of the 
Sublime Porte may give rise to conflicts injurious to the friendly relations 
between our two governments, the Sublime Porte engages to carry out, without 
loss of time, the reforms and re-organization demanded by local interests in the 
provinces inhabited by the Armenians and to ensure the security of the Armenians 
against the depredations of the Kurds and Circassians.140 
 
The article is revealing of how Russia envisioned future control over the region.  They 
would keep troops in what areas they could while relying on the Ottoman state, which 
they hoped would act under Russian suzerainty, to undertake the necessary reforms to 
restore order and bring justice to the non-Muslim populations in the region. 
The British sought to maintain Eastern Anatolia as a buffer zone between the 
more central parts of the empire and the Russian-held Caucasus.  They used the region as 
a bargaining chip to acquire possession of Cyprus as a key naval base in the 
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Mediterranean.  On June 4, 1878, the Ottomans and the British signed an agreement that 
stipulated that the Ottomans would cede Cyprus to Britain on the condition that British 
would support the sultan in the upcoming international negotiations in Berlin and help 
him maintain control over Eastern Anatolia.141 
Conspicuously absent from the negotiating process was perhaps one of the most 
important actors in Eastern Anatolia: the Kurds.  Kurdish groups were viewed negatively 
by almost all players on the Eastern Anatolian scene.  Most of the Armenians viewed 
them as the source of their grievances.  The British saw them as a group of unruly tribes 
for whom the Ottoman state bore the ultimate responsibility of controlling.  The 
Ottomans viewed them as unmanageable and had a lingering desire to revert to the old 
status quo of affording them semiautonomy, albeit on a much lesser degree, in return for 
keeping the peace.  The Russians viewed the Kurds as savages whom they could at times 
exploit for their own political gain.  Yet by the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878 it was 
becoming increasingly clear that the Kurds were developing greater understanding of 
how not only Ottoman policy, but also international politics, might affect them and that 
they were plotting ways to preempt political circumstances that would be to their 
disadvantage. Yet the Ottomans afforded the Kurds no representation as an ethnic group, 
but instead continued to count them as part of the Ottoman Muslim community whom 
they represented without their consent before the international powers. 
In a letter to the Marquis of Salisbury, Vice Consul Billiotti in Trabzon captures 
the sense of frustration that Eastern Anatolian Muslims felt toward the state: 
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The Mussulmans are clamoring as loudly as, and with more reason than, the 
Christians, for a better administration….  They can only apply for redress to the 
very authorities against which they have to complain; they are restrained by a sort 
of patriotism, or by religious fanaticism, from submitting their grievances against 
their own government to foreigners; and with British Agents, in cases of flagrant 
injustice which may happen to come to their knowledge, Consuls never raise their 
voice in favor of oppressed Mussulmans; they are not in the habit to give publicity 
through the press to the abuses heaped upon them, and, if they did so, no heed 
would be taken of their complaints.142 
 
 
Revolt and Disorder 
After the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin, a significant part of Eastern Anatolia 
fell into a state of even greater political disarray than it had previously been, and rival 
Muslim groups resumed their contestations for power with one another. 
Kurdish groups in Dersim rose against the Ottoman government just after the 
conclusion of the Berlin conference.  State forces seemed to have crushed the rebellion 
by October,143 although according to a report in December, Ottoman forces were still 
keeping the Kurds at Dersim under armed supervision.144  The sons of Bedr Khan, 
Hüseyin Kenan and Osman Bey, attempted to mobilize resistance against the state in 
Cizre in late 1878.  During the 1877-1878 war they, along with other sons of Bedr Khan, 
were commissioned by the Ottomans to leave Istanbul, where they had been residing, and 
gather soldiers from different parts of the empire.  Bedri Bey was assigned to gather three 
thousand soldiers from Syria, Hüseyin Kenan three thousand from Adana, and Ali Şamil 
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three thousand from Istanbul. 
However, the decision to place them in charge of bringing together forces was 
based on wishful, if not desperate, thinking and resulted in relative failure.  Bedri Bey 
managed to find a number of volunteers, but complained of the lack of provisions given 
to them by the state and left them in the hands of Mustafa Ağa, one of his close 
associates.145  Hüseyin Kenan Bey appeared to have indeed gone to Adana and then 
Aleppo to assemble a group of volunteers, but fled sometime after the war in mid-1878 to 
Cizre via the Tigris River.146 
By November 1878, Hüseyin Kenan and Osman Beys managed to amass a force 
of some five to twenty thousand Kurdish men in the Cizre region, which they led to 
occupy the treasury and weapons caches around Deh and Siirt and oust the kaymakam.  
Consul Trotter reports that according to private letters sent to him from missionaries and 
others at Bitlis, Hüseyin Kenan and Osman were “not…specially harassing the 
Christians, but…devoting their energies principally against the Government troops” 
leading Trotter to suspect that “Russian intrigue [was] at the bottom of the movement.”147  
According to Averyanov, Hüseyin Kenan and Osman managed to gain the support of 
Kurdish groups in Hakkari and the Yazidi Kurds in the surrounding region.  If it is indeed 
true that the sons of Bedr Khan formed a multiethnic base consisting of Christians and 
Yazidis, then it represented a movement that was based on a more defined political vision 
than other Kurdish groups in the region, many of whom saw Christians as a major threat. 
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If it is also true that the sons of Bedr Khan sought to enlist the support of the Yazidis, 
then it represents a major breach from the days of their father who sought to cow them 
brutally into submission.  Trotter reported that the men of Hüseyin Kenan and Osman 
were armed with a large number of Winchester and Henry-Martini rifles which they had 
gathered “during and subsequent to the war,” an indication of the persuasive powers that 
they had among both the Ottoman military leaders, whom they tricked into distributing 
weapons to them, and the very volunteers who helped them transport those weapons to 
Cizre.148 
The Ottomans began dispatching forces from Diyarbakır, Erzincan, and Erzurum 
by late November to put down the rebellion in the Cizre-Siirt region.149  Accompanying 
them was Bedri Bey who convinced his brothers that Ottoman forces would eventually 
crush their revolt, and that they should return with him to Istanbul.  Hüseyin Kenan and 
Osman obliged and were imprisoned for only a few months.  After their release they were 
ordered to remain in Istanbul.150 
Some Armenian groups who were disillusioned with the prospect of remaining 
under complete Ottoman control rose in rebellion.  Small yet significant Armenian 
rebellions occurred in Van and Diyarbakır in 1878, which Ottoman forces were able to 
put down with relative ease.151  The most significant Armenian revolt against the 
Ottoman state took place in Zeytun between 1878 and 1879.  Located in Cilicia, Zeytun 
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was distant from other places in Eastern Anatolia.  Nonetheless, political incidents 
initiated by the Armenians there often influenced political action in other Armenian-
inhabited areas of the empire.  For instance, the 1862 Zeytun revolt certainly reverberated 
among Armenians in Muş, who rebelled in 1863-1864. 
Between 1865 and 1875 few incidents occurred between Christian and Muslim 
groups in Zeytun, a period of relative peace largely attributable to a series of reforms that 
the state attempted to implement there.  Some of these reforms were aimed at appeasing 
the local Armenian and Muslim populations by balancing power between them.  The 
creation of a joint Muslim-Armenian police force and the redistribution of land to an 
increasing number of Muslim and Armenian inhabitants weakened the power of elite 
Armenian and Muslim families who had hitherto posed frequent threats to state 
authority.152  Yet the state was attentive to potential demands that local groups often 
raised.  Hence they created a meclis, which consisted of four Armenian members and two 
Muslims in 1871, with the aim of keeping locals content.153  However, the Armenian 
inhabitants of Zeytun were generally unhappy with the Ottomans’ decision to appoint a 
Muslim kaymakam over the region who collected regular taxes from them and kept their 
activities under close surveillance.  In addition, the state paid select Armenian religious 
elites a tribute (taltif) to maintain their loyalties in the event of insurrection.  Thus the 
Ottoman government awarded Papaz Masus Efendi, an Armenian priest appointed by the 
Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul a taltif to govern the affairs of Zeytun in 1866.154 
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There is some discrepancy in different sources as to the starting date of the revolt 
in Zeytun.  According to Aghassi’s memoirs of Zeytun, published in 1897—which is 
widely cited by subsequent Armenian-language historians—the rebellion of Zeytun 
began in June 1876 when Prince Babig Yeni Dunya, of an elite Armenian family in the 
region, led an armed group of some three hundred Armenians from their mountain refuge 
to the town of Zeytun where they sacked the kaymakam’s house, burned the mosque, and 
established independent control.155  In 1900, Zeytuntsi wrote that “the Zeytuntsis156 lived 
freely for three whole years [1876-1879] without a kaymakam, independent from the 
government of Maraş.”157  Given the intensity of British and Russian vigilance of 
Ottoman political affairs in 1876, it would be highly significant for a successful 
Armenian rebellion to have taken place in Zeytun with no foreign acknowledgement.  It 
would also be significant for the Ottoman state to tolerate an autonomous Armenian 
administration in Zeytun for such a long and politically unstable period. While the exact 
date of the rebellion is unclear, it appears from Ottoman documents that a group of 
Armenians rose in revolt toward the end of the Russo-Ottoman War 1877-1878.  A year-
end report from 1294 (January 16, 1877-January 4, 1878) reveals that relations between 
the Ottoman state and local Armenians in Zeytun worsened when Davud Efendi (whom 
contemporary Armenian observer Aghassi calls Davud Niyazi), the former kaymakam 
accused of murdering his Armenian aide, was “temporarily and conditionally” set free 
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from captivity along with other Muslim and Christian convicts in Zeytun.158  Since his 
appointment as kaymakam, Davut Efendi had been accused by local Armenians of 
levying excessive taxes on the local population and of accepting bribes in exchange for 
appointments to positions in the local meclis.  One night when his house was broken into 
and his gold stolen, Davut Efendi accused his servant Hagop Topalian of conspiring with 
the thieves.  Unable to force a confession after torturing him, Davut allegedly stabbed 
him to death.159  The brutal nature of his death led to an outcry among the local 
Armenians who demanded justice from the Ottoman authorities.  Davut’s case was heard 
before a joint Muslim-Christian appellate court and he was convicted of criminal activity 
but given a light sentence.160  
The rebels who allegedly stormed Zeytun destroyed the kaymakam’s house, 
burned the local mosque, and ousted the state administrators were led by Prince Babig.  
Since the Ottoman state could not spare a great number of troops to retake Zeytun at the 
time, it attempted to persuade local groups to fight Babig.  State authorities attempted to 
enlist the support of the Bozdoğan tribe in the region to beat back the Armenian rebels.  
However, their attempt to take Zeytun was rendered unsuccessful for two reasons.  First, 
they were engaged in a political struggle against rivals, both Christian and Muslim, in the 
Gaban plains, who, according to Aghassi, enlisted the support of Babig to resist them.  
Second, Babig was a better military strategist than the leader of the Bozdoğan tribe 
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Boyrazoğlu, and was able to defeat them in spite of having fewer men.161 
Babig’s defeat of the Bozdoğan tribe enabled him and his forces to expand into 
the neighboring Muslim villages of Tanur, Döngöl, Kurtul, and Nedirli in the spring of 
1878.162  Kamil Paşa accuses Babig’s forces of being responsible for “blocking caravans, 
plundering money, merchandise, and flocks, and killing and exterminating a great 
number of men and women.”163  The Ottoman government dispatched forces in July to 
try to put down the rebellion.  Although they managed to seize twelve hundred weapons 
and arrest two hundred individuals,164 a handful of well-armed rebels escaped arrest by 
fleeing to the mountains from where they launched periodic raids on Zeytun.  The revolt 
of the Kozanoğlu tribal confederation, which consisted of Kurdish and Turcoman tribes 
and spread throughout Konya, Kayseri, and Adana at the time, deterred the Ottomans 
from launching a full-scale invasion of Zeytun.165   Nonetheless the Ottomans were able 
to prevent Babig from making an alliance with the Kozanoğlu and from expanding his 
domain.166 
Between July and November, the Zeytun rebellion attracted the attention of 
Armenians throughout different parts of the empire and became an issue of great 
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controversy among them.  Khrimian looked positively at the rebellion and saw it as a sign 
that the question of Armenian independence was worthy of greater attention from Russia, 
Britain, and France. On his way back from Berlin, Migirdich Khrimian ironically 
remarked that he “forgot to take the Zeytun rebels” with him to the conference in order to 
throw greater weight behind his demands.  “They have ladles” instead of paper, he said, 
with which to be able “scrape something from the bottom or the side of the bowl.”167  By 
this Khrimian meant that the Zeytun rebels possessed the resources, symbolized by an 
iron ladle, with which to be able to partake of the limited portions of international soup of 
freedom and sovereignty instead of mere paper that could not hold the soup.  Despite his 
praise of the Zeytun rebels, there is no evidence that Khrimian attempted to provide them 
with material support or manpower. 
Besides Khrimian, other Armenians throughout the empire were excited by the 
Zeytun rebellion and lent it their full support.  Most notably Kokaz, the nephew of one of 
the leading Armenian Gregorian ecclesiastical figures in Izmir, traveled to Zeytun to join 
the movement.  He collaborated with Bishop Nikogos of the Firnis monastery in Zeytun 
to rally more Armenian recruits and petition the Europeans to provide them with money 
and arms.  By mid-November, they managed to gather 600 more men to help fortify 
Zeytun.168 
Not all Armenians were enthusiastic about the rebellion.  Many believed 
themselves to be reliant on a stable Ottoman Empire for their livelihoods and were not 
particularly keen on the politics of the rebels, let alone the prospect of coming under 
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Russian control.  According to Kamil Paşa it was the Armenian Catholics in the Zeytun 
area who tipped off the state authorities of plans for a rebellion.169  Many Armenians 
willingly sided with the Ottoman state against the rebels. According to Aghassi, the 
Ottomans managed to secure the crucial alliance of an Armenian priest in Zeytun named 
Der-Garabet Ergaynian.  Der-Garabet persuaded Veysi Paşa, the mutasarrıf of Maraş, in 
1878 to keep pressure on Babig and his followers, despite the rising threat of the 
Kozanoğlu, and not let them gain strength by alliances with other rebel groups in the 
Ottoman Empire.  He also rallied the support of other locals to prevent Babig Paşa from 
receiving ammunition from outside.170 
While Patriarch Nerses Varzhabedian did not support the rebels, he told the 
Ottomans that he lacked the political and social capital to be able to put down the 
rebellion,171 an indication that power in the Armenian millet had become increasingly 
diffuse since the promulgation of the Armenian Constitution of 1861 and especially 
because of the Russo-Ottoman War 1877-1878.  Yet in October 1878 the Ottomans 
managed to recruit Bedros Efendi, an influential Armenian in Cilicia, to rally together 
Armenians throughout the region to support the Ottoman government.172   
By early November 1878, the Ottomans struck a deal with the Kozanoğlu tribal 
confederacy, allowing them to focus their efforts on the Zeytun rebels.  With forces 
gathered from Maraş, Aleppo, and Urfa, the Ottomans once again launched an offensive 
against Babig and his loyalists.  This time they managed to capture Bishop Nikoghos, an 
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influential religious figure who helped shape the strategy behind the rebellion, as well as 
other key Zeytuni Armenian rebels.  Babig, however, managed to escape once again to 
the mountains taking a small force with him. 
The vali of Aleppo, Kamil Paşa, and his forces were reportedly much more 
aggressive during the November offensive than they had been previously in spite of the 
promises that they had made to Patriarch Nerses that they would tread more softly.173  As 
a tactic to try to draw the rebels from the mountains, and possibly to redistribute the 
population, Kamil Paşa “seized nineteen Christian women and brought them as prisoners 
to that city,” a move that evoked strong outrage from Consul Henderson.174  To appease 
the Consul, Kamil Paşa claimed that he was trying to protect them until Zeytun could be 
contained.175   
Despite British pressure, the Ottomans kept refusing to accept the rebels’ 
demands of increased independence for Armenians in Zeytun and other Armenian-
inhabited regions and insisted that they maintain an official presence in the region to 
monitor political activity closely.  State officials worried that granting autonomy to 
Armenians in Zeytun would embolden other Armenian opposition groups in Eastern 
Anatolia to ratchet up their political demands and that perhaps Russia might once again 
become politically, if not even militarily, involved. 
Social conditions in Zeytun were described as being in a dire state.  Lieutenant 
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Herbert Chermside, the British military vice-consul in Anatolia, reported in May 1879 
that he had visited Zeytun and spent several days there.  He noted that there was “not the 
slightest evidence existing of there ever having been anything worthy of the name 
rebellion.  Although I am convinced that abundant evidence exists of the cruel, arbitrary, 
and fanatical acts of Weissi [Veysi] Pasha and other functionaries to disgrace them for 
life….The condition of the town and people of Zeytun is a disgrace to any Government, it 
is hardly an exaggeration to call it an outrage on humanity.”176 
The rebels appeared to have gained the upper hand once more when they 
descended upon the town of Zeytun in January 1879, broke into the prison, and released 
the prisoners.177  To prevent further conflict, the British intervened and tried to arrange a 
settlement between the Ottoman state and the rebels.  On May 26, 1879, the rebels made 
the following set of demands: that those who had been taken prisoner from Ottoman raids 
in the mountains should be freed, that they should not be subject to pay the bedel-i askeri 
tax to relieve themselves of obligatory military service, that they should pay only a small 
tribute instead of regular taxes, that they should be able to bear arms to fend off local 
invaders (many of whom were ethnically Circassian), and that nomadic tribes should be 
prohibited from migrating through their area.  The Ottomans accepted the demands with 
the following qualifications: that they still be subject to taxes (although reduced), that 
both Turkish and Armenian should be taught in the schools, that they should not wage 
attacks upon neighboring Muslims, and that some Armenian rebels should be tried before 
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a court before being set free.  In August 1879, Babig Paşa and thirty other rebels were 
granted pardon and allowed administrative privileges over Zeytun.178 
 
Conclusion 
 The period between 1868 and 1878 was defining for Eastern Anatolia.  Tensions 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which culminated in war, resulted in an 
unprecedented degree of ethnic hostility between Armenians and Kurds in the region.  
While some communities held out a vision of a multiethnic and multireligious future for 
the region and sought to preserve as much as possible of the status quo ante of 
coexistence, cynicism grew to larger proportions as Muslim groups usurped lands and 
Armenians fled to Russia with hopes of a new and better life.  With the sense of political 
and economic uncertainty growing in the region, groups felt an increasing need to take 
swift action to keep a hand in the shrinking power game.  Groups found negotiation and 
coordination to be long and difficult processes and often opted for more violent and 
forceful methods of conflict preemption.  It is intriguing that Kurdish groups, unlike the 
Armenians, did not seek outside non-Kurdish help in their rather desperate attempts to 
hold on to power.  While many Armenians looked to the Russians, Kurds felt themselves 
stranded.  Even though they often used the Ottoman state as leverage against rival 
Kurdish groups, they openly doubted its capacity in times of war to help them achieve 
control over their future.  It was this sense of isolation that led Kurdish actors to resort to 
the unjust treatment of their neighbors.  The Ottoman state knew it wanted to centralize 
control over Eastern Anatolia, but it had no clear vision of how to effectively do this.  
                                                          





They too were cynical of the locals’ abilities to maintain peace and comply with orders 
from Istanbul. The state’s reluctance to invest in providing infrastructure in the region 
and integrating the population into its central administrative apparatus perpetuated deep 











The purpose of this study has been to explain the nature of coexistence among 
diverse elements of Eastern Anatolia, identify the factors that generated tensions in 
society, and describe the reasons that tensions either intensified or decreased.  As is the 
case in many multiethnic and multireligious communities throughout the world, tensions 
in Eastern Anatolia ran across more than just religious and ethnic lines.  Tensions swelled 
along tribal, cultural, family, socioeconomic, state vs. local, indigenous vs. foreign, and 
agriculturalist vs. pastoralist lines as well.  Additionally, some tensions were the result of 
personal power struggles and personality conflicts between two individuals and cannot be 
understood as having roots in collective differences.  The idea that Muslims and 
Christians were in a perpetual religious struggle or that Kurds, Armenians, Turks, 
Assyrians, Lazes, Georgians, and Russians were in a perpetual ethnic struggle is 
incorrect.  While religious and ethnic distinctions existed in Eastern Anatolia and 
institutions that were propped up by both top-down and bottom-up forces helped to 
emphasize and preserve ethnic and religious distinctions, these distinctions did not 
always translate into tensions that were bound to burst into violent conflict at a later point 
in time.  Moreover, even amid economic hardship, international warfare, and overall 
political uncertainty, some tensions did not translate into violent conflict. 
Coexistence, tension, and conflict in Eastern Anatolia during the nineteenth 





patterns of coexistence and interaction among different indigenous and external groups.  
This may seem like stating the obvious; however, given the propensity of scholarship on 
Eastern Anatolia (and on many other regions of the world) to assume that the causes of 
conflicts in later periods of time are similar to the causes of conflicts in earlier periods of 
time, this point must be emphasized.  In other words, the massacres of Armenians in 1915 
do not help us understand the nature of tensions between Muslims and Christians in 
earlier periods.  Likewise, the causes of the conflict between the modern Turkish 
government and separatist Kurdish groups in Eastern Anatolia that has been ongoing 
since the 1970s does not provide a window of insight into the conflict between Kurds and 
Turks during earlier periods. 
At the same time, linear histories can be just as fallacious as retrospective 
histories and are prone to commit post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacies.  It cannot be 
assumed that simply because event A occurred in the same location and immediately 
before event B that event A caused event B.  For instance, the Armenian revolts of 1862-
1863, the influx of Circassians into the Ottoman Empire beginning in 1863, and Ottoman 
attempts at land reform and administrative reform in Eastern Anatolia 1864-1871 cannot 
be said to mutually correspond.  There is no evidence that the Armenian rebellions in 
Van, Zeytun, and Muş in 1862-1863 prompted Ottoman authorities to encourage 
Circassian Muslims to migrate to the Ottoman Empire from the Caucasus to increase the 
Muslim population in Armenian areas.  Evidence is also lacking that Ottoman officials 
undertook land and administrative reforms in direct response to increases of refugees and 
demands by Armenians for autonomy.  Similarly, it cannot be said that Ottoman attempts 





the massacres of Assyrians in Tiyari, Tkhuma, and Aşita in the 1840s. 
Explaining coexistence, tension, and conflict in Eastern Anatolia between 1800 
and 1878 necessitates consideration of broad factors of international relations and 
Ottoman domestic policy alongside more local factors that are specific to different 
regions.  Eastern Anatolian actors had long been accustomed to living in a region that 
was politically contested throughout the entire Ottoman period.  They had also long been 
accustomed to living in an environment in which groups emphasized tribal, religious, and 
ethnic distinctions, which varied from region to region. 
The experiences of Eastern Anatolians with the Ottoman state and with each other 
at a local level throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led them to develop a 
set of expectations that they carried into the nineteenth century.  In relation to the 
Ottoman state, the general expectation among Eastern Anatolians was that it would 
maintain a minimalist presence in the region (not demanding high taxes and manpower 
for the military), protect the political privileges of different beys, root out excessive 
foreign interference (i.e., rival Kurdish tribes from Iran, Catholic missionaries, etc.), and 
preserve the status quo among locals.  Locals had also come to expect that the main 
conflicts for which they would need to brace themselves the most were the potential 
outbreak of conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Iran, power struggles between the 
Ottoman state and local beys and/or valis, intertribal rivalries, and power struggles 
between family members.  Prior to the nineteenth century, locals in the region did not 
generally fear the outbreak of conflict along religious or ethnic lines.  This was arguably 
the case in many regions of Eastern Anatolia throughout much of the period before 1878, 





invasion of Eastern Anatolia in the 1828-1829 war with the Ottoman Empire. 
While many groups maintained distinctions along religious and ethnic lines, these 
distinctions were not always in and of themselves significant sources of tensions.  
Religious distinctions, inasmuch as they pertained to Muslims distinguishing themselves 
from Christians and vice versa, cannot be said to be a major driver of conflict throughout 
much of Ottoman period.  For centuries, Christians of various denomination, Muslims 
(including Alevis, Shi’ites, and Sunnis), and Yezidis had generally accepted each other’s 
existence, even if there was mild tension among them.  What kept them from trying to 
annihilate each other or forcibly convert each other was a prevalent status quo among 
them.  Muslims saw themselves as entitled to positions of political and military power, 
but they tolerated Christians working as financiers, traders, merchants, artisans, 
agriculturalists, and physicians.  In a select few locations, Muslims even tolerated 
Christians as potentates and magnates.  However, Christians did not generally dare seek 
political and military positions within the Ottoman state in Eastern Anatolia and accepted 
Ottoman and Kurdish treatment of them as a different class that was unequal with the 
Muslims, but enjoyed a select number of privileges nonetheless.  Few Christians in 
Eastern Anatolia fostered hopes of achieving autonomy, independence, and power.  The 
Muslims, in turn, were fully confident that the Christians posed little if any threat to their 
dominance of the region.  While the perpetual conflict between the Ottoman Empire and 
Iran did create a Sunni-Shi’i divide, which affected politics in southern Iraq, few Shi’is 
inhabited Eastern Anatolia (since they were probably driven out in an earlier period, or 
had masked their identities as Shi’is).  In spite of the fact that the Alevis, or Kizilbash 





and there is little evidence that the Alevis’ distinction from Sunnism was a source of 
social tension. 
Among Muslims, religious distinction tended to trump ethnic distinction.  Kurds, 
Turks, Arabs, Azeris, and Persians tended to emphasize their religious identities before 
emphasizing their ethnic identities.  Ethnic distinctions were arguably greater among the 
Christians of Eastern Anatolia.  Assyrians distinguished themselves from Armenians in 
spite of the fact that many were of the same miaphysite Oriental Orthodox tradition that 
emerged as a result of a schism in the aftermath of the ecumenical Council of Chalcedon 
in 451.  The Assyrian and Armenian languages had a more holy status in their respective 
churches than did the Turkish, Kurdish, and Persian languages in Islam.  Islam did not 
function as a channel for the expression of ethnic identity, but Christianity did to a much 
greater extent.  Nonetheless, whatever ethnic tensions existed among Greeks, Armenians, 
and Assyrians in earlier periods were greatly mollified with the advent of the Ottoman 
conquest. 
The confessional system that the Ottoman state implemented in Eastern Anatolia 
for the Armenian community was designed to accommodate ethnic diversity.  It was the 
most practical solution for the Ottoman Turks to maintain control over a large multiethnic 
domain.  This system benefitted enough Armenian elites to keep them favoring the 
Ottomans over separatist elements.  It was not only the Ottoman administrators who 
fought off calls for Armenian liberation from the Ottoman Empire, but the Armenian 
elites themselves.  Nonetheless, the Ottoman-backed Armenian elites sought to protect 
ethnic distinction and prevent assimilation.  Yet they did make sure to nip all currents of 





exist within the Ottoman system and alongside the interests of the Gregorian Armenian 
church. 
Armenians in Eastern Anatolia were largely under the control of the Ottoman-
backed Armenian elites.  Any assertion of ethnic dominance against non-Armenian 
groups, as little as it was, was stalled.  In most cases, whatever ethnic consciousness 
Armenians in Eastern Anatolia had was not separatist.  They were used to foreign 
domination and while many may have been acquainted with dominant Armenian groups 
of the past, they were a distant memory, if not even a distant abstraction of sorts.  It 
should be noted that some groups in Eastern Anatolia assimilated ethnically.  Armenians 
and Kurds in some areas would learn each other’s languages (most often, Armenians 
learned Kurdish and/or Turkish) and sought a means of communication with each other.1 
Thoughts of full liberation from state control do not appear to have crossed the 
minds of Assyrian groups.  They were small and isolated and had managed to acquire a 
significant degree of autonomy in certain pockets.  Assyrianness was promoted as an 
ethnic identity that would coexist with the more populous non-Assyrian identities around 
them. 
Kurds promoted ethnic distinction but were tolerant of ethnic diversity.  Eastern 
Anatolia had long been an area on the frontier and a place of refuge for ethnically distinct 
minorities from state control.  Assertions of Kurdish dominance appear to have been 
longstanding given the fact that the Ottomans had long referred to the region as Kurdistan 
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in recognition the Kurds’ ethnic distinction.  The Ottoman campaign against Kurdish 
elites in Eastern Anatolia during the 1830s and 1840s appeared to have deepened a rift 
along ethnic lines, even if the Kurds did not seem to voice their sense of Kurdishness in 
nationalist separatist terms until after WWI.  Most Kurds were Muslims, and as was the 
case with other Muslims, one’s religious identity took primacy over one’s ethnic identity.  
Kurds were generally cautious to emphasize ethnic divisions against fellow Muslims. 
Ethnic and religious tension in the region appeared to increase as a result of the 
increased intervention of first the Ottoman state, and later the foreign powers.  The 
organic distinction was not enough on its own to be an escalating factor in tension, there 
had to be an outside catalyst.  The main driver of this tension was the Ottoman 
administrations’ centralization effort, which occurred throughout the entire period 
covered in this study.  The fact that all three of the Ottomans’ major garrison cities, 
Erzurum, Diyarbakır, and Van, fell out from under direct Ottoman control between 1800 
and 1809 is indicative of how widespread opposition was to Sultan Selim III’s reform 
efforts.  When the Ottomans managed to win back control of their major garrison cities in 
1819, war with Persia and Russia created another set of tensions that the Ottomans would 
struggle to contain.  War with Iran pushed the Ottomans into greater conflict with 
seminomadic groups near the border.  In an effort to turn Ottoman subjects against the 
sultan, Russia emboldened Kurds and Armenians, but mainly the latter, against the 
Ottoman state.  Russia’s attempt to mobilize Christians for the sake of conquest fueled 
Muslim suspicion against many Armenians.  However, whatever social divisions 
emerged along religious lines appeared to be largely local.  The Ottoman state bade 





war zone appeared to be at greater peace.  Nonetheless, Russian efforts to capture Eastern 
Anatolia throughout the 1800s would undoubtedly contribute to the spread of religious 
polarization. 
The Ottomans’ scramble to centralize control in the 1830s, driven largely over 
worries of Egypt’s invasion of Syria spreading into northern Iraq and southeastern 
Anatolia, was rash, harsh, and unfairly targeted Kurdish groups.  The campaign planted 
the seed of ethnic conflict between Turkish administrators and Kurds, particularly in the 
area south of Lake Van.  Although the Ottomans pursued a modestly successful 
calculative centralization effort against rebel Kurdish groups during the 1840s, they were 
arguably never able to mend the divisions that their earlier more brutal effort had created.  
Furthermore, the Ottomans demolished the traditional structure that had held Kurdish 
society together without replacing it with an effective order.  Strained by multiple internal 
pressures from Muslim groups throughout the empire and Christian separatist groups in 
the Balkans, the Ottomans shied away from investing the resources needed to establish 
order in Eastern Anatolia and allowed a virtual state of anarchy to prevail there between 
1856 and 1878. 
Socioeconomic divisions became another source of significant tension until the 
mid-nineteenth century.  The life of the peasantry may have been quite harsh; however, 
they did not know much different and lacked the political consciousness and resource 
capabilities to launch any form of effective resistance against their overlords.  Education 
played a significant role in turning social divisions into tension.  Yet as Western 
missionaries and different Armenian churches began expanding education throughout 





resentful towards their lowly socioeconomic state in relation to dominant groups. 
European efforts to push for Muslim-Christian equality throughout the Ottoman 
Empire aggravated the situation.  These efforts heightened expectations of Armenian 
elements, who were caught in the power struggles between local Muslim groups in 
Eastern Anatolia, for change and reform.  European rhetoric turned the Kurds and 
Circassians into hostile enemies of the Armenians and Armenian activists adopted their 
vocabulary in order to advance their causes.  Kurdish groups, lacking any sort of 
representation at the state or international level, were forced to accept a negative 
international label and to be viewed as irrational marauders.  The Ottomans were forced 
into a position of appearing hapless and incapable of maintaining order in the 
international community. 
It was the inability of the Ottoman state and local communities to lessen the 
tensions of earlier periods that created an environment in which new circumstances 
would spawn new tensions.  As long as old tensions were not mitigated, actors 
experiencing the tensions kept trying to redefine the source of their tensions.  Unable to 
express the complexity of tensions, locals often turned to simplistic views to describe 
tensions, which views often originated from outsiders who were unacquainted with the 
depth of social interaction in the region.  What had been imagined as a longstanding 
religious and ethnic tension and conflict in the region by outsiders gradually became 
adopted by locals who sought easy answers to complex issues.  As more and more actors 
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